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Zusammenfassung	
	
Chile	 hat	 eine	 privilegierte	 Frischwasserverfügbarkeit	 im	 Vergleich	 zu	 anderen	 Ländern	 in	
Lateinamerika	 aber	 seine	 Ressourcen	 sind	 ungleich	 verteilt.	 Die	 Hauptstadt	 Santiago	 befindet	 sich	
fast	 in	 der	 geographischen	Mitte	 des	 Landes	 und	 kann	 von	 reichen	Wasserreserven	 schöpfen.	 Im	
Norden	 Chiles	 ist	 der	 Zugang	 zu	 frischem	Wasser	 stark	 begrenzt	 und	 es	 gibt	 eine	 offensichtliche	
Situation	 von	 Wasserstress.	 Im	 Süden	 des	 Landes	 hingegen	 gibt	 es	 eine	 reichliche	
Frischwasserverfügbarkeit.	 Jedoch	 sind	 es	 der	 Bergbau	 und	 die	 intensive	 landwirtschaftlichen	
Aktivitäten	 im	 Norden	 und	 im	 Zentrum	 des	 Landes,	 die	 zu	 einem	 höheren	 Frischwasserverbrauch	
führen	 .	 Zudem	 wird	 Chile	 aufgrund	 seiner	 klimatischen,	 geographischen	 und	 wirtschaftlichen	
Bedingungen	 als	 sehr	 anfällig	 für	 die	 Auswirkungen	 des	 Klimawandels	 identifiziert.	 Die	 mögliche	
Erhöhung	 der	 Temperaturen	 und	 der	 Rückgang	 der	 Niederschlagsmenge	 haben	 einen	 wichtigen	
Einfluss	auf	die	Frischwasserverfügbarkeit..	
Der	 Zugang	 zu	 Wasserressourcen	 in	 Chile	 ist	 durch	 einen	 sogenannten	 Wassermarkt	 verwaltet.	
Wasserressourcen	wird	hier	also	zur	ökonomischen	und	von	Angebot	und	Nachfrage	auf	dem	freien	
Markt	definiert.	Der	institutionelle	Rahmen	für	diesen	Markt	ist	das	Wassergesetzbuch	von	1981,	das	
besagt,	 dass	 das	Wasser	 unabhängig	 vom	 Besitz	 eines	 Stück	 Landes	 gehandelt	 werden	 kann.	 Eine	
Reihe	 von	 Schwierigkeiten	 sind	 in	 diesem	 institutionellen	 Rahmen	 identifiziert	 worden,	 trotzdem	
zielte	die	einzige	Reform	des	Wassergesetzbuches	 (im	Jahr	2005)	 lediglich	darauf,	die	Bedingungen	
für	 das	 Funktionieren	 des	 Marktes	 zu	 verbessern.	 Darüber	 hinaus	 gibt	 es	 noch	 Projekte	 zur	
Entwicklung	 von	Wassermärkten	 in	 anderen	Wassereinzugsgebieten,	 wo	 dieses	Modell	 nicht	 aktiv	
daran	arbeitet.	
Vor	diesem	Hintergrund	wird	deutlich,	daß	es	auch	gilt	die	sozialen	und	kulturellen	Bedingungen	des	
Wassermanagements,	 die	 Verwundbarkeit	 der	 Bauern	 und	 die	 Anpassungsmöglichkeiten	 an	 die	
Auswirkungen	 des	 Klimawandel	 im	 Kontext	 zu	 verstehen.	 Meine	 zentrale	 Forschungsfrage	 lautet	
daher:	Welche	Voraussetzungenlassen	sich	im	chilenischen	Modell	des	Wassermanagements	finden,	
um	Wasserstresssituationen	zu	bekämpfen?	Um	diese	Frage	zu	beantworten,	wurde	die	Forschung	
im	sogenannten	"Limarí	Becken"	durchgeführt,	einer	Region	mit	einem	sehr	aktiven	Wassermarkt	die	
sich	gleichzeitig	in	einer	Wasserstresssituation	befindet.	
Im	 Limarí	 Becken	 wird	 das	 sogenannte	 "Paloma	 System"	 angewandt.	 Dieses	 System	 besteht	 aus	
einem	 Netz	 von	 Kanälen	 und	 Stauseen,	 die	 die	 Speicherung	 und	 Verteilung	 von	 Frischwasser	
ermöglichen,	 und	Bedingungen	 für	 einen	 sehr	 aktiven	Wassermarkt	 erzeugen.	Da	die	Ressource	 in	
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diesem	 Becken	 ein	 knappes	 Gut	 ist,	 erhält	 sie	 einen	 großen	 wirtschaftlichen	 Wert,	 was	 den	
Wettbewerb	 für	 diese	 Ressource	 unter	 den	 Nutzern	 verstärkt.	 Das	 Paloma	 System	 reguliert	 den	
Zugang	 zu	 Wasserressourcen	 der	 neun	 Benutzerorganisationen	 mit	 einem	 innovativen	
Operationssystem.	 Es	 verwaltet	 die	 Ressource	 Wasser	 anhand	 von	 drei	 Stauseen	 und	 ermöglicht	
Transaktionen	von	Wasserrechten	und	Wassermengen,	Überweisungen,	Leasing	und	Krediten.	
Im	 Rahmen	 der	 Forschung	 wurden	 wie	 folgt	 vorgegangen:	 semi-strukturierten	 Interviews	 (52),	
Gruppeninterviews	 (3)	 und	 ethnographische	 Beobachtungen,	 die	 mithilfe	 des	 Software	 Atlas.ti	
analysiert	 wurden.	 Die	 Befragten	 wurden	 durch	 ein	 „Structural	 Sampling“	 ausgewählt,	 in	 dem	
Mitglieder	 von	 verschiedene	 Organisationen	 (Regierung,	 Zivilgesellschaft,	 Experten	 und	
Bewässerungsverbände)	 und	 Bauern	 verschiedener	 Art	 (kleine,	 mittlere	 und	 große	 Landwirte	 und	
landwirtschaftlichen	Unternehmen)	identifiziert	wurden.	Den	theoretischen	Rahmen	der	Analyse	der	
empirischen	 Daten	 bildet	 der	 Sozial-ökologische	 System	 Ansatz,	 der	 besonders	 auf	 Begriffe	 wie	
Verletzlichkeit,	Resilienz	und	soziales	Lernen	eingeht.	
Für	die	Widerstandsfähigkeit	des	Paloma	Systems	sind	bestimmte	Elemente	zu	identifizieren:	
• Flexibilität:	 Eigentumsrechte	 und	 Wasserinfrastruktur	 ermöglichen	 große	 Flexibilität	 in	 dem	
Becken.	Jedoch	wurde	diese	Flexibilität	aufgrund	der	Reduzierung	der	Kulturpflanzenvielfalt	und	
Konzentration	des	Eigentums	auf	einige	wenige	verringert.	
• Konnektivität:	 Nutzerorganisationen	 sind	 in	 der	 Regel	 gut	 angesehen,	 aber	 einige	
Geschäftsführer	 in	 Verdacht	 aufgrund	 ihrer	 Aktienanteile	 ausgewählt	 worden	 zu	 sein.	
Gleichzeitig	gibt	es	einen	allgemeinen	Rückgang	der	horizontalen	Kooperationen,	so	dass	fast	nur	
die	 Unterstützung	 durch	 die	 familiäre	 Netze	 bleibt.	 Die	 vertikale	 Kooperation	 von	 lokalen,	
regionalen	und	nationalen	Organisationen	birgt	gravierende	Einschränkungen,	vor	allem	in	Bezug	
auf	den	Austausch	zwischen	Gemeinden	und	regionalen	Behörden.	
• Sozial-Ökologisches	 Gedächtnis:	 Zum	 einen	 hat	 das	 traditionelle	 Wissen	 über	
Grundwasserneubildung	 deutlich	 an	 Bedeutung	 verloren,	 zum	 anderen	 gibt	 es	 wesentliche	
Unterschiede	zwischen	den	Bauern	in	Bezug	bei	der	Identifizierung	der	Ursache	des	Wasserstress	
(Die	Ursache	wird	in	entweder	dem	Becken	oder	in	anderen	Teilen	des	Landes	identifiziert).	
• Selbstorganisation:	Durch	den	Verlust	 des	 sozial-ökologischen	Gedächtnisses	 und	 aufgrund	der	
fehlenden	 Konnektivität	 zwischen	 lokalen	 und	 nationalen	 Organisationen,	 scheint	 die	
Möglichkeit	 Änderungen	 an	 den	 Eigentumsverhältnissen	 oder	 am	 Wassermanagement	
vorzunehmen	minimal.	
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Darüber	hinaus	wird	in	Bezug	auf	die	Anpassungsfähigkeit	an	Wasserstress	das	Folgende	deutlich:	
• Identifizierung	von	Bedrohung:	Konstante	Dürren	werden	als	Teil	des	normalen	Verhaltens	des	
Beckens	 identifiziert,	 und	 nur	 sehr	 wenige	 erkennen	 darin	 den	 Klimawandel.	 Von	 Seiten	 der	
Regierung	wurden	einige	Initiativen	offiziell	gegründet,	aber	nicht	wirklich	ernst	genommen.	
• Steuerungskapazität:	Scheint	für	die	ersten	drei	Jahre	der	Dürre	angepasst	dank	der	Kapazität	der	
Stauseen	und	Kanäle.	Allerdings	ist	es	wahrscheinlich,	dass	das	Becken	länger	nutzbar	ist.	
• Wiederherstellungsleistung:	Ist	sehr	begrenzt,	weil	der	Verbrauch	von	Wasser	intensiver	und	die	
Plantagen	 umfangreicher	 geworden	 sind.	 Da	 es	 keine	 Regelungen	 für	 diese	 Probleme	 gibt,	
werden	 sogar	 nicht	 so	 schwerwiegende	Dürren	 schwierige	 und	 lang	 anhaltende	Auswirkungen	
haben.	
• Fähigkeit	 zur	 Selbstmodifikation:	 Auf	 lokaler	 Ebene	 besteht	 hierfür	 eine	 große	 Chance;	
Bewässerungsverbände	haben	einige	wichtige	Vorschriften	eingearbeitet.	Andererseits	 sind	die	
landesweiten	 Möglichkeiten	 begrenzt;	 nach	 12	 Jahren	 politischer	 Diskussionen	 wurden	 nur	
kleinere	 Änderungen	 im	 Wassergesetzbuch	 implementiert	 und	 weitergehende	 Reformen	
scheinen	wenig	aussichtsreich.	
Dieses	Chilenische	Modell	hat	gravierende	Auswirkungen	auf	das	soziale	Gerechtigkeitsgefüge,	weil	
es	 den	 Zugang	 zu	 Wasserressourcen	 für	 die	 bäuerliche	 Landwirtschaft	 und	 kleinere	 Produzenten	
erschwert,	und	die	Verbesserungen	der	Lebensbedingungen	in	ländlichen	Armutsgebieten	erschwert.	
Die	 Beteiligung	 dieses	 Sektors	 am	Wassermarkt	 ist	 stark	 eingeschränkt,	 sowohl	 in	 Bezug	 auf	 den	
Zugang	zu	wirtschaftlichen	Ressourcen	als	auch	zu	Informationen.	In	der	Regel	sind	die	Möglichkeiten	
mit	 Wasserknappheit	 umzugehen	 bei	 den	 Landwirten	 sehr	 ungleich	 verteilt.	 Während	 der	
Marktmechanismus	 gut	 für	 mittlere	 und	 große	 Bauern	 funktioniert,	 weil	 sie	 bei	 Bedarf	 Wasser	
kaufen,	profitieren	Kleinbauern	wegen	der	hohen	Preise	nur	selten	oder	gar	nicht	davon.	Dennoch	ist	
es	möglich,	dass	sie	 ihr	Wasserrechte	verkaufen	und	auf	diese	Weise	trotz	 ihrer	prekären	Situation	
ein	Einkommen	in	Dürrejahren	haben.	
Das	 chilenische	 Modell	 des	 Wassermanagements	 hat	 eine	 begrenzte	 Anpassungskapazität	 für	
Situationen	 der	 Wasserknappheit	 und	 Klimawandel.	 Die	 wichtigste	 Einschränkung	 ist	 die	 geringe	
Kapazität	 für	 soziales	 Lernen	 und	 somit	 die	 Unfähigkeit	 langfristige	 Folgen	 der	 getroffenen	
Entscheidungen	zu	berücksichtigen.	Dies	beeinflusst	die	Widerstandsfähigkeit	des	Systems	und	damit	
auch	seine	Fähigkeit	sich	anzupassen.	
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Abstract	
Chile	 has	 privileged	 fresh	 water	 availability	 compared	 with	 other	 countries,	 but	 its	 resources	 are	
unevenly	 distributed	 through	 the	 country.	 The	 capital,	 Santiago,	 is	 located	 at	 the	 center	 of	 the	
country.	While	access	to	fresh	water	is	limited	and	there	is	evident	water	stress	from	Santiago	to	the	
North,	 the	availability	of	 fresh	water	 in	 southern	Chile	 is	 abundant.	Yet,	mainly	due	 to	mining	and	
agricultural	activities,	 its	use	 is	more	 intensive	 in	the	north	and	center	of	 the	country.	At	the	same	
time,	Chile	is	highly	vulnerable	to	the	effects	of	climate	change	due	to	its	climatic,	geographical,	and	
economic	 conditions.	 Possible	 increases	 in	 temperature	 and	 decreases	 in	 rainfall	 can	 have	 an	
important	impact	on	fresh	water	availability,	affecting	an	important	part	of	the	Chilean	territory.		
Access	to	water	resources	in	Chile	is	managed	by	a	so-called	water	market	in	which	water	resources	
are	a	commodity	 subject	 to	 the	 forces	of	 supply	and	demand,	based	on	a	 free-market	 regime	that	
regulates	the	use	and	consumption	of	national	resources.	The	institutional	framework	for	this	market	
is	 a	 legal	 document	 called	 the	Water	 Code	 (Código	 de	Aguas,	 enacted	 in	 1981),	which	 states	 that	
water	can	be	traded	independently	of	the	ownership	of	the	land.	A	number	of	difficulties	have	been	
identified	 with	 this	 institutional	 framework,	 but	 the	 only	 significant	 reform	 to	 the	 Water	 Code	
(enacted	 in	 2005)	 was	 merely	 intended	 to	 improve	 conditions	 for	 the	 functioning	 of	 the	 market.	
Moreover,	 there	 are	 ongoing	 projects	 to	 develop	 water	 markets	 in	 other	 watersheds	 where	 this	
system	is	not	yet	operative.		
From	this	background,	it	is	essential	to	understand	the	social	and	cultural	conditions	related	to	water	
management,	the	vulnerability	of	farmers,	and	possible	adaptations	to	the	effects	of	climate	change.	
The	 central	 research	 question	 is:	 what	 conditions	 are	 present	 in	 the	 Chilean	 model	 of	 water	
management	 in	 order	 to	 address	 situations	 of	 water	 stress?	 To	 answer	 this	 question,	 I	 have	
performed	my	research	in	the	Limarí	basin,	where	the	water	market	is	active	and	there	is	an	ongoing	
situation	of	water	stress.		
In	the	Limarí	basin,	the	so-called	“Paloma	System”	is	operational.	This	system	consists	of	a	network	
of	canals	and	reservoirs	that	allows	fresh	water	to	be	stored	and	distributed,	generating	conditions	
to	maintain	a	highly	active	water	market.	Since	water	 is	a	 scarce	commodity	 in	 the	Limarí	basin,	 it	
acquires	 great	 economic	 value,	 generating	 strong	 competition	 among	 users.	 The	 Paloma	 System	
regulates	 the	 access	 to	 water	 resources	 of	 nine	 user	 organizations	 with	 an	 innovative	 operating	
system	that	manages	resources	from	three	reservoirs	and	enables	transactions	involving	water	rights	
and	volumes,	in	addition	to	transfers,	leases,	and	loans	of	water	volumes.	
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The	investigation	techniques	used	in	carrying	out	the	research	were:	semi-structured	interviews	(52),	
group	 interviews	 (3),	ethnographic	observation,	and	analysis	using	ATLAS.ti.	The	 interviewees	were	
selected	 through	 structural	 sampling,	 which	 identifies	 people	 representing	 different	 organizations	
(government,	civil	society,	experts,	and	 irrigator	associations)	and	farmers	of	different	types	(small,	
medium	and	 large-scale	 farmers	and	agricultural	companies).	The	 theoretical	 tools	used	 to	analyze	
the	 empirical	 data	 are	 based	 on	 socio-ecological	 systems	 and	 their	 applications	 to	 the	 notions	 of	
vulnerability,	resilience	and	social	learning.	
From	the	analysis,	it	is	possible	to	identify	elements	relevant	to	the	resilience	of	the	system:	
§ Flexibility:	 Property	 rights	 and	 water	 infrastructure	 allow	 great	 plasticity	 in	 the	 basin,	
meaning	resources	shift	to	where	their	use	is	more	efficient.	However,	due	to	the	reduction	
of	crop	diversity	and	the	concentration	of	property,	this	flexibility	has	decreased.	
§ Connectivity:	User	organizations	are	well	evaluated	in	general.	However,	there	is	suspicion	of	
some	leaders	because	the	directors	are	chosen	in	relation	to	the	proportion	of	shares.	There	
is	generally	a	parallel	decrease	of	horizontal	collaborations,	leaving	only	some	family	support.	
Vertical	collaboration,	which	refers	to	the	relationship	between	local,	regional,	and	national	
organizations,	 has	 serious	 limitations,	 especially	 in	 the	 relationship	 between	 communities	
and	regional	authorities.		
§ Socio-ecological	memory:	On	one	hand,	it	is	possible	to	identify	a	significant	loss	of	ancestral	
knowledge	of	groundwater	recharge.	On	the	other,	farmers	may	face	significant	differences	
in	addressing	the	problems	of	water	stress	depending	on	their	origin	(from	the	basin	or	other	
parts	of	the	country).	
§ Self-organization:	 Due	 to	 the	 loss	 of	 social-ecological	memory	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 connectivity	
between	local	and	national	organizations,	there	appears	to	be	a	minimal	ability	to	deal	with	
modifications	in	ownership	structures	or	water	management.	
Moreover,	in	relation	to	adaptability	to	water	stress,	one	can	state	the	following:	
§ Identification	of	 threat:	Constant	droughts	are	 identified	as	part	of	 the	normal	behavior	of	
the	 basin	 and	 only	 very	 few	 informants	 identified	 climate	 change	 as	 a	 threat.	 At	
governmental	level,	a	few	formal	initiatives	have	been	formally	established,	but	the	issue	has	
not	been	taken	seriously.		
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§ Control	capacity:	It	seems	to	be	well	matched	for	the	first	three	years	of	drought,	thanks	to	
the	capacity	of	reservoirs.	However	there	is	not	control	capacity	in	the	long	term.	
§ Recovery	 capacity:	 This	 is	 very	 limited	 due	 to	 the	 increasingly	 intensive	 use	 of	 water	 and	
more	 extensive	 plantations.	 There	 is	 no	 regulation	 on	 this	 issue,	 so	 the	 effects	 of	 milder	
droughts	are	more	severe	and	widespread.	
§ Self-modification	ability:	 Locally	 this	 capacity	 is	 relatively	good.	 Irrigator	organizations	have	
incorporated	some	important	regulations.	Nationally,	however,	capacity	is	very	low.	After	12	
years	of	discussion,	only	minor	modifications	have	been	made	to	the	Water	Code	and	there	
is	no	prospect	of	more	in-depth	reform.	
This	model	 has	 a	 serious	 impact	 on	 social	 equality,	 because	 it	 does	 not	 facilitate	 access	 to	water	
resources	 for	 peasant	 farmers	 and	 small	 producers,	 thus	 hindering	 the	 improvement	 of	 living	
conditions	in	poor	rural	areas.	The	participation	of	this	sector	in	the	water	market	is	limited,	due	to	
restricted	access	to	economic	resources	and	lack	of	information.	In	general,	the	potential	for	farmers	
to	deal	with	water	scarcity	is	very	unevenly	distributed.	The	market	is	useful	for	medium-	and	large-
scale	 farmers,	but	not	 for	 small	 farmers.	 The	 former	have	 the	ability	 to	buy	water	when	 required,	
while	the	latter	cannot	access	it	due	to	high	prices.	Nevertheless,	the	market	allows	small	farmers	to	
sell	 their	water	 instead	of	cultivating	and	 in	 this	manner	 they	can	receive	some	 income	 in	drought	
years,	although	in	a	very	precarious	situation.	
The	 Chilean	 model	 has	 a	 limited	 capacity	 to	 adapt	 to	 situations	 of	 water	 scarcity	 and	 to	 the	
challenges	of	climate	change.	The	main	limitation	is	a	low	capacity	for	social	learning	and	inability	to	
consider	 the	 long-term	 consequences	 of	 decisions.	 This	 significantly	 affects	 the	 resilience	 of	 the	
system	and	therefore	also	its	ability	to	adapt.	
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1. Introduction	
Since	 the	 Dublin	 Statement	 on	 Water	 and	 Sustainable	 Development	 (UN,	 1992),	 water	 has	 been	
recognized	 as	 an	 economic	 good.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 Chilean	 model	 of	 water	 management	 (the	
“Chilean	model”)	has	been	considered	as	achieving	technical	and	economic	efficiency	 in	 the	use	of	
water,	by	regulating	water	resources	through	the	market.	However,	many	problems	have	also	been	
identified	associated	with	the	management	of	water	resources	in	this	model.	At	the	same	time,	Chile	
has	been	characterized	as	a	country	that	is	highly	vulnerable	to	the	effects	of	climate	change.	One	of	
its	main	vulnerabilities	is	associated	with	increased	water	stress	in	some	regions	of	the	country.	The	
present	 investigation	 is	 framed	by	 these	 two	 topics:	 the	Chilean	model	 and	 the	 context	of	 climate	
change.	
At	 present,	 no	 empirical	 studies	 evaluate	 the	 social	 and	 environmental	 conditions	 associated	with	
the	 Chilean	model.	With	 the	 aim	 of	 contributing	 to	 the	 international	 debate	 on	 this	 subject,	 this	
research	 empirically	 addresses	 the	 problem	 of	 water	 stress	 for	 farmers	 in	 the	 context	 of	 climate	
change,	analyzing	the	real	capacities	of	the	Chilean	model	to	face	situations	of	water	stress.	Both	its	
regulations	 for	 access	 to	water	 through	 the	market	 and	 its	 institutional	 conditions	 are	 considered.	
The	 research	 also	 addresses	 the	 vulnerabilities	 to	water	 stress	 affecting	different	 types	of	 farmers	
located	at	 the	Limarí	watershed.	This	watershed	 is	 innovative	 in	market-based	water	management	
and	 involves	 the	most	active	 rights	market	and	 the	highest	volumes	of	water	at	 the	national	 level,	
including	an	electronic	water	market.	We	propose	 investigating	vulnerabilities	 in	drought	situations	
on	the	basis	of	descriptions	and	assessments	of	the	different	actors	 involved,	 identifying	economic,	
social,	institutional,	organizational	and	cultural	conditions	to	deal	with	water	stress	problems.	
1.1.	Background	of	the	Problem	and	Research	Question		
Chile	 is	 a	 vulnerable	 country	 to	 climate	 change:	Climate	 change	 is	 one	of	 the	 greatest	 challenges	
faced	by	society	in	the	21st	century	and	must	be	addressed	at	both	global	and	local	levels.	Countries	
must	 face	 its	 consequences	 developing	 strategies	 to	 adapt	 to	 changes	 associated	 with	 global	
warming,	 irrespective	 of	 their	 developmental	 level	 and	 their	 participation	 in	 greenhouse	 gas	
emissions	(IPCC,	2007;	ECLAC-CEPAL,	2010).	Chile	is	identified	as	a	country	that	is	highly	vulnerable	to	
the	effects	of	climate	change	due	to	 its	climatic,	geographical,	and	economic	conditions.	A	possible	
increase	in	temperatures	may	have	an	impact	on	fresh	water	availability,	affecting	a	significant	part	
of	 the	Chilean	 territory.	A	 temperature	 increase	of	approximately	3°C	 is	predicted	 in	northern	and	
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central	 Chile,	 as	 well	 as	 decreases	 in	 rainfall	 on	 the	 western	 slope	 of	 the	 Andes	mountain	 range	
(ECLAC-CEPAL,	2009;	CONAMA,	2008;	AGRIMED,	2008;	DGA	2007).	
Water	market	 in	Chile:	Access	to	water	resources	 in	Chile	 is	managed	by	a	water	market,	 in	which	
water	 resources	 are	 a	 commodity	 subject	 to	 the	 forces	 of	 supply	 and	 demand,	 based	 on	 a	 free-
market	 regime	 that	 regulates	 the	 use	 and	 consumption	 of	 national	 resources.	 The	 institutional	
framework	for	this	market	is	a	legal	document	called	the	Water	Code	(1981),	which	states	that	water	
can	 be	 traded	 independently	 of	 the	 ownership	 of	 the	 land.	 A	 number	 of	 difficulties	 have	 been	
identified	 in	 this	 institutional	 framework.	 The	 main	 issues	 are	 limited	 market	 flexibility,	 high	
transaction	 costs,	 concentration	 of	 ownership	 of	 water	 rights,	 worsening	 water	 stress,	 lack	 of	
integrated	 watershed	 management	 and	 limitations	 on	 public	 control	 of	 the	 resource	 (Chile	
Sustentable,	2010;	Bauer,	2003;	Donoso	2003;	Hernández,	2006;	Núñez	&	Soto,	2010;	Gentes,	2007;	
ECLAC-CEPAL,	 2003;	 SAMTAC-CEPAL,	 2000;	World	 Bank,	 2011).	 The	 only	 significant	 reform	 to	 the	
Water	 Code	 (in	 2005)	 merely	 sought	 to	 improve	 conditions	 for	 the	 functioning	 of	 the	 market.	
Moreover,	 there	 are	 ongoing	 projects	 to	 develop	 water	 markets	 in	 other	 watersheds	 where	 this	
system	is	not	yet	operative.		
Inequalities	in	the	water	market:	The	operation	of	water	markets	requires	that	participating	farmers	
must	 take	 risks.	 These	 risks	 depend	 on	 the	 type	 of	 production	 in	which	 they	 are	 engaged	 and	 its	
degree	 of	 sensitivity	 to	water	 availability.	 In	 contexts	 of	 greatest	 scarcity,	 it	 has	 been	 shown	 that	
water	 prices	 rise	 significantly,	 resulting	 in	 substantial	 difficulties	 for	 poor	 farmers	 (Hadjigeorgalis,	
2004;	 Zegarra,	2002;	Galaz,	2004).	At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	model	may	be	defended	on	 the	grounds	
that	 it	 favors	 poor	 farmers,	 because	 it	 allows	 them	 to	 earn	 income	 through	 the	 sale	 of	 their	
temporary	 or	 permanent	 rights.	 Nevertheless,	 this	 defense	 has	 been	 widely	 questioned	 (Galaz,	
2004).	Finally,	the	results	of	recent	research	have	indicated	that	the	participation	of	farmers	in	water	
market	 is	 much	 lower	 than	 expected.	 This	 relates	 to	 the	 type	 of	 farmer	 who	 participates	 in	 the	
market	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 not	 all	 farmers	 participate	 in	 the	 same	way,	 since	 those	who	have	more	
resources	 use	 the	 market	 more	 actively,	 leveraging	 their	 advantages	 of	 investment	 capital	 and	
asymmetries	in	information	(Fuster,	2006).	
Operation	of	 the	water	market	 in	 the	Paloma	System:	 The	Paloma	System	operates	 in	 the	 Limarí	
basin.	This	system	consists	of	a	network	of	canals	and	reservoirs	that	allows	fresh	water	to	be	stored	
and	distributed,	generating	conditions	to	maintain	a	highly	active	water	market.	Since	this	resource	is	
a	 scarce	 commodity	 in	 the	 Limarí	 basin,	 it	 acquires	 great	 economic	 value,	 generating	 strong	
competition	among	users.	The	Paloma	System	constitutes	a	unique	model	 in	Chile.	 It	 regulates	 the	
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access	 to	 water	 resources	 of	 nine	 user	 organizations	 with	 an	 innovative	 operating	 system	 that	
manages	 resources	 from	 three	 reservoirs	 and	 enables	 transactions	 involving	 water	 rights	 and	
volumes,	in	addition	to	transfers,	leases,	and	loans	of	water	volumes	(Alvarez	&	Poncet,	2011;	Diaz,	
2008;	Fuster,	2006;	Alevy,	et	al.	2011;	Leon,	2008;	Donoso,	2003;	Cristi,	et	al.	2001;	Hadjigeorgalis,	
2004;	Ministerio	del	Medio	Ambiente,	2011).	
Status	of	current	research:	Several	studies	in	Chile	have	already	identified	the	productive	sectors	and	
geographical	areas	that	would	be	most	affected	by	the	consequences	of	climate	change,	as	well	as	
the	main	problems	that	must	be	faced.	At	the	same	time,	state	agencies	are	already	making	progress	
in	 the	 production	 of	 systematic	 information	 on	 this	 subject.	 For	 instance,	 the	 Second	 National	
Communication	 on	 Climate	 Change	 (Segunda	 Comunicación	 Nacional	 sobre	 Cambio	 Climático)	 has	
recently	been	published	(Ministerio	del	Medio	Ambiente,	2011).	In	addition,	in	recent	years	several	
studies	and	reflections	have	considered	the	particular	model	of	water	management	in	Chile,	offering	
criticisms	 of	 both	 the	 model	 and	 water	 markets	 in	 general.	 However,	 there	 are	 no	 studies	 that	
analyze	the	performance	of	this	market	in	the	context	of	climate	change,	or	that	specifically	examine	
the	water	market	in	the	context	of	water	stress	and	consider	cultural	aspects,	social	vulnerabilities,	
inequalities	and	risks	faced	by	farmers.	Thus,	 it	 is	key	to	go	beyond	the	economic	dimension	of	the	
performance	of	the	market	in	order	to	evaluate	how	it	manages	water	resources.	It	is	also	important	
to	 consider	 how	 the	 vulnerable	 population	 can	 participate	 in	 this	 market,	 considering	 the	 social	
conditions	of	the	market	and	cultural	biases.	So	far,	neither	the	effects	of	the	neoliberal	regime	on	
users	nor	 the	 relevance	of	 organizations	 and	 intermediaries	 in	 the	 functioning	of	 the	market	have	
been	 studied.	 There	 have	 been	 no	 studies	 evaluating	 the	 uncertainty	 faced	 by	 farmers,	 the	 risk	
tolerance	of	the	most	vulnerable	people	or	cultural	aspects	of	water	appraisals	(Hadjigeorgalis,	2004;	
Gentes,	2007).	
From	this	background,	it	is	essential	to	understand	the	social	and	cultural	conditions	related	to	water	
management,	the	vulnerability	of	farmers,	and	the	possibilities	of	adapting	to	the	effects	of	climate	
change.	 To	properly	 address	 these	 issues,	we	proposed	 conducting	 research	 in	 a	 context	 of	water	
scarcity	regulated	by	a	water	market,	evaluating	the	possibilities	that	the	Chilean	model	offers.	In	this	
way,	the	central	research	question	is:	What	conditions	are	present	in	the	Chilean	model	in	order	to	
address	water	stress	situations?	To	answer	this	question,	we	have	studied	the	Limarí	basin,	where	
the	 market	 is	 currently	 active	 and	 there	 is	 an	 ongoing	 situation	 of	 water	 stress.	 This	 will	 permit	
reflection	on	the	Chilean	model,	evaluating	the	conditions	that	increase	or	decrease	the	vulnerability	
of	farmers	and	their	adaptation	capabilities.	
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To	address	 this	 research	question,	 the	Limarí	basin	 is	presented	as	an	especially	 interesting	unit	of	
study.	 This	 basin	 contains	 the	 most	 active	 water	 market	 at	 a	 national	 level,	 it	 being	 possible	 to	
observe	 permanent	 and	 temporary	 water	 transactions.	 Moreover,	 from	 a	 climate	 change	
perspective,	the	basin	houses	the	more	vulnerable	municipalities	from	the	agricultural	sector,	due	to	
potential	reduction	in	river	flows	(close	to	50%),	the	socio-economic	conditions	of	its	population,	and	
its	production	system.	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 although	water	 rights	were	privatized	by	means	of	 the	Water	Code	 in	1981,	 an	
informal	 rights	market	 has	 existed	 since	 the	 early	 1940s.	 Finally,	 the	 basin	 permits	 a	 geographical	
division	 that	offers	a	comparative	view,	between	 the	 irrigation	sector	 located	above	 the	 reservoirs	
and	the	area	below	them.	The	latter	is	the	sector	benefiting	from	water	storage	infrastructure	and	it	
has	an	active	market	(León,	2008;	Donoso,	2003;	Cristi,	et	al.	2001;	Hadjigeorgalis,	2004;	Ministerio	
del	Medio	Ambiente,	2011).	
1.2.	Research	Objectives	and	Conceptual	Framework	
In	 the	 context	of	 the	 consequences	of	 climate	 change	and	 the	need	 to	observe	 the	possibilities	of	
adapting	to	this	global	phenomenon,	the	main	objective	of	this	research	is	to	identify	and	explain	the	
conditions	that	the	Chilean	model	establishes	in	order	to	address	situations	of	water	stress.	This	will	
then	be	used	to	discuss	the	capability	of	the	Chilean	model	to	deal	with	the	effects	of	climate	change.		
In	view	of	 this	 challenge,	 there	 is	an	urgent	need	 to	 improve	our	comprehension	of	water	 scarcity	
and	the	situations	of	vulnerability	that	it	provokes	in	rural	and	urban	communities.	The	relationship	
between	society	and	the	environment	has	been	addressed	from	systemic	tradition,	with	significant	
theoretical	developments	within	the	framework	of	the	complex	adaptive	systems	approach	(Holland,	
2006;	 Gunderson	 &	 Holling,	 2002)	 and	 social-ecological	 systems	 (Holling,	 2001;	 Cumming,	 2008;	
Ostrom,	 2009;	 Rappaport,	 1977).	 Our	work	 concentrates	 on	 the	 description	 of	 social	 systems	 and	
how	they	relate	to	the	ecological	milieu.	 In	this	context,	we	work	with	two	key	concepts:	resilience	
and	adaptation.	The	theoretical	discussion	is	developed	in	detail	in	chapter	3,	but	below	we	show	the	
specific	objectives	for	each	theoretical	dimension.	
TABLE	1:	OBJECTIVE	FOR	THEORETICAL	DIMENSION	
Theory	 Dimension	 Research	Objective	
Resilience:	
Flexibility	and	
Diversity		
Economic	rules	 Evaluation	of	the	operation	of	the	water	market	
Legal	rules	 Evaluation	 of	 the	 legal	 conditions	 for	 the	 management	 of	
water	resources	
Higher	regulators	 Description	 of	 the	 institutional	 and	 organizational	 conditions	
for	water	management	
Lower	regulators	 Evaluation	 of	 the	 functioning	 of	 user	 organizations	 in	 the	
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administration	of	water	resources	
Cultural	evaluations	 Ownership	 of	 water	 and	 their	 networks	 of	 associated	
meanings	
Resilience:	
Connectivity	
Vertical	collaboration	 Influence	 of	 state	 organizations	 in	 the	management	 of	water	
resources	
Horizontal	collaboration	 Cooperative	and/or	competitive	actions	in	the	management	of	
water	resources	
Trust	 Conditions	of	trust	for	collaboration	(vertical	and	horizontal)	
Resilience:	
Socio-
ecological	
Memory	
Knowledge	 Local	knowledge	about	the	water	situation	in	the	basin	
Learning	 Learning	 about	 the	 management	 of	 water	 resources	 from	
previous	droughts	
Resilience:	
Self-
organization	
Capacity	 for	 self-
transformation	
Possibilities	to	modify	the	conditions	of	management	of	water	
resources	
Capacity	for	innovation	 Development	 of	 new	 strategies	 to	 address	 the	 challenges	 of	
water	stress	
Adaptive	
Capacity	
Identifying	the	threat	 Information	 on	 water	 resources	 and	 their	 scarcity	 conditions	
(including	effects	of	climate	change)	
Control	capacity	 Difficulties	 faced	 by	 farmers	 and	 user	 organizations	 in	 water	
shortage	situations	
Recovery	capacity	 Recovery	 capacity	 of	 user	 organizations	 and	 farmers	 in	
different	situations	of	water	scarcity	
Transformation	capacity	 Capacity	 of	 local	 and	 national	 organizations	 (user	 and	 State	
organizations)	 to	 develop	 strategies	 for	 adapting	 to	 climate	
change	
1.3.	Relevance	of	the	study		
Chile	is	one	of	the	main	examples	of	the	application	of	neoliberal	policies	in	water	management.	The	
Chilean	model	 has	 inspired	 other	 countries	 in	 the	 region,	 such	 as	 Bolivia,	 Peru	 and	 some	 Central	
American	countries	(Galaz,	2004),	which	are	already	making	changes	in	their	 legislation	to	replicate	
this	 model.	 Important	 international	 organizations	 have	 also	 highlighted	 the	 Chilean	 model	 as	 a	
reference	 point	 for	 water	 management	 (Haughton,	 2002).	 It	 is	 therefore	 especially	 important	 to	
observe	the	performance	of	this	model	in	the	Limarí	basin	where	it	is	fully	operative.	
Finally,	it	must	be	considered	that	water	markets	are	most	active	when	water	is	scarce,	so	if	climate	
change	 increases	 water	 stress	 situations,	 the	 performance	 of	 water	 markets	 will	 be	 increasingly	
important.	Therefore,	 it	 is	essential	 to	study	 the	performance	of	currently	active	markets.	As	such,	
the	Limarí	river	basin	offers	a	privileged	space	to	research	the	management	of	water	resources	in	the	
context	of	potential	water	shortages	as	a	result	of	climate	change.	
1.4.	Methodological	Approach	
This	 research	 proposes	 a	 conceptual	 and	 empirical	 approach	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 water	 stress	 and	
water	markets	in	Chile,	in	the	context	of	climate	change,	analyzing	the	operation	of	the	water	market	
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from	the	perspectives	of	public	 institutions	 involved	 in	 its	management,	users	of	 the	resource,	and	
organizations	from	civil	society	involved	in	the	issue.		
In	 the	existing	research	on	water	markets,	 there	 is	an	approach	 from	the	economic	model	or	 from	
the	legal	institutions	(top-down).	There	is	no	research	available	including	reflection	and	analysis	from	
users	 (bottom-up).	Thus,	 in	 this	 research,	besides	considering	 the	background	of	other	studies	and	
official	 documents	 on	 the	 water	 market	 (top-down),	 the	 discourses	 of	 different	 stakeholders	
regarding	the	water	market’s	performance	in	the	local	context	will	be	studied.	
This	research	will	adopt	a	qualitative	approach	(Mack,	et	al.,	2005),	which	will	observe	and	describe	
the	 operation	 of	 the	 water	 market	 through	 ethnographic	 work.	 It	 will	 observe	 different	 actors’	
perspectives	of	the	water	market	in	the	Limarí	basin,	taking	it	as	a	case	study	(Flyvbjerg,	2011).	The	
research	will	also	compare	(Beckers,	et	al.,	2010)	descriptions	of	the	basin	area	below	the	reservoirs	
(where	the	market	is	very	active)	and	the	geographical	sectors	located	upstream	from	the	reservoirs	
(where	water	stored	cannot	be	traded).	
Research	techniques	and	analysis:	
§ Analysis	of	secondary	data	and	institutional	documents:	We	propose	a	documentary	analysis	
(Garcia,	 Ibanez	&	Alvira,	2000),	applied	to	relevant	 information	in	the	local	print	media	and	
to	other	research	on	water	markets	with	relevance	to	the	aims	of	this	study.		
§ Semi-structured	 interviews:	 This	 type	 of	 interview	 (Rubin,	 H.	 &	 Rubin,	 I.,	 1995)	 seeks	 to	
address	 the	descriptions	of	users,	 professionals,	 state	organizations,	 civil	 society	members,	
and	experts	on	the	operation	of	the	water	market.		
§ Ethnographic	 observation:	 Together	 with	 the	 interviews,	 during	 the	 weeks	 of	 fieldwork,	
ethnographic	 observation	 was	 performed	 (Geertz,	 1994)	 of	 the	 functioning	 of	 user	
organizations	 and	 the	 relationships	 between	 officials	 of	 government	 agencies	 and	 user	
associations.		
§ Content	 analysis:	 Semi-structured	 interviews	 were	 transcribed	 textually,	 to	 subsequently	
carry	out	a	systematic	content	analysis	(Krippendorf,	2004).	The	results	of	this	analysis	were	
linked	to	the	outcomes	from	documentary	analysis	and	ethnographic	observation.		
An	 information-oriented	 sampling	 strategy	 (Denzin	 &	 Lincoln,	 2011)	 was	 used	 to	 select	 the	
interviewees,	with	the	aim	of	identifying	distinctions	and	evaluations	made	by	different	stakeholders.	
It	was	considered	to	perform	54	semi-structured	interviews.		
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TABLE	2:	INTERVIEW	BY	TYPE	OF	INFORMANT	
Type	of	Informant	 Interview	
Experts	
CEAZA	expert	
CAZALAC	expert	
Climate	change	expert	
Pro-market	expert	
Regional	expert	
National	expert	
Positions	with	Political	
Responsibility	
Left-wing	government	politician	(2006-2010)	
Right-wing	government	politician	(2010-2014)	
Civil	Servants	
DGA	Serena	
DGA	Santiago		
DGA	Santiago	user	organization	head	
INDAP	Ovalle	
DOH	Serena	
DOH	Santiago	
CNR	Santiago	
CNR	Santiago	user	organization	head	
Market	intermediaries	
Intermediary	lawyer	1	
Intermediary	lawyer	2	
Intermediary	lawyer	3	
Electronic	market	administrator	
Informal	intermediary	1	(stockbroker)	
Informal	intermediary	2	(stockbroker)	
Leaders	and	
Administrators,	User	
Organizations	
Administrator,	Limarí	Monitoring	Board	
Administrator	Paloma	System	
Administrator	Recoleta	
Administrator	Camarico	
Administrator	Cogotí	
Administrator	Hurtado	river	
Leader	Cogotí	
Leader	Limarí	Monitoring	Board	
Leader	Mostazal	Monitoring	Board	
Civil	Society	
CS	Ovalle	
CS	National	
CS	South	
Farmers	
	
Agriculture	company	1	
Agriculture	company	2	
Agriculture	company	3	
Agriculture	company	4	
Large-scale	farmer	1	
Large-scale	farmer	2	
Large-scale	farmer	3	
Mid-size	farmer	1	
Mid-size	farmer	2		
Mid-size	farmer	3	
Mid-size	farmer	4	
Mid-size	farmer	5	
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Small	farmer	1	
Small	farmer	2		
Small	farmer	3	
Small	farmer	4	
Small	farmer	5	
Small	farmer	6	
Small	farmer	7	
Small	farmer	8	
	
1.5.	Theoretical	Context	
Certain	 theoretical	points	of	support,	especially	 the	adoption	of	a	strategy	based	on	social	
systems	 theory	 supported	 by	 the	 concept	 of	 social-ecological	 system	 and	 the	 complex	
adaptive	systems	approach,	have	already	been	explained.	Within	this	perspective	and	based	
on	the	development	of	the	natural	and	social	sciences,	our	work	is	methodologically	framed	
by	what	is	known	as	“radical	constructivism”,	in	which	the	limits	in	the	process	of	knowledge	
are	acknowledged	but	 its	construction	 is	not	relinquished	(Maturana	and	Varela,	1984).	To	
accomplish	this,	we	use	the	strategy	of	“second	order	observation”	(Luhmann,	1984)	as	our	
support	and	assume	the	pertinence	of	 identifying	the	distinctions	and	concepts	with	which	
knowledge	is	constructed.	Second	order	observation	is	carried	out	concerning	the	manner	in	
which	another	observer	observes;	i.e.,	the	distinctions	they	employ	in	order	to	observe,	the	
means	 with	 which	 they	 make	 distinctions,	 differentiate,	 and	 evaluate.	 Through	 this	
methodology,	 knowledge	 ultimately	 emerges	 from	 an	 understanding	 of	 how	 others	
construct	 their	worlds	 of	 reality	 (Luhmann,	 1997).	 Second	order	 observation	 constitutes	 a	
general	methodological	framework	that	sets	out	the	techniques	for	the	production	of	data	
and	interpretation	of	results. 
In	the	investigation	of	complex	adaptive	systems,	work	is	traditionally	done	with	quantitative	
data	for	modeling	information.	However,	in	recent	years	emphasis	has	also	been	placed	on	
the	importance	of	qualitative	investigation	(Chan	et	al.,	2012;	Saterfield	et	al.,	2013).	This	is	
because	 the	 narratives	 of	 key	 informants	 enable	 information	 to	 be	 gathered	 on	 the	
descriptions	 and	 evaluations	 of	 the	 interviewees,	 without	 structuring	 the	 responses	 and	
allowing	greater	flexibility	for	the	researcher	to	adapt	to	the	conditions	of	different	subjects	
(Chan	et	al.,	2012).	The	use	of	narrative	and	exploratory	techniques	thus	makes	it	possible	to	
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delve	 deeper	 into	 symbolic	 and	 abstract	 elements	 related	 to	 the	 ecosystemic	 services	
(Saterfield	et	al.,	2013).	 
An	 example	 of	 qualitative	 work	 adopting	 this	 perspective	 has	 been	 developed	 by	 Roy	
Rappaport	(1977,	1996).	He	highlights	the	constructed	character	of	ecological	problems	and	
the	relationship	between	social	systems	and	their	surroundings,	aside	from	the	constructivist	
nature	 of	 the	 investigation	 starting	 from	 the	 difference	 observed	 by	 the	 same	 author	
(Rappaport,	1996)	between	“cognitive	models”	and	“operative	models”.	Operative	models	
encompass	those	distinctions	concerning	the	ecological	environment	made	by	the	different	
stakeholders	acting	within	it,	distinctions	that	circulate	in	the	social	system,	and	in	relation	
to	which	cultural	processes	and	practices	that	affect	the	system’s	ecological	environment	are	
of	 special	 significance.	 Cognitive	models,	 for	 their	 part,	 refer	 to	 the	 abstract	 components	
identified	through	the	model	that	the	researcher	constructs,	thanks	to	the	observation	and	
measuring	 of	 empirical	 elements.	 To	 build	 a	 cognitive	model	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	
society	and	water	resources	in	a	specific	territory,	aside	from	describing	the	distinctions	that	
are	 built	 over	 the	 ecological	 surroundings,	 it	 is	 also	 essential	 to	 address	 the	 formal	 and	
informal	rules	that	regulate	interaction	and	coordination		(North,	1990)	vis-à-vis	the	access	
to	these	resources.	 
In	 this	 study,	 the	 analysis	 of	 qualitative	 data	 is	 considered	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 gathering	
information	 on	 socio-cultural	 conditions.	 Based	 on	 semi-structured	 interviews	 (Rubin	 &	
Rubin,	1995),	user	descriptions	are	addressed	—	professionals	in	state	organs,	members	of	
civil	society,	and	experts	managing	the	water	resources	in	the	watersheds	selected.	Based	on	
the	analysis	of	 these	 interviews	 (Krippendorf,	2004),	 the	meanings	and	valuations	 that	 the	
different	stakeholders	assign	to	water	resources	are	observed,	in	addition	to	identifying	the	
formal	 and	 informal	 rules	 that	 regulate	 access	 to	 those	 resources.	 Furthermore,	 pertinent	
information	is	 identified	as	regards	the	institutional	framework	and	the	situations	of	water	
stress	 from	 an	 analysis	 of	 secondary	 data	 and	 institutional	 documents	 (García,	 Ibáñez	 &	
Alvira,	 2000).	 Finally,	 through	 the	 triangulation	 of	 information	 (Flick,	 2008),	 a	 “cognitive	
model”	 is	 constructed	 (Rappaport,	 1996)	 on	 the	 different	 operational	models	 observed	 in	
the	relationship	between	society	and	water	stress.	
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1.6.	Dissertation	Structure	
This	document	is	organized	into	seven	chapters.	Chapter	1	corresponds	to	the	present	introduction,	
which	 reviews	 the	 background	 of	 the	 dissertation,	 its	 objectives,	 and	 methodology.	 Chapter	 2	
presents	 the	 conditions	 of	 water	 stress	 and	 climate	 change	 in	 Chile.	 Chapter	 3	 is	 dedicated	 to	
analyzing	the	concepts	of	water	vulnerability,	resilience,	and	capacity	to	adapt	from	the	perspective	
of	 social-ecological	 systems.	 Chapter	 4	 presents	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 Chilean	 model	 of	 water	
management,	 including	 the	 Water	 Code,	 user	 associations,	 institutions	 participating	 in	 water	
management	and	the	operation	of	the	Limarí	basin.		
Chapters	5	and	6	present	an	analysis	of	the	data	collected	 in	the	Limarí	basin,	 from	the	theoretical	
perspective	outlined	in	Chapter	3.	Chapter	5	focuses	on	the	resilience	of	the	system	and	chapter	6	on	
adaptive	capacity	faced	with	the	threat	of	water	scarcity	in	the	Limarí	basin.	
Chapter	 7	 presents	 the	 conclusions	 of	 this	 research,	 summarizing	 the	 problems	 surrounding	 the	
conditions	of	the	Chilean	model	for	dealing	with	situations	of	water	stress.	
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2. Water	Stress	and	Climate	Change	in	Chile	
Chile	contributes	only	0.2%	of	worldwide	greenhouse	gas	emissions	(CEPAL/BID,	2010)	and	emissions	
per	 inhabitant	 are	 estimated	 at	 3.9	 t	 CO2/capita,	 close	 to	 the	 world	 average	 (PNUD,	 2007).	 But	
because	 of	 its	 geographical,	 climatic,	 and	 productive	 characteristics,	 Chile	 is	 considered	 a	 country	
that	is	highly	vulnerable	to	the	effects	of	climate	change.	
In	 recent	 years	 a	 series	of	 studies	have	been	 carried	out	 in	Chile	on	 the	possible	 consequences	of	
climate	change.	These	studies	have	predicted	a	possible	rise	 in	temperature	(close	to	3°C)	across	a	
great	part	of	 the	 country,	 in	 addition	 to	decreasing	 rainfall	 (up	 to	30%	 in	 summer	and	autumn)	 in	
regions	 with	 the	 highest	 concentration	 of	 population	 (DGF,	 2006).	 They	 have	 also	 identified	 a	
significant	 decrease	 in	 the	 glaciers	 of	 the	 Cordillera	 de	 los	 Andes,	which	 are	 the	main	 reserves	 of	
fresh	water	 in	Chile.	This	 is	 clearly	 significant	 for	 the	provision	of	drinking	water	 in	 several	 regions	
(CONAMA,	2008).	
Chile	has	two	critical	situations	of	vulnerability.	The	first	refers	to	the	possibility	of	desertification	in	
Norte	 Chico	 (Region	 IV)	 and	 the	 second	 is	 the	 reduced	 availability	 of	water	 resources	 for	 drinking	
water	 coverage	 in	 the	 metropolitan	 area.	 Both	 situations	 are	 directly	 related	 with	 the	 probable	
decline	 in	 river	 flows	 in	 these	 regions,	 caused	 by	 a	 decrease	 in	 rainfall,	 combined	with	 dwindling	
stocks	of	snow	due	to	rising	temperatures	(CEPAL/BID,	2010).	
The	risks	associated	with	these	critical	scenarios	must	be	addressed	nationally	and	 locally,	creating	
adaptive	strategies.	Chile’s	economy	is	highly	dependent	on	natural	resources,	so	that	adaptation	to	
climate	change	is	essential	to	move	the	country	towards	sustainable	economic	development	(Claro,	
2007).	However,	both	the	discussion	and	the	development	of	adaptation	strategies	to	climate	change	
impacts	remain	incipient	in	Chile.	On	the	other	hand,	the	socio-economic,	institutional,	and	cultural	
conditions	 available	 to	 affected	 localities	 in	 order	 to	 address	 declining	 water	 resources	 are	 very	
different.	These	aspects	have	not	yet	been	investigated.			2.1. The	Problem	of	Water	
Compared	 with	 other	 countries,	 Chile	 has	 privileged	 access	 to	 fresh	 water,	 due	 to	 both	 the	
availability	 of	 surface	 water	 and	 the	 presence	 of	 water	 reserves	 in	 the	 Southern	 Ice	 Fields.	 The	
availability	 of	 fresh	 water	 in	 Chile	 is	 estimated	 at	 60,614	 m3/capita/yr,	 with	 an	 estimated	 9,245	
m3/inhab.	(World	Water	Assessment	Programme,	2003).	
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Despite	the	abundance	of	water	resources,	their	distribution	is	very	uneven	throughout	the	country.	
From	Santiago	to	the	north	of	Chile,	access	to	fresh	water	is	limited	(about	639m3/inhab/yr)	and	this	
region	faces	clear	water	stress.	On	the	other	hand,	in	southern	Chile,	available	water	is	plentiful	(over	
9,000	m3/capita/yr)	(GEO	Chile,	2008).	This	significant	difference	in	the	availability	of	fresh	water	 is	
largely	due	to	important	differences	in	precipitation	by	latitude.	
Water	 legislation	 in	 Chile	 distinguishes	 between	 “consumptive”	 and	 “non-consumptive”	 uses.	
Consumptive	 uses	 take	 into	 account	 water	 consumption	 without	 being	 returned	 to	 the	 flow	 of	 a	
river.	 Non-consumptive	 use	 encompasses	 the	 use	 of	water	 that	 is	 then	 returned	 to	 the	 river	 flow	
(Bauer,	2003).	It	is	estimated	that	about	89%	of	“water	rights”	are	for	non-consumptive	use	and	only	
11%	refer	to	consumptive	uses	(GEO	Chile,	2008).	
Consumptive	 uses	 include	 the	 following	 distribution	 of	 rights:	 irrigation	 73.8%	 (average	 flow	 of	
526m3/s,	used	 to	 irrigate	about	 two	million	hectares),	5.6%	potable	water	 (40m3/s,	which	 supplies	
98%	of	 the	urban	population	and	nearly	 80%	of	 the	 rural	 population),	 12%	 for	 industrial	 purposes	
and	9%	for	mining	activities	(Nuñez	&	Soto,	2010).	Projections	for	the	year	2030	predict	a	reduction	
of	 13%	 in	 water	 consumption	 for	 irrigation	 purposes,	 and	 a	 1%	 decrease	 in	 demand	 for	 potable	
water.	 A	 14%	 increase	 in	 industrial	 consumption	 and	 stability	 in	 the	 percentage	 of	 water	
consumption	in	the	mining	sector	are	also	expected	(GEO	Chile,	2008).	
However,	this	distribution	is	very	different	when	analyzed	for	each	region	of	Chile.	While	mining	and	
industrial	water	 consumption	 are	 highly	 significant	 for	 the	 regions	 located	 at	 the	 north	 and	 south	
extremes	 of	 the	 country,	 in	 the	 central	 regions	 consumption	 is	mainly	 agricultural	 (Nuñez	&	 Soto,	
2010).	In	table	3	below,	we	observe	the	distribution	of	consumptive	uses	by	region.	
Concerning	non-consumptive	uses,	consumption	increases	are	concentrated	in	electricity	generation.	
In	2006,	an	 installed	capacity	of	around	8,500	MW	was	established	 for	 the	Central	 Interconnected	
System	(Sistema	Interconectado	Central,	or	SIC),	with	55.6%	of	power	generated	from	hydroelectric	
energy	and	44.4%	corresponding	to	carbon-based	power	plants	(DGA,	2007).	
In	recent	years,	consumptive	and	non-consumptive	use	of	water	in	Chile	have	increased,	which	has	
also	created	a	greater	pressure	in	areas	where	resource	availability	is	limited.	In	many	cases,	this	has	
triggered	evident	water	stress	(Nuñez	&	Soto,	2010).			
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TABLE	3:	MODIFICATION	OF	WATER	CONSUMPTION	BY	SECTOR	1990-2006.	
Sector	consumption	(m³/s)	 1990	 1999	 2002	 2006	
Agriculture	(consumptive	uses)	 515.8	 611.4	 647	 526,732	
Potable	Water	(consumptive	uses)	 27.4	 34.1	 36.7	 40,134	
Industrial	(consumptive	uses)	 47.1	 68.2	 77.2	 83,847	
Mining	(consumptive	uses)	 43.2	 50.5	 53.2	 62,776	
Energy	(non-consumptive	uses)	 1189	 2914	 3929	 3,997,246	
Source:	National	Report	(Informe	País)	2008	(Geo	Chile,	2008)	
The	increased	importance	of	consumption	of	water	in	the	country	has	been	linked	to	the	particular	
institutional	model	 regulating	 the	distribution	of	 this	 resource.	The	Chilean	model,	which	 regulates	
the	use	and	consumption	of	fresh	water,	 is	unique	in	the	world.	It	was	legally	promulgated	in	1981	
through	 the	Water	 Code,	 within	 the	 framework	 of	 neoliberal	 reforms	 enacted	 under	 the	military	
regime	led	by	Augusto	Pinochet.	This	Code	remains	in	force	today,	and	was	only	amended	in	2005.	
On	that	occasion,	certain	aspects	were	established	as	critical	to	the	normal	functioning	of	the	water	
market,	 but	 there	was	 no	modification	whatsoever	 concerning	 the	 orientation	 of	 the	market	with	
regard	 to	 regulating	 access	 to	 water	 resources.	 This	 process	 has	 meant	 that	 water	 policies	 are	
dictated	by	the	free	market	more	in	Chile	than	in	any	other	country	in	the	world.	
Through	 the	 enactment	 of	 the	 Water	 Code	 in	 1981	 Chile	 established	 the	 foundations	 for	 the	
privatization	of	water	rights,	 reducing	state	regulatory	capacities	and	stating	at	 the	same	time	that	
water	rights	are	“private	property”	and	a	tradable	commodity	(Bauer,	2003).	 In	parallel,	during	the	
second	half	of	the	1980s	and	through	the	1990s,	water	services	were	privatized.	Before	privatization,	
the	private	sector	controlled	only	2%	of	water	services.	By	the	end	of	the	1990s,	83%	of	water	service	
companies	 were	 privately	 owned	 (Gebauer,	 2002).	We	must	 emphasize	 that	 the	 great	 process	 of	
privatization	 took	 place	 under	 the	 transitional	 post-military	 regime	 governments,	 in	 order	 to	
encourage	investment	in	the	area	and	expand	water	service	coverage	nationwide.	
2.1.1.	Climate	Change	and	Water	Stress	in	Chile	
Current	estimates	of	the	effects	of	climate	change	on	Chile	predict	a	temperature	rise	of	close	to	3°C	
in	 the	northern	and	central	 regions	of	 the	country,	 in	addition	 to	 reduced	 rainfalls	on	 the	western	
slopes	of	the	Andes	mountain	range,	particularly	in	the	average	latitudes	and	in	the	summer	and	fall	
seasons.	The	decrease	in	rainfall	may	be	as	high	as	50%	in	the	summer	months,	but	in	some	cases	the	
flow	 of	 rivers	 in	winter	 season	 could	 increase	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 0°C	 isotherm,	 thereby	
reducing	 solid	precipitation	 in	 the	high	peaks	and	 reduction	 in	 the	Andean	area	 capable	of	 storing	
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snow	(DGF,	2006).	Related	to	this,	a	significant	decrease	of	the	glaciers	in	Chile	has	been	identified,	
which	reduces	freshwater	sources	(CONAMA,	2008).	
Chile	has	critical	situations	of	vulnerability	in	some	regions	due	to	this	probable	decline	in	river	flows	
caused	by	lower	rainfall	coupled	with	dwindling	stocks	of	snow	due	to	increased	temperatures.	The	
most	critical	 situations	 relate	 to	 the	possibilities	of	desertification	 (Norte	Chico,	Region	 IV)	and	the	
reduced	 availability	 of	water	 resources	 for	 consumption	 and	 potable	water	 (Metropolitan	 Region)	
(CEPAL,	2009).	
As	regards	the	estimation	of	climate	scenarios	for	different	regions	of	Chile,	two	different	emission	
scenarios	have	been	identified	for	the	21st	century	(IPCC,	2007),	one	moderate	(B2)	and	one	severe	
(A2).	With	respect	to	projections	of	precipitation,	the	B2	scenario	estimates	a	decrease	in	rainfall	of	
between	10%	and	20%	in	the	Norte	Chico	area	(Atacama	and	Coquimbo	regions).	For	the	transition	
period,	both	scenarios	project	a	decrease	in	precipitation	for	the	Antofagasta	and	Los	Lagos	regions.	
This	 decrease,	 coupled	with	 the	 raising	 of	 the	 zero	 degree	 isotherm,	would	 result	 in	major	water	
stress	from	the	semi-arid	region	(Norte	Chico)	to	a	significant	part	of	central	Chile	(CEPAL,	2009).	This	
implies	 that	 from	 the	Maipo	 river	 basin	 to	 the	North	 (between	20°	 and	33°	 south	 latitude),	water	
availability	 restrictions	 are	 projected	 depending	 on	 the	 scenario	 (A2	 or	 B2)	 and	 the	 time	 period	
considered.	For	the	 late	period,	restrictions	may	vary	between	30%	(B2	scenario	 in	the	Maipo	river	
basin)	and	65%	(A2	scenario	for	the	Aconcagua	River	basin)	(DGF,	2006).	
Similarly,	in	the	mountainous	region	between	29°	and	40°	south	latitudes,	there	are	reductions	in	the	
zero	 degree	 isotherm	 area	 for	 all	 seasons	 during	 the	 year.	 This	 is	 highly	 important	 because	 these	
regions	provide	the	greatest	productivity	from	the	agro-forestry-livestock	standpoint,	 in	addition	to	
the	hydro-generated	power	from	the	SIC	(DGF,	2006).	
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FIGURE	1:	VARIATION	OF	THE	0°C	ISOTHERM	AREA	BETWEEN	PRESENT	CLIMATE	(BLUE	LINE)	AND	A2	SCENARIO	(RED	LINE)	
	Source:	Study	of	climatic	variability	in	Chile	for	the	21st	century	(Estudio	de	la	variabilidad	climática	en	
Chile	para	el	siglo	XXI)	(DGF,	2006)	
In	this	scenario	of	significant	water	stress	in	Chile	resulting	from	climate	change,	the	Chilean	model	
of	 water	 management,	 based	 on	 a	 water	 market	 with	 property	 rights,	 has	 been	 evaluated	 as	
suffering	from	serious	deficiencies	 in	terms	of	capacity	 to	address	shortages	of	water	resources,	 to	
develop	programs	 for	 improving	 resource	use,	and	 to	ensure	equity	of	distribution.	To	meet	 these	
challenges,	 it	will	 be	 necessary	 to	 implement	 actions	 that	 aim	 to	 relax	 the	operation	of	 dams	 and	
improve	water	management	at	basin	level,	trying	to	reduce	the	impacts	associated	with	a	reduction	
in	levels	of	water	availability	and	changes	in	the	regularity	of	flows	(CEPAL,	2009).	2.2 Vulnerability	to	Climate	Change	
In	 the	 watersheds	 located	 between	 the	 regions	 of	 Coquimbo	 and	 Los	 Lagos,	 the	most	 significant	
flows	are	expected	 to	decline,	 in	 addition	 to	 a	 change	 in	 regularity	of	 flows	and	a	decrease	 in	 the	
accumulated	ice	of	the	glaciers	(CEPAL,	2009).	Climate	change	models	indicate	that	by	the	end	of	the	
century	 the	situation	 in	 this	geographic	area	may	be	completely	different	 from	today,	dramatically	
decreasing	water	availability.	These	hydrological	changes	would	affect	the	productivity	of	industries	
that	depend	on	the	availability	and	regularity	of	flows,	including	irrigated	agriculture,	hydro-electric	
power	generation,	and	potable	water	in	the	municipal,	industrial,	and	mining	sectors	(León,	2008).		
In	 this	 context,	 aspects	 that	 are	 highly	 vulnerable	 to	 interannual	 climate	 variations	 have	 been	
identified	 in	 the	 affected	 regions,	 with	 significant	 challenges	 to	 sanitary,	 mining	 and	 agriculture	
sectors	(CEPAL,	2009):	
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§ Sanitary	 sector:	 In	 the	 metropolitan	 area,	 there	 would	 be	 hydrological	 changes	 in	 the	 main	
source	of	 supply	 for	 the	 city	 (Maipo	 river),	 creating	a	 future	deficit	 in	 the	provision	of	potable	
water.	One	possibility	 is	 that	water	companies	will	buy	more	water	 rights	 to	safeguard	supply,	
triggering	new	costs	that	would	be	transferred	to	users	in	the	city	in	the	form	of	increased	rates.	
§ Agricultural	sector:	It	is	projected	that	there	will	be	a	decline	in	the	water	available	for	irrigation	
in	 the	districts	 located	 to	 the	north	of	 the	Maipo	 river.	Coupled	with	projected	changes	 in	 the	
productivity	 of	 different	 types	 of	 exploitations,	 this	 potentially	 has	 considerable	 effects	 in	
agriculture,	especially	in	the	fragile	ecosystem	of	Norte	Chico.	
§ Mining:	Projections	for	the	next	30	years	indicate	that	in	all	the	basins	where	mines	are	located,	
availability	of	water	will	be	reduced	due	to	climate	change,	placing	more	pressure	on	the	basins	
that	provide	the	water	necessary	for	this	sector.		
The	geographical	areas	identified	as	most	vulnerable	to	these	changes	are	located	in	arid	steppes	and	
semi-arid	 Norte	 Chico,	 due	 to	 droughts	 and	 increasing	 desertification	 (Ferrando,	 2002).	 These	
processes	are	present	in	most	water-stressed	areas	of	the	sector	and	aggravate	the	negative	impacts	
of	water	scarcity,	which	in	turn	hinders	the	sustainable	development	and	conservation	of	ecosystems	
associated	with	these	environments	(Unesco,	2010).	
2.2.1.	Agricultural	Vulnerability	
In	 Chile,	 agriculture	 has	 great	 significance	 for	 the	 national	 economy.	 Agriculture	 and	 livestock	
farming	 are	 among	 the	 main	 activities	 in	 the	 central	 and	 southern	 regions	 of	 the	 country.	 The	
contribution	 of	 this	 sector	 to	 national	 GDP	 (taking	 into	 account	 production	 chains)	 is	 almost	 13%.	
Over	 the	 past	 20	 years,	 exports	 of	 agricultural	 and	 forestry	 products	 have	 grown	 at	 an	 annual	
average	 rate	 of	 9.1%.	 Agriculture	 is	 one	 of	 the	 key	 sectors	 driving	 national	 job	 growth,	 with	 an	
average	of	738,000	people	per	year	 (including	seasonal	work),	amounting	 to	11.2%	of	 the	national	
workforce	(Public	Accounts	of	the	Government	of	Chile,	(Cuenta	Pública	Gobierno	de	Chile),	2010).	
However,	 the	 importance	of	 this	 activity	 differs	 greatly	 if	we	 compare	 regions	of	 the	 country,	 due	
mainly	to	varying	climatic	conditions	and	availability	of	water	resources.	In	regions	where	agricultural	
activity	is	significant,	such	as	the	regions	of	O'Higgins,	Maule,	and	Araucanía,	the	sector	contributes	
about	15%	to	regional	GDP,	while	the	figure	in	the	regions	of	Coquimbo	and	Los	Lagos	is	close	to	10%	
(OECD,	2009).	However,	 in	 the	 regions	of	Tarapacá,	Antofagasta,	Aisén	and	Magallanes,	 the	 sector	
contributes	only	around	1%	(Libertad	y	Desarrollo,	2011).	
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In	 the	per	capita	evaluation	of	 the	existing	and	projected	availability	of	water	 resources	 (Figure	4),	
the	supply	of	water	is	very	different	between	regions.	From	the	far	north	to	the	metropolitan	region,	
there	is	critically	low	water	availability	(SAMTAC-CEPAL,	2000).	
Research	on	vulnerability	to	climate	change,	focusing	on	the	impact	on	agriculture,	has	been	carried	
out	in	this	context	in	Chile.	The	main	problem	identified	in	such	research	is	the	potential	water	stress	
in	major	basins	of	the	country.	The	map	in	Figure	5	identifies	the	sectors	most	affected	by	changes	in	
flow	 (red),	 for	which	a	decrease	 in	wealth	of	up	 to	30%	could	occur	as	a	 result	of	 climate	change,	
generating	evident	water	stress.	(CONAMA,	1999).	
The	agricultural	sector	in	Chile	is	the	largest	user	of	water,	representing	85%	of	consumptive	rights.	
The	irrigated	area	is	close	to	1,100,000	hectares,	representing	an	increase	of	about	37,000	hectares	
in	the	1990s	resulting	from	irrigation	works.	The	irrigation	of	orchards	and	vineyards	associated	with	
exports	plays	a	significant	role	 in	this	 increase,	especially	 in	the	northern	and	central	valleys	of	the	
country.	 Due	 to	 the	 scarcity	 of	 surface	 water,	 this	 has	 led	 to	 increased	 demand	 for	 groundwater	
(Peña,	Luraschi	&	Valenzuela,	2004).	
Because	 a	 “stock”	 (share)	 or	 right	 belongs	 to	 each	 of	 the	 parties,	 dividing	 the	 amount	 of	 water	
available	 in	 the	 source	 of	 supply,	 whether	 river,	 canal,	 or	 reservoir,	 due	 to	 water	 stress	 on	 the	
watersheds,	there	will	be	less	water	granted	per	share.	The	effects	of	water	stress	in	these	basins	will	
depend	 on	 the	 ability	 to	 regulate	 flows	 in	 each	 river	 and	 the	 possibility	 of	 “moving”	 water	 from	
periods	of	the	year	during	which	is	available	to	the	periods	during	which	it	is	needed	(CEPAL,	2009).	
	
32	
	
3. Water	Vulnerability:	Conceptual	Tools		
The	 comprehension	 of	 water	 scarcity	 requires	 an	 interdisciplinary	 vision	 that	 responds	 to	 the	
problem’s	complexity,	considering	 the	 interdependence	between	the	biophysical	and	socio-cultural	
conditions.	Critical	and	holistic	analysis	of	these	situations	demands	a	redefining	of	the	concepts	of	
scarcity	and	vulnerability,	based	on	a	dialog	between	the	social	and	geographic	disciplines. 
In	 the	 international	 literature,	 the	phenomenon	of	water	 scarcity	 is	not	 studied	 solely	as	a	natural	
phenomenon;	 rather	 it	 is	 recognized,	 identified	 and	 analyzed	 in	 its	 social	 dimension	 as	 well.	 The	
authors	who	underscore	 the	 socio-cultural	 factors	 that	 influence	 the	 configuration	of	 such	 scarcity	
refer,	for	instance,	to	a	“socially	constructed”	water	scarcity	(Mehta,	2007).	On	the	other	hand,	when	
the	focus	of	study	is	the	degree	of	vulnerability	experienced	by	various	social	groups	before	natural	
phenomena,	it	is	recognized	that	a	variety	of	factors	exert	influence	over	this	aspect.	Aside	from	the	
external	or	“natural”	factors,	which	include	the	availability	and	distribution	of	hydrological	resources,	
in	reference	to	biophysical	conditions,	several	socio-cultural	conditions	are	identified	that	affect	the	
capacity	 for	 control	 and	potential	 for	 recovery	 of	 a	 specific	 social	 group	before	 an	 external	 threat	
(Adger	&	Kelly,	1999).	 
In	 recognition	of	 this	 complexity	 and	understanding	 the	 interdependence	 and	 reciprocity	 between	
biophysical	 and	 socio-cultural	 dimensions,	 we	 likewise	 sustain	 in	 this	 work	 that	 the	 socio-cultural	
conditions	 that	 configure	 a	 social	 group's	 vulnerability	 to	 water	 scarcity	 are,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	
contributing	factors	to	the	creation	of	this	very	threat.	This	situation	presupposes	the	overlapping	of	
diverse	 social	 subsystems,	 especially	 the	 social	 systems	of	 economy,	 science,	politics,	morality	 and	
mass	 media.	 Economic	 operations,	 for	 example,	 construct	 a	 threat,	 given	 the	 overexploitation	 of	
resources.	As	for	morality	and	politics,	they	configure	possibilities	of	reaction	to	this	overexploitation	
through	 the	observation	of	 favorable	or	 unfavorable	 situations,	 and	 the	development	of	 collective	
action	strategies	to	confront	situations	of	water	scarcity.	The	 identification	of	water	scarcity	 is	also	
mediated	by	the	possibilities	for	scientific	observation	(for	example,	ability	to	measure	the	aquifers’	
capacity).	Mass	media	widen	the	communication	on	the	problems	of	water	shortage	as	well	as	the	
demand	 for	 this	 resource,	 since	 the	water	 volumes	 required	 to	meet	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 population	
differ	depending	on	economic	and	cultural	factors	—	for	example,	per	capita	water	consumption	in	
the	so-called	developed	countries	is	more	than	double	that	of	countries	recognized	as	belonging	to	
the	“third	world”.	 
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In	the	context	of	multiple	observations	and	actions,	we	consider	it	fundamental	to	build	a	model	that	
will	 enable	 interdisciplinary	 dialog,	 and	 engage	 with	 the	 challenge	 in	 this	 document.	 Our	 work	
focuses	on	the	construction	of	the	concept	of	hydrological	vulnerability	to	observe	the	relationship	
between	a	specific	social	system	and	its	ecological	environment,	where	a	threat	of	water	shortage	is	
identified.	With	this	objective	in	mind	and	on	the	basis	of	a	conceptual	discussion,	we	identified	the	
critical	elements	of	the	social	system	that	would	enable	us	to	identify	conditions	of	vulnerability,	as	
well	as	the	core	elements	that	should	be	considered	in	the	description	of	the	ecological	environment	
in	 order	 to	 speak	 of	 water	 scarcity.	 We	 propose	 a	 theoretical	 model	 for	 the	 observation	 and	
comprehension	 of	 vulnerability	 to	 situations	 of	water	 scarcity,	 articulating	 their	 socio-cultural	 and	
biophysical	dimensions.		3.1.	The	Social	Construction	of	Water	Scarcity	
The	final	decades	of	the	20th	century	saw	a	profound	questioning	in	different	scientific	disciplines	of	
positivism	 and	 the	 claims	 to	 objectivity	 of	 scientific	 knowledge.	 There	 are	 multiple	 possible	
approaches	 in	 this	 context,	 some	 of	 them	 the	 fruit	 of	 the	 development	 of	 the	 “natural	 sciences”	
themselves,	 in	 which	 there	 was	 a	 problematization	 of	 peoples’	 processes	 of	 perception	 and	 the	
limitations	of	different	senses	vis-à-vis	accessing	“reality”,	constraining	the	possibility	of	resorting	to	
that	 reality	 for	 validation	 of	 scientific	 explanations.	 Advocates	 of	 General	 Systems	 Theory	 such	 as	
Heinz	Von	Foerster,	Francisco	Varela	and	Humberto	Maturana	(Brandao,	2012)	have	made	significant	
contributions	to	this	 line	of	thought.	What	is	fundamental	here	is	the	explanation	of	the	process	of	
knowing	and	 the	 limits	of	 knowledge,	 in	which	 it	 is	 understood	 that	 the	observer	 is	 central	 to	 the	
construction	 of	 the	 observed	 (Maturana,	 1990).	 Concurrently,	 within	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 social	
sciences,	 Berger	 and	 Luckmann's	 celebrated	The	 Social	 Construction	 of	 Reality	 (1966)	 founded	 the	
current	known	as	social	constructionism,	which	established	that	knowledge	 is	 the	product	of	social	
interactions.	The	majority	of	the	social	and	human	sciences	developed	within	this	framework	in	the	
second	half	of	the	20th	century. 
The	 identification	 of	 environmental	 problems	—	 in	 our	 case,	 water	 scarcity	—	 is	 likewise	 framed	
within	this	problematization	of	knowledge	(Blaikie	et	al.,	1994).	The	environment	and	the	properties	
or	problems	attributed	to	it	are	the	result	of	communications	operations	carried	out	in	society.	When	
we	speak	of	'society',	we	do	not	refer	to	individuals	or	groups,	to	their	thoughts	or	bodies;	rather	to	
the	 communication	 produced	 between	 people	 (Luhmann,	 1991).	 Certainly,	 society	 could	 not	 exist	
without	 people,	 their	 bodies	 or	 thoughts,	 but	 society	 cannot	 be	 reduced	 to	 its	 parts,	 since	 it	 is	 a	
system	 of	 a	 different	 sort	 that	 reproduces	 itself	 autonomously.	 For	 this	 reason,	 it	 is	 through	
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communication	 that	 that	 which	 is	 the	 environment	 is	 defined.	 Through	 it,	 its	 dangers,	 risks	 and	
natural	resources,	as	well,	are	identified	(Luhmann,	1991).	 
In	 a	 modern	 society	 such	 as	 ours,	 the	 biophysical	 conditions	 of	 the	 surroundings	 are	 primarily	
identified	 through	 the	 conditions	 available	 in	 the	 scientific	 system,	 and	 the	 possibilities	 for	
observation	of	the	social	group	that	interacts	with	it.	Modern	society	is	a	functionally	differentiated	
society.	Each	subsystem	fulfills	a	function	for	society,	resolves	a	problem	of	reference,	and	produces	
a	 perspective	 for	 the	 observation	 of	 society.	 Thus	 the	 economy	 resolves	 the	 problem	 of	material	
scarcity	 of	 resources	 (doubled	 as	 shortage	 of	 money	 in	 a	monetary	 economy),	 and	 perceives	 the	
world	as	a	scarce	resource	that	must	be	distributed	(Luhmann,	2013).	The	function	of	public	policy	is	
to	 generate	 collectively	 binding	 decisions,	 and	 its	 horizon	 is	 the	 issue	 of	 power	 for	 such	 decision	
making.	 Morality	 divides	 the	 world	 between	 good	 and	 bad	 and	 reflexively	 assumes	 that	 this	
distinction	 can,	 in	 turn,	 be	 good	 or	 bad.	 The	 function	 of	 mass	 media	 function	 is	 to	 disseminate	
communications	 far	 beyond	 the	 immediate	 vicinity	 of	 the	 participants	 in	 an	 interaction,	 and	 they	
perceive	the	world	as	an	 irritant,	whether	 it	generates	surprises	or	redundancies	 (Luhmann,	2007).	
Science	 has	 the	 function	 of	 generating	 knowledge,	 and	 whoever	 seeks	 true	 knowledge	 that	 is	
possible	to	experience	in	a	generalized	manner	has	scientific	communication	at	their	disposal.	All	of	
these	systems	are	differentiated	communications	that	exist	in	society	and	they	do	not	allow	society	
to	be	seen	in	a	unified	way,	but	as	a	horizon	of	multiple	perspectives	(Nassehi,	2011).	 
For	 this	 reason,	 environmental	 problems	 that	 are	 not	 communicated	 do	 not	 exist	 socially.	 This	
enables	us	to	comprehend	how,	nowadays	—	thanks	to	scientific	advances	—	we	can	identify	many	
more	problems	than	those	that	were	themed	decades	ago	(for	example,	the	dioxins	that	pollute	our	
food	 or	 drinking	 water,	 gases	 that	 affect	 global	 climate,	 etc.).	 Furthermore,	 we	 see	 that	 the	
environmental	problem	goes	hand-in-hand	with	our	modern	society's	development,	since	it	was	born	
with	modern	 society	 and	 therein	 seeks	 its	 solutions.	 An	 environmental	 problem	 is	 identified	 as	 a	
threat	only	when	there	is	communication	concerning	it	(Luhmann,	1986),	independently	of	whether	
it	may	have	been	in	existence	for	much	more	time	in	the	ecological	environment.	Unlike	other	social	
communications,	environmental	problems	have	a	special	sensitivity	to	scientific	observation	and	the	
answers	are	sought	in	science.	However,	these	problems	are,	in	turn,	also	visible	as	political,	legal	or	
economic	problems,	and	even	as	religious	portents.	The	importance	of	science	resides	in	its	capacity	
to	delve	deeper	into	the	“knowledge”	of	an	ecological	problem,	and	not,	as	in	other	systems,	into	the	
economic,	moral,	religious,	or	other	advantages	or	disadvantages	inherent	in	their	identification.	For	
this	reason,	we	consider	it	fundamental	to	gain	knowledge	of	ecological	problems	and	comprehend	
their	functioning. 
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On	 the	 other	 hand,	 vulnerability	 to	 environmental	 problems	 is	 also	 a	 social	 construct,	 not	 only	
because	 it	 is	 identified	 and	 communicated	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 social	 conditions,	 but	 also	 because	 the	
positions	 of	 different	 groups	 in	 society	 (e.g.,	 social	 class,	 gender,	 ethnicity),	 access	 to	 social	 and	
natural	 resources,	 inhabited	 spaces,	 and	 the	 strategies	 that	 can	 be	 implemented	 to	 tackle	
environmental	 problems	 influence	 how	 such	 groups	 are	 affected	 by	 environmental	 disasters	 or	
threats	(Blaikie	et	al.,	1994). 
Among	the	implications	of	this	perspective	—	along	with	assuming	the	limits	of	scientific	knowledge	
itself	—		we	find	that	identification	of	situations	of	water	scarcity	and	vulnerability	are	influenced	by	
social	and	cultural	conditions	within	a	specific	context.	Thus,	we	only	speak	of	this	scarcity	when	it	is	
identified	and	communicated	by	those	it	affects.	This	does	not	mean	that	no	relationship	exists	with	
the	 “natural”	 conditions	 of	water	 availability,	 identifiable	 and	 comparable	 through	 time;	 however,	
this	 relationship	 is	 conditioned	by	 society's	possibilities	of	observation	as	well	 as	by	 the	valuations	
and	expectations	existing	in	it.	Scarcity	is,	in	this	way,	always	a	scheme	of	comparison	that	depends	
on	adopted	social	perspectives. 
The	case	of	water	scarcity	shows	how	society	is	a	system	that	operates	autonomously	and	that	uses	
its	own	outputs	as	inputs	for	its	operations.	As	can	be	clearly	seen	in	the	case	of	water	scarcity,	these	
situations,	 aside	 from	being	 conditioned	by	 the	possibilities	of	observation,	 are	provoked	by	 these	
very	social	operations.	On	one	hand,	the	intensive	use	of	water	resources	has	provoked	a	dramatic	
shortage	 in	 certain	 regions	 of	 the	 world,	 but	 the	 creation	 of	 settlements	 in	 areas	 historically	
characterized	 by	 water	 scarcity	 only	 acquires	 significance	 and	 is	 problematized	 as	 scarcity	 when	
there	exists	a	demand	 for	 the	resource	 (i.e.,	 the	establishment	of	mining	operations,	agro-industry	
or,	 quite	 simply,	 urban	 settlements	 requiring	 sanitary	 services).	On	 the	other	hand,	 the	 scarcity	of	
this	resource	is	related	to	its	use	and	consumption,	since	watersheds	that	in	prior	centuries	had	no	
shortage	 of	water,	 today	 experience	 it	 due	 to	 intensive	 use	 and,	 in	many	 cases,	 overexploitation.	
Thus,	it	seems	appropriate	to	speak	of	a	scarcity	that	is	socially	constructed	twice	over;	i.e.,	through	
operation	and	observation	of	the	resource. 
In	 this	 context,	 we	 understand	 that	 hydrological	 vulnerability	 is	 constructed	 and	 that	 the	
reproduction	of	 its	 conditions	 relates	 to	 the	 socio-cultural	 characteristics	of	 the	groups	concerned.	
The	 increase	 in	 threats	 of	 natural	 origin	 is	 a	 product	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 society	 and	 the	
environment;	thus,	we	can	speak	of	socially	constructed	risks	(Beck,	1996;	Luhmann,	1991;	Douglas,	
1996).	Assuming	these	conditions	for	water	scarcity	obliges	us	to	build	an	interdisciplinary	focus	for	
comprehension	between	society	and	environment. 
36	
	
3.1.1.	Interdisciplinary	Approach:	Society	and	Environment	
The	 relationship	 between	 society	 and	 the	 environment	 has	 not	 been	 addressed	 from	 multiple	
perspectives;	 nevertheless,	 one	 of	 the	most	 important	 of	 these	 has	 been	 systemic	 tradition,	 with	
significant	 theoretical	 developments	 within	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 complex	 adaptive	 systems	
approach	 (Holland,	 2006;	 Gunderson	 &	 Holling,	 2002),	 social-ecological	 systems	 (Holling,	 2001;	
Cumming,	 2008;	 Ostrom,	 2009;	 Rappaport,	 1977)	 and	 social	 systems	 (Luhmann,	 1998).	Moreover,	
these	perspectives	offer	 interesting	 tools	 for	 interdisciplinary	work,	whether	 from	general	 systems	
theory	 (Ashby,	 1984;	 Wiener,	 1979),	 which	 proposes	 the	 development	 of	 an	 interdisciplinary	
paradigm,	 or	 from	 second-order	 cybernetics	 (Von	 Bertalanffy,	 1976;	 Von	 Foerster,	 2003),	 which	
encompasses	 complex	 systems	 as	 sets	 of	 elements	 interacting	 amongst	 themselves	 on	 different	
levels,	with	varying	degrees	of	autonomy	and	self-organizing	properties.	 
From	 this	 perspective,	 upon	 observing	 the	 relationship	 between	 system	 and	 environment,	 it	 is	
identified	that	complex	systems	are	capable	of	perceiving	their	surroundings	and	reacting	to	them;	
however,	the	surroundings	cannot	control	or	direct	changes	within	the	system,	and	in	this	sense	they	
are	 autonomous	 (Holland,	 1994;	 Cumming,	 2011;	 Luhmann,	 1984).	 Nevertheless,	 both	 complex	
adaptive	systems	in	general,	and	social	systems	and	social-ecological	systems	in	particular,	have	the	
ability	to	react	to	their	surroundings	thanks	to	mechanisms	of	self-organization	that	have	to	do	with	
preceding	conditions	of	the	system,	based	on	which	it	can	modify	its	own	structure.	What	occurs	in	
the	 system	 is	 a	 product	 of	 the	 system's	 own	 activity	 and	 not	 that	 of	 the	 surroundings;	 however,	
precisely	due	to	this	last,	systems	can	be	“vulnerable”	to	their	milieu. 
Changes	in	systems	are	observed	as	emerging	states	that	may	respond	to	different	attractors	or	self-
organized	states	of	stability,	called	basins	of	attraction	(Gunderson	&	Holling,	2002).	In	this	context,	
the	 problem	 of	 system	 definition	 is	 central:	 how	 do	 we	 differentiate	 between	 system	 and	
environment?	There	are	a	variety	of	alternatives	in	the	systemic	tradition;	for	example,	identification	
of	 a	 system	 through	 its	 identity	 (Holland,	2006),	 by	means	of	 the	 cohesion	among	 its	 components		
(Collier	&	Hooker,	 1999),	maintaining	 the	 relationship	 between	 its	main	 components	 (Cumming	&	
Collier,	 2005),	 or	 —	 from	 the	 constructivist	 perspective	 of	 the	 theory	 of	 social	 systems	 —	 the	
identification	 of	 a	 system	 results	 from	 the	 realization	 of	 a	 distinction,	 of	 the	 application	 of	 a	
difference	based	on	 levels	 of	 complexity.	 In	 other	words,	 a	 system	 is	 always	 less	 complex	 than	 its	
environment	 and,	 thus,	 traces	 a	 limit	 with	 respect	 to	 it	 and	 self-organizes	 on	 its	 basis	 (Luhmann,	
1984).	 Considering	 this	 work's	 constructivist	 basis,	 we	 will	 apply	 this	 last	 perspective	 of	 social	
systems	 theory,	 as	 it	 encompasses	 the	 preceding	 approaches	 and	 grants	 them	 coherence.	 In	
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addition,	 it	 enables	 us	 to	 differentiate	 between	 observer	 systems	 (psychic	 and	 social),	 biological,	
biophysical	 and	 social-ecological	 systems,	 depending	 on	 the	 level	 of	 observation	 and	 the	
investigation's	 scope.	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 our	 work	 concentrates	 on	 the	 description	 of	 social	
systems	 and	 how	 they	 relate	 to	 the	 ecological	 milieu,	 the	 latter	 also	 possible	 to	 distinguish	 as	 a	
social-ecological	system. 
The	spatial	dimension	of	the	observed	system	must	be	identified	(Cadenas,	2012)	in	order	to	address	
a	specific	environmental	problem	such	as	the	one	selected.	This	can	be	done	on	different	levels.		We	
can	observe	a	small	system	(for	example,	an	organization)	and	its	various	settings	–biological,	social,	
physical,	 etc.;	 also,	 a	 system	where	 social	 and	 economical	 subsystems	 interact	 within	 a	 delimited	
geographic	space.	Or	we	can	even	speak	of	the	planet	Earth	as	a	world	system	(Lovelock,	1979),	 in	
which	 multiple	 subsystems	 can	 be	 identified.	 This	 should	 clearly	 establish	 that	 a	 system	 always	
emerges	as	an	observer's	action,	and	in	the	case	of	scientific	observation,	a	system	is	such	depending	
on	the	problems	to	be	resolved	through	the	praxis	of	science. 
In	 this	 work,	 and	 based	 on	 the	 research	 problems	 enunciated	 above,	 we	 will	 identify	 a	 specific	
territory,	 delimited	 by	 watersheds,	 observing	 different	 social	 and	 ecological	 systems	 that	 interact	
within	the	watersheds,	supporting	ourselves	on	the	theory	of	social	systems	and	of	social-ecological	
systems	 (Gallopin	 et	 al.,	 1989).	 Given	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 issue	 and	 the	 challenge	 implied	 by	
interdisciplinary	work,	we	have	selected	the	complex	adaptive	systems	perspective	to	approach	the	
problematic	of	water	scarcity.		Within	this	framework,	conceptual	tools	will	be	presented	to	observe	
what	 have	 been	 named	 “social-ecological	 systems”,	 to	 then	 address	 hydrological	 vulnerability	 and	
the	system's	resilience,	based	on	the	relationship	between	biophysical	and	socio-cultural	conditions. 3.2.	Social-ecological	Systems	
In	 the	 context	 of	 complex	 adaptive	 systems,	 a	 social-ecological	 system1	 refers	 to	 the	 periodic	
interaction	 between	 biophysical	 and	 social	 factors,	 with	 emergent	 properties	 and	 self-organizing	
capacity	 (Norberg	 &	 Cumming,	 2008;	 Folke	 et	 al.,	 2005).	 The	 different	 elements	 and	 their	
interactions	 generate	 observable	 dynamics	 and	 adaptive	 processes	 arising	 from	 their	 self-
organization	(Holling	&	Gunderson,	2002). 
                                                      
1	Following	the	proposal	of	Folke	and	with	the	aim	of	avoiding	undervaluation	of	the	pertinence	of	the	social	
and	ecological	systems,	we	will	speak	of	socio-ecological	systems	(Folke	et	al.,	2005).	In	this	way	we	emphasize	
the	integrated	observation	between	society	and	nature,	but	assuming	that	the	definitions	of	the	limits	of	these	
systems	are	arbitrary	and	socially	constructed.	
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To	comprehend	the	behavior	of	social-ecological	systems,	we	must	clarify	the	relationship	between	
the	social	system	and	the	ecological	environment.	According	to	this	perspective,	social	systems	are	
maintained	 thanks	 to	a	 constant	exchange	of	matter,	energy	and	 information	with	 their	ecological	
environment,	 therefore	 a	 close	 interrelationship	 is	maintained	 between	 society	 and	 environment.	
These	 relationships	 and	 the	 processes	 associated	 to	 them	 may	 lead	 to	 modifications	 in	 the	
functioning	or	structure	of	the	social	system	due	to	changes	in	the	ecological	milieu	(Gallopin,	2006),	
just	as	 social	operations	 likewise	generate	changes	 in	 the	ecological	 surroundings.	This	 idea	comes	
from	the	“open	systems”	concept	in	general	systems	theory	(Rodríguez	&	Arnold,	1991),	which	states	
that	a	system's	viability	consists	of	an	incessant	(but	selective)	flow	of	inputs	of	matter,	energy	and	
information	 from	 the	 environment.	 Thanks	 to	 these	 inputs,	 systems	 can	 support	 themselves,	
temporarily	 negating	 the	 tendency	 toward	 entropy.	 Systems	 produce	 negative	 entropy	 to	 sustain	
themselves	as	an	order	within	an	environment	that	tends	toward	disorder.	Since	we	have	indicated	
the	 modern	 theory	 of	 social	 systems	 within	 our	 approach,	 we	 should	 reconstruct	 this	 systems	
approach	 through	 the	 observation	 that	 social	 systems	 are	 closed	 systems	 vis-à-vis	 communication	
(Luhmann,	 1991).	 Of	 course,	 this	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 they	 are	 independent	 of	 flows	 of	matter	 and	
energy,	but	it	does	indeed	exclude	that	the	information	is	something	that	is,	as	it	were,	“given”	in	the	
environment,	 and	 that	 the	 system	 should	 introduce	 it.	 Information	 is	 a	 value	 of	 the	 system	 and,	
thanks	to	it,	communication	is	constituted,	and	therefore	is	self-constructed.	 
For	 this	 reason,	 so	 that	 this	 relationship	 may	 be	 comprehended,	 we	 replace	 the	 idea	 of	
“interchanges”	of	information	between	system	and	environment	and	will	instead	consider	Maturana	
and	 Varela's	 (1984)	 proposal	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 “structural	 coupling”.	 This	 concept	 leaves	 the	
conception	of	matter	and	energy	exchanges	between	system	and	environment	 intact,	but	excludes	
the	 interchange	 of	 information.	 System	 and	 environment	 are	 in	 a	 situation	 of	 structural	 coupling	
since	the	system	operates	in	a	closed	manner	with	respect	to	its	environment,	but	is	not	autarchic	in	
relation	 to	 it.	 In	 effect,	 following	 our	 theoretical	 proposal,	 a	 system	 is	 a	 distinction	—	 namely,	 a	
distinction	 between	 system	 and	 environment.	 According	 to	 Maturana	 and	 Varela,	 the	 recurring	
interactions	between	a	system	and	 its	environment	are	understood	as	a	 structural	 coupling,	which	
means	that	a	co-ontogenic	drift	is	maintained	between	them,	and	this	allows	the	mutual	triggering	of	
structural	 changes	 (Maturana	&	 Varela,	 1984).	 The	 concept	 of	 “structure”	 is	 understood	when	 an	
additional	 distinction	 is	 added	 to	 this	 explanation	 that	 refers	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 structure	 of	 a	
system	 is	 its	 variable	 aspect,	 while	 its	 "organization"	 is	 its	 constant	 state.	 “Organization”	 and	
“structure”	are	two	properties	of	any	system	coupled	to	an	environment	(Maturana	&	Varela,	1984).	
A	system	is	viable	when	it	is	capable	of	maintaining	its	organization	through	changes	in	its	structure.	
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As	a	result	of	these	recurrent	interactions,	a	common	domain	emerges	of	coordinations,	from	which	
units	 of	 greater	orders	 are	 constructed.	 In	our	 case,	 a	 social-ecological	 system	would	be	 a	 greater	
unit	of	order	that	would	be	delimited	spatially	as	a	result	of	these	recurrent	interactions. 
Thus,	 to	 define	 a	 social-ecological	 system	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 delimit	 the	 relationships	 between	 the	
elements,	 identifying	 the	 system's	 emergent	 properties,	 ecosystemic	 services,	 governance	 and	
memory	 (Norberg	 &	 Cumming,	 2008).	 The	 spatial	 or	 geographic	 proximity	 makes	 it	 possible	 to	
establish	 relations	between	elements	and,	based	on	 these	 interactions,	ascertain	 the	properties	of	
the	 social-ecological	 systems	 as	 complex	 adaptive	 systems.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	 location	 of	 the	
system’s	elements	 and	 their	 environments	 and	 the	 spatial	 connectivity	 among	 them,	 including	 the	
geography	 and	 infrastructure	 of	 the	 spaces	 where	 the	 social	 and	 ecological	 systems	 interact,	 are	
factors	 of	 importance.	 Consequently,	 aside	 from	 spatial	 delimitation	 in	 the	 identification	 of	 a	
territory	 for	 the	 social-ecological	 system,	 it	 must	 be	 considered	 that	 the	 environment	 of	 the	
observed	 system	 (major	 geographic	 spaces,	 social	 systems	 having	 regional	 or	world	 scope,	 etc.)	 is	
also	related	to	the	system’s	behavior. 
In	 this	 context,	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 observing	 an	 environmental	 problem,	 we	 will	 define	 a	 social-
ecological	system	basing	ourselves	on	the	delimitation	of	a	territory	where	it	 is	possible	to	observe	
the	structural	coupling	between	social	and	ecological	systems,	which,	on	the	basis	of	their	emergent	
properties,	 can	 in	 turn	 be	 identified	 as	 a	 complex	 adaptive	 system.	 In	 the	 specific	 case	 which	
concerns	 us,	 hydrological	 vulnerability	will	 be	 observed	 in	 a	 social-ecological	 system	based	 on	 the	
relationship	established	with	the	water	resource	within	the	confines	of	a	specific	territory	(such	as	a	
defined	basin).	Stated	simply,	a	social-ecological	system	describes	the	regular	interaction	between	a	
social	 system	and	 its	 environment;	 that	 is,	 a	 domain	 of	 recurrent	 interactions	 that	 characterizes	 a	
specific	 and	 delimited	 praxis.	 Certain	watersheds	 constitute	 a	 social-ecological	 system	when	 there	
exists	this	type	of	recurrent	and	institutionalized,	empirically	observable	relationship.	Through	these	
interactions	we	can	then	identify	the	innate	characteristics	of	complex	adaptive	systems,	depending	
on	 the	 type	 of	 relationships	 observed	 in	 these	 interactions	 (mainly	 their	 number,	 temporality	 and	
selectivity),	 
To	comprehend	what	we	understand	as	hydrological	vulnerability,	however,	we	must	first	explain	an	
important	property	of	 complex	adaptive	 systems:	 resilience;	and	based	on	 it,	 the	 relationship	with	
the	system's	adaptive	capacity. 
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3.2.1	Resilience		
Resilience	is	often	referred	to	in	relation	to	sustainability,	and	therefore	with	a	notion	of	permanence	
through	 time	 (Christmann	et	 al.,	 2012).	 In	 some	cases	 the	 concepts	of	 resilience	and	 sustainability	
may	even	be	 superimposed,	one	over	 the	other.	However,	within	 the	 framework	of	 this	work,	we	
base	this	concept	on	the	contributions	within	the	systemic	perspectives,	considering	resilience	as	a	
property	of	the	observed	system. 
The	discussion	on	resilience	began	 in	the	1970s	with	the	proposal	of	Holling	(1973),	who	proposed	
that,	 based	 on	 this	 concept,	 the	maintenance	 of	 a	 system	be	 observed,	 its	 capacity	 to	 absorb	 the	
disturbances	 in	 its	 surroundings,	 including	 its	capacity	 for	change,	but	also	 the	maintenance	of	 the	
relationships	 between	 its	 components.	 Holling	 and	 colleagues	 have	 subsequently	 made	 a	 few	
adjustments	 to	 the	 concept,	 specifying	 that	 resiliency	 refers	 to	 the	 system’s	 capacity	 to	 absorb	
disturbances	 without	 changing	 its	 basic	 structure,	 but	 modifying	 variable	 elements	 (Holling	 &	
Gunderson,	 2002).	 The	 system’s	 capacity	 to	 reorganize	 itself	 while	 maintaining	 its	 essential	
characteristics	(function,	structure,	etc)	is	related	to	the	maintenance	of	the	system's	identity	and	of	
its	basins	of	attraction2	 (Walker	et	al.,	2004).	However,	complex	adaptive	systems	present	multiple	
regimes	 of	 stability,	 and	 thus	 there	 would	 not	 be	 just	 one	 point	 of	 equilibrium,	 and	 it	 would	 be	
possible	that	the	system	could	change	rapidly	from	one	regime	of	stability	to	another	(Gotts,	2007). 
In	line	with	the	development	of	the	systemic	perspectives	we	have	adopted,	resilience	is	an	intrinsic	
property	of	the	system.	The	environment	cannot	be	resilient;	only	a	system	is	resilient,	and	thus,	to	
speak	of	environmental	resilience,	we	must	refer	to	the	resilience	of	the	social	“system”	and	of	the	
“ecological	 system”,	 or	 of	 the	 relationship	 that	 arises	 between	both	 as	 a	 Social-ecological	 System.	
Said	 resilience	 is	 related	 to	 the	 system’s	 sensitivity	 or	 irritability,	 indicating	 the	 degree	 to	 which	
affectations	 are	 triggered	 in	 a	 system,	 or	 modifications	 originated	 by	 external	 or	 internal	
disturbances	(Gallopin,	2006);	 in	other	words,	as	the	result	of	 its	structural	coupling.	This	definition	
leads	 us	 to	 differentiate	 between	 the	 properties	 of	 the	 system	 and	 the	 exposure	 to	 an	 external	
threat,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 empirically	 possible	 to	 relate	 resilience	 to	 threats	 to	 its	 adaptive	
capacity.	The	concept	of	resilience	renders	visible	the	relationship	between	a	system	and	a	specific	
environment,	 from	 the	 system’s	 capacity	 to	 react	 to	 the	 threats	 that	 are	 identified	 in	 the	
                                                      
2	"A	‘basin	of	attraction’	is	a	region	in	state	space	in	which	the	system	tends	to	remain.	For	systems	that	tend	
toward	equilibrium,	the	equilibrium	state	is	defined	as	an	‘attractor,’	and	the	basin	of	attraction	constitutes	all	
initial	conditions	that	will	tend	toward	that	equilibrium	state.	All	real-world	SESs	are,	however,	continuously	
buffeted	by	disturbances,	stochasticity,	and	decisions	of	actors	that	tend	to	move	the	system	off	the	attractor.	
Therefore,	we	think	of	SESs	as	moving	about	within	a	particular	basin	of	attraction,	rather	than	tending	directly	
toward	an	attractor"	(Walker	et	al.,	2004).	
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environment.	Insofar	as	social-ecological	systems	are	concerned,	the	threats	that	can	arise	are	social	
disturbances	 as	 well	 as	 environmental	 ones,	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 they	 trigger	 changes	 in	 certain	
subsystems.	 
According	 to	 our	 proposal,	 resilience	 is,	 above	 all,	 a	 scheme	 for	 observing	 the	 structural	 coupling	
between	a	system	and	its	environment,	which	places	emphasis	on	a	system's	capacity	to	respond	in	
an	adaptive	manner	to	a	variety	of	disturbances	in	the	environment.	Thus,	the	resilience	of	a	system	
depends	on	the	variables	considered	and	the	structural	properties	that	are	observable	 in	a	system.	
Resilience	 is	not	mere	adaptation,	but	 rather	a	generalized	 readiness	on	 the	part	of	 the	 system	 to	
activate	 structural	 changes	 in	 diverse	 internal	 ambits	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 maintaining	 its	 viability.	 All	
systems	 that	 perdure	 through	 time	 are	 in	 a	 certain	 manner	 adapted	 (whether	 well-	 or	 poorly-
adapted)	 and	 all	 of	 them	 are	 endowed	with	 structural	 coupling	 with	 the	 environment	 (otherwise	
they	 would	 disappear);	 however,	 not	 all	 systems	 are	 resilient.	 Resilience	 is	 observed	 in	 a	 system	
throughout	its	history	of	diverse	past	structural	changes	and	its	general	readiness	to	accept	changes	
in	 its	 structure	 whose	 result	 is	 not	 as	 yet	 foreseeable.	 For	 our	 case	 study,	 the	 external	 trigger	 is	
climate	 change	 and	 the	 influence	 exerted	 by	 the	 rise	 in	 temperatures	 and	 diminished	 rainfall	 on	
water	availability	in	a	watershed. 
While	social	systems	can	be	described	without	difficulty	as	resilient	when	observed	independently	of	
their	 ecological	 environments,3	 this	 resilience	 cannot	be	 sustained	 through	 time	 if	 resilience	 is	 not	
observed	in	the	ecosystems	they	relate	to	(Folke,	2006).	The	same	is	true,	mutatis	mutandi,	in	regard	
to	their	operative	aspects;	i.e.,	the	system	that	operates	with	resilience	that	ignores	the	resiliences	of	
its	environment	opens	itself	to	danger.	For	this	reason,	the	observation	and	assessment	of	resilience	
in	ecological	systems	independently	of	their	relationship	to	social	systems	is	equally	insufficient.	Due	
to	 the	 above,	 in	 the	 perspective	 of	 social-ecological	 systems,	 the	 observation	 is	 proposed	 of	
resilience,	considering	both	the	social	and	the	environmental	dimensions.	 
In	sum,	and	in	favor	of	an	integrative	approach	that	can	enable	us	to	develop	our	investigation,	we	
can	 point	 out	 that,	 thanks	 to	 the	 development	 of	 the	 theory	 of	 social-ecological	 systems,	 and	
considering	the	other	theoretic	foci	adopted,	it	is	possible	to	establish	a	set	of	elements	that	are	key	
for	evaluating	the	resilience	in	complex	adaptive	systems.	 
                                                      
3	As	has	been	pointed	out,	the	application	of	the	concept	of	resilience	in	a	separate	manner	to	social	systems	
and	ecological	systems	poses	no	theoretical	impediments,	given	that	both	are	complex	adaptive	systems	and,	
therefore,	if	they	possess	more	than	one	basin	of	attraction,	it	would	be	possible	to	speak	of	resilience	
(Gallopin,	2006).	
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To	observe	the	resilience	of	a	complex	adaptive	system,	it	is	necessary	to	know:	1)	the	magnitude	of	
the	change	that	is	supported	by	a	system	while	maintaining	its	state,	which	refers	to	the	width	of	its	
basin	of	attraction	(latitude);	or	said	in	another	way,	its	capacity	for	structure	change	together	with	
maintaining	 its	organization;	2)	 the	system’s	capacity	 to	modify	 its	 self-organization	 (resistance);	3)	
the	system’s	capacity	to	learn	and	improve	its	possibilities	of	response	(Carpenter	et	al.,	2001);	4)	the	
system’s	 limit	 or	 threshold	which,	 upon	 being	 crossed,	 impedes	 recovery	 (precariousness);	 that	 is,	
when	a	point	of	no	return	is	reached;	and	5)	the	possibility	of	 influencing	the	states	desired	by	the	
system’s	dynamic	 in	 its	various	 levels	 (panarchy)	 (Walker	et	al.,	2004).	These	elements	refer	to	the	
maintenance	 of	 the	 system’s	 identity	 or	 organization,	 defined	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 its	 components,	
relations,	maintenance	 in	 time,	and	 its	 capacity	 for	 innovation	 (Cumming	et	al.,	2005).	All	of	 these	
properties	enable	us	to	delimit	observation	criteria	for	resilience. 
In	addition	 to	 these	observation	criteria,	 in	 the	case	of	 social-ecological	 systems	and	based	on	 the	
elements	 identified	 as	 pertinent	 by	 various	 authors	 (Norberg	 &	 Cumming,	 2008;	 Adger,	 2000;	
Tompkins	&	Adger,	2004;	Ostrom,	1990;	Rappaport,	1977;	Olsson	et	al,	2004;	Cumming,	2011),	four	
specific	 characteristics	 can	 be	 defined	 that	 are	 central	 for	 maintaining	 the	 system’s	 resilience:	 1)	
diversity,	 redundancy	 and	 flexibility,	 both	 in	 the	 social	 ambit	 and	 in	 the	 ecological	 ambit;	 2)	 high	
degree	of	connectivity	among	its	elements	and	with	their	environments,	together	with	the	capacity	
of	organizations	and	communities	to	collaborate	vertically	and	horizontally;	3)	the	system’s	memory	
linked	 to	 its	 capacity	 to	process	 information	and	 learn;	and	4)	 the	capacity	 to	modify	 the	 system’s	
structures	and	conditions	through	its	self-organization.	 
We	will	 explain	 each	 of	 these	 characteristics,	 which	 allow	 us	 to	 observe	 the	 capacity	 to	maintain	
resilience	in	social-ecological	systems.	 
3.2.1.1	Redundancy,	Diversity	and	Flexibility	
One	 of	 the	 fundamental	 aspects	 for	 the	 resilience	 of	 a	 system	 relates	 to	 the	 diversity	 of	 its	
components.	When	 uncertain	 situations	 are	 faced,	 the	 diversity	 of	 the	 components	 improves	 the	
possibilities	 for	 successfully	 engaging	 with	 them.	 We	 refer	 to	 the	 institutional,	 technological,	
productive,	 biological,	 institutional	 diversities,	 among	 others,	 that	 a	 social-ecological	 system	 is	
equipped	with.	When	a	system	possesses	this	kind	of	diversity	and	even	redundancy	of	elements,	it	
has	 greater	 flexibility	 and,	 therefore,	 improved	 possibilities	 of	 reaction	 to	 disturbances	 in	 the	
environment,	since	said	diversity	provides	it	with	more	tools	to	act	in	front	of	uncertainty	or	surprise.	
This	is	fundamental,	since	the	strategies	of	response	must	be	sufficiently	flexible	to	be	able	to	adapt	
to	the	changes	and	disturbances	that	the	system	faces	(Tompkins	&	Adger,	2004).	 
43	
	
By	 1977,	 Rappaport	 was	 already	 identifying	 the	 importance	 of	 over-homogenization	 and	 over-
segregation	for	the	relationship	between	society	and	the	environment.	The	growing	specialization	in	
agricultural	 production,	 for	 example,	 would	 produce	 a	 reduction	 in	 ecological	 stability,	 since	
monoculture	cultivation	develops	very	delicate	ecosystems	(Rappaport,	1977).		Low	diversity	entails	
a	 reduction	 of	 the	 system’s	 self-sufficiency	 and	 leaves	 it	 at	 the	 mercy	 of	 disturbances	 in	 the	
environment.	In	the	case	of	monoculture	crops,	these	form	highly	vulnerable	ecosystems	in	front	of	
climate	changes	or	—at	the	social	level—	changes	in	trade	structures.	Therefore,	it	may	be	sustained	
that	 excessive	 homogeneity	 results	 in	 loss	 of	 flexibility,	 which	 hampers	 the	 system’s	 response	
capacity	(Cumming,	2011). 
Redundancy	in	institutions	(for	example,	when	multiple	organizations	are	focused	on	the	same	issue)	
should	 not	 be	 understood	 in	 a	 negative	 sense,	 because	 this	 can	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	
absorption	of	the	disturbances	faced	by	a	system.	This	is	usually	seen	as	the	opposite	of	efficiency,	or	
as	 an	 unnecessary	 duplication	 of	 functions.	 	 However,	 this	 same	 redundancy	 entails	 a	 diversity	 of	
organizations	that	attend	to	an	issue,	providing	different	perspectives	and	alternative	possibilities	for	
engaging	with	it.	In	contexts	of	uncertainty,	this	can	be	an	important	tool	(Folke	et	al.,	2005). 
Finally,	the	variety	of	knowledge	and	experience	around	the	relationship	with	the	environment	can	
improve	the	strategies	for	facing	changes.		Also,	in	this	context	the	system’s	capacity	for	innovation	
(Cumming,	 2011)	 is	 important,	 since	 it	 allows	 for	 increasing	 internal	 diversity	 and,	 with	 it,	 the	
system’s	flexibility. 
3.2.1.2	Connectivity,	Collaboration	and	Collective	Action	
In	studies	about	resilience	in	social-ecological	systems,	it	has	been	determined	that	fragmentation	in	
both	the	ecological	and	social	domains	decreases	the	system’s	ability	to	react,	as	isolated	fragments	
lack	 connectivity,	 which	 decreases	 access	 to	 social	 and	 ecological	 diversity.	 This	 explains,	 for	
example,	why	socially	excluded	groups	tend	to	be	more	vulnerable	to	various	kinds	of	disturbances	
(Cumming,	2011):	they	lack	connectivity	and	have	poor	access	to	diversity	in	social	terms	(e.g.,	access	
to	services,	support	networks,	etc.).	Social	networks	are	often	built	around	ecological	networks	and	
natural	 resources;	 therefore,	 in	 many	 cases,	 social	 networks	 can	 be	 linked	 to	 spatial	 patterns	
(Cumming,	2011).	Where	social	isolation	is	spatially	associated	with	ecological	isolation,	the	system’s	
resilience	would	be	even	poorer. 
The	 connection	 between	 different	 social	 players	 and	 networking	 –understood	 as	 connections	 that	
are	 stable	 over	 time–	 enable	 the	 creation	 of	 opportunities	 for	 new	 interactions	 and	 thus	 greater	
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diversity	of	social	and	ecological	resources.	This	is	central	in	dealing	with	uncertainty	vis-à-vis	threats,	
as	well	as	in	addressing	the	changes	and	disturbances	affecting	the	system	(Folke	et	al.,	2005).	Thus,	
the	growth	and	consolidation	of	social	networks	at	the	local	level,	as	well	as	on	a	national,	regional	or	
international	scale,	contributes	to	 increasing	the	resilience	of	the	system	by	 increasing	connectivity	
and	diversity	(Olsson	et	al.,	2004).	 
Also	 important	 in	 this	 context	 is	 the	 relationship	between	 local	 groups	 and	 the	organizations	with	
broader	 territorial	 reach,	 as	 this	 allows	 for	 regulations	 or	 institutions	 designed	 at	 the	 national	 or	
regional	 level	 to	be	more	 in	 line	with	 local	 conditions	 (Tompkins	&	Adger,	2004).	Additionally,	 this	
makes	it	possible	to	make	use	of	the	knowledge	of	the	communities	that	are	directly	related	to	the	
environment.	This	has	been	understood	through	the	concept	of	polycentric	institutions,	which	makes	
reference	 to	 this	 condition	 that	 in	 some	cases	might	 create	 redundancy	but	nevertheless	makes	 it	
possible	to	face	disturbances	and	changes	at	different	levels	(Folke	et	al,	2005). 
Bridges	between	local	organizations	and	stakeholders,	and	organizations	acting,	for	example,	at	the	
national	level,	can	generate	opportunities	for	accessing	new	resources	or	further	knowledge.	Hence	
the	importance	of	vertical	and	horizontal	partnerships,	that	is,	the	connections	and	networks	that	are	
established	 to	 harness	 common	 resources	 and	 knowledge,	 both	 between	 the	 stakeholders	 in	 a	
community	and	with	others	who	are	part	of	a	higher	level	but	have	some	kind	of	vertical	relationship	
with	the	community	(government	agencies,	universities,	etc.)	(Folke	et	al.,	2005). 
Finally,	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 ability	 to	 act	 collectively	 is	 one	 of	 the	 aspects	 around	 which	
greatest	 consensus	 exists	 in	 the	 environment-society	 relationship.	 Collective	 action	 refers	 to	
coordination	between	 individuals	 in	order	to	accomplish	a	common	goal	 (Ostrom,	1990).	Access	to	
natural	 resources	 requires	 coordination	 between	 individuals,	 fundamentally	 to	 achieve	 a	 more	
sustainable,	equitable	access.	Joint	work,	support	networks,	and	participation	in	decision-making	are	
key	 elements	 for	 increasing	 resilience	 (Tompkins	 &	 Adger,	 2004).	 Specifically,	 for	 example,	 in	
connection	 with	 the	 possibilities	 to	 respond	 to	 climate	 change,	 the	 relevance	 of	 community	
resources	for	responding	to	the	impact	of	climate	change	and	making	collective	decisions	aiming	at	
improving	resilience	in	the	long	term	has	been	underscored. 
3.2.1.3	Social-ecological	Memory	and	Learning	
Another	factor	that	 is	 important	for	the	system’s	resilience	is	the	system’s	ability	to	 learn	about	 its	
relationship	 with	 the	 surroundings	 and	 about	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 social	 and	 ecological	
systems.	“Ecological	memory”	is	crucial	for	this	purpose	(Folke	et	al,	2005;	Olsson	et	al.,	2006).	This	
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concept	 brings	 together	 all	 the	 knowledge	 of	 a	 social	 system	 about	 its	 environment,	 how	 the	
environment	 has	 been	 impacted	 by	 changes	 in	 the	 surroundings,	 and	 the	 various	 adaptation	
strategies	that	have	been	developed. 
This	capability	to	store	knowledge	and	keep	it	available	in	the	system	involves	shared	learning	from	
which	perspectives	are	 reformulated	 to	 incorporate	new	knowledge	 that	will	be	 remembered	over	
time	 (Nykvist,	 2012).	 Both	 formal	 and	 informal	 contexts	 –scientific	 and	 popular	 knowledge–	 are	
considered	 in	 decision-making.	 In	 some	 instances,	 this	 knowledge	 is	 shared	 in	 the	 community	 at	
large,	but	in	other	cases,	only	a	portion	of	the	population	has	access	to	it	(Saterfiel	et	al.,	2013).		
The	 ability	 to	 capture	 experiences	 on	 changes,	 disturbances,	 or	 failed/successful	 adaptation	
strategies	 is	 configured	 by	 the	 possibilities	 for	 discussion	 and	 incorporation	 of	 different	 levels	 of	
knowledge	 for	 decision-making	 purposes	 (Folke	 et	 al.,	 2005).	 Ultimately,	 the	 social-ecological	
memory	 has	 to	 do	 with	 the	 social	 structures	 that	 define	 the	 possibility	 to	 remember	 and	 forget	
specific	events	and	the	knowledge	around	those	events	(Luhmann,	2007). 
The	 social-ecological	 memory	 makes	 it	 possible	 to	 connect	 past	 events	 to	 the	 present,	 to	 the	
expectations,	 and	 to	 future	 threats	 (Folke	 et	 al.,	 2005).	 The	 diversity	 in	 this	 kind	 of	 knowledge	 is	
critical	for	the	system’s	resilience,	as	it	makes	it	possible	to	develop	innovations	to	better	tackle	new	
threats	and	changes.	The	configuration	and	scope	of	this	memory	is	also	associated	with	the	level	of	
connectivity	 and	 vertical/horizontal	 partnership,	 since	 greater	 connectivity	 allows	 for	 addition	 of	
different	levels	of	knowledge	to	the	social-ecological	memory	of	the	systems,	at	the	same	time	as	it	
makes	it	possible	to	achieve	an	increased	collective	learning	during	processes	of	change. 
3.2.1.4	Self-organization	and	Governance	of	System	Changes	
A	fourth	 important	property	for	a	system	to	be	resilient	 is	 its	ability	to	self-organize	and	modify	 its	
own	structures;	we	addressed	this	earlier	 in	connection	with	the	distinction	between	structure	and	
organization.	This	property	relates	to	the	ability	to	preserve	the	system’s	original	identity	when	that	
status	is	desirable	or,	otherwise,	it	refers	to	the	possibility	of	driving	any	transformations	needed	in	
order	to	reach	more	desirable	states	in	the	face	of	threats	or	when	the	system’s	original	condition	is	
not	as	expected	(Folke,	2006;	Engle,	2011).	 
This	self-modifying	ability	is,	in	turn,	related	to	the	three	properties	explained	above.	(2.1.1)	A	system	
can	 modify	 its	 structures	 when	 it	 possesses	 the	 diversity	 and	 redundancy	 that	 provide	 it	 with	
sufficient	flexibility,	as	it	requires	elements	that	are	available	to	it	and	allow	it	to	make	the	necessary	
modifications.	 (2.1.2)	Additionally,	 in	order	 to	be	able	 to	carry	out	 those	modifications,	 the	system	
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needs	high	connectivity	between	 its	ecological	and	social	elements,	based	on	established	networks	
that	 make	 it	 possible	 to	 pass	 on	 knowledge	 and	 resources	 in	 general.	 (2.1.3)	 Finally,	 it	 is	 also	
necessary	 for	 the	 system	 to	 learn	 from	 past	 experiences	 and	 keep	 knowledge	 available	 in	 its	
memory,	in	order	to	make	innovations	and	thereby	respond	to	emerging	situations. 
In	 the	 social	 sphere,	 this	 ability	 to	 self-organize/govern	 is	 critical	 in	modifying	 the	 institutions	 and	
organizations	 that	 set	 the	 rules	 concerning	 natural	 resources,	 so	 that	 the	 system	 will	 be	 better	
prepared	 to	 face	 unexpected	 events,	 crises	 or	 uncertainty	 in	 general,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 deal	 with	 any	
conflicts	associated	with	such	changes	(Folke	et	al.,	2005).	This	latter	property	of	resilient	systems	is	
fundamental	to	develop	the	capacity	to	adapt	to	disturbances. 
We	have	briefly	summarized	those	properties	conducive	to	maintaining	the	resilience	of	a	system.	In	
the	 next	 section	 we	 will	 provide	 elements	 to	 specify	 what	 we	 observed	 based	 on	 this	 adaptive	
capacity	 (2.2),	 and	 then	 we	 will	 delve	 into	 the	 characteristics	 of	 self-organization	 for	 adaptive	
governance	(2.3). 
3.2.2	Capacity	to	Adapt:	Adaptability/Vulnerability	
Capacity	 to	 adapt	 is	 a	 cross-cutting	 concept	 that	 is	 used	 by	 both	 the	 vulnerability	 and	 resilience	
perspectives.	 As	 noted	 by	 Engle	 (2011),	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 articulate	 both	 paradigms	 based	 on	 the	
concept	of	adaptive	capacity;	therefore,	we	will	use	it	here	to	specify	the	theoretical	relationships	we	
are	discussing. 
Resilience	 is	 a	 property	 of	 the	 system	 that	 should	 not	 be	 seen	 as	 necessarily	 positive.	 A	 resilient	
system	may	be	publicly	unwanted	for	moral	reasons	(e.g.,	a	dictatorial	political	system)	or	because	it	
restricts	 the	 sustainability	 of	 a	 larger	 system	 in	 the	 long	 term	 (e.g.,	 a	 capitalist	 system	 based	 on	
consumption	 of	 non-renewable	 resources),	 or	 for	 other	 reasons.	 As	 mentioned	 before,	 what	
characterizes	resilience	in	purely	formal	terms	is	a	widespread	availability	throughout	the	system	to	
activate	 structural	 changes	 in	 various	 internal	 areas	 and	 to	 accept	 changes	 in	 its	 structure	whose	
outcome	has	not	yet	been	anticipated.	Resilience	describes	a	history	of	various	structural	changes	in	
a	system,	aimed	at	maintaining	the	system’s	viability.	Thus	it	is	clear	that	a	system’s	resilience	is	not	
intrinsically	positive	for	 its	milieu	(for	example,	the	resilience	of	the	capitalist	economic	system	can	
be	very	negative	when	evaluated	in	terms	of	its	impact	on	the	environment	or	in	terms	of	its	impact	
on	the	human	environment).	However,	its	adaptive	capacity	is	part	of	the	qualities	of	resilience	as	it	
relates	 to	 management	 and	 governance	 of	 system	 changes	 in	 order	 to	 improve	 the	 system’s	
relationship	 to	 the	environment.	 In	 this	 context,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	point	 out	 that	 a	 system	with	 low	
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adaptive	capacity	displays	more	“vulnerability”	to	threats	and	changes,	as	under	this	paradigm,	both	
“vulnerability”	and	“adaptation”	refer	to	relational	concepts	that	describe	a	system's	ability	to	react	
to	its	surroundings	in	a	specific	temporal	and	spatial	dimension	(Christmann	et	al.,	2012).		
While	resilience	refers	solely	to	a	system’s	 internal	aspects,	adaptation	and	vulnerability	 involve	an	
assessment	 of	 the	 specific,	 unique	 connection	 between	 a	 system	 and	 an	 observed	 threat	 in	 its	
surroundings.	 	 Based	 on	 the	 concepts	 of	 “adaptation”	 and	 “vulnerability,”	 we	 shall	 describe	 the	
observation	of	the	relationship	between	a	social-ecological	system	and	the	environmental	conditions	
encountered	by	said	system.	This	is	our	observation	of	a	relationship	that	occurred	within	a	specific	
period	of	time,	in	a	limited	area,	and	according	to	the	system’s	response	capacity	vis-à-vis	identified	
potential	threats.	All	of	these	concepts	are	explained	below. 
3.2.2.1	Vulnerability:	Low	Capacity	to	Adapt	
Vulnerability	 is	 generally	 defined	 as	 a	 system’s	 susceptibility	 to	 damage.	 It	 relates	 to	 a	 possible	
transformation	 of	 the	 system	 due	 to	 a	 specific	 external	 threat	 (Gallopin,	 2006).	 Considering	 the	
proposals	of	authors	 such	as	Gabi	Hufschmidt	 (2011),	Neil	Adger	&	Mick	Kelly	 (1999),	and	Michael	
Watts	&	Hans	Bohle	(1993),	three	key	elements	can	be	identified	when	researching	vulnerability:	1)	
exposure	 to	an	external	 threat	directly	associated	with	 the	biophysical	 conditions	of	 the	ecological	
milieu	and	the	disturbances	therein	identified;	2)	difficulties	to	control	that	threat,	and	3)	problems	
recovering	 from	damage	caused.	 In	 this	context,	 the	system’s	sensitivity	and	response	capacity	are	
key	to	identifying	its	vulnerability	vis-à-vis	the	threatening	conditions	identified	in	the	milieu. 
It	 is	 important	 to	 clarify	 that	 vulnerability	 is	 not	 the	 opposite	 of	 resilience	 –although	 a	 resilient	
system	 might	 be	 empirically	 less	 vulnerable	 vis-à-vis	 a	 non-resilient	 one-,	 since	 resilience	 as	 a	
property	of	the	system,	and	its	capacity	to	react	to	specific	disturbances	are	not	two	sides	of	a	single	
phenomenon	 (Adger,	 2000).	 A	 system	 can	 be	 non-resilient	 and	 non-vulnerable	 if	 it	 is	 not	 being	
submitted	 to	 any	 external	 threats.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 a	 system	may	 be	 resilient,	 but	 vulnerable	
anyway	 if	 faced	 with	 an	 extremely	 violent	 threat.	 That	 is	 to	 say,	 a	 “resilient”	 system	 can	 be	
“vulnerable”	if	 it	 is	exposed	to	threats	from	its	surroundings.	However,	as	noted	earlier,	the	history	
of	previous	exposures	to	threats,	past	vulnerabilities	which	are	stored	in	the	system’s	memory	can	be	
important	 elements	 in	 building	 resilience	 (Holling,	 1973).	Moreover,	 subject	 to	 the	 systems	 being	
observed	and	taking	into	account	what	part	of	the	elements	that	affect	vulnerability	operate	at	the	
individual	 or	 collective	 level	 (e.g.,	 access	 to	 economic	 resources	 or	 water	 ownership	 rights),	
consideration	 should	 be	 given	 to	 identifying	 various	 vulnerabilities	 in	 a	 single	 area	 (Adger	&	Kelly,	
1999;	Watts	&	Bohle,	1993).	 
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3.2.2.2	Adaptability:	High	Capacity	to	Adapt	
Another	 important	 relationship	 is	 the	 one	 that	 occurs	 between	 “adaptation”	 and	 “resilience”.	 As	
noted	above,	resilience	is	a	system’s	capacity	to	react	to	disturbances	in	general;	adaptive	capacity,	
on	the	other	hand,	has	to	do	with	the	system’s	capacity	to	react	vis-à-vis	a	specific	disturbance,	which	
allows	 it	 to	modify	 its	own	structures	based	on	 learning	and	self-organization	 (Walker	et	al.,	2004;	
Tompkins	&	Adger,	2004).	Due	to	their	conceptual	affinities,	“adaptation”	and	“sustainability”	have	
generally	 been	 correlated	 because	 sustainability	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 the	 system's	 capacity	 to	
maintain	adaptation	(Holling,	2001).	Adaptation	makes	the	system	appear	as	behaving	successfully	in	
its	 ecological	milieu	 because	 it	 has	 to	 do	with	 the	 system’s	 capability	 to	 deal	 with	 environmental	
contingencies	by	maintaining	or	improving	its	conditions	vis-à-vis	changes	in	its	milieu	and	changes	in	
its	 relationship	 with	 its	 milieu.	 Unlike	 resilience,	 which	 merely	 directs	 the	 system	 towards	 a	
generalized	preparedness	 for	structural	change,	adaptive	capacity	makes	use	of	 resilience	 to	direct	
transformations	 in	 the	 system.	 Thus,	 albeit	 with	 different	 results,	 both	 adaptation	 and	 resilience	
imply:	1)	the	system’s	capacity	to	react	vis-à-vis	threats;	2)	its	capacity	to	face	the	impacts	of	external	
forces;	 and	 3)	 its	 capacity	 to	 recover.	 And	 we	 add	 a	 fourth	 property:	 4)	 capacity	 to	 improve	 the	
system’s	condition	in	the	presence	of	an	equivalent	disturbance	in	the	future	(Adger,	2000;	Gallopin,	
2006).	 
To	achieve	adaptation,	there	are	elements	that	have	already	been	identified	as	critical:	learning	from	
previous	disturbances,	anticipation,	preparedness,	and	planning	 for	new	threats	 (Gunderson,	2000;	
Hufschmidt,	2011).	Also	 relevant	 is	a	system’s	capacity	 to	modify	 its	own	conditions	and	prospects	
for	change	(including	creation	of	new	basins	of	attraction	that	are	more	favorable	to	the	system,	or	
reduction	 of	 unwanted	 basins).	 Ultimately,	 a	 system’s	 capability	 to	 manage	 its	 own	 resilience	 is	
critical	to	achieve	adaptation	(Walker	et	al.,	2004;	Folke,	2006).	 In	this	regard,	a	system’s	resilience	
would	be	part	of	its	capacity	to	adapt	to	disturbances	caused	by	its	milieu,	since	a	resilient	system	is	
more	likely	to	react	to	its	environment.	In	other	words,	resilience	is	an	element	of	adaptive	capacity.	
These	elements	are	closely	connected	with	the	means	by	which	the	institutions	favor	these	processes	
(Adger	&	Kelly,	1999;	Nykvist,	2012);	therefore,	the	evolution	of	the	rules	affecting	resilience	during	
the	self-organization	phase	is	crucial	to	improving	the	possibilities	of	adaptation	(Walker	et	al,	2004).	 
3.2.2.3	Adaptive	Governance:	Positive	Resilience		
We	 talk	 about	 adaptation/vulnerability	 in	 the	 face	 of	 a	 specific	 threat	when	we	 envision	 four	 key	
elements:	reaction	to	a	threat,	capacity	to	face	the	impact	produced,	recovery	from	damage	caused,	
and	 modification	 of	 structures	 in	 order	 to	 be	 prepared	 to	 face	 new	 hazards.	 We	 can	 talk	 about	
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adaptation	(or	the	positive	side	of	adaptive	capacity)	when	a	system	manages	a	transformation	into	a	
desirable	 state	 so	 as	 to	 remain	 viable.	When	 this	 does	 not	 occur	 as	 expected,	 we	 can	 talk	 about	
vulnerability.	 In	 this	 context,	 when	 a	 system	 is	 capable	 of	 improving	 its	 adaptive	 capacity	 and	
manages	 to	 transform	 by	 self-organizing,	 we	 talk	 about	 positive	 resilience	 in	 social-ecological	
systems.		
To	 achieve	 this	 kind	of	 governance,	 stakeholders	must	be	 able	 to	 reorganize	 the	 system	within	 its	
desirable	statuses,	thus	responding	to	changing	conditions	and	the	disturbances	it	is	subject	to	(Folke	
et	 al.,	 2005).	 To	 achieve	 adaptive	 governance	 it	 is	 fundamental	 that	 the	 system	 be	 capable	 of	
experiencing	 and	 learning	 from	 different	 environment	 change	 adaptation	 strategies,	 maintaining	
bridges	 between	 organizations	 that	 generate	 scientific	 knowledge,	 decision-making	 organizations,	
and	the	affected	communities.	Therefore,	it	is	of	the	utmost	importance	to	provide	spaces	that	favor	
involvement	of	the	various	stakeholders	 in	the	decision-making	processes,	also	to	achieve	constant	
communication	 between	 the	 different	 levels	 and	 create	 forums	 for	 conflict	 resolution,	 all	 of	 this	
through	institutions	with	flexibility	to	confront	different	situations.	Also	important	is	the	availability	
of	information	about	the	system,	its	environment	and	the	disturbances	that	might	confront	it,	as	well	
as	the	development	of	infrastructure	to	deal	with	a	variety	of	scenarios.	Finally,	the	system’s	capacity	
to	 improve	its	own	conditions	by	taking	advantage	of	critical	situations	is	fundamental	(Dietz	et	al.,	
2003;	Folke	et	al.,	2005).		
Within	 this	 same	 discussion,	 and	 for	 this	 research	 in	 particular,	 we	 will	 understand	 “hydrologic	
adaptation”	 as	 an	 attribute	 of	 a	 system	 that	 positively	 responds	 to	 a	 disturbance	 in	 the	 water	
resource	(Gallopin,	2006),	and	whose	processes	develop	before,	during,	and	after	the	occurrence	of	a	
damage	or	disaster	(Hufschmidt,	2011).	At	the	same	time,	“hydrological	vulnerability”	refers	both	to	
the	system’s	limitations	to	confront	a	threat	and	to	the	negative	modifications	that	the	system	may	
suffer	 in	 the	 face	 of	 a	 specific	 disturbance,	 either	 during	 or	 after	 the	 occurrence	 of	 the	 threat	 or	
actual	 damage.	 Both	 these	 concepts	make	 reference	 to	 the	 system’s	 response	 capacity	 vis-à-vis	 a	
specific	disturbance.	Both	concepts	observe	the	relationship	between	the	system	and	its	milieu,	and	
are	intrinsically	tied	to	the	resilience	of	the	system.	Finally,	when	the	system	is	able	to	modify	itself,	
to	 manage	 its	 own	 resilience	 and	 improve	 its	 own	 conditions	 to	 be	 better	 prepared	 to	 confront	
future	disturbances,	we	speak	of	“adaptive	governance	of	water”. 3.3.		Social	Sources	of	Water	Vulnerability	
Heretofore	 we	 have	 fully	 explained	 the	 concepts	 coming	 from	 the	 approaches	 to	 the	 complex	
adaptive	systems	and	social-ecological	systems	that	serve	as	the	basis	for	our	research.	For	a	better	
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understanding	 of	 the	 social	 and	 cultural	 sources	 associated	 with	 hydrological	 vulnerability	 and	 to	
explain	 the	 factors	 identified	 as	 relevant	 for	 the	 resilience	 of	 the	 social	 system,	 in	 this	 section	we	
gather	 a	 variety	 of	 contributions	 from	 social	 sciences	 that	 complement	 the	 above	 perspectives.	 In	
this	 context,	 the	 theory	 of	 social	 systems	 is	 relevant,	 as	 it	 establishes	 synergy	 with	 the	 above-
mentioned	 perspectives	 and	 provides	 explanatory	 descriptions	 of	 the	 workings	 of	 contemporary	
society.	 However,	 this	 perspective	 must	 be	 complemented	 with	 the	 theoretical	 developments	 of	
other	systemic	 lines	that	address	social	phenomena	in	the	framework	of	complex	adaptive	systems	
and	 also	 from	 other	 perspectives	 that	 have	 questioned	 the	 social	 conditions	 associated	 with	
vulnerability.		
In	the	next	section	we	present	four	issues	that	are	central	to	the	observation	of	social	conditions	in	a	
social-ecological	system’s	resilience,	adaptive	capacity	and	vulnerability:	1)	cultural	characteristics	in	
the	 relationship	 with	 the	 environment;	 2)	 fundamental	 characteristics	 of	 contemporary	 society	 –
functional	 differentiation	 and	 organizational	 systems;	 3)	 institutional	 framework	 and	 ownership	
relations;	and	4)	the	collective	action	associated	with	natural	resource	management.	 
3.3.1	Cultural	Characteristics	in	the	Relationship	with	the	Environment	
The	cultural	characteristics	of	 the	social	groups	present	 in	a	 territory	constitute	a	key	 factor	 to	the	
relationship	 between	 society	 and	 the	 ecological	 milieu.	 The	 importance	 of	 culture	 to	 the	 society-
environment	 relationship	 has	 been	 approached	 from	 different	 perspectives	 in	 socio-cultural	
anthropology.	We	will	focus	on	the	contributions	of	Mary	Douglas	(1982)	and	Roy	Rappaport	(1977)	
because	 of	 the	 considerable	 influence	 of	 their	 proposals,	 both	 in	 general	 and	 on	 the	 systemic	
perspectives	previously	adopted. 
Rappaport’s	work	(1977,	1996)	was	influenced	by	the	systemic	theories,	and	it	is	one	of	the	primary	
milestones	 in	 ecological	 anthropology.	 This	 perspective	 considers	 man	 to	 be	 just	 another	 animal	
species	and,	as	such,	intimately	connected	with	his	environments	or	ecological	milieus	composed	of	
other	 biological	 organisms	 and	 inorganic	 substances	 from	 which	 the	 social	 systems	 obtain	 the	
resources	 necessary	 for	 their	 subsistence	 (matter	 and	 energy).	 	 The	 process	 of	 adapting	 to	
biophysical	 milieus	 is	 considered	 critical,	 as	 the	 relationship	 with	 nature	 is	 measured	 by	 beliefs,	
knowledge	 and	 imagery	 of	 nature	which	 are	 present	 in	 society.	 According	 to	Rappaport	 (1996),	 in	
order	to	appropriately	describe	the	relationship	between	society	and	the	environment	it	is	necessary	
to	consider	the	socio-cultural	elements	of	this	relationship,	as	well	as	its	symbols	and	values,	because	
they	define	the	risks	and	potential	impacts	involved,	as	well	as	the	strategies	to	deal	with	them. 
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One	 of	 this	 author’s	 most	 relevant	 contributions	 is	 his	 questioning	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	
culture	and	adaptation.	From	his	research	on	rituals,	he	explains	the	relevance	of	such	practices	for	
adaptation	as	well	as	for	maladaptation	to	ecological	milieus	(Rappaport,	1977).	By	examining	these	
practices	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 see	 that	 in	 certain	 circumstances,	 the	 cultural	 elements	 (e.g.,	 rituals),	
respond	 to	 the	 interests	 of	 just	 a	 sector	 of	 society	 or	 some	 institutions,	 which	 implies	 important	
negative	costs	to	individuals	and	the	ecosystems.	In	other	occasions,	the	cultural	elements	favor	self-
regulation	 by	 permitting	 to	 maintain	 the	 effects	 in	 the	 environment	 within	 acceptable	 ranges,	
thereby	avoiding	compromising	the	continuity	of	the	system	(e.g.,	the	famous	pig	slaughter	ritual	of	
the	 Tsembaga	 Maring	 tribe	 in	 Papua	 New	 Guinea).	 These	 self-regulation	 mechanisms	 permit	 to	
control	 the	 system	 when	 it	 approaches	 dangerous	 states.	 Such	 mechanisms	 may	 be	 cultural	
components,	 such	 as	 symbolic	 systems,	 religious	 beliefs,	 behavior	 patterns,	 moral	 codes,	 etc.,	
capable	 of	 making	 the	 system	 return	 to	 a	 state	 within	 an	 optimum	 range,	 and	 thus	 maintain	
adaptation	(Rappaport,	1977).		
In	 Rappaport’s	 proposal,	 self-organization	 is	 presented	 as	 a	mechanism	 that	 allows	 the	 system	 to	
remain	adapted,	as	 it	 is	thanks	to	self-organization	that	the	system	transforms	 itself	 in	response	to	
changes	in	the	milieu,	but	also	situations	are	observed	where	cultural	manifestations	are	associated	
with	 maladaptation	 processes	 (Rappaport,	 1977).	 These	 elements	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	
culture	and	adaptation	will	be	considered	in	this	paper. 
Another	element	that	is	important	in	observing	the	relationship	between	society	and	environment	is	
the	concept	of	risk.	In	understanding	risks	as	socially	constructed,	culture	appears	as	a	determinant	
of	 the	social	perception	and	construction	of	 threats.	Mary	Douglas	 (1987)	has	addressed	 this	 issue	
from	the	standpoint	of	anthropology;	she	explains	that	the	perception	of	risk	implies	recognition	and	
acceptance	 of	 the	 social	 dimension	 of	 risk,	 considering	 that	 risk	 is	 related	 to	 a	 society’s	 dominant	
beliefs	and	views.	From	her	perspective,	risks	are	loaded	with	cultural	conditionings:	the	perception	
of	risk	depends	on	the	social	system;	risk	generation	is	a	product	of	social	operations;	risks	are	often	
used	 socially	 (in	 the	 political,	 economic,	 legal,	 and	 other	 spheres),	 and	 their	 acceptance	 is	
determined	by	social	and	cultural	conditions	(Douglas	&	Wildavsky,	1982). 
Within	the	framework	of	what	has	been	known	as	cultural	theory,	Douglas	and	Wildavsky	delve	into	
a	theory	of	risk	perception	(Douglas	&	Wildavsky,	1982).	Based	on	risk	perception	and	culture,	ways	
of	life	associated	with	manners	of	perceiving	nature	are	identified:	robust,	somewhat	robust,	fragile,	
and	 capricious	 (Douglas,	 1992).	 Thus,	 different	 ways	 of	 life	 are	 identified,	 which	 configure	 the	
relationships	 of	 a	 social	 group	 with	 its	 ecological	 milieu.	 In	 the	 description	 of	 the	 ways	 of	 life,	 a	
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typology	known	as	“grid-group	cultural	theory”	is	used;	it	contemplates	two	basic	elements:	first,	an	
orientation	 towards	 the	 group	 of	 individuals,	 with	 a	 sense	 of	 belonging	 and	 solidarity	 in	 their	
relationships;	and	second,	the	social	restrictions	(grid)	for	individual	actions,	considering	the	setting	
up	of	roles	and	authorities	(Douglas,	1978).	 
In	 this	 context,	 four	major	ways	 of	 life	 or	 cultural	 types	 are	 identified:	 hierarchical,	 individualistic,	
egalitarian,	 and	 fatalistic,	 identifying	 ties	with	 the	myths	of	 nature	 (robust	 or	 benign,	 semi-robust,	
perverse	or	capricious,	ephemeral	or	fragile)	(Mamadouh,	1999).	When	nature	is	benign	and	robust,	
you	can	experiment	with	it,	it	is	seen	as	stable,	so	it	is	associated	with	the	selfish	and	individualistic	
way	of	life.	When	nature	is	capricious	and	perverse,	it	is	like	a	lottery,	its	behavior	is	unpredictable,	
you	 cannot	 learn	 from	 experience.	 This	myth	 is	 compatible	 with	 the	 fatalist	 point	 of	 view.	When	
nature	is	robust,	expert	knowledge	is	utterly	important,	as	it	is	used	to	assess	the	security	zone.	This	
is	 equivalent	 to	 the	 hierarchical	 way	 of	 life.	 Finally,	 when	 nature	 is	 ephemeral	 and	 fragile,	 any	
movement	 might	 unchain	 a	 catastrophe;	 this	 vision	 is	 associated	 with	 an	 egalitarian	 standing	
(Schwarz	&	Thompson,	1990).	 
While	 this	 typology	will	 not	 be	 directly	 applied	 in	 this	 paper,	we	will	 use	 some	 of	 its	 elements	 in	
analyzing	the	cultural	aspects	associated	with	the	water	resource,	like	other	researches	have	done	in	
questioning	 strategies	 to	 deal	 with	 climate	 change	 (Schubert	 &	 Gill,	 2010).	 In	 the	 model	 herein	
presented,	 the	grid	considers	both	 the	 formal	and	 informal	 structures	 (institutional	and	 ideological	
conditions)	 as	 they	 relate	 to	 water	 ownership	 regulation,	 while	 in	 group	 orientation	 we	 consider	
social	 relations,	 both	 informal	 and	 formalized	 into	 organizations	 (social	 and	 organizational	
conditions).	 
3.3.2	Functional	Differentiation	and	Organizational	Systems	
The	socio-cultural	conditions	that	are	relevant	to	the	relationship	with	the	environment	are	diverse,	
and	 develop	 at	 different	 levels	 in	 a	 society.	 Although	 in	 order	 to	 observe	 the	 relationship	 with	 a	
specific	ecological	milieu,	we	must	first	define	territorial	boundaries,	a	considerable	part	of	the	socio-
cultural	conditions	evinced	 in	such	space	are	associated	with	functional	and	organizational	systems	
at	the	global,	national,	and	regional	 levels.	Thus,	to	comprehend	the	social,	we	should	first	address	
the	basics	of	the	workings	of	society.	To	this	end,	we	will	 focus	on	the	description	of	a	functionally	
differentiated	society	and	organizational	systems,	which	are	central	to	understanding	contemporary	
society,	from	the	perspective	of	Niklas	Luhmann	(1984,	1997). 
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As	briefly	pointed	out	at	 the	beginning,	modern	society	 is	a	 functionally	differentiated	society	with	
dedicated	 subsystems	 in	 charge	 of	 resolving	 specific	 problems	 (Luhmann,	 1997).	 Along	with	 these	
functional	systems,	organizational	systems	arise,	which	operate	oriented	towards	specific	objectives,	
based	 on	 decisions.	 Each	 subsystem	 is	 operatively	 enclosed	 and	 observes	 its	 milieu	 through	 the	
distinctions	available	 to	 it,	 and	 is	blind	 to	 the	 choices	of	direction	 that	 are	not	observable	with	 its	
own	codes.		
Social	 systems	 are	 oriented	 to	 problems	 identified	 by	 their	 own	 structure,	 and	 do	 not	 follow	 an	
integrative	approach	at	a	global	level.	This	has	an	impact	on	environmental	issues,	which	arise	from	
social	 operations	 in	 the	 ecological	 milieu	 and	may	 be	 described	 in	 varying,	 sometimes	 conflicting	
ways.	 The	 distinctions	 of	 each	 system	 create	 difficulties	 in	 addressing	 environmental	 issues	 in	 a	
coordinated	manner.	Additionally,	environmental	communication	is	addressed	only	by	systems	that	
are	able	to	observe	it	from	their	own	structures,	i.e.,	systems	that	environmental	communication	can	
disturb,	which	limits	the	chances	for	greater	resonance	(Luhmann,	1986).		
Social	 systems	 presuppose	 a	milieu,	 as	 their	 operations	 are	 attached	 to	 their	 surroundings,	which	
may	 encompass	 other	 social	 subsystems,	 as	 well	 as	 psychical	 and	 ecological	 contexts.	 From	 this	
perspective,	 different	 surroundings	 can	 disturb	 a	 social	 system	 depending	 on	 the	 thresholds	 of	
resonance	established	by	 the	system’s	structure	 (Luhmann,	1984).	 	Therefore,	both	 for	 the	sake	of	
understanding	the	relationship	between	society	and	environment	and	for	observing	social	affairs	in	
the	 context	 of	 social-ecological	 systems,	 we	 need	 to	 observe	 the	 different	 social	 subsystems	
operating	 within	 a	 given	 territory	 and	 identify	 the	 structural	 constraints	 of	 functional	 and	
organizational	systems	(expectations	and	codes	of	the	functional	systems,	the	organizations	and	their	
decisions)	 and	 the	 relationships	 established	 with	 the	 ecological	 milieu	 based	 on	 these	
ascertainments. 
3.3.3	Institutional	Framework	and	Ownership	Relations	
The	 set	 of	 institutional	 restrictions	 translates	 into	 multiple	 combinations	 of	 formal	 and	 informal	
limitations,	 which	 set	 up	 the	 conditions	 for	 coordination	 between	 stakeholders	 and	 configure	 not	
only	 the	 ownership	 relations	 and	 the	 chances	 for	 trade,	 but	 also	 the	 regulations	 of	 access	 to	
ownership,	transaction	regulatory	structures,	and	the	function	of	the	organizations	involved	in	their	
management	(North,	1990).	When	institutions	face	hydrological	vulnerability	conditions,	it	is	possible	
to	 identify	patterns	of	social	 interaction	that	 restrict	 the	chances	 for	action	around	water	 resource	
management	(Nykvist,	2012).		
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An	element	 that	 is	 central	 to	 the	 institutional	 framework	 in	connection	with	 the	hydrological	 issue	
has	 to	 do	with	 ownership	 of	water	 resources.	 To	 address	 this	 issue,	we	 consider	 the	 proposals	 of	
several	 authors,	 including	 Robert	 Ellikson	 (1993),	 Chris	 Hann	 (2007),	 Franz	 von	 Benda-Beckmann,	
Douglas	North	(1990),	Keebet	von	Benda-Beckmann	and	Melanie	Wiber	(2006).		Following	them,	we	
will	 understand	 ownership	 of	water	 based	 on	 a	 set	 of	 rights,	where	 the	 social	 unit	 that	 holds	 the	
property	right	to	the	resource	or	has	been	granted	access	to	it	has	to	be	considered,	as	well	as	the	
valuable	defined	as	a	property	–in	this	case,	water–	and	the	rights	and	obligations	with	regard	to	that	
property	right	or	right	of	use.		 
The	 transaction	 costs	 are	 associated	 with	 ownership	 relations	 and	 the	 institutions	 that	 lessen	
uncertainty	around	this	issue	(North,	1990).	Generally,	the	role	of	the	institutions	consists	in	reducing	
uncertainty	 in	 human	 interaction	 by	 limiting	 the	 choices	 of	 the	 actors	 and	 enabling	 coordination.	
These	institutions	act	according	to	formal	regulatory	frameworks	–political-juridical	rules	(laws),	and	
economic	 rules	 (contracts).	 All	 of	 these	 rules,	 in	 their	 different	 hierarchies,	 define	 restrictions	 on	
ownership	 relations	 and	on	 the	 chances	 for	 trade.	 In	parallel	 appear	 informal	 rules	or	 restrictions,	
including	 beliefs,	 ideologies,	 customs,	 rules	 of	 conduct	 and	moral	 values,	which	 play	 an	 important	
role	in	decision-making	with	regard	to	the	ownership	and	use	of	water,	because	the	formal	rules	are	
often	 incomplete;	 additionally,	 informal	 restrictions	 motivate	 certain	 choices	 above	 others.	 These	
informal	 restrictions	 also	 influence	 the	 preparation	 and	 amendment	 of	 formal	 rules.	 As	 amending	
these	 rules	 involves	 investing	 resources,	 this	 is	 done	 only	 when	 properly	 justified	 and	 viewed	 as	
necessary	(North,	1990). 
Following	 the	proposal	 of	Rappaport	 (1977),	we	will	 differentiate	between	higher-	 and	 lower-level	
regulators,	 considering	 formal	 and	 informal	 regulations	 that	 operate	 at	 different	 levels	 in	 society.	
Lower-level	 regulators	 would	 be	 closer	 related	 to	 the	 conditions	 of	 the	 milieu,	 while	 higher-level	
regulators	 may	 be	 more	 "arbitrary."	 Rappaport	 states	 that	 the	 response	 times	 of	 lower-level	
regulators	are	shorter	than	those	of	higher-level	regulators	because	they	are	more	directly	exposed	
to	environmental	disturbances,	and	also	because	of	 their	possibilities	 for	modification.	 In	 contrast,	
higher-level	 regulators	 take	 longer	 to	 respond,	 but	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 react	 vis-à-vis	 major	
disturbances.		However,	the	loss	of	diversity	and	self-sufficiency	would	result	in	loss	of	autonomy	by	
institutions,	 and	 gain	 of	 influence	 on	 the	 part	 of	major	 regulators	 (Rappaport,	 1977).	 In	 situations	
where	local	and	regional	benefits	are	in	conflict,	a	difference	arises	in	the	institutions’	management	
capabilities:	the	 local	government	may	be	more	responsive,	while	the	regional	government	may	be	
more	 capable	 of	 ensuring	 equity	 and	 sustainability	 (Cumming,	 2011).	 The	 chances	 of	 endurance	
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increase	when	disturbances	occur	on	smaller	scales	(Walker	et	al,	2004),	because	the	system	is	less	
likely	to	react.	 
Ultimately,	 to	 understand	 the	 ownership	 relations	 around	 hydrological	 resources,	 we	 need	 to	
examine	 the	 various	 levels	 of	 social	 practices	where	 they	 are	 expressed	 -the	 venues	where	water	
ownership	 rights	 are	 defined	 or	 discussed,	 the	 transactions	 of	 water	 rights,	 and	 the	 formal	 and	
informal	restrictions	that	enable	this	coordination. 
3.3.4	Management	of	Resources	at	Community	Level	
A	fundamental	aspect	of	the	socio-cultural	conditions	for	this	society-environment	relationship	is	the	
ability	to	act	collectively.	This	aspect	was	briefly	addressed	above	in	connection	with	collaboration	in	
the	 context	of	 the	 resilience	of	 a	 social-ecological	 system.	Collaborative	partnerships	are	 critical	 in	
relating	 to	 the	 ecological	 milieu.	 To	 understand	 this,	 we	 have	 considered	 the	 work	 of	 two	 great	
international	icons:	Mancur	Olson	(1971)	and	Elinor	Ostrom	(1990). 
The	theory	of	collective	action	sets	out	the	conditions	under	which	cooperation	occurs.	Olson,	with	
his	book	The	Logic	of	Collective	Action:	Public	Goods	and	the	Theory	of	Groups	(1971),	set	out	a	line	
of	work	of	great	influence,	which	has	remained	current	to	date,	addressing	the	potentiality	of	group	
action.	His	work	 in	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 theory	 of	 groups,	 attempts	 to	 explain	 the	 existence	 and	
action	of	a	group,	when	and	how	a	certain	number	of	people	will	act	jointly	with	one	common	goal.		
This	perspective	illustrates	the	fact	that	when	people	sharing	interests	make	strategic	decisions	as	a	
group,	 there	 is	 always	 a	 very	 large	 proportion	 of	 its	 members	 for	 whom	 the	 effort	 invested	 in	
protecting	 those	 interests	 is	 greater	 than	 the	 actuarial	 expectation	 of	 drawing	meaningful	 results	
from	said	action.	This	is	because	the	benefit	from	the	action	is	common	to	all	group	members,	while	
the	effort	is	always	individual.	Thus,	there	will	be	a	great	temptation	to	expect	others	to	mobilize	and	
obtain	benefits	 for	 the	 group	 (the	 so-called	 “free	 rider”).	Nonetheless,	 collective	 actions	do	occur,	
and	 for	 this	 to	 happen,	 Olson	 (1971)	 proposes	 the	 use	 of	 “selective	 incentives”	 (social,	 cultural,	
economic,	etc.).	So,	the	collective	action	will	occur	when,	in	addition	to	the	expectation	of	achieving	
the	collective	goal	–understood	as	a	public	good–	there	is	a	mechanism	that	boosts	participation	in	
the	 action,	 in	 the	 form	 of	 selective	 benefits.	 In	 this	 context,	 selfish	motivations	 oriented	 towards	
private	 (economic,	 emotional,	 symbolic,	 etc.)	 purposes,	 work	 as	 selective	 incentives	 conducive	 to	
materializing	the	collective	action	(Urquiza,	2006).		
Elinor	 Ostrom,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 has	 focused	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 access	 to	 the	 commons	 (Ostrom,	
1990).	The	author	proposes	key	socio-cultural	conditions	to	successful	management	of	these	assets,	
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including:	 access	 limits	 should	 be	 clearly	 defined,	 that	 is,	 there	 should	 be	 explicit	 rules	 regarding	
access	to	the	commons;	local	conditions	should	be	taken	into	consideration;	the	community	should	
be	involved	in	the	decision-making	process;	the	community’s	prospects	for	self-determination	should	
be	 respected.	Ostrom	also	emphasizes	 the	 relevance	of	both	 supervising	and	 tracking	 the	use	and	
consumption	of	 the	 commons,	 and	providing	 for	 penalties	 against	 those	who	do	not	 abide	by	 the	
standards	 established	 for	 their	 use	 and	 consumption.	 Also,	 to	 successfully	manage	 the	 commons,	
reliable,	accessible	dispute	settlement	mechanisms	should	be	in	place	(Ostrom,	2000).	To	fulfill	these	
requirements,	 it	 is	 fundamental	to	have	a	good	institutional	structure,	so	as	to	distribute	operating	
costs,	 income,	 or	 the	 use	 of	 the	 commons.	 In	 order	 to	 reduce	 uncertainties,	 it	 is	 critical	 for	 the	
community	 to	 have	 control	 over	 resource	 use/appropriation	 decisions,	 as	 well	 as	 over	 the	
information	 on	 the	 resources.	 In	 this	 context,	 knowledge	 of	 the	 system	 and	 the	 system’s	 learning	
capacity	are	of	the	essence.	 In	parallel,	Cardenas	and	Ostrom	(2004)	point	out	some	elements	that	
drive	individuals	to	act	cooperatively:	identity,	reciprocity	in	the	group	context,	and	trust.	Institutions	
play	a	critical	role	here,	since	individual	values	are	not	enough.	In	some	contexts,	the	institutions	may	
disfavor	 sustainable	 development,	 particularly	 where	 local	 knowledge	 and	 authorities	 are	 not	
respected,	or	where	communities’	ability	to	develop	self-regulations	is	ignored. 
Elinor	Ostrom	 (2009)	 also	develops	her	work	 in	 the	 context	of	 social-ecological	 systems;	here,	 she	
identifies	multiple,	interrelated	subsystems,	including	the	social.	To	Ostrom,	the	greatest	challenge	is	
in	understanding	why	in	some	cases,	social-ecological	systems	achieve	sustainable	development	and	
in	others,	they	do	not.	To	make	progress	in	this	respect,	she	highlights	the	importance	of	examining	
the	 relationships	 between	 the	 stakeholders	 at	 different	 levels	 (Ostrom,	 2009).	 When	 individuals	
expect	 the	 benefits	 gained	 from	 the	 joint	 management	 of	 resources	 to	 be	 greater	 than	 the	
investment	made	in	creating	the	necessary	rules	and	regulations,	they	are	likely	to	self-organize.	But	
when	 users	 cannot	 be	 trusted	 to	 respect	 the	 rules,	 these	 community	 governance	 initiatives	 are	
discouraged.	 Ostrom	 (2009)	 identifies	 ten	 key	 variables	 that	 would	 affect	 the	 governance	 of	 the	
commons	 and	 the	 costs	 and	 assets	 perceived:	 the	 clarity	 of	 the	 rules	 established	 by	 the	 users;	
coherence	and	respect	for	the	rules	from	the	national	level	toward	local	conditions;	information	and	
cooperation	 at	 the	 various	 levels;	 compliance	 monitoring,	 and	 user’s	 willingness	 to	 monitor	 the	
practices	associated	with	the	use	and	distribution	of	resources.	 
Other	 elements	 that	 Ostrom	 and	 colleagues	 identify	 as	 relevant	 in	 promoting	 collective	 action	 to	
govern	access	to	the	commons,	are:	the	individuals	should	be	aware	that	their	contribution	will	make	
a	 difference;	 there	 should	 be	 some	 certainty	 that	 the	 contribution	 made	 will	 be	 returned	 or	
recovered;	the	reputation	of	the	community	involved	should	be	positive;	the	time	horizon	should	be	
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longer;	the	individuals	should	be	able	to	enter	and	exit	the	various	groups	(in	order	to	achieve	micro-
adjustments).	These	researchers	also	emphasize	that	 it	should	be	possible	to	communicate	with	all	
participants,	 ideally	 in	face-to-face	situations;	therefore,	group	size	is	 important.	Based	on	previous	
research,	 it	 has	been	determined	 that	 it	 is	 easier	 to	build	 trust	 in	 smaller	 groups.	However,	 in	 the	
case	 of	 public	 goods,	 large	 groups	 are	 necessary	 in	 order	 to	 enhance	 the	 expectations	 of	 success	
(e.g.,	 for	mitigation	of	climate	change),	as	 it	 is	not	possible	 to	address	 these	 issues	on	 the	basis	of	
small	 groups.	 This	 certainly	 creates	 a	 bigger	 challenge	 in	 dealing	 with	 problems	 associated	 with	
public	goods.	They	also	highlight	 that	 if	a	system	 is	highly	productive,	 there	will	be	no	 incentive	to	
invest	time	and	effort	 in	community	organization,	as	there	 is	no	obvious	need	for	collective	action.	
Thus,	 self-organization	 would	 be	 likely	 to	 occur	 only	 where	 users	 identify	 conditions	 of	 scarcity	
(Poteete	et	al.,	2010). 
Therefore,	 we	 can	 conclude	 that	 collective	 action	 in	 connection	 with	 the	 use	 and	 care	 of	 the	
commons	is	not	something	that	can	be	taken	for	granted.	Just	because	a	community	shares	the	same	
interests,	 you	 cannot	 assure	 that	 its	 members	 will	 act	 based	 on	 those	 interests.	 However,	 when	
collective	action	occurs,	it	is	thanks	to	selective	incentives	and	to	the	assumption	that	others	will	act	
collectively	 too,	which	 is	 associated	with	 the	 socio-cultural	 conditions	 of	 the	 group	 and	 how	 such	
conditions	make	it	possible	to	have	confidence	in	the	group. 
In	 sum,	 a	 number	 of	 conditions	 are	 necessary	 in	 order	 to	 facilitate	 collective	 action,	 including	
promotion	and	support	from	institutions,	appropriate	size	of	the	community	involved,	and	existence	
of	selective	incentives	(Ostrom,	1990).		Only	when	favorable	conditions	exist,	is	it	possible	to	prevent	
the	 individual	 strategic	 behavior	 that	 passes	 over	 the	 good	 of	 the	 community	 (known	 as	 “free-
riding”4)	 or	 the	 excessive	 exploitation	 of	 the	 resources	 (as	 in	 the	 so-called	 	 “tragedy	 of	 the	
commons”5).		Thus,	the	conditions	that	favor	collective	action	can	increase	the	resilience	of	he	social	
system	vis-à-vis	the	threats	of	the	ecological	milieu. 
In	 the	 studies	 by	 Elinor	Ostrom	and	 colleagues	 (Attanasio	 et	 al.,	 2009),	 it	 is	 concluded	 that	 family	
members	and	close	 friends	are	more	 likely	 to	act	collectively	and	generate	 relations	of	 reciprocity,	
while	relations	or	reciprocity	and	collective	action	are	much	less	common	between	strangers.	These	
authors	 stress	 the	 importance	 of	 risk	 aversion	 in	 unfamiliar	 contexts,	 the	 relevance	 of	 the	 social	
standards	 involved,	 the	monitoring	 of	 their	 compliance,	 and	 the	 interactions	 between	 the	 parties	
                                                      
4	The	"free	rider"	issue	has	often	been	used	in	political	and	economic	theory	to	refer	to	situations	where	
individuals	benefit	from	common	goods	or	services	without	paying	or	working	towards	achieving	the	benefits.	
5	“Tragedy	of	the	Commons”	involves	a	situation	where	a	group	of	individuals	moved	by	personal	interests	and	
acting	independently	destroy	or	extinguish	a	shared	asset.	
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(Poteete	et	al.,	2010).	An	important	aspect	of	this	process	involves	the	historical	background,	that	is,	
when	 some	 individuals	 develop	 a	 successful	 partnership,	 others	 are	more	 likely	 to	 act	 collectively	
too.	The	more	people	engage	in	collective	action,	the	less	are	the	perceived	risks	of	not	receiving	the	
expected	collective	benefits:	trust	and	reciprocity	are	mutually	reinforcing.	But	this	also	means	that	
when	the	 trust	 is	broken	and	some	community	members	abstain	 from	taking	collective	action,	 the	
rest	 is	 likely	 to	 follow	 suit.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 of	 the	 utmost	 importance	 to	 establish	 appropriate	
penalties	and	oversight	capacities	to	prevent	such	occurrences.	 
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4. Chilean	Model	of	Water	Management	
Chile	pioneered	the	installation	of	a	free-market	regime	for	use	of	national	water	resources,	where	
water	 is	managed	as	a	commodity	subject	to	the	forces	of	supply	and	demand	in	a	market	without	
state	 regulations	 (Bauer,	 2003).	 Paradoxically,	 the	Water	 Code	 argues	 that	 the	market	 recognizes	
water	as	a	national	good	for	public	use,	but	at	the	same	time	as	a	tradable	economic	good,	which	has	
permitted	water	 resources	 to	be	 governed	by	 rules	of	 private	property	within	 the	 framework	of	 a	
free	market	(Donoso,	2003).	4.1.	The	Water	Code	in	Chile	
The	 main	 features	 of	 the	 Chilean	 Water	 Code	 are	 the	 stating	 of	 conditions	 for	 managing	 water	
resources;	 that	 is,	 regulating	 the	water	market	 in	Chile	 (Donoso,	2003;	Hernández,	 2006;	Nuñez	&	
Soto,	2010):	
§ The	State	provides	 free	water	 rights	 in	perpetuity	 to	anyone	 that	 requests	 them,	provided	 the	
requesting	party	 complies	with	 the	 following	 requirements:	 a)	 the	application	must	be	“legally	
appropriate”;	 b)	 it	must	 be	 technically	 demonstrated	 that	 there	 are	 available	water	 resources	
from	a	natural	source,	distinguishing	whether	they	emanate	from	surface	or	groundwater;	and	c)	
the	new	use	must	not	affect	 the	holders	of	existing	 rights.	 The	application	must	define:	a)	 the	
amount	of	water	to	be	extracted	(in	liters	per	second);	b)	the	points	at	which	the	party	wishes	to	
collect	the	water	and	the	means	of	such	collection;	and	c)	whether	the	right	 is	consumptive	or	
non-consumptive,	 to	 be	 permanently	 or	 temporarily	 exercised,	 continuous,	 discontinuous	 or	
alternated	with	other	persons.	
§ If	 a	 dispute	 occurs	 between	 individuals	 applying	 for	 the	 same	 rights,	 the	 final	 owner	 is	
determined	 through	 an	 auction	 to	 the	 highest	 bidder,	 where	 the	 person	 willing	 to	 pay	 the	
highest	 amount	 for	 the	 resource	 is	 awarded	 the	 rights.	However,	 in	 cases	 involving	 the	 public	
interest,	the	President	of	Chile	may	cancel	the	auction	and	assign	the	resource	for	the	benefit	of	
a	particular	party.	
§ After	obtaining	the	water	rights,	the	owners	can	trade	with	them	without	restriction,	paying	no	
taxes	or	license	fees	for	the	maintenance	of	the	resource	(except	for	the	2005	amendment	to	the	
Water	 Code,	 which	 establishes	 a	 fee	 for	 non-use	 of	 the	 resource,	 aimed	 at	 discouraging	 the	
accumulation	of	and	speculation	in	an	“idle	resource”).	Transactions	involving	water	rights	can	be	
made	on	 the	 free	market,	as	once	 they	are	granted	private	 rights	by	 the	State,	 individuals	 can	
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make	use	of	those	rights	without	State	 intervention.	There	 is	absolute	freedom	of	disposal	and	
acquisition,	 with	 the	 market	 established	 as	 the	 means	 to	 resolve	 the	 competition	 between	
different	uses	of	the	resource.	
§ Water	rights	are	 legally	defined	as	a	real	right	that	allows	the	use	of	assigned	water	resources.	
Therefore,	water	rights	are	not	subject	to	a	particular	use	requirement	and	there	are	no	grounds	
for	their	revocation.	
§ Rights	of	water	use	are	not	linked	to	land	ownership	rights,	which	means	that	they	can	be	bought	
and	sold	irrespective	of	the	owner	of	the	land	on	which	the	water	flows.	
§ Water	 use	 rights	 are	 subject	 to	 the	 “registered	 property	 regime”,	 similarly	 to	 land	 ownership.	
This	registry	provides	legal	certainty	regarding	the	ownership	of	water	rights,	establishing	several	
constitutional,	civil,	criminal	and	special	legal	actions	for	parties	to	defend	their	water	use	rights	
against	damage	or	unlawful	interference.	
§ Water	rights	must	be	administered	by	organized	users.	The	State	practically	does	not	interfere	at	
all	 in	 the	management	and	control	of	 the	effective	exercise	of	 these	 rights.	User	organizations	
are	 responsible	 for	managing	 and	monitoring	 the	 implementation	of	 these	 rights,	 and	 also	 for	
building,	maintaining	 and	 improving	 the	 headworks,	 canals	 and	 other	works	 necessary	 for	 the	
exploitation	of	the	resource.	
The	 Water	 Code	 defines	 different	 types	 of	 rights,	 classifying	 them	 as	 consumptive	 and	 non-
consumptive	(Donoso,	2003;	Bauer,	2003):	
§ Consumptive	 rights	 (derechos	 consuntivos):	 right	 to	 use	 the	 water	 without	 a	 requirement	 to	
return	 the	 resource	 post-use.	 The	 owner	 of	 this	 right	 can	 entirely	 consume	 the	 water	 in	 any	
activity	(including	 irrigation,	potable	water,	 industrial	and	mining	use).	However,	some	of	these	
waters	 do	 in	 fact	 return	 to	 the	 rivers	 either	 as	 ground	 or	 surface	 water,	 in	 many	 cases	
contaminated.	
§ Non-consumptive	rights	(Derechos	no	consuntivos):	right	to	use	that	forces	the	owner	to	restore	
the	water,	 amounting	 to	use	without	 consumption	 (an	example	would	be	hydroelectric	 power	
generation).	It	is	established	that	this	use	must	not	impede	or	limit	the	exercise	of	other	current	
consumptive	 rights.	 However,	 there	 is	 no	 clear	 regulation	 on	 period	 of	 accumulation	 of	 these	
waters,	which	may	in	practice	affect	downstream	consumptive	users.	
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The	manner	of	exercising	both	rights	(consumptive	and	non-consumptive)	can	also	vary.	This	variety	
of	rights	was	designed	with	the	aim	of	increasing	opportunities	for	use	of	water	resources.	The	rights	
are	supported	by	a	special	 legal	 framework	that	protects	them	and	permits	their	 transfer	 (Donoso,	
2003):	
§ In	permanent	exercise:	 rights	allowing	the	use	of	water	resources	 in	an	ongoing	manner	 in	the	
amount	established	by	 the	 rights	of	use,	unless	 the	 source	of	 supply	does	not	 contain	enough	
water,	in	which	case	the	flow	must	be	divided	among	the	users	who	have	rights	over	it.	
§ Possible	 exercise:	 right	 that	 allows	 the	owner	 to	use	water	only	during	periods	when	 the	 flow	
maintains	a	surplus,	and	only	after	the	owners	of	continuous	exercise	rights	have	been	supplied.	
§ In	 continuous	 exercise:	 right	 that	 allows	 the	 steady	 use	 of	water	 for	 twenty-four	 hours	 a	 day,	
throughout	the	year.	
§ In	discontinuous	exercise:	 right	 that	allows	 the	use	of	water	only	during	certain	periods	of	 the	
year.	
§ Alternating	 exercise:	 water	 rights	 in	 which	 the	 resource	 is	 distributed	 between	 two	 or	 more	
parties	who	take	turns	to	make	use	of	the	supply.	
The	Chilean	model	defines	water	resources	in	an	overlapping	sense	as	both	public	and	private	goods,	
since	 it	considers	that	where	a	river	enters	 into	some	kind	of	authorized	channeling,	 it	 temporarily	
loses	 its	character	as	a	national	good	 for	public	use	and	 is	considered	as	a	private	economic	good.	
When	the	waters	return	to	the	river	flow,	they	are	again	deemed	public	goods	until	channeled	back	
to	another	owner	(Donoso,	2003).	Considering	that	the	waters	have	owners,	as	a	private	economic	
good	 they	 can	 be	 sold,	 leased,	 assigned	 and	 used	 for	 any	 production	 process,	 such	 as	 irrigation,	
among	other	possibilities.	
One	 of	 the	 benefits	 identified	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 model	 is	 that	 it	 allows	 users	 to	 internalize	 the	
opportunity	 cost	of	 the	 resource	and	provides	 incentives	 to	adopt	new	 technologies	 that	 conserve	
resources	and	improve	efficiency	of	use.	 In	this	model,	efficiency	is	understood	as	the	use	of	water	
by	 an	 agent	 with	 the	 highest	 economic	 value.	 From	 this	 perspective,	 a	 competitive	 water	 rights	
market	would	permit	optimal	resource	allocation,	through	the	regulation	of	supply	and	demand	in	a	
“water	market”.	In	short,	the	spirit	underpinning	the	design	of	the	Water	Code	considers	water	as	an	
economic	good;	therefore,	the	market	is	the	appropriate	mechanism	to	ensure	its	efficient	use,	with	
public	authorities	interfering	as	little	as	possible	(Hernandez,	2006).	
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However,	 even	 proponents	 of	 the	model	 identify	 elements	 that	 limit	 the	 operation	 of	 and	 create	
many	difficulties	in	achieving	a	properly	functioning	market.	One	of	the	main	difficulties	identified	is	
the	initial	allocation	of	water	use	rights	for	free,	which	represents	a	transfer	of	wealth	to	individuals	
from	a	national	good	for	public	use.	Since	this	initial	allocation	does	not	reflect	the	economic	value	of	
the	 resource,	 coupled	 with	 serious	 deficiencies	 in	 transparency	 and	 fairness,	 it	 favors	 only	 those	
stakeholders	who	 are	 better	 informed	 about	 the	 possibilities	 of	 resource	 allocation.	 Similarly,	 the	
ability	to	accumulate	“idle	water”	has	increased	market	problems,	because	until	recently	the	lack	of	
legal	 restriction	or	payment	of	 license	 fees	would	 favor	monopolistic	 situations.	 Finally,	 it	 has	also	
been	stated	that	this	model	poses	serious	difficulties	for	the	integrated	management	of	watersheds,	
as	 the	 uses	 of	 each	 type	 of	 right	 are	 subject	 to	 change	 that	 may	 affect	 downstream	 consumers	
(Donoso,	 2003),	 while	 the	 State	 has	 no	 opportunity	 to	 monitor	 or	 plan	 for	 situations	 of	 extreme	
water	scarcity.	
4.1.1	Legal	Reform	of	2005	
After	years	of	discussions	on	 the	provisions	of	 the	Water	Code	and	the	need	to	 improve	 it,	due	 to	
performance	problems	 in	 the	water	market	across	most	of	 the	country,	 it	was	decided	 to	partially	
amend	 the	 legislation.	 This	 reform	was	 corrective	 and	 aimed	 at	 strengthening	 and	 revitalizing	 the	
water	market,	 avoiding	accumulation	and	excessive	 speculation	by	users	who	did	not	make	use	of	
their	rights.	The	main	aspects	of	this	reform	were	(Hernandez,	2006;	Nuñez	&	Soto,	2010):	
§ A	requirement	to	justify	new	water	rights	applications	that	exceed	a	certain	number	of	liters	per	
second,	 clarifying	 the	 projected	 kind	 of	 use.	 Although	 the	 kind	 of	 use	 must	 be	 previously	
declared,	nothing	prevents	an	owner	or	 successor	 from	changing	 the	destination	or	use	of	 the	
water	subsequent	to	its	acquisition.	
§ A	requirement	to	pay	for	non-use	of	the	resource,	through	a	license	fee	intended	to	discourage	
hoarding	 and	 accumulation	 of	 idle	 water.	 This	 fee	 is	 applied	 in	 the	 case	 of	 owners	 of	 water	
flowing	at	more	than	10	or	100	liters	per	second,	depending	on	the	location	of	the	resource	and	
the	type	of	right	(consumptive	or	non-consumptive).	
§ The	President	of	 the	Republic	of	Chile	now	has	 the	ability	 to	exclude	 from	market	competition	
water	resources	considered	significant	for	the	community,	with	the	aim	of	protecting	the	public	
interest	 of	market	 competition.	 It	 is	 possible	 to	 avoid	 auctions	when	 there	 is	 competition	 for	
rights.	
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§ The	General	Water	Office	 (Dirección	General	de	Aguas,	 or	DGA)	has	 the	obligation	 to	 consider	
environmental	 issues	 when	 granting	 new	 water	 rights,	 which	 permits	 the	 establishment	 of	
“ecological	flows”	of	up	to	20%	of	average	annual	flow	and	may	even	reach	40%	in	some	cases	
(Nuñez	&	Soto,	2010).	The	DGA	also	has	increased	powers	to	protect	the	resource,	being	able	to	
stop	works	or	prevent	water	extractions	of	certain	rivers	when	there	are	problems	with	 legally	
established	rights.	
§ In	 order	 to	 produce	 a	 “public	 water	 cadaster”,	 new	 user	 requirements	 and	 a	Water	 Register,	
which	allows	records	to	be	developed	of	traditionally	used	rights,	are	introduced.	
§ User	organizations	called	Water	Communities	now	include	groundwater	and	can	be	granted	legal	
status,	giving	them	greater	scope	for	action.	
§ River	Monitoring	Boards	now	have	faculties	to	control	groundwater	basins.	
These	modifications	may	improve	the	water	market	in	Chile	but	could	also	accelerate	it,	particularly	
as	 regards	 the	payment	 for	non-use	of	 the	 resource,	which	encourages	 the	growth	of	 transactions	
and	 projects	 to	 prevent	 hoarding	 of	 “idle	water”	 and	 to	 avoid	 license	 fees.	 This	may	 result	 in	 the	
intensification	 of	 water	 stress	 in	 certain	 regions	 resulting	 from	 higher	 pressure	 to	 use	 water.	 In	
addition,	due	to	the	delay	in	implementing	the	reform	(discussions	began	1992	and	the	reform	was	
only	 adopted	 in	 2005),	 there	 are	 significant	 difficulties	 that	 limit	 the	 possibilities	 of	 improving	 the	
water	market.	 It	 is	 hard	 to	 implement	 the	 new	 allocation	 system	 in	 rivers	 that	 are	 already	 legally	
exhausted	and	not	possible	to	establish	“ecological	 flows”	 in	most	of	 the	rivers	that	require	such	a	
system,	because	rights	already	exist	over	the	entire	flow	(Hernandez,	2006).	4.2.	User	Associations	
Private	actors	have	the	important	function	of	distributing	water	resources	according	to	the	rights	of	
each	user,	in	addition	to	the	function	of	maintaining	the	water	facilities	of	common	use	(reservoirs,	
canals),	 which	must	 be	 performed	 through	 user	 associations.	 The	 current	Water	 Code	 recognizes	
three	types	of	user	organization	(Donoso,	2003;	León,	2008;	Chile	Sustentable,	2004):	
§ Water	Communities	(Comunidades	de	Agua):	user	organizations	that	exist	by	the	mere	fact	that	
two	or	more	parties	have	rights	to	use	the	waters	of	a	channel	or	source	of	groundwater	and/or	
share	use	of	 the	same	headworks,	 canals	or	dams.	These	communities	have	a	 responsibility	 to	
obtain	and	distribute	the	resource	among	the	holders	of	water	rights,	and	to	build,	maintain	and	
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improve	headworks,	dams	and	canals.	They	have	legal	personality,	and	each	community	member	
has	the	right	to	vote	in	relation	to	the	amount	of	water	rights	it	holds.	
§ Channel	Associations	(Asociación	de	Canalistas):	user	organizations	made	up	of	owners	of	water	
rights	who	use	artificial	channels	to	control	water	flows.	This	organization	is	designed	to	facilitate	
the	use	of	water	by	its	members,	taking	care	of	water	distribution	and	its	proper	use,	as	well	as	
the	construction,	maintenance	and	management	of	irrigation	structures.	
§ River	Monitoring	Boards	(Juntas	de	Vigilancia):	user	organizations	that	exploit,	in	some	manner,	
the	waters	of	a	basin	or	watershed.	These	organizations	comprise	individuals,	legal	persons	and	
other	 user	 organizations	 (Water	 Communities	 and	 Channel	 Associations).	 Their	 purpose	 is	 to	
manage	and	distribute	water	 from	 rivers	 to	members,	 safeguarding	 the	 resources	of	 an	entire	
watershed	 or	 a	 river	 section.	 These	 organizations	 can	 exploit,	 conserve	 and	 build	 works	 of	
common	use,	as	well	as	resolving	conflicts	over	the	use	of	established	rights.	Their	organizational	
structure	consists	of	a	General	Assembly,	which	elects	a	Director	and	a	President.	The	President	
is	the	legal	representative	of	the	organization.	The	Director	must	also	appoint	a	manager,	who	is	
in	charge	of	technical	aspects	of	water	distribution.	
In	2004,	21	River	Monitoring	Boards	were	registered	with	the	DGA	(with	a	further	30	unregistered).	
There	were	49	registered	Channel	Associations	 (with	167	unregistered),	 in	addition	to	2,625	Water	
Communities,	 all	 of	 which	 were	 unregistered	 because	 prior	 to	 2004,	 there	 was	 no	 registration	
obligation	 for	 Water	 Communities	 (Hernandez,	 2006).	 A	 total	 of	 2,892	 user	 organizations	 were	
estimated	to	exist	throughout	the	country.		4.3.	Institutions	Participating	in	Water	Management	
Although	 the	Water	 Code	 establishes	 that	 rights	 are	 regulated	 by	 the	market,	 it	 also	 reserves	 the	
following	functions	to	the	State	(Donoso,	2003):	
§ The	State	is	responsible	for	investigating	and	measuring	water,	creating	the	databases	necessary	
to	enable	informed	management	of	water	rights.	
§ It	 must	 analyze	 the	 possibilities	 of	 conceding	 new	 water	 rights,	 regulating	 the	 use	 of	 water	
resources	 and	 preventing	 harm	 to	 third-party	 rights	 or	 inappropriate	 exploitation	 of	 water	
channels.	Therefore,	the	State	should	also	consider	other	types	of	permits	such	as	construction	
of	new	works,	modifications	at	the	point	of	extraction	of	water	and	discharges	into	watercourses,	
among	others.	
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§ The	 State	 is	 required	 to	 ensure	 the	 conservation	 and	 protection	 of	 national	 water	 resources	
through	 a	 system	 of	 environmental	 impact	 assessment	 (Sistema	 de	 Evaluación	 de	 Impacto	
Ambiental,	or	SEA).	
In	this	context,	the	most	important	State	institutions	that	are	involved	in	water	management	are:	
§ General	Water	Office	(DGA):	an	agency	under	the	Ministry	of	Public	Works	with	responsibility	for	
planning,	 development	 and	 exploitation	 of	 natural	water	 sources.	 Among	 its	main	 tasks	 is	 the	
management	of	the	National	Hydrometric	Service	(Servicio	Nacional	Hidrométrico),	analysis	and	
approval	 of	 applications	 for	 water	 rights	 and	 hydraulic	 improvement	 projects,	 in	 addition	 to	
supervising	the	activities	of	the	River	Monitoring	Boards.	
§ National	 Irrigation	 Commission	 (Comisión	 Nacional	 de	 Riego,	 or	 CNR):	 an	 agency	 under	 the	
Ministry	of	Agriculture	with	responsibility	 for	planning,	assessment	and	approval	of	 investment	
projects	 in	 irrigation	 infrastructure,	 through	 the	 coordination	 of	 public	 institutions	 and	 private	
organizations.	 This	 institution	 also	 coordinates	 the	 implementation	 of	 irrigation	 law	 for	major	
and	minor	works,	together	with	its	Irrigation	Department.	
§ Office	 of	Hydraulic	Works	 (Dirección	 de	Obras	Hidráulicas,	 or	DOH):	 an	 agency	 responsible	 for	
implementing	technical	and	economic	studies	for	State-financed	irrigation	investments	that	have	
been	previously	approved	by	the	CNR.	
However,	 it	 has	 been	 noted	 that	 the	 functions	 of	 some	 of	 these	 organizations,	 especially	 those	
associated	with	planning	and	management	of	water	resources,	are	only	nominal:	the	ability	to	design	
and	 implement	programs	 is	 very	 limited.	On	 the	other	hand,	 control	 and	monitoring	 functions	are	
limited	by	 the	same	Water	Code,	which	means	 that	 institutions	 lack	appropriate	 tools	 to	deal	with	
water	pollution	and	water	shortages.	Finally,	a	major	flaw	has	been	pointed	out	in	the	development	
of	 an	 integrated	 approach	 to	water	 resources.	 Separating	 resource	 allocation	 responsibilities	 from	
those	relating	to	resource	management	limits	the	opportunities	to	efficiently	manage	resources	and	
to	effectively	respond	to	increasing	competition	and	demand	for	water	(Chile	Sustentable,	2004).	
Other	 state	 agencies	 linked	 to	 the	 management	 of	 water	 resources	 in	 Chile	 are:	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Environment,	responsible	for	its	protection	and	conservation;	the	Environmental	Assessment	Service	
(Servicio	 de	 Evaluación	 de	 Impacto	 Ambiental,	 or	 SEA),	 responsible	 for	 environmental	 assessment	
processes;	 Sanitary	 Services	 Superintendence	 (Superintendencia	 de	 Servicios	 Sanitarios,	 or	 SISS),	
which	 oversees	 the	 behavior	 of	 the	 sanitary	 sector	 and	 also	 monitors	 industrial	 liquid	 waste	
discharges	 from	 the	 industrial	 sector;	 the	 National	 Energy	 Commission	 (Comisión	 Nacional	 de	
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Energía,	 or	 CNE),	 responsible	 for	 the	 regulation	 of	 electricity	 services;	 the	 Institute	 of	 Agricultural	
Development	 (Instituto	 de	 Desarrollo	 Agropecuario,	 or	 INDAP),	 responsible	 for	 supporting	
agricultural	production	in	the	poorest	sectors;	the	Agriculture	and	Livestock	Service	(Servicio	Agrícola	
y	Ganadero,	or	SAG),	responsible	for	the	health	of	the	country’s	agricultural	products;	the	Ministry	of	
Health	 (Ministerio	 de	 Salud,	 or	 MINSAL),	 responsible	 for	 monitoring	 health	 conditions	 for	 the	
inhabitants	of	the	country;	and	the	National	Marine	Fisheries	Service	(Servicio	Nacional	de	Pesca,	or	
SERNAPESCA),	responsible	for	overseeing	water	quality	for	specific	purposes.	
It	 is	 also	 necessary	 to	 emphasize	 that	 the	 State	 has	 invested	 in	 more	 infrastructure	 for	 the	
management	 of	 water	 (dams	 and	 canals)	 and	 also	 offers	 financial	 aid	 programs	 to	 encourage	
investment	in	irrigation	works	for	agriculture	(León,	2008):	
§ Law	No.	18,450,	Approving	rules	for	the	promotion	of	private	investment	in	minor	irrigation	and	
drainage	works	(Ley	18.450:	Aprueba	normas	para	el	fomento	de	la	inversión	privada	en	obras	de	
riego	y	drenaje):	This	legislation	came	into	effect	in	1986,	with	the	aim	of	increasing	the	irrigated	
area,	 improving	 irrigation	 efficiency	 and	 developing	 agricultural	 soils.	 The	 promotion	 of	
investment	under	this	 law	has	been	carried	out	within	the	framework	of	the	National	 Irrigation	
Commission	(CNR).	
§ Farmers	 Irrigation	 Program	 (Programa	 de	 Riego,	 or	 PRC):	 this	 program	 was	 implemented	 by	
INDAP	 and	 aims	 to	 support	 the	 incorporation	 of	 new	 surface	 irrigation	 or	 drainage	 for	
agricultural	production	and	improve	irrigation	safety	through	the	construction	of	small	irrigation	
works.	
§ Solidarity	 and	 Social	 Investment	 Fund	 (Fondo	 de	 Solidaridad	 e	 Inversión	 Social,	 or	 FOSIS):	
Established	 in	 1990,	 FOSIS	 subsidizes	 plans,	 programs,	 projects	 and	 special	 development	
activities	 that	 contribute	 to	 overcoming	 poverty	 in	 the	 country,	 including	 the	 full	 or	 partial	
funding	of	local	irrigation	projects.	4.4 The	Operation	of	the	Limarí	Basin	
In	Limarí,	decreasing	rainfall	is	very	important	because	the	average	annual	rainfall	in	the	Coquimbo	
Region	is	180mm	and	a	large	part	of	agricultural	production	depends	on	the	management	of	water	
reservoirs	(León,	2008).	
In	this	region,	a	policy	was	soon	introduced	to	promote	irrigation	with	the	construction	of	three	large	
dams,	 which	 has	 contributed	 greatly	 to	 the	 expansion	 of	 irrigation	 technology	 and	 increased	
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planting.	Nevertheless,	 today,	due	 to	 the	expansion	of	mining	activity,	 the	 stock	price	has	become	
largely	inaccessible	to	small	farmers	and	peasants	in	the	area	(Leon,	2008).	
Between	 1980	 and	 2000,	 the	 communities	 near	 the	 dam	 (including	Monte	 Patria)	 invested	 nearly	
300,000	 dollars	 to	 improve	 infrastructure,	 offering	 subsidies	 and	 technical	 assistance.	 The	 three	
dams	built	in	Limarí	province	have	a	total	storage	capacity	of	about	one	million	cubic	meters	of	water	
(León,	2008).	
The	current	estimated	flow	of	the	basin	and	its	present	uses	are	set	out	below.	
	
TABLE	4:	FLOW	OF	LIMARÍ	RIVER	BASIN	
Flow	by	use	[m3/s]	
Limarí		Basin	 Farming	 Potable	Water	 Industry	 Mining	 Electricity	 Forestal	 Tourism	 Waste	receptor	 Ecological	flow	Hurtado	river	 1.041	 0.016	 	 0.064	 	 0.002	 	 0.000	 0.250	Grande	river	 3.343	 0.021	 0.047	 0.001	 1.250	 0.004	 	 0.017	 0.890	Guatulame	river	 1.222	 0.077	 	 0.157	 	 0.003	 	 0.022	 	Limarí		river		 5.274	 0.196	 	 0.208	 	 0.001	 0.001	 0.164	 	Source:	Ayala,	Cabrera	y	Asociados	Ltda.	(2007)	
FIGURE	2:	BASINS	AND	SUB-BASINS	REGION	IV	(LIMARÍ:	045)	
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Source:	Ayala,	Cabrera	y	Asociados	Ltda.	(2007)		
There	are	more	than	460	canals	and	three	dams	in	the	area:	
§ La	Paloma	reservoir:	has	a	capacity	of	750	million	cubic	meters	of	water	and	covers	an	area	of	
3,000	 hectares.	 The	 reservoir	 was	 built	 between	 1959	 and	 1966	 and	 was	 opened	 in	 1968.	 It	
contains	 the	waters	of	 the	Grande	and	Huatulame	rivers.	 It	 is	 the	 largest	 irrigation	reservoir	 in	
Chile	and	the	second	largest	in	South	America.	
§ Cogotí	reservoir:	has	a	maximum	capacity	of	150	million	cubic	meters	and	covers	an	area	of	850	
hectares.	 It	was	built	 in	1939	at	the	confluence	of	the	Pama	and	Cogotí	rivers.	 It	 is	mainly	used	
for	irrigation,	but	also	for	tourism,	since	its	banks	are	camping	areas	and	there	is	a	beach	suitable	
for	swimming.	
§ Recoleta	reservoir:	has	a	capacity	of	100	million	cubic	meters,	used	exclusively	for	irrigation	and	
covering	a	total	area	of	555	hectares.	It	contains	the	waters	of	the	Higuerillas	and	Hurtado	rivers.	
Its	construction	began	in	1929	and	was	completed	in	1934.	It	is	mainly	used	for	irrigation,	but	is	
also	available	for	tourist	activities.	
These	dams,	added	to	the	system	of	 interconnected	canals,	are	known	as	 the	Paloma	System.	This	
system	 regulates	 the	 flow	 of	 the	 Grande,	 Huatulame	 and	 Hurtado	 rivers.	 Every	 year	 the	 River	
Monitoring	 Board	 for	 the	 Paloma	 System	 assigns	 the	 amount	 of	 water	 that	 corresponds	 to	 each	
organization,	based	on	its	shares,	the	water	reserves	and	projections.	Thus,	the	distribution	system	
operates	according	to	the	availability	of	water	in	each	dam	(León,	2008).		
The	Paloma	System	has	7,398	users	 (irrigators	or	 shareholders),	 1,679	of	which	are	organized	 into	
three	channels	and	15	associations	of	water	communities.	There	are	three	River	Monitoring	Boards	
in	 the	 basin,	 for	 the	 Grande,	 Rapel	 and	 Cogotí	 rivers.	 The	 gross	 and	 net	 demand	 of	 water	 for	
irrigation	 in	 the	 basin	 are	 estimated	 at	 between	 790,840,000	 m3/year	 and	 724,402,000	 m3/year	
(CADE	IDEPE,	2004)	
In	evaluations	of	the	water	management	model	in	Chile,	the	Paloma	System	provides	an	example	of	
the	 active	 operation	 of	 the	 water	 market.	 Because	 water	 is	 scarce	 in	 this	 system,	 it	 has	 great	
economic	 value	 and	 thus	 generates	 significant	 competition	 among	 users.	 One	 advantage	 of	 this	
system	is	that	the	proportionality	of	rights	depends	not	on	a	variable	flow,	but	on	the	volume	stored	
in	the	dams,	which	means	availability	is	known	in	advance	of	the	agricultural	season.	The	regulation	
capacity	of	dams	gives	security	about	the	availability	of	water	supply,	clarifies	the	supply	and	allows	
users	to	make	 informed	decisions	regarding	how	they	will	use	 its	waters	 (Donoso,	2003).	Thus,	the	
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Paloma	System	may	be	conceived	of	as	a	 “water	bank”,	where	users	have	accounts	and	can	make	
withdrawals	of	water	or	loans	(with	the	corresponding	return	in	the	following	period),	in	addition	to	
different	users	being	able	to	exchange	deposits	of	water.	
4.4.1	Agricultural	Activity	
The	most	 important	 crops	 in	 the	basin	are	artificial	 grasslands,	orchards	and	cereals.	 In	 relation	 to	
the	area	used	in	the	community,	farms	amount	to	433,534	hectares	in	total,	of	which	8,969	hectares	
are	used	for	annual	crops,	27,912	are	devoted	to	fallow	and	rest	periods,	32,8420	are	grassland	and	
617	are	used	for	infrastructure	(Censo	Agropecuario	y	Forestal,	2007).		
In	 recent	 years,	 the	 sector	 has	 seen	 an	 accentuated	 replacement	 of	 traditional	 crops	 irrigated	
annually	by	more	intensive	(often	permanent)	crops	in	the	use	of	labor	and	higher	yield	per	hectare.	
The	Vine	Pisquera	represents	37.5%	of	the	surface	with	permanent	crops,	as	the	sector	has	a	suitable	
climate	 for	 growing	pisco	 grapes.	 This	 industry	 has	 incorporated	 new	 technological	 advances	 over	
time	 and	 is	 export-oriented.	 Moreover,	 the	 surface	 area	 occupied	 by	 vegetables	 and	 flowers	 has	
increased	 significantly,	 the	 most	 important	 products	 being	 peppers,	 artichokes,	 sweet	 cucumber,	
peppers	 and	 tomatoes.	 These	 crops	 are	 aimed	 at	 satisfying	 the	domestic	market	 and	 exporting	 to	
certain	niches	of	Argentina	at	certain	times	of	year.	Livestock	is	mainly	goats,	while	cattle	stocks	are	
diminshing	 because	 the	 feed	 resources	 available	 for	 this	 species	 are	 declining.	 Sheep	 farming	 is	
specialized	 toward	 wool	 production,	 industrial	 in	 character	 but	 with	 low	 representation	 in	 the	
community.		
In	 this	 highly	 commercialized	 area,	 most	 farmers	 tend	 to	 specialize	 in	 one	 or	 two	 types	 of	 crop.	
Zegarra	has	developed	a	typology	of	producers	in	the	Limarí	valley,	identifying	four	typical	activities	
(Zegarra,	2002):	
§ Livestock/traditional:	 This	 covers	an	 important	group	of	 livestock	producers	and	a	 few	 farmers	
who	 specialize	 in	 traditional	 crops	 such	 as	 corn,	 beans	 and	 potatoes.	 In	 the	 past,	 cattle	 were	
much	more	 important	 in	 the	 Limarí	 valley.	 Although	 this	 activity	 is	 now	 less	 important	 due	 to	
declining	profitability	and	the	scarcity	of	water,	a	presence	remains,	both	as	a	specialist	activity	
and	as	a	complementary	one	for	some	types	of	farmers.	
§ Horticulture/greenhouse:	 These	 crops	 mainly	 include	 artichokes,	 sweet	 cucumber,	 tomatoes,	
green	 peppers	 and	 chili.	 Farmers	 in	 this	 group	use	 greenhouses	 in	 small	 plots,	 irrigating	 crops	
using	the	drip	technique.	
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§ Pisco	grapes	and	avocados:	These	are	permanent	crops,	consisting	of	trees	that	live	for	between	
15	and	20	years.	Farmers	in	this	group	require	a	high	initial	investment.	Most	grapes	produced	in	
this	sector	are	processed	by	 local	pisco	 industries:	Pisco	Capel	and	Pisco	Control.	Avocados,	on	
the	other	hand,	are	sold	at	local	markets.	
§ Grape	exports:	These	 farmers	also	work	with	 trees	and	are	oriented	almost	exclusively	 toward	
the	 export	 market	 (mainly	 U.S.	 and	 Asia).	 The	 production	 process	 is	 dominated	 by	 large	
commercial	enterprises	dedicated	to	both	growing	and	packing	and	also	to	the	export	of	grapes.	
Family	 farms	remain	present	 today	 in	 this	 sector,	but	 they	have	steadily	decreased	 in	 terms	of	
area,	since	large	companies	have	achieved	a	significant	expansion	in	recent	years.		
In	 the	 valley	 one	 can	 identify	 the	 coexistence	 of	 the	 family	 farm,	 consisting	 of	medium	 and	 small	
farmers	who	manage	their	own	land.	However,	in	grape	exports	the	participation	of	such	farmers	is	
very	 low,	 since	 large	 exporters	 operate	 most	 of	 the	 land	 dedicated	 to	 this	 product.	 In	 general,	
traditional	 farmers	 in	 the	 valley	 have	 the	 lowest	 level	 of	 education	 (5.7	 years	 on	 average)	 and	
horticultural	producers	show	significantly	fewer	years	of	experience	and	smaller	families	than	other	
producers.	Among	the	horticulturists	there	is	also	a	greater	presence	of	tenants,	which	is	explained	
by	the	younger	heads	of	households.	Also,	some	cattle	producers	are	small	tenants,	since	they	have	
little	land	or	no	grassland	and	instead	rent	on	a	seasonal	basis	(Zegarra,	2002).	
Recent	 years	 have	 seen	 sustained	 growth	 in	 fruit	 exports	 in	 the	 Limarí	 valley,	 surpassing	 the	
evolution	of	the	rest	of	the	valleys	of	Norte	Chico.	Some	of	this	growth	has	been	evaluated	as	due	to	
the	possibilities	provided	by	the	water	market.	
However,	this	steady	increase	in	planted	areas	requiring	irrigation	gives	rise	to	a	scenario	that	comes	
into	 conflict	 with	 the	 sustainability	 of	 the	 water	 market.	 This	 adds	 to	 increasing	 erosion	 and	
desertification	as	a	result	of	misuse	of	resources	and	the	exploitation	of	vegetation	in	order	to	feed	
goats	 (Ferrando,	 2002).	 There	 is	 hence	 a	 tension	 between	 economic	 growth,	 desertification	
processes	and	 the	use	of	water	 resources,	which	could	be	 reaching	 their	maximum	usage	capacity	
due	to	reduced	rainfall.	
4.4.2	Paloma	System	Hydro-Efficiency	
The	water	resources	of	the	Limarí	river	have	been	managed	through	the	water	and	social	system	known	 as	 the	 Paloma	 System	 since	 the	 1970s.	 This	 system	 integrates	 three	 reservoirs	 and	multiple	 irrigation	 channels	 and	has	 given	 rise	 to	 a	major	 expansion	of	 agriculture	 in	 an	 area	
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with	low	rainfall,	with	a	sustained	increase	in	irrigated	area	and	a	changed	production	structure	in	the	basin	(Alvarez,	Kretschmer	&	Oyarzun,	2006).	It	has	also	permitted	the	development	of	a	highly	mobile	water	rights	market.	The	Limarí	basin	has	been	divided	into	two	sections:	the	irrigation	sector	above	the	reservoirs	and	the	area	below	them,	the	latter	being	known	as	the	Paloma	System.	Water	rights	are	defined	in	terms	of	cubic	meters	of	stored	water,	which	can	be	predicted	before	the	start	of	the	season	and	 is	 calculated	 proportionally	 according	 to	 the	 rights	 or	 shares	 held	 by	 each	 farmer.	 These	shares	 are	 distributed	 simultaneously	 to	 the	 proprietors	 or	 with	 a	 rotating	 system	 of	distribution	(or	in	shifts)	in	case	of	drought	(Cristi,	et	al.	2001).		Thanks	to	the	secure	availability	of	water	generated	by	the	dams,	one	may	describe	the	Paloma	System	 as	 a	water	 bank,	 because	 users	 can	 perform	 transactions	 such	 as	water	withdrawals,	sales,	purchases	and	deposits	between	different	users.	Users	may	even	 request	 lending	 rights,	with	“repayment”	in	the	following	season	(Donoso,	2003).		The	Monitoring	Board	of	the	Paloma	System	administers	the	system	and	is	in	turn	subordinate	to	the	National	Irrigation	Commission.	The	organization	estimates	the	annual	amount	of	water	stored	and	establishes	the	amount	of	water	that	corresponds	to	water	user	associations	 in	the	system.	 The	maximum	allowable	 volume	of	water	 is	 50%	of	 the	 total	 stored,	when	 such	 total	amounts	to	less	than	500	million	m3.	If	this	volume	is	exceeded,	the	maximum	allowable	is	320	million	m3.	Subsequently,	each	irrigator	association	assigns	the	appropriate	volume	of	water	to	each	of	its	members	(Cristi,	et	al.	2001).	Transaction	 costs	 in	 this	 system	 are	 considerably	 lower	 than	 for	 other	 watersheds	 in	 the	country,	 thanks	 to	 a	 highly	 flexible	 water	 distribution	 structure	 that	 also	 allows	 water	availability	 to	 be	 predicted	 with	 greater	 certainty.	 This	 not	 only	 permits	 the	 existence	 of	 a	permanent	 trading	 market	 where	 water	 rights	 are	 purchased	 and	 sold,	 but	 also	 enables	temporary	transfers	between	users,	who	trade	certain	volumes	of	water	on	what	is	known	as	a	"spot	market".	The	volumes	transferred	during	periods	of	scarcity	are	greater	than	10%	of	the	total	volume	assigned	to	users	(Cristi	et	al,	2001;	Donoso,	2003).	This	water	market	 activity	may	 also	 explain	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 significant	 number	 of	 farmers	with	non-permanent	crops.	Such	farmers	have	the	potential	to	modify	their	water	consumption	by	varying	 the	percentage	of	 use	of	 their	 land	 to	provide	water	when	 its	 spot	market	price	 is	greater	than	its	cost	when	used	as	input	in	their	production.	
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Multiple	benefits	have	been	identified	in	the	functioning	of	this	market,	including	increasing	the	gross	 product	 of	 the	 area	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 reallocation	 of	 water	 to	 activities	 generating	economic	 value,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	 small	 and	medium	 farmers	 obtaining	 income	from	the	sale	of	water	in	lean	years	(Cristi	et	al,	2001).	The	 need	 to	 improve	market	 efficiency	 through	more	 transparent	 information	 concerning	 the	reserves	of	each	user,	with	a	reduction	in	“private”	information,	is	also	clear.	There	is	an	obvious	need	to	 formalize	an	options	market,	which	would	reduce	uncertainty	about	 the	availability	of	water	on	the	spot	market,	and	small	and	medium	farmers	also	require	access	to	a	capital	market	in	order	to	be	able	to	access	the	water	market	(Cristi	et	al,	2001).	Finally,	one	of	the	critical	issues	identified	in	this	market	is	that	its	high	mobility	has	changed	the	production	structure	of	 the	sector;	 the	water	rights	 that	were	 initially	associated	with	an	area	have	moved	elsewhere	and	become	subject	to	different	uses.	This	movement	has	also	resulted	in	the	expansion	of	cultivation	areas,	which	may	in	future	require	the	use	of	new	water	sources	in	times	of	scarcity	(Alvarez,	Kretschmer	&	Oyarzun	2006).		
4.4.3	Environmental	Problems	associated	with	Water	Resources	and	Agriculture	
An	analysis	of	the	regulatory	plans	for	each	community	reveals	the	environmental	problems	declared	
by	 each	municipality6.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 Limarí	 province,	 the	 following	 environmental	 problems	 have	
been	identified:	
§ Pollution	 of	 rivers,	 streams	 and	 reservoirs:	 Due	 to	 the	 disposal	 of	 mining	 waste	 in	 rivers	
(including	the	Hurtado	river),	intensive	farming	with	agrochemicals	(pesticides)	polluting	streams	
and	production	activities	related	to	pisco	and	wine,	liquid	effluent	(vinasse)	is	generated,	the	bulk	
of	which	 joins	 the	waters	 of	 the	Grande	 and	 Rapel	 rivers.	 The	 pollution	 of	 streams	 and	 rivers	
flowing	into	the	La	Paloma	reservoir	increases	its	pollution	levels.	
§ Deterioration	 in	 vegetation	 and	 fauna:	 Deterioration	 in	 vegetation	 has	 been	 identified	 due	 to	
overgrazing	 of	 goats	 and	 sheep	 and	 the	 clearing	 of	 native	 vegetation	 in	 order	 to	 create	
monocultures	 in	valleys	and	on	the	hills,	particularly	 involving	the	over-harvesting	of	old	carob.	
This	phenomenon	is	more	marked	in	the	towns	of	Monte	Patria,	El	Palqui,	Chañaral	de	Caren	and	
Huatulame,	due	to	advances	in	agricultural	crops.	The	loss	of	native	vegetation	leads	to	a	loss	of	
habitat	for	local	fauna.	In	parallel,	the	demand	for	firewood	and	charcoal	has	generated	an	over-
exploitation	of	the	carob	tree,	a	species	becoming	endangered	within	the	communal	territory.	
                                                      
6	Source:	Regulatory	Plan,	Monte	Patria	Community	(Plan	Regulador	Comuna	Monte	Patria)	(2005)	
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§ Erosion	and	desertification:	Good	agricultural	soils	are	being	lost	due	to	improper	management	
of	 industrial	 aggregate	 extraction	 in	 riverbeds,	 increased	 grassland	 soil	 erosion	 due	 to	
overgrazing	 of	 livestock	 (especially	 goats)	 and	 the	 clearing	 of	 hills	 through	 consumption	 of	
vegetation	for	fuel.	
Despite	 these	 problems,	 the	 Limarí	 river	 and	 its	 tributaries	 are	 classified	 as	 good	 in	 general,	 with	
certain	exceptions.	The	river	with	the	best	natural	quality	is	the	Comberton,	followed	by	the	Moston,	
Rapel,	Hurtado,	Cogotí	and	Huetulame	rivers.	Finally,	the	Punitaqui	and	Limarí	rivers	are	those	with	
the	 lowest	 water	 quality.	 The	 main	 contaminants	 identified	 are	 related	 to	 mining,	 intensive	
agriculture,	logging	and	goat	husbandry	(CADEIDEPE,	2004):	
§ Abundance	of	manganese	in	the	entire	Limarí	basin.	
§ High	concentration	of	metals:	boron,	copper,	selenium	and	aluminum.	
§ The	Grande,	Hurtado,	Cogotí,	Huatulame,	Limarí	and	Punitaqui	rivers	have	high	concentrations	of	
calcium	ion,	magnesium	and	sodium.	
Finally,	 climatic	 studies	 have	 shown	 desertification	 trends	 due	 to	 reduced	 rainfall,	 increased	
frequency	of	droughts	and	rising	temperatures.	Some	studies	suggest	that	the	maximum	capacity	of	
water	 resources	 in	 the	 sector	 has	 been	 reached,	 despite	 the	 high-efficiency	 irrigation	 system	
(Ferrando,	2002).		4.5.	Problems	in	the	Water	Market	
The	 Chilean	model	 of	water	management	 has	 faced	 a	 number	 of	 difficulties	 and	 one	 can	 identify	
important	weaknesses	in	spite	of	the	reform	adopted	in	2005.	Among	the	main	problems	identified	
in	 this	 water	 market	 are	 (Chile	 Sustentable,	 2010;	 Bauer,	 2003;	 Donoso	 2003;	 Hernandez,	 2006;	
Nuñez	&	Soto,	2010;	Gentes,	2007;	CEPAL,	2003):	
§ Limitations	of	market	agility:	Because	of	the	geography	of	the	country,	it	is	very	costly	to	transfer	
resources	from	one	basin	to	another	and	the	infrastructure	is	not	sufficiently	developed	for	this	
purpose	 (resulting	 in	 high	 transaction	 costs).	Moreover,	 one	 cannot	 be	 certain	 about	 the	 real	
availability	of	water	due	to	the	poor	quality	of	national	registries.	There	is	a	significant	difference	
between	nominal	and	real	rights,	as	well	as	conflicts	among	users	due	to	customary	rights	sales	
and	the	hoarding	of	non-consumptive	rights.	
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§ High	transaction	costs:	The	high	costs	involved	in	investing	or	modifying	infrastructure	for	water	
distribution	 limit	 market	 flexibility.	 Basins	 with	 a	 developed	 water	 market	 have	 a	 significant	
infrastructure.	This	 infrastructure	has	been	developed	through	State	 investment;	an	example	 is	
the	Limarí	basin	and	the	highly	active	market	of	the	Paloma	System.	
§ Lack	of	 an	extensive	water	market:	 Transactions	are	 relatively	 few	and	only	more	prevalent	 in	
certain	places,	 since	 the	accumulation	of	 rights	 remains	a	 security	measure	 for	 the	dry	 season	
and	 because	 there	 is	 uncertainty	 about	 the	 relationship	 between	 supply,	 demand	 and	
profitability.	Nor	is	it	possible	to	find	reliable	information	on	actual	transactions,	since	only	part	
of	 the	 rights	are	 registered	with	 formalized	 titles	 in	 the	public	water	 cadaster.	This	 situation	 is	
due	 to	 the	 high	 cost	 of	 regulating	 rights,	 resulting	 from	 the	 bureaucratic	 procedures	 that	 are	
involved.	
§ Concentration	 of	 water	 right	 ownership:	 Because	 of	 the	 free	 concession	 of	 rights	 and	 lack	 of	
control	in	the	process,	some	monopolistic	situations	have	arisen,	in	terms	of	consumptive	rights	
(mining,	major	exporters	of	agricultural	products,	water	companies),	and	non-consumptive	rights	
(hydroelectrical),	 violating	 the	 assumption	 of	 free	 competition	 and	 impeding	 the	 optimal	
allocation	of	resources.	
§ Impact	 on	 social	 equity:	 The	 water	management	 system	 in	 Chile	 has	 not	 promoted	 access	 to	
water	for	family	farming	purposes,	hindering	the	improvement	of	living	conditions	in	poor	rural	
areas.	When	the	Water	Code	came	into	effect,	a	significant	proportion	of	farmers	did	not	register	
the	water	 rights	 passing	 through	 their	 lands	 as	 they	were	 not	 sufficiently	 informed	 about	 the	
process.	 Today,	 agribusinesses	 and	 mining	 industries	 have	 the	 rights	 to	 channels	 and	 the	
investment	 capacity	 to	 use	 them.	 This	 is	 the	 result	 of	 marked	 asymmetry	 among	 the	 various	
actors	in	the	Chilean	water	market.	
§ Concentration	of	ownership	in	the	sanitary	sector:	the	privatization	of	sanitary	services,	together	
with	the	monopolization	of	these	services	by	particular	geographical	sectors,	has	led	to	sanitary	
service	 access	 problems	 for	 people	with	 fewer	 resources,	 due	 to	 frequent	 rate	 increases.	 The	
water	tariff	system	in	Chile	is	the	most	expensive	in	Latin	America.	
§ Worsening	of	water	 stress	 and	destruction	of	watersheds:	Most	of	 the	basins	of	northern	and	
central	 sector	of	 the	country	 are	 subject	 to	heavy	demand,	which	 in	many	cases	 results	 in	 the	
depletion	 of	 rivers	 and	 destruction	 of	 numerous	 ecosystems.	 Hydroelectric	 companies	
monopolize	water	 to	produce	energy,	affecting	downstream	water	users.	 Similarly,	mining	and	
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forestry	companies	use	abundant	water	for	their	tasks,	returning	some	of	it	contaminated	to	the	
rivers.	 Peasant	 agriculture	 suffers	 without	 sufficient	 water,	 with	 reduced	 production,	 food	
shortages	and	desertification.	In	some	cases,	villages	that	traditionally	had	plenty	of	water	must	
today	be	supplied	using	water	tank	trucks.	
§ Lack	 of	 integrated	 watershed	 management:	 Water	 management	 is	 carried	 out	 at	 sections	 of	
rivers	and	not	at	river	basin	level,	which	limits	opportunities	to	monitor	environmental	problems	
and	resolve	conflicts.	The	River	Monitoring	Boards	and	the	DGA	do	not	have	sufficient	 tools	 to	
address	problems	between	different	types	of	users	(e.g.,	consumptive/non-consumptive),	which	
becomes	even	more	difficult	when	users	belong	 to	different	 sections	of	 rivers.	 Likewise,	 these	
organizations	 fail	 to	address	environmental	problems	 that	 arise	 in	one	 section	of	 the	 river	but	
affect	 another.	 Many	 of	 these	 conflicts	 lead	 to	 the	 courts,	 exacerbating	 the	 conflict	 and/or	
damaging	the	weaker	party	(usually	peasant	farmers).	
§ Loss	 of	 public	 control	 and	 governance	 of	 the	 resource:	 the	 Chilean	 model	 presents	 serious	
difficulties	 for	 managing	 water	 resources	 in	 the	 basins,	 resolving	 conflicts	 relating	 to	 those	
resources	and	protecting	river	ecosystems.	Legal	and	institutional	conditions	limit	the	scope	for	
governments	 to	 respond	 to	 the	 growing	 social	 and	 environmental	 problems	 of	 water	
management.	The	loss	of	public	control	over	the	ownership	and	management	of	water	generates	
a	structural	problem	as	regards	the	democratic	governance	of	water	and	hence	increases	 local,	
regional	and	national	conflicts	relating	to	the	resource.	
However,	 some	 aspects	 have	 been	 improved	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	Water	 Code	 and	 the	 privatization	
process,	 such	 as	 the	 increase	 in	 coverage	 of	 sanitary	 services,	 sewage	 treatment	 and	 greater	
efficiency	in	using	the	resource.	From	the	perspective	of	some	authors	(Bauer,	2003;	Donoso,	2003),	
the	“recognition	of	water	as	an	economic	good”	has	encouraged	private	investment	and	has	allowed	
greater	flexibility	in	allocating	resources.	But	we	must	emphasize	that	these	authors	agree	that	this	
market	 works	 in	 situations	 of	 scarcity	 and	 where	 there	 is	 adequate	 infrastructure	 to	 reduce	
transaction	costs.		
4.5.1	Performance	of	the	Market	and	Inequality	
The	 functioning	 of	 the	 water	market	means	 that	 participating	 farmers	 will	 face	 some	 uncertainty	
about	 water	 supply,	 resulting	 in	 varying	 degrees	 of	 risk	 to	 farmers	 depending	 on	 the	 type	 of	
production	 in	 which	 they	 are	 involved	 and	 the	 sensitivity	 of	 that	 production	 to	 variations	 in	 the	
availability	of	water	 (Hadjigeorgalis,	2004).	 For	example,	permanent	 crop	producers	 face	 increased	
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risk	 due	 to	 the	 significant	 investment	 they	 make	 in	 their	 plantations,	 as	 the	 risks	 faced	 not	 only	
involve	 the	 current	 season,	 but	 may	 also	 affect	 the	 future	 of	 their	 plantations.	 On	 the	 contrary,	
annual	crop	farmers	risk	losing	only	with	regard	to	the	current	production.	
It	 has	 been	 identified	 that	 the	 degree	 to	which	 farmers	 tolerate	 risk	 varies,	which	may	 be	 due	 to	
many	factors,	of	which	one	of	 the	most	 important	 is	 income.	Where	 farmers	have	higher	 incomes,	
their	 	 risk	tolerance	will	be	higher	and	they	will	be	more	willing	to	make	high-risk	and	high-reward	
decisions.	 In	 contrast,	 low-income	 farmers	 prefer	 not	 to	 take	 risks	 and	 instead	 make	 safe	
investments,	but	have	 less	potential	 for	profit.	 These	 farmers	prefer	a	 low	but	 secure	 income	 to	a	
higher	but	uncertain	income	(Hadjigeorgalis,	2004).	
This	 reduced	willingness	 to	 take	 risks	 influences	 their	 decision	 to	 participate	 in	 the	water	market,	
since	 a	 low-income	 farmer	will	 be	willing	 to	 sell	water	 or	water	 rights	 on	 the	 spot	market,	which	
provides	 a	 steady	 income,	 rather	 than	 taking	 the	 risks	 associated	 with	 agricultural	 production	
(Hadjigeorgalis,	 2004).	 Thus,	 low-income	 farmers	 sell	 their	 water	 rights,	 whether	 permanent	 or	
temporary,	 to	 higher-income	 farmers	 who	 are	 willing	 to	 invest	 in	 agricultural	 production	 with	
increased	risk.	
Research	conducted	by	Zegarra	(2002)	identifies	that	for	the	period	between	1996	and	1997,	9%	of	
respondents	 were	 net	 sellers	 of	 water,	 while	 28%	were	 buyers	 during	 the	 season,	 representing	 a	
transfer	of	9,632	m3.	Price	per	m3	was	53.2	Chilean	pesos	and	 the	biggest	buyers	were	 the	major	
producers	 of	 grapes	 for	 export,	 amounting	 to	 35%	 of	 all	 buyers.	 Permanent	 crop	 farmers	 tend	 to	
participate	in	these	transactions	as	buyers	on	the	water	use	rights	market,	since	for	them	a	deficit	of	
water	 is	more	risky	for	production.	Meanwhile,	participating	low-income	farmers	sell	water	(on	the	
spot	market)	or	water	use	rights	(on	the	permanent	market),	since	many	of	them	are	only	producers	
of	seasonal	crops	(Hadjigeorgalis,	2004).		
The	consequences	of	farmers’	tolerance	and	willingness	to	take	risks	for	their	cultural	and	economic	
conditions	have	not	been	sufficiently	studied.	However,	it	is	possible	to	identify	that	certain	patterns	
of	trade	between	farmers	are	not	possible	to	explain	considering	only	economic	transactions	in	the	
water	market	(Hadjigeorgalis,	2004).	This	could	be	very	significant	in	terms	of	unequal	opportunities	
for	 farmers	 in	 this	market	 and	 also	 in	 increasing	 the	 gap	 between	 traditional	 farmers	 and	 export-
oriented	agribusiness.		
Although	we	have	 identified	 that	water	markets	work	 best	 in	 situations	 of	 scarcity,	 in	 the	 Paloma	
System	serious	limitations	were	revealed	in	the	drought	during	the	1996/97	season	(Zegarra,	2002).	
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The	water	market	became	less	efficient	in	the	allocation	of	resources	due	to	high	demand,	which	led	
to	 an	 extremely	 high	 price	 of	water	 distribution,	 limiting	 the	 opportunities	 for	 small	 and	medium	
farmers	 to	buy	water	and	hindering	opportunities	 for	 investment	 in	permanent	crops.	This	 issue	 is	
important	 because	 a	 greater	 frequency	 of	 droughts	 has	 been	 recorded	 in	 the	 Limarí	 valley	 during	
recent	 years.	 Moreover,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 drought,	 farmers	 must	 pay	 the	 same	 amount	 for	
administration	costs,	despite	receiving	a	much	smaller	amount	of	water;	this	can	be	a	major	problem	
for	poor	farmers.	
A	mechanism	to	reduce	risk	to	producers	is	the	hoarding	of	water	by	maintaining	a	surplus	of	rights	
or	additional	purchases.	Many	analysts	question	this	behavior,	but	it	represents	a	type	of	insurance	
for	 farmers	who	 face	 high	 risks	 in	 periods	 of	water	 deficit	 (Hadjigeorgalis,	 2004).	 This	 risk-sharing	
alternative	is	threatened	by	the	new	policy	of	charging	fees	for	non-use,	built	into	the	reform	of	the	
Water	Code	of	2005,	which	aims	to	improve	the	efficiency	of	the	water	use	rights	allocation	process.	
The	effects	of	this	new	policy	on	the	water	market	remain	to	be	studied.	
Another	 important	 factor	 also	 plays	 a	 part	 in	 the	 inequality	 of	 conditions	 for	 participation	 in	 the	
market;	this	is	the	possibility	of	water	theft.	Upstream	farmers	can	take	illegally	significant	amounts	
of	water,	affecting	the	remaining	 farmers	who	draw	from	the	same	stream.	This	problem	seriously	
affects	 the	 poorest	 farmers,	 because	 there	 are	 no	 adequate	 tools	 to	 protect	 their	 rights	 and	 the	
judicial	process	involves	high	monetary	costs	(Zegarra,	2002).		
Finally,	 a	 defense	 of	 the	 model	 maintains	 that	 the	 model	 actually	 favors	 farmers	 with	 fewer	
resources,	enabling	revenue	to	be	generated	through	the	sale	of	temporary	or	permanent	rights.	This	
defense	is	strengthened	by	the	scarcity	of	reports	of	water	theft	and	violations	of	the	rights	of	those	
groups	(Galaz,	2004).	However,	 this	defense	fails	 to	take	 into	account	that	the	water	market	 is	not	
equivalent	 to	other	markets.	 If	 farmers	 sell	 their	permanent	 rights,	 they	 lose	 the	ability	 to	 recover	
them,	unless	they	are	able	to	significantly	 increase	their	 income	from	other	sources.	Meanwhile,	 in	
the	case	of	spot	markets,	farmers	sell	their	temporary	shares,	but	at	the	same	time	stop	investing	in	
their	 own	 lands.	 This	 distorts	 the	distribution	of	 resources	between	 rich	 and	poor	users,	 gradually	
increasing	 differences	 between	 the	 two.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 low	 numbers	 of	 theft	 and	 violation	
complaints	are	due	to	the	lack	of	oversight	tools	and	absence	of	facilities	for	low-income	farmers	to	
make	complaints.			
In	 this	 context,	 it	 is	possible	 to	assert	 that	 the	 shortcomings	of	 the	 judicial	 system	and	 the	 limited	
tools	 for	 resolving	 conflicts	 through	 user	 associations	 are	 determining	 factors	 for	 unequal	
participation	in	the	water	market.	Thus,	rich	users	have	a	highly	advantageous	position	in	the	market,	
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as	 they	enjoy	more	 investment	opportunities	and	can	also	buy	water	when	required	 in	addition	to	
illegally	extracting	water	without	 consequences	 (Galaz,	2004).	The	condition	of	 the	Chilean	 judicial	
system	is	crucial	to	this	weakness.	The	system	is	slow	and	costly	for	its	users.	Furthermore,	the	most	
vulnerable	members	of	the	population	have	little	confidence	in	 it.	Moreover,	there	is	no	significant	
presence	of	other	organizations	that	might	support	the	poor	farmers,	such	as	rural	NGOs.	The	user	
associations	 operate	 by	 representation	 based	 on	 shares	 or	 rights,	which	means	 that	 farmers	with	
more	water	resources	can	exert	more	influence.	Finally,	government	agencies	offer	scant	control	and	
support	tools	for	vulnerable	farmers.	
4.5.2	Water	Markets	and	Water	Stress	
In	 a	 scenario	 of	 water	 stress,	 the	 ability	 to	 control	 scarce	 resources	 and	 mitigation	 planning	 are	
essential	to	address	the	problems	that	climate	change	may	trigger.	This	explains	the	significance	of	
the	Water	Code	and	the	performance	of	the	Chilean	water	market	that	it	has	established.	
The	water	market	presents	significant	operational	constraints:	high	transaction	costs,	 lack	of	public	
information,	 variability	 of	 resource	 availability	 and	 uncertain	 definition,	 and	 the	 accumulation	 of	
rights	and	monopolies	in	some	markets.	Additionally,	it	is	necessary	to	note	that	if	the	rights	market	
is	fully	implemented	and	the	expected	dynamism	created,	vulnerable	sectors	of	the	population	may	
face	greater	shortages,	because	there	are	significant	disparities	 for	 the	use	of	water	 resources	and	
other	 problems	may	 arise	 from	 the	 scarcity	 of	 the	 resource,	 such	 as	 the	 transmission	 of	 diseases	
(SAMTAC-CEPAL,	2000).	
In	this	context,	the	Water	Code	of	1981	has	been	shown	to	be	inadequate	to	address	the	integrated	
management	 of	 water	 resources.	 This	 is	 mainly	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 Water	 Code	 does	 not	
generate	the	conditions	for	the	development	of	tools	permitting	integrated	watershed	management,	
coordination	 of	 multiple	 water	 uses	 and	 the	 internalization	 of	 economic	 and	 environmental	
externalities	 (Donoso,	 2003).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 has	 not	 been	 possible	 to	 develop	 a	 single	 audit	
body,	 a	 transparent	 and	 effective	 public	 conflict	 resolution	 system	 or	 appropriate	 environmental	
control	and	conservation	mechanisms	in	Chile	(Gentes,	2008).		
Despite	 the	 2005	 amendment	 to	 the	 Code,	 whereby	 the	 State	 intended	 to	 appropriate	 higher	
capacities	of	intervention	and	increase	control	of	water	resources,	the	overexploitation	of	resources	
in	certain	sectors	of	the	country	has	impeded	the	protection	of	watersheds	(Gentes,	2008).	Nor	has	
the	reform	delivered	the	tools	to	address	issues	of	inequality	in	access	to	water	rights	and	in	conflict	
resolution.	
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Finally,	 from	 a	 global	 perspective,	 one	 of	 the	main	 difficulties	 in	 confronting	 the	 consequences	 of	
climate	 change	 is	 the	 lack	 of	 integrated	 watershed	 management,	 because	 water	 resources	 are	
managed	 at	 the	 level	 of	 river	 sections,	 which	 limits	 the	 possibility	 of	 addressing	 the	 problems	 of	
scarcity	or	pollution	at	the	watershed	level	since	surface	water	and	groundwater	are	independently	
administrated.	Nor	 is	there	 integrated	management	of	the	quality	and	quantity	of	water	resources.	
All	 this	 raises	 serious	 difficulties	 in	 developing	 action	 plans	 on	 problems	 resulting	 from	 climate	
change,	 as	 well	 as	 limitations	 in	 dealing	 with	 extreme	 drought	 situations	 and	 developing	
comprehensive	mitigation	plans	(SAMTAC-CEPAL,	2000).	
The	 watersheds	 facing	 critical	 water	 stress	 scenarios	 require	 government	 intervention	 to	 resolve	
conflicts	 which	 the	 market	 cannot	 settle	 satisfactorily.	 From	 the	 progressive	 evidence	 of	 trends	
toward	a	substantial	 reduction	 in	available	water	resources	due	to	global	climate	change,	one	may	
even	 predict	 the	 need	 for	 decentralized	 agencies	 (at	 watershed	 level)	 in	 order	 to	 control	 and	
coordinate	the	use	of	resources	(SAMTAC-CEPAL,	2000).	
The	peculiarities	of	 the	water	market	 in	Chile	have	 led	 to	 it	 being	 repeatedly	 cited	as	 a	 successful	
free-market	 experience	 in	 water	 resources.	 There	 has	 also	 been	 criticism	 of	 some	 respects,	 but	
mainly	related	to	the	corrections	that	might	be	made	to	the	model.	The	2005	reform	attempted	to	
achieve	 some	 of	 these	 corrections.	 However,	 other	 studies	 that	 question	 the	 model	 point	 to	
significant	weaknesses,	 in	some	cases	structural	and	not	possible	to	address	through	partial	reform	
or	corrections	to	the	existing	model	(Bauer,	2005).	
Some	 key	 conditions	 are	 necessary	 for	 a	 water	 market	 to	 function	 well:	 management	 of	 water	
shortages,	 guaranteed	 and	 clearly	 defined	 water	 rights,	 appropriate	 regulation	 of	 market	
transactions,	an	 inventory	of	water	 resources	and	mechanisms	 for	 conflict	 resolution.	Under	 these	
conditions,	 in	 the	 opinion	 of	 the	 experts	 a	 water	 market	 could	 work	 efficiently	 and	 sustainably	
(Donoso,	2006).	In	the	Chilean	example,	there	are	important	gaps	in	several	of	these	areas.	
Evaluating	 the	performance	of	 the	Chilean	market	and	comparing	 it	with	other	equivalents	 reveals	
significant	shortcomings,	particularly	in	relation	to	equity	in	market	access	and	sustainability	of	water	
resources.	In	the	study		entitled	“An	Integrated	Assessment	of	Water	Markets”	(Grafton	et	al,	2010),	
the	Chilean	market	is	compared	with	others	in	Australia,	China,	the	USA	and	South	Africa.	The	main	
deficiencies	 identified	 in	 Chile	 in	 terms	 of	 equity	 are	 weakness	 in	 market	 control,	 difficulty	 in	
accessing	the	resource	benefits	and	deficiencies	in	the	initial	resource	allocation	(figure	3).		
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FIGURE	3:	EQUITY	
	Source:	Grafton	et	al,	2010	
For	sustainability,	the	main	shortcomings	are	lack	of	scientific	data	on	water	resources,	appropriate	
boundaries	 of	 environmental	 flows,	 adaptation	 to	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 environment	 and	 integrated	
watershed	management	(figure	4).	
FIGURE	4:	ENVIRONMENTAL	SUSTAINABILITY	
	Source:	Grafton	et	al,	2010	
In	 general,	 we	 have	 identified	 that	 the	market-based	 system	 for	 allocating	 water	 rights	 considers	
water	as	an	economic	good,	recognizing	water	as	a	scarce	resource	and	internalizing	this	scarcity	in	
its	 price,	 which	 has	 brought	 many	 benefits	 because	 it	 permits	 the	 use	 of	 market	 incentives	 for	
management.	In	Chile,	the	legal	security	of	private	property	rights	has	promoted	private	investment	
in	 water	 use	 and	 the	 freedom	 to	 buy	 and	 sell	 water	 rights	 has	 allowed	 water	 resources	 to	 be	
reallocated	 in	 some	 areas,	 meaning	 the	 resource	 has	 been	 used	 more	 efficiently.	 However,	 the	
Chilean	legal	framework	has	proven	to	be	rigid	and	resistant	to	change	(12	years	of	discussion	only	
achieved	 a	 partial	 modification	 of	 the	 Water	 Code)	 and	 presents	 serious	 deficiencies	 in	 the	
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management	 of	 water	 conflicts,	 in	 the	 protection	 and	 sustainability	 of	 the	 resource	 and	 in	 the	
protection	of	poor	farmers.	This	model	demonstrates	that	institutional	reinforcement	is	required	to	
improve	its	efficiency,	sustainability	and	equity	and	to	safeguard	the	public	interest	(Bauer,	2005).	
To	 adequately	 address	 situations	 of	 scarcity	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 develop	 integrated	 watershed	
management,	 coordinating	 the	 different	 uses	 of	 water,	 internalizing	 environmental	 externalities,	
resolving	 conflicts	 and	 facilitating	 the	participation	of	 the	most	 vulnerable.	Otherwise,	 the	Chilean	
model	does	not	have	the	tools	to	address	long-term	problems	and	cannot	cope	with	the	challenges	
of	climate	change.	
Ultimately,	 in	 light	of	 the	 facts	 regarding	 the	consequences	of	 climate	change	 in	Chile,	 the	current	
problems	 in	 the	management	 of	water	will	worsen	while	 competition	 for	water	 increases,	 putting	
increasing	 pressure	 on	 the	 existing	 institutional	 framework.	 Recognizing	 the	 need	 to	 regulate	 the	
water	market,	improvement	in	institutional	conditions	is	essential	in	order	to	meet	the	challenges	of	
climate	change.	
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5. Resilience	of	the	Socio-Ecological	System	in	Limarí	Basin	
	
As	 set	 out	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 resilience	 in	 a	 socio-ecological	 system	 is	 related	 to	 two	main	
aspects:	the	flexibility	of	its	elements	and	the	inter-connectivity	of	those	elements.	When	observing	
the	 social	 dimension,	we	establish	 central	 components	 that	must	 be	 addressed	 in	 considering	 this	
flexibility	 and	 connectivity,	 in	 order	 to	 analyse	 the	 system	 with	 regard	 to	 access	 to	 hydrological	
resources.					
The	 legal	 and	 economical	 regulations	 that	 affect	 such	 access	 to	 these	 resources	 are	 key	 to	
understanding	the	flexibility	of	the	system.		At	the	same	time,	the	manner	in	which	the	organizations	
operate	at	a	national	level	(major	regulators)	and	at	a	local	level	(minor	regulators)	is	fundamental	to	
the	flexibility	of	the	system	when	facing	scarcity	problems.				
Finally,	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 theoretical	 approach	 outlined	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 it	 is	 also	
important	 to	observe	 the	relation	between	different	elements	of	 the	system,	a	connectivity	 that	 is	
reflected	in	terms	of	the	social	dimension	by	collaborative	relationships,	both	vertical	and	horizontal,	
and	the	trust	that	these	kinds	of	relationship	allow.	
Below,	 we	 describe	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 empirical	 material	 obtained	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 interviews	
carried	out,	addressing	each	of	the	previously	identified	theoretical	dimensions.		5.1	Flexibility:	Legal	Regulations			
The	main	 legal	 regulations	 relating	 to	access	 to	hydrological	 resources	 in	Chile	are	 set	 forth	 in	 the	
Water	Code	(Código	de	Aguas)	that	was	approved	by	the	military	regime	and	has	been	in	force	since	
1981.	Accordingly,	and	also	taking	into	account	the	analysis	of	speech	of	the	different	interviewees,	
the	Water	 Code	 is	 clearly	 identified	 as	 the	 most	 important	 regulation	 for	 hydrological	 resources,	
defining	what	is	possible	in	this	field	and	the	limitations	faced	by	the	different	parties	involved	in	the	
distribution	of	and	access	to	water.	Thus,	various	questions,	criticisms	and	positive	aspects	of	water	
management	relate	directly	or	indirectly	to	the	conditions	established	under	the	Code	(for	detail,	see	
chapter	3).		
The	 various	 stakeholder	 evaluations	 place	 their	 hopes	 in	 a	 change	 to	 the	 model,	 describing	 the	
reforms	 that	 are	 required	 in	 the	 Code.	 Concurrently,	 the	 model	 is	 seen	 as	 inflexible,	 with	 direct	
reference	made	to	the	Water	Code	and	to	the	practical	difficulties	in	amending	it..		
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The	local	media	also	confronts	and	identifies	this	as	an	issue.	Below	is	an	example	of	how	important	
this	 topic	 is	 among	 local	 public	 opinion,	which	 differs	 from	 the	 national	 press,	 where	 this	 kind	 of	
treatment	does	not	appear	with	respect	to	the	same	issue.		
IMAGE	1:	“LOCAL	LEADERS	WILL	FIGHT	FOR	CHANGES	IN	THE	WATER	CODE”	
	
Source:	El	Ovallino	newspaper	(04.11.2009)	
5.1.1	Water	Codes	Not	the	Origin	of	Water	as	Private	Property	
The	 first	 formal	 water	 code	 was	 enacted	 in	 1969.	 It	 established	 a	 distribution	 of	 hydrological	
resources,	but	linked	to	land	ownership.	One	of	the	distinguishing	elements	of	that	code	as	opposed	
to	 the	current	one	 is	 that	at	 that	 time,	“for	every	kind	of	activity	 they	had	 to	present	a	productive	
project	 to	be	evaluated	and	 then	a	water	concession	was	given	 for	a	 specific	period	of	 time,	which	
normally	 lasted	20	years,	after	which	 it	was	 re-evaluated	and	another	permission	was	given”	 (local	
agronomist	independent	expert).	
The	1981	Code	 implemented	 two	 radical	 changes:	 land	was	distinguished	 from	water	 and	a	water	
rights	 market	 was	 introduced	 (civil	 servant	 CNR	 user	 organization	 head).	 Farmers	 remember	 that	
previously,	water	was	bought	and	sold,	but	it	was	always	related	to	land	(large-scale	farmer	2).	This	
changed	from	1981:		
	“…in	 1981,	 when	 the	military	 regime	 ruled	 the	 whole	 country,	 a	 new	 law	 was	
passed	where	it	was	established	that	water	was	given	to	private	parties	through	
an	exploitation	right	which	took	the	form	of	private	property,	even	registering	this	
property	in	the	Property	Register”	(regional	civil	servant	DGA)	
From	the	results	of	this	research,	one	may	highlight	the	need	to	question	the	widely	accepted	thesis	
that	 the	 1981	 Code	was	 responsible	 for	 the	 commodification	 of	water	 (chapter	 4).	 The	 interviews	
carried	out	confirm	that	 there	 is	widespread	memory	of	pre-existing	private	access	 to	hydrological	
resources.	 In	 Chile,	 some	 kind	 of	 water	 trading	 and	 some	 understanding	 of	 water	 as	 a	 private	
resource	have	in	fact	been	present	since	the	19th	century.		
The	 Code	 reasserts	 what	 many	 farmers	 had	 already	 been	 doing	 in	 practice:	 “The	 1981	 Code	
confirmed	what	we	wanted	to	hear.	 It	said:	now	you	are	the	owner	of	 the	exploiting	right	that	you	
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have	used	 for	 your	whole	 life	under	 the	 category	of	 concession.	And	 it	was	well	 received,	we	were	
happy.	 It	 is	 fantastic	because	now	 I	 can	mortgage,	 I	 can	sell	and	do	a	 lot	of	 things.	Moreover,	 it	 is	
separated	from	the	land	to	deepen	the	model”	(local	university	expert).		
Although	there	was	a	favorable	reception	from	local	farmers,	there	is	widespread	questioning	of	the	
model	 that	 the	 legislation	 constructed.	 The	 experts	 identified	 serious	 faults	 in	 the	model,	 but	 an	
element	 highlighted	 by	 several	 parties	 is	 that	 through	 the	 1981	 Code,	 water	 rights	 received	 an	
economic	value;	hence,	it	would	permit	water	scarcity	issues	to	be	addressed	more	effectively,	even	
though	the	value	was	only	economic:	“The	positive	aspect	of	the	Code	is	that	it	was	done	for	society	
to	allocate	a	value	 to	 the	water	 rights,	but	 the	problem	 is	 that	 this	value	would	be	only	economic”	
(local	university	expert).	
However,	 the	words	of	 the	different	 interviewees,	 experts,	 professors,	 users	 and	members	 of	 civil	
society	describe	the	need	for	better	regulation	of	the	trading	and	movement	of	water	rights.	In	this	
context,	user	organizations	from	the	Limarí	basin	have	developed	their	own	regulations	to	establish	
the	limits	and	conditions	of	the	transfers,	which	govern	a	large	amount	of	the	trading.		
Furthermore,	 in	 this	 context,	 there	 is	 an	 argument	 between	 user	 organizations	 and	 the	 General	
Water	 Office	 (Dirección	 General	 de	 Aguas,	 or	 DGA)	 at	 a	 local	 level,	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
management	authorizes	transfers	which	the	organization	sees	as	harmful	for	other	users:	“the	DGA	
has	authorized	changes	 in	 the	source	of	supply,	which	means	that	people	who	have	water	rights	 in	
the	last	part	of	the	river	or	halfway	have	moved	their	rights	to	the	Paloma	reservoir.	We	have	warned	
them	about	 that,	we	have	opposed	 it	 and	we	have	 suggested	 the	 corrections	 to	 the	DGA	but	 they	
have	never	considered	our	opinion”	(administrator,	Limarí	Monitoring	Board).	
5.1.2	Reforms	to	the	Water	Code	
Among	the	responses	of	the	parties	related	to	governmental	organizations	and	research	centers,	the	
effectiveness	of	the	last	and	only	Water	Code	reform	is	questioned.	In	general	terms,	it	is	possible	to	
identify	 that	 in	 spite	 of	 agreement	 regarding	 the	 changes	 made,	 this	 reform	 is	 not	 considered	
sufficient	to	deal	with	the	water	scarcity	problem	in	the	North.		
Out-of-use	fee	
The	establishment	of	an	out-of-use	water	rights	fee	was	an	innovation	incorporated	in	2005	with	the	
purpose	 of	 reducing	 the	 concentration	 of	 control	 and	 stimulating	 the	 market	 (see	 chapter	 4).	
Notwithstanding	this,	the	interviewees	pose	many	questions.		
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The	reform	promoted	the	intensive	use	of	aquifers,	because	when	groundwater	levels	are	low,	there	
are	water	wells	which	no	longer	work	as	they	are	not	deep	enough.	The	owner	of	such	a	water	well	
has	to	pay	a	fee	or	 leave	the	water	extraction	machinery	installed.	This	 is	because	it	 is	sufficient	to	
have	 installed	the	machinery	 to	avoid	paying	the	 fee;	 for	 instance,	 to	 leave	water	pumps	on	water	
wells	(DGA	civil	servant	Ovalle).	This	encourages	people	to	sell	their	water	wells	to	other	users	who	
can	build	deeper	water	wells	and	continue	with	the	use	of	the	resource:	“…but	how	can	they	push	me	
to	use	the	water	if	my	water	well	is	dry…	It	is	dry.	How	would	I	leave	the	water	pump	there	so	anyone	
could	steal	 it	or	could	steal	 the	 transformer	and	everything?	 	Because	now	 it	 is	dry	 if	 the	aquifer	 is	
deep	down	there.	Then	they	say	we	have	to	pay	and	if	I	do	not	pay	it	is	going	to	be	sold	at	auction,	
someone	else	comes	along,	a	mining	company	for	example,	and	builds	a	deeper	water	well	and	takes	
more	water”	(regional	civil	servant	DGA).				
In	general	 terms,	 it	 is	 stated	 that	 the	 reform	carried	out	 so	 far	 strengthens	 the	model,	orienting	 it	
more	 towards	 to	 the	market,	 because	 it	 tries	 to	 ensure	 that	 resources	 are	 available	 for	 use	 (local	
university	expert).	In	addition,	the	cost	is	lower	in	comparison	to	the	loss,	which	may	militate	in	favor	
of	 divesting	 oneself	 of	 the	 rights.	 This	 is	why	 in	 some	 cases	 it	 is	more	 convenient	 to	 pay	 the	 fee.	
Another	alternative	 is	 to	 sell	 the	 rights	and	 in	 this	way	 invigorate	 the	market,	but	 these	 rights	are	
never	returned	to	the	State.		
“I	believe	that	the	out-of-use	fee,	more	than	encouraging	people	to	give	up	their	
rights,	promoted	investments.	It	invigorates	…	but	in	the	same	way,	if	you	have	a	
right	and	you	have	the	construction,	you	do	not	pay	the	fee.	Then	maybe	you	do	
not	use	the	water.	But	 it	does	not	 incentivize	the	non-use	of	water.	Not	at	all,	 it	
means	the	cost	of	the	fee	is	lower	than	the	cost	of	water,	hence	I	prefer	to	pay	the	
fee	instead	of	returning	or	selling	the	water	right”	(DGA	user	organization	national	
division)	
There	 are	 also	 elements	 that	 go	 against	 sustainability	 or	 ecological	 flow.	 For	 example:	 “Pucon’s	
municipality	 registered	many	water	 rights	 and	 I	 understand	 that	 they	 now	pay	 around	 200	million	
Chilean	pesos	for	not	using	them.	We	have	1400	and	as	the	law	says	that	1500	down,	you	do	not	pay,	
we	are	just	out	of	it”	(CS	South).	
An	 element	 continuously	 questioned	 is	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 out-of-use	 fee,	 mainly	 because	 it	
would	not	be	appropriate	for	contexts	involving	scarcity,	but	rather	where	there	is	abundance	and	to	
avoid	speculation	(CNR	Santiago).	Otherwise,	this	reform	establishes	that	when	a	fee	is	not	paid	the	
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water	rights	are	auctioned.	This	 last	aspect	 is	described	as	a	wasted	opportunity,	because	 it	would	
have	been	better	to	provide	for	the	return	of	the	water	rights	to	the	State	in	this	situation:	
	“Another	 anomaly	 from	 the	 legislators	 is	 the	 out-of-use	 fee.	Whoever	 does	 not	
use	 the	water	 has	 to	pay	a	 fee,	 and	 you	 can	 see	 that	 in	 this	 area,	 it	 is	 stupid,	 I	
mean	the	person	who	does	not	use	the	water,	you	tell	me,	do	I	have	to	make	him	
use	 it,	when	 it	 is	 supposed	 to	 be	 the	 other	way	 around…?	Hey,	 leave	 it	 there;	 I	
should	be	paying	the	one	who	is	not	using	the	water.	And	if	the	guy	does	not	pay	
the	fee,	the	State	auctions	the	water	rights	to	the	higher	bidder.	Just	picture	that,	
when	they	should	have	said	it	stays	with	the	State…”	(regional	civil	servant	DGA)	
Ecological	Flow	
The	 implementation	 of	 an	 ecological	 flow	 was	 one	 of	 the	 best-evaluated	 aspects	 of	 the	 reform.	
However,	 a	 critical	 view	 refers	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 only	 applied	 to	 the	 rivers	with	 available	 rights	
(which	can	be	saved	for	an	ecological	flow).	On	the	contrary,	rivers	in	high-demand	areas	are	already	
exhausted,	there	are	no	available	water	rights	and	therefore	it	 is	no	longer	possible	to	establish	an	
ecological	flow.	This	is	paradoxical	in	that	the	areas	that	cannot	have	ecological	flows	are	those	that	
urgently	 need	 to	 establish	 a	 lower	 water	 level,	 as	 many	 of	 their	 rivers	 have	 completely	 dried	 up	
because	of	the	intensive	use	of	the	resource.	
The	alternative	is	that	the	State	would	buy	the	water	rights	to	establish	those	flows.	Nonetheless,	the	
costs	are	so	high	that	this	has	been	declared	unfeasible.	State	organizations	argue	that	they	do	not	
have	 enough	 resources	 to	 take	 ownership	 of	 the	 private	 rights	 because	 the	 price	 is	 so	 high:	 “Of	
course,	 the	 State	 could	 expropriate,	 but	 the	 private	 parties	 can	 ask	 for	 the	 price	 they	 want,	 then	
where	does	the	money	come	from	to	pay	for	those	rights?”	(DOH	Serena).	
Ecological	flow	is	considered	a	good	choice	but	useless	for	the	North,	where	there	is	no	flow	to	take	
care	 of:	 “No,	 there	 is	 no	 ecological	 flow,	 in	 other	 words	 that	 came	 out	 after	 all	 rights	 had	 been	
allocated.	But	in	the	South,	yes,	there	are	some	rivers	that	still	have	rights	to	be	given,	so	there	it	is	
possible,	but	there	is	an	abundance	of	water	there,	here	there	is	water	scarcity”	(Cazalac	expert).	
Moreover,	for	some	extreme	drought	situations,	some	associations	explain	that	they	change	the	flow	
of	 the	 river	and	conduct	 it	 from	one	channel	 to	 the	next,	with	 the	aim	of	 reducing	water	 leakage:	
“The	 thing	 that	 we	 do	 here	 is	 that	 when	 there	 is	 no	 water	 coming,	 for	 example	 300	 liters	 come	
instead	of	2000,	we	know	that	the	water	will	not	be	enough	to	reach	the	last	part,	because	it	is	going	
to	be	absorbed	and	will	not	be	enough,	then	the	first	canal	is	taken	and	the	whole	flow	is	led	to	it,	and	
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after	that	it	is	conducted	to	another	one	and	so	on	and	so	forth;	we	do	not	conduct	the	water	to	the	
river,	but	only	from	one	canal	to	the	next.”	(leader	Mostazal	Monitoring	Board).	
In	that	case,	in	the	center	and	to	the	north	of	the	country,	ecological	flows	would	only	have	an	effect	
for	temporary	or	for	non-consumptive	water	rights:	“Here,	the	ecological	flow	only	had	an	effect	for	
the	 ones	 who	 asked	 for	 non-consumptive	 rights,	 for	 example,	 if	 they	 ask	 for	 run-of-river	 plants,	
because	at	the	beginning	we	had	to	leave	water	only	for	the	canals	and	it	could	dry	up	until	the	rights	
were	 restored,	 yet	 today	 this	 is	 not	 the	 case,	 water	 must	 be	 left	 for	 the	 canals	 and	 also	 for	 the	
ecological	 flow.	 Besides	 for	 the	 temporaries,	 insofar	 as	 at	 the	 bottom	 of	 the	 river	 there	 is	 a	
spectacular	 estuary,	 then	 if	 the	 temporary	 rights	 could	 be	 applied	 without	 the	 need	 to	 leave	 an	
ecological	 flow,	 they	could	dry	up	 the	estuary,	 that	 is	why	 they	were	asked	 for	1	 lt/s”	 (civil	 servant	
DGA	Ovalle).	
Change	in	use	
One	of	the	most	controversial	elements	of	the	Code	refers	to	the	lack	of	restrictions	on	modifying	the	
use	of	water	rights.	Water	right	owners	can	use	this	resource	for	their	convenience,	even	modifying	
the	 initial	 use	 without	 any	 restriction.	 Despite	 this	 significant	 anomaly,	 the	 reform	 that	 was	
introduced	only	managed	to	establish	one	restriction,	regarding	the	need	to	report	the	intended	use	
at	the	time	of	requesting	a	right.	However,	this	use	can	then	be	modified	without	any	limitation.		
The	most	common	change	of	use	in	the	North	is	from	agriculture	to	mining.	This	is	due	to	the	“lt/s”	
being	more	profitable	when	used	in	a	mining	context:		
“An	exploitation	water	right	for	mining,	I	mean	if	the	mining	industry,	it	would	be	
100	 times	more	 expensive	 so…	 the	 farmer	 does	 not	 have	 the	 chance	 to	 buy	 an	
exploitation	water	 right	with	 that	 competition”	 (DGA	user	 organization	national	
division)	
“A	water	right	for	the	mining	industry	is	completely	different	to	a	water	right	for	
agriculture.	First,	the	mining	company	asks	for	the	right	in	a	basin	and	takes	the	
water	away	and	uses	it	all.	But	in	agriculture,	the	water	is	used	in	the	same	basin	
and	all	the	poor	irrigation,	everything	comes	back	to	the	basin,	and	moreover	the	
watering	 does	 not	 last	 the	 12	 months	 of	 the	 year,	 it	 is	 not	 permanent	 and	
continuous,	 you	 water	 by	 season,	 twice	 a	 week,	 so	 the	 groundwater	 recovers.	
However,	in	the	mining	industry	the	water	is	taken	continuously	and	permanently,	
every	 day	 of	 the	 year	 suck	 and	 suck,	 just	 like	 every	water	 company.	 The	 use	 is	
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completely	different,	but	 legally	 there	are	no	differences,	because	when	you	ask	
for	the	water	right,	everyone	asks	for	it	to	be	permanent	and	continuous	so	they	
can	sell	it	later”	(DOH	Serena)	
Aware	of	the	significant	implications	of	a	change	in	the	use	of	water	rights	in	a	basin,	farmers	often	
directly	oppose	this	kind	of	project,	even	though	there	is	no	legal	basis	to	restrict	it.	
IMAGE	2:	“MINING	PROJECT	INFURIATES	FARMERS	IN	PAN	DE	AZUCAR”	
	
Source:	El	Ovallino	newspaper	(09.10.2007)	
Social	and	environmental	costs	are	not	 taken	 into	account	when	evaluating	 the	efficiency	of	water	
use.	This	 is	 looked	upon	as	one	of	 the	worst	problems	of	deregulation.	 In	 spite	of	 the	 reform,	 the	
Code	continues	to	encourage	the	use	of	water	where	it	 is	more	profitable.	Across	a	broad	range	of	
the	Chilean	 territory	 this	means	 the	mining	 industry:	“Currently	 the	Water	Code	encourages	giving	
the	water	right	to	the	one	that	is	more	profitable.	In	that	case,	clearly	in	the	North	the	most	profitable	
industry	is	the	mining	industry.	In	other	words,	this	cost	is	not	assumed,	it	is	not	part	of…	the	Water	
Code	is	strongly	biased,	it	does	not	seek	anything	else,	it	does	not	point	to	an	overall	issue.	The	only	
thing	it	encourages	is	an	intensive	use	of	the	resource”	(DGA	user	organization	national	division).	
	
	
	
	
	
IMAGE	3:	“LOCAL	LEADERS	WILL	FIGHT	FOR	CHANGES	TO	THE	WATER	CODE”	
	
Source:	El	Ovallino	newspaper.	(03.04.2009)	
	
Expectations	of	the	reform	and	the	role	of	legislators	
A	 detailed	 analysis	 of	 the	 different	 interested	 viewpoints	 reveals	 frequently	 expressed	 doubts	
regarding	 the	 abilities	 of	 the	 policymakers	 to	 carry	 out	 the	 required	 reforms.	 The	 parliamentary	
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debate	concerning	the	2005	reform	lasted	more	than	a	decade	and	the	results	have	left	a	significant	
number	of	parties	unsatisfied.		
A	 common	 concern	 regarding	 the	 policymakers’	 work	 is	 the	 accusation	 that	 the	 legislators	 have	
investments	 that	 are	 directly	 affected	 by	 hydrological	 resources,	 for	which	 reason	 the	 speed	with	
which	the	amendments	were	introduced	was	affected.	Another	complaint	is	centralization	of	political	
decisions,	resulting	in	a	significant	under-appreciation	of	the	interests	of	other	territories.	
Among	 the	key	demands	expressed	 for	 the	 reform	 is	 the	need	 to	modify	 the	nature	of	water	as	a	
private	property	given	in	perpetuity:	“A	constitutional	reform	was	needed	with	relation	to	the	nature	
of	national	property	of	public	use	and	what	is	implied	by	it	in	terms	of	the	concession	of	water	rights	
that	naturally,	I	mean	from	my	point	of	view	naturally,	should	not	be	given	in	perpetuity	but	should	
naturally	be	subject	to	inspection	by	proper	authorities	according	to	the	limitations	of	availability	of	
the	 resource	 characteristic	 of	 different	 ecosystems”	 (Concertación	 civil	 servant,	 high	 government	
office).	
During	 the	 last	 presidential	 term	 of	 the	 Concertación	 party	 (2006-2010),	 there	 was	 a	 debate	
concerning	 the	 necessity	 of	 reforming	 this	 aspect,	 including	 some	 sectors	 that	 demanded	 water	
nationalization.	Nonetheless,	this	stance	has	not	given	rise	to	significant	consequences,	although	in	
the	agricultural	 context:	 “A	 rumor	 started	about	agricultural	 reform	 to	 the	water	and	about	water	
rights	being	revoked	and,	of	course,	there	are	farmers	that	have	a	lot	of	political	influence	and	there	
was	huge	pressure	to	stop	the	project”	(user	organization	head,	civil	servant	CNR).	
Overall,	 one	 may	 surmise	 that	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 legal	 framework,	 the	 different	 interviewees	
observe	inflexibility	and	difficulties	in	modifying	the	structures.		5.2	Flexibility:	Economic	Regulations		
Economic	regulations	define	the	conditions	for	trading	water	as	private	property.	As	mentioned,	the	
Code	does	not	establish	 sufficient	 regulations	 for	 the	market,	which	has	 represented	an	 important	
weakness.	 To	 address	 this	 problem,	 the	 user	 organizations	 themselves	 have	 seen	 the	 need	 to	
introduce	internal	regulations	and	rules	to	define	transactions.	
The	 economic	 rules	 involved	 in	 the	 management	 of	 hydrological	 resources	 refer	 mainly	 to	 the	
regulations	that	allow	a	water	market	to	be	founded.	To	a	large	extent,	this	is	underpinned	by	legal	
regulations	that	establish	the	chance	to	sell	and	purchase	both	water	rights	and	water	volumes.			
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The	 importance	 of	 this	 opportunity	 is	 clearly	 reflected	 in	 the	 words	 associated	 with	 hydrological	
resources.	 The	 content	 analysis	 applied	 to	 every	 interview	 on	 this	 research	 shows	 that	 the	words	
SELL	 and	 BUY	 (or	 PURCHASE)	 appear	 around	 500	 times	 with	 relation	 to	 water,	 while	 STOCK	 (or	
SHARES)	has	212	references	and	MONEY	223.	
It	 is	 common	 to	 see	 references	 in	 the	 interviewees’	 discourse	 to	 self-regulation	 within	 the	 water	
market,	whereby	 State	 organizations	would	 not	 have	 any	 influence.	 In	 general,	 it	 is	 assumed	 that	
private	parties	are	autonomous	when	deciding	how	to	use	their	own	hydrological	resources;	hence,	
they	do	not	have	any	 limitations	 in	carrying	out	 their	economic	 trading	with	 their	 stock	and	water	
volumes.	This	self-regulation	and	the	inability	of	the	State’s	civil	servants	to	interfere	is	reflected	in	
the	recognition	of	the	head	of	the	General	Water	Office	that	he	obtains	information	about	the	cost	of	
water	through	the	virtual	water	market	(DGA	Ovalle).	
An	 important	 change	 has	 been	 recognized	 following	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 new	 Water	 Code.	
However,	 a	market	 had	 existed	 since	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 use	 of	water	 channels,	 and	 it	was	 only	
after	 the	1980	Code	that	 it	became	possible	 to	sell	water	separately	 from	 land,	which	has	brought	
great	flexibility	to	the	market.	However,	the	concentration	of	property	has	been	rising	in	parallel.		
	Of	course,	there	is	a	group	in	the	middle,	but	90%	of	our	users	are	small	and	they	
have	30%	of	the	water,	that	is	the	reality	so	the	opposite	situation	could	happen	
too.	(administrator,	Limarí	Monitoring	Board)	
The	great	difference	and	advantage	of	the	market	rules,	from	the	point	of	view	of	some	farmers,	is	
that	 since	 the	 new	 Code	 it	 has	 become	 feasible	 to	 buy	 and	 sell	 water	 separately	 from	 the	 land,	
bringing	great	flexibility	to	the	market.	In	addition,	the	status	that	the	Code	has	given	to	water	rights	
as	private	property	has	provided	investors	with	security	in	relation	to	the	use	of	the	resources.			
Moreover,	 due	 to	 the	 status	 that	 the	 Code	 has	 given	 to	 water	 rights	 as	 private	 and	 transferable	
property,	there	 is	an	 increased	chance	of	 investment	because	such	 investment	 involves	 less	risk.	 In	
this	 context,	 and	 by	 virtue	 of	 the	 formalized	 water	 rights	 given	 and	 supported	 by	 the	 State,	 the	
market	has	been	 invigorated,	 leaving	a	 great	 amount	of	 transferable	water	 rights	 available	 (Ovalle	
stockbroker).	
5.2.1	Water	Rights	Market	
This	 kind	 of	market	 exists	 around	 the	whole	 country,	 as	 previously	 explained	 (chapter	 4).	 It	 is	 the	
oldest	market,	as	a	result	of	the	selling	of	water	rights	since	the	19th	century	(“water	gifts”	–	merced	
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is	an	old-fashioned	word	for	gift	or	favor).	Nonetheless,	after	the	division	between	land	and	water	as	
a	result	of	the	1981	Code,	this	market	was	invigorated	around	the	whole	country,	and	especially	in	
the	basins	with	scarce	resources.			
In	 the	 Limarí	basin,	 the	 current	 cost	of	water	 stock	 can	 reach	8	million	pesos.	However,	 there	 is	 a	
certain	 range	of	prices,	depending	on	the	 transfer	 limitations	 that	exist	and	the	 legal	conditions	 to	
which	the	rights	are	subject	 (whether	they	are	“perfected	rights7”).	The	cost	of	these	rights	always	
varies,	due	to	there	being	no	entity	to	set	the	price	of	the	stocks;	these	are	instead	set	by	the	market.	
“The	 market	 sets	 the	 price.	 The	 prices	 are	 related	 to	 how	much	 they	 are	 sold.	
Look,	 normally	 a	 good	 price,	 cheap	 is	 around	 3	 million	 for	 a	 stock,	 but	 by	 the	
example	of	the	Cogotí	reservoir	where	there	is	no	water	and	each	stock	gives	you	
1500	mt3,	the	share	cost	is	6	to	7	millon	pesos”	(illegal	water	stockbroker)	
“The	 water	 exploiting	 rights	 are	 also	 distinguished	 if	 they	 are	 or	 are	 not	
“perfected”.	When	they	are	not	perfected	they	are	cheaper.	A	“perfected”	water	
right	costs	1.5	to	2	million	pesos	more	than	the	water	right	that	is	“not	perfected”.		
By	virtue	of	 that	 you	are	obviously	avoiding	 the	6-7	month	 formality,	which	 can	
sometimes	last	1	year”	(water	trading	lawyer)	
Although	the	water	rights	can	be	sold	without	being	perfected,	so	they	can	be	traded	on	the	market,	
they	must	 be	 registered	 in	 the	 Property	 Register.	When	 this	 has	 been	 done,	 water	 rights	 can	 be	
treated	as	any	other	property	or	may	even	be	used	to	guarantee	a	loan	from	a	banking	institution.				
“In	some	basins	which	suffer	 from	scarcity	conditions,	demand	grows	for	rights	
that	are	generated	by	 this	market,	which	 is	 primarily	 the	 sale	and	purchase	of	
shares,	 water	 volumes,	 and	 mortgage	 rights.	 Many	 users	 levy	 the	 rights	 to	 a	
bank,	 and	 they	 mortgage	 them,	 they	 are	 property”	 (CNR	 civil	 servant,	 user	
organization	manager)	
The	 Limarí	 basin	was	declared	empty	more	 than	30	 years	 ago	 and	 from	 that	 time	 it	has	not	been	
possible	 to	 register	 new	 water	 rights.	 The	 amount	 of	 water	 rights	 and	 the	 proportion	 of	 water	
volumes	have	been	settled;	 therefore,	water	can	now	only	be	accessed	when	buying	 rights	on	 the	
market.	
                                                      
7	The	“perfection”	formality	takes	into	account	the	incorporation	of	legal	characteristics	from	water	legislation.	
When	a	water	right	is	“perfected”	it	is	possible	to	carry	out	the	different	formalities	with	the	DGA	(transfers,	
change	of	supply	source)	and	also	it	is	possible	to	apply	for	water	benefits.	
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“As	the	basin	is	empty	and	the	rights	settled,	the	common	sense	is	that	all	water	
rights	are	set	and	for	that	reason	the	only	way	to	obtain	them	within	the	current	
legal	framework,	 it	 is	only	through	the	market,	by	virtue	of	not	having	any	other	
legal	route	to	them”	(local	university	expert)	
Due	 to	 these	 requirements,	 lawyers’	 intervention	 is	 fundamental	 for	 the	 operation	 of	 the	market.		
There	are	now	law	firms	that	only	work	in	water	trading	and	legalization	of	water	rights.	
“The	water	exploitation	right,	as	 it	 is,	 is	a	property	that	has	a	registration	which	
has	a	series	of	steps	and	contracts	during	the	different	stages	of	transfer,	and	all	
that	needs,	let	us	say,	study,	at	least	from	the	legal	point	of	view”	(water	trading	
lawyer)	
IMAGE	4:	LAW	FIRM	SPECIALIZING	IN	WATER	TRADING	
	
Photograph	taken	in	Ovalle,	March	2013	
	
Finally,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 emphasize	 the	 common	 dissatisfaction	 shown	 by	 the	 interviewees	
concerning	 the	high	 cost	of	water	 rights.	 Farmers	 identify	 that	 the	price	of	 stocks	has	 significantly	
risen	during	recent	years,	making	 it	ever	harder	 for	small	and	medium-sized	producers	to	maintain	
their	 agriculture	 business.	 Owing	 to	 this,	many	 countrymen	 state	 that	 they	 have	 had	 to	 sell	 their	
shares	 in	order	 to	be	able	to	cope	with	 financial	difficulties.	 It	 is	not	normally	possible	 for	 them	to	
subsequently	recover	their	stocks	and	reestablish	their	wealth.	
5.2.2	Spot	Market	
This	kind	of	market	refers	to	the	sale	and	purchase	of	water	volumes.	In	contrast	to	the	water	rights	
market,	the	spot	market	only	works	in	some	basins	of	the	country	where	there	are	enough	facilities	
to	store	water	and	make	water	transfers,	and	where	there	are	user	organizations	that	support	and	
administrate	this	kind	of	trading.			
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The	most	important	spot	market	in	the	country	is	located	in	the	Limarí	basin.	Due	to	the	facilities	of	
the	 Paloma	 System,	 the	 professional	 nature	 of	 the	 user	 organizations	 and	 precise	 resource	
management	 in	 the	 reservoirs,	 many	 water	 volume	 transactions	 are	 possible	 in	 the	 Limarí	 basin.	
Moreover,	its	reservoirs	function	as	a	kind	of	water	bank.	
Even	 though	 this	market	has	 grown,	 the	 information	provided	by	 the	 interviewees	 shows	 that	not	
everybody	can	be	 involved	 in	water	volume	trading.	 In	addition	to	the	difficulties	presented	by	the	
high	unit	costs	of	water	during	droughts,	there	are	cultural	elements	and	issues	relating	to	access	to	
information	that	make	it	difficult	for	traditional	small-scale	farmers	to	take	part.		
“Small	farmers	have	very	limited	participation	in	the	market,	in	many	cases	these	
people	cannot	be	 involved	because	they	are	at	the	highest	part	of	the	basin	and	
do	not	have	any	access	to	the	facilities	to	channel	the	water.	Thus,	it	is	not	related	
to	the	fact	that	they	do	not	want	to	participate,	but	instead	they	cannot;	that	they	
do	not	participate	culturally	is	one	thing,	but	they	also	cannot	transfer	their	rights	
easily.	Moreover,	there	are	restrictions	from	the	point	of	view	of	information	and	
communication,	these	people	are	not	connected;	they	know	what	the	organization	
officer	 says,	 but	 they	do	not	 have	 the	 chance	 to	 enter	 the	online	market”	 (local	
university	expert)	
At	the	same	time,	agriculture	companies	below	the	 level	of	the	reservoir	(this	 is	a	 limited	watering	
area)	 have	 a	 significant	 trading	 level,	 because	 in	 many	 cases	 it	 is	 more	 profitable	 to	 buy	 water	
volumes,	particularly	during	drought	time.		
In	the	case	of	farmers	who	own	water	rights	on	the	reservoir,	an	equivalent	strategy	to	the	sale	and	
purchase	of	water	volumes	is	water	renting.	This	is	a	very	old	practice,	dating	from	the	beginning	of	
intensive	production	within	the	basin	water,	when	water	renting	started	among	neighbors.		
“In	the	areas	where	there	are	no	reservoir	regulations,	what	they	trade	is	not	the	
water	volume,	it	is	a	flow	that	changes	with	the	passing	of	time,	so	they	can	rent	
the	water	exploitation	right	for	a	whole	season,	but	they	can	start	with	1	lt/s	and	
later	 0.3	 lt/s	 by	 stock,	 so	 it	 has	 other	 restrictions;	 the	 difference	 between	 the	
legalized	and	the	non-legalized	area	is	very	important”	(local	university	expert)	
After	 the	 enactment	 of	 the	Water	 Code,	 this	 old	 practice	 has	 continued	 but	 is	 now	within	 a	 legal	
framework.	These	kinds	of	transactions	are	fundamental	in	contexts	where	there	is	no	chance	to	join	
the	water	volume	market.		
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5.2.3	Water	Trading	
According	to	our	interviewees,	in	order	to	keep	trading	costs	at	a	low	price	and	to	have	the	chance	to	
develop	a	water	market	it	is	necessary	to	have	sufficient	facilities	to	perform	water	channeling.	This	
allows	 hydrological	 resources	 to	 be	 conducted	 to	 areas	with	 higher	 profit	 per	 cubic	 centimeter	 of	
water.			
The	biggest	traders	of	water	in	the	area	are	the	large	agriculture	companies.	Apart	from	having	more	
supplies,	which	allows	such	companies	to	buy	water	though	it	is	expensive,	they	have	huge	volumes	
of	permanent	crops,	which	must	be	maintained	during	times	of	drought	in	order	to	avoid	a	large	loss	
on	investments	and	at	the	same	time	fulfill	existing	export	commitments.		
“The	ones	who	used	 to	buy,	 as	usual,	were	 the	 companies	 that	were	 there;	 just	
think	 that	 they	 have	 contracts	 with	 shipping	 companies	 and	 people	 who	 must	
honor	 contracts,	 then	 they	 cannot	 say	 ‘you	 know	 I	 am	 going	 to	 have	 less	
production,	 now	 I	will	 stop	watering	 50	 hectares’,	 that	 is	 impossible:	 they	must	
buy	water,	 they	have	 to	provide,	as	 I	was	 saying,	 for	 the	deficit	by	buying	more	
just	 in	 case,	 and	 that	 happens	mainly	 because	 they	 paid	 those	 high	 costs	when	
they	 bought,	 for	 the	 small	 ones	 there	 was	 not	 any	 chance”	 (electronic	 market	
administrator)	
On	the	other	side,	the	vegetable	farmers	(who	work	with	temporary	cultivated	fields,	mainly	growing	
vegetables)	 are	 normally	 the	 ones	who	 sell	water.	 This	 is	 because	 it	 is	more	 profitable	 to	 sell	 the	
water	of	the	season	than	to	seed	during	a	time	of	drought.		
“The	vegetable	 farmers	 say:	 in	other	words	 I	 cannot	buy	water	at	a	 cost	of	140	
pesos	 if	 what	 I	 am	 planting	 is	 not	 profitable…	 that	 is	 why	 I	 do	 not	 plant,	 and	
instead	sell	the	water”	(electronic	market	administrator)	5.3	Flexibility:	Major	Regulators	and	Small	Regulators	
To	 continue	with	 the	 theoretical	 approach	 developed	 in	 chapter	 3,	we	 acknowledge	 organizations	
that	are	part	of	 the	regulation	and	administration	of	access	 to	hydrological	 resources	as	 important	
aspects	in	ensuring	the	flexibility	of	the	system.	When	these	organizations	work	at	a	general	level,	we	
call	them	major	regulators.	
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5.3.1	Involvement	of	the	State	
The	 primary	 regulators	 are	 involved	 with	 the	 current	 institutional	 framework	 and	 legislation	
established	to	govern	water	access.	In	addition	to	legislation	(summarized	in	the	section	concerning	
legal	 regulation),	 the	 institutions	 responsible	 for	 water	 administration	 are	 the	 main	 regulators	
(chapter	4	presents	an	institutional	description	of	these	State	organizations).	
According	 to	 the	 evaluations	 of	 the	 different	 stakeholders,	 the	 ability	 of	 State	 organizations	 to	
govern	 access	 to	 hydrological	 resources	 is	 widely	 questioned.	 On	 the	whole,	most	 critics	 point	 to	
weak	assistance	from	State	organizations	in	the	regulation	of	access	to	water.	Additionally,	farmers	
adopting	a	pro-market	position	claim	that	the	market	is	not	properly	regulated;	they	identify	market	
deregulation	on	behalf	of	the	State	as	an	important	problem,	as	it	leaves	the	decisions	affecting	the	
market	in	the	hands	of	private	parties.			
“particular	situations	happen	because	of	the	 lack	of	rules	 in	the	market,	when	in	
practice	the	State	should	be	the	market	regulator	and	would	be	able	to	ensure	the	
more	efficient	use	of	water,	depute	and	transfer	everything	to	private	parties,	and	
finally	private	parties	distort	market	management	due	to	very	specific	situations”	
(company	administrator	3)	
One	of	the	problems	identified	by	civil	servants	from	State	organizations	relates	to	their	own	inability	
to	intervene	in	the	market,	to	reject	changes	in	the	use	of	the	resources	and	to	restrict	the	number	of	
seeded	hectares	according	to	the	shares	owned.			
“There	 is	not	any	chance	to	 limit	the	changes	 in	use	of	water	rights.	Nor	can	we	
restrict	the	cultivation	field	size	area.	This	is	a	very	problematic	situation,	because	
we	cannot	restrict	farmers,	in	other	words,	if	a	farmer	has	20	stocks	and	imagine	
those	 20	 stocks	 are	 enough	 to	 water	 20	 hectares,	 this	 farmer	 could	 absolutely	
have	these	20	stocks	and	plant	40	hectares”	(DGA	civil	servant,	Ovalle)	
Civil	servants	from	State	organizations	accept	that	their	role	should	be	providing	the	conditions	for	
the	 market	 to	 operate	 as	 well	 as	 possible	 and	 to	 be	 extended	 to	 other	 basins.	 The	 Limarí	 basin	
provides	an	example	 in	 this	 respect.	Among	 the	 conditions	necessary	 to	enhance	 the	operation	of	
the	market	 are	 the	 regulation	 of	 water	 rights	 (rights	 legalization	 restructuring,	 registration	 in	 the	
Property	 Register,	 etc.)	 and	 the	 improvement	 of	 access	 to	 information.	 An	 example	 of	 this	 is	 the	
electronic	 market,	 since	 this	 initiative	 is	 supported	 by	 the	 CNR	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 publishing	 the	
information	and	then	showing	the	prices	in	the	market.			
At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 State	 takes	 part	 in	 water	management	 at	 an	 economic	 level	 in	 two	 ways:	
benefits	and	large	investments	in	reservoirs.	The	benefits	vary	according	to	the	size	of	the	farmer’s	
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business,	but	 the	ones	who	 receive	 the	most	are	 larger	 farmers	and	agriculture	companies.	This	 is	
due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 in	 order	 to	 have	 access	 to	 benefits,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 have	 the	 capital	 to	 co-
finance	the	investments.			
But	the	most	important	investments	in	terms	of	hydrological	 issues	are	connected	to	investment	in	
reservoirs.	 There	 have	been	 large	 investments	 in	 this	 area,	 but	 all	 during	 the	 first	 part	 of	 the	 20th	
century.	According	 to	 the	point	of	 view	of	many	of	 the	 interviewees,	 reservoir	 investment	has	not	
been	sufficient	in	recent	years.			
In	this	respect,	one	may	compare	two	contradictory	points	of	view	which	come	from	the	State	and	
are	related	to	reservoir	investment:		
	“Chile	is	an	undeveloped	country	from	the	hydrological	point	of	view,	that	is	why	
in	other	words,	 the	 investments	during	 the	 last	50	 years	have	been	quite	basic”	
(right-wing	civil	servant,	high	government	office)	
“How	 you	 can	 justify	 the	 separation	 between	 water	 and	 all	 that	 stuff,	 they	
justified	 it	 saying	 that	 it	was	 the	only	way	 for	 the	country	 to	grow	and	 then	big	
investors	could	come.	But	the	most	incredible	thing	is	that	the	largest	investment,	
in	the	reservoirs	for	instance,	it	is	made	by	the	State.	Later,	the	users	did	not	pay	a	
single	penny.	Deep	down	the	State	gives	away	water	and	facilities	to	them.	What	
is	more,	now	private	parties	are	 the	owners	of	 the	 reservoirs,	 imagine	 that	 they	
spent	 so	many	 years	 when	 private	 parties	 did	 not	 pay	 for	maintenance,	 it	 was	
better	 for	 the	State	to	give	the	reservoirs	 to	them,	so	they	at	 least	can	maintain	
them.		Even	though,	after	that,	when	there	is	a	problem,	they	ask	to	the	State	for	
solutions”	(DOH	Serena)	
As	it	is	possible	to	observe	in	these	speeches,	the	right-wing	civil	servant	considers	that	there	is	not	
enough	 investment.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 left-wing	 civil	 servant	 (the	 latter)	 argues	 that	 the	 State	 has	
invested	heavily	in	facilities	and	that	both	these	facilities	and	water	rights	have	been	given	to	farmers	
for	free.		
An	 important	 State	 enterprise	 to	 enhance	market	 conditions	 has	 been	 the	 State-supported	 (CNR)	
creation	 of	 the	 electronic	market.	Nonetheless,	 the	main	market-related	 legal	 regulations	 concern	
user	organizations,	which	are	the	ones	who	set	the	boundaries	on	water	movements.			
Among	the	main	roles	of	the	State	is	the	audit	of	private	parties	in	order	to	prevent	water	theft	and	
misappropriation	related	to	its	management.		
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IMAGE	5:	DGA	INTERVENES	IN	HUATULAME	RIVER	DUE	TO	IRREGULARITIES	IN	WATER	EXTRACTION	
	
Source:	El	Ovallino	newspaper	(15,07,2007)	
	
The	interviewees’	comments	show	that	the	roles	of	the	main	State	organizations	relating	to	access	to	
hydrological	resources	are	as	follows:		
• DGA:	water	rights	regulation	and	audit	of	use	
• CNR:	benefit	to	encourage	efficient	watering	
• DOH:	building	and	maintenance	of	reservoirs	
However,	 it	 is	 also	 noted	 that	 since	 there	 are	 faults	 within	 these	 organizations,	 it	 is	 frequently	
necessary	 to	seek	 the	resolution	of	water-related	conflicts	 in	 the	courts.	Hence,	a	 litigation	culture	
has	developed	around	water	right-related	conflicts,	with	litigation	becoming	a	commonly	used	tool,	
mainly	employed	by	user	organizations	and	farmers	with	greater	financial	resources.	
IMAGE	6:	COURT	RULES	IN	FAVOR	OF	WATER	RIGHT	HOLDERS	FROM	RECOLETA	RESERVOIR	
	
Source:	El	Ovallino	newspaper	(12.11.2008)	
	
One	 of	 the	 important	 findings	 of	 this	 research	 was	 the	 identification	 of	 the	 market	 as	 the	 main	
regulator	of	water	access.	Entrepreneurs,	lawyers	and	stockbrokers	all	agree	that	the	market	is	highly	
deregulated.		
“The	 Oversight	 Board	 is	 a	 water	 administration	 organization,	 but	 neither	 has	
power	 over	 them	 nor	 can	 decide	 over	 them,	 because	 the	 ones	 who	 can	 really	
decide	 are	 the	 owners	 and	 the	 DGA	 does	 not	 meddle.	 It	 is	 a	 profoundly	
deregulated	market”	(lawyer	for	entrepreneurs)	
Thus,	 the	 interviewees	 emphasize	 the	 lack	 of	 major	 regulators	 as	 the	 main	 problem	 in	 the	
management	of	hydrological	resources.	In	this	sense,	the	absence	of	legal	regulations	for	the	basin,	
together	 with	 the	 limited	 involvement	 of	 the	 State,	 represents	 one	 of	 the	 main	 difficulties	 in	
achieving	sustainable	management	of	hydrological	resources.		
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5.3.2	User	Organizations	
In	 the	 Chilean	 model,	 user	 organizations	 have	 the	 important	 function	 of	 hydrological	 resource	
administration.	 This	 is	 established	 in	 the	 Water	 Code	 and	 it	 has	 been	 promoted	 by	 State	
organizations	during	recent	decades.	In	fact,	the	interviews	conducted	with	State	civil	servants	show,	
the	considerable	efforts	 from	Concertación	governments	 to	strengthen	user	organizations.	The	aim	
has	 been	 to	 try	 to	 encourage	 community	 administration	 of	 the	 resources,	 although	 in	 legal	 terms	
water	rights	are	individual.			
From	 this	 point	 of	 view,	 user	 organizations	 have	 performed	 an	 important	 role	 in	 hydrological	
resource	 administration	 and	 in	 establishing	 rules	 for	 market	 management.	 However,	 both	
entrepreneurs	 and	 large-scale	 farmers	 have	 heavily	 criticized	 the	 conditions	 and	 regulations	 that	
these	organizations	impose	on	the	market	as	a	whole	and	on	water	transfers	in	particular.	According	
to	 these	 groups,	 the	 regulations	 betray	 a	 lack	 of	 knowledge	 from	 leaders	 and	 administrators	 and	
would	only	hinder	the	free	market	(company	administrator	3).	
In	 this	 regard,	 one	 of	 the	 most	 critical	 aspects	 has	 been	 that	 the	 DGA	 frequently	 authorizes	
permanent	transfers	that	are	later	questioned	by	the	user	organizations,	which	deny	them	because	
they	consider	the	rest	of	the	user	organizations	would	be	harmed.		
“I	am	the	first	 to	check	those	transfers	and	the	 last	word	 is	given	by	the	DGA,	 if	
they	say	that	it	is	transferred,	it	is	transferred	and	I	have	to	accept	it;	but	I	am	the	
first	who	can	oppose	along	with	 the	Board	 lawyer,	because	 it	harms	others	and	
we	 are	 here	 to	 safeguard	 everybody’s	 interests,	 everybody”	 (user	 organization	
administrator,	Hurtado	river)	
Concurrently,	experts	consider	 that	 the	 role	of	 the	OU	has	been	very	 important,	precisely	because	
they	 are	 the	 ones	 who	 set	 the	 boundaries	 for	 water	 transfers	 and	 establish	 few	 rules	 for	 its	
development.		
	“The	organizations	started	to	regulate	this	movement,	because	they	realized	that	
when	 a	 right	 was	 transferred	 from	 a	 particular	 channel,	 the	 channel	 would	
continue	 having	 the	 same	 area	 and	 it	was	 not	 flexible,	 it	 did	 not	 grow	 smaller,	
then	the	costs	rose	and	the	losses	from	leakage	were	maintained	or	increased;	so	
they	perceived	that	 it	could	be	 just	 like	that,	but	 there	must	be	a	way	to	govern	
the	transfers,	by	pointing	out	that	these	could	be	moved	in	some	directions	and	in	
some	others	could	not.	By	this	time,	certain	rules	started	to	develop	and	there	was	
some	narrowing	of	 the	 free-market	and	multidirectional	model”	 (local	university	
expert)	
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The	user	organizations	themselves	established	that	purchasers	of	water	volumes	must	be	the	owners	
of	water	rights	in	the	basin.	This	was	implemented	with	the	aim	of	reducing	opportunities	for	water	
stockholders,	who	are	the	stockbrokers	involved	in	the	sale	and	purchase	of	water,	taking	advantage	
of	privileged	information	and	engaging	in	speculation	based	on	prices.		
Meanwhile,	 the	 involvement	of	 user	organization	administrators	 and	 leaders	 in	water	 transactions	
was	 also	 subject	 to	 regulation,	 on	 account	 of	 the	 obvious	 conflict	 of	 interest	 among	 leaders,	
administrators	 and	 entrepreneurs.	 Some	 people	who	 used	 to	work	 in	 user	 organizations	 and	who	
had	access	to	privileged	information	would	do	business	with	entrepreneurs.	To	address	this	issue,	it	
has	been	established	 that	 temporary	 transfer	 requests	may	only	be	made	by	 the	owners	of	water	
rights,	or	by	administrators	of	agriculture	companies	that	have	obtained	the	corresponding	consent.		
But	these	regulations	only	relate	to	annual	amounts	or	to	the	water	volume	market	(spot	market),	it	
being	considered	that	in	legal	terms	it	is	not	feasible	to	establish	conditions	for	the	sale	and	purchase	
of	water	rights.			
“The	transfers	of	title	deeds	are	defined	according	to	the	DGA	rules	and	the	Water	
Code.	 Because	 it	 is	 a	 title,	 it	 is	 yours.	 On	 the	 amounts	 there	 are	 interventions,	
there	they	can	establish	the	rules,	but	not	on	the	property.	It	belongs	to	you	and	
you	do	not	need	to	ask	for	permission	either	for	selling	or	for	purchase	or	anything	
else”	(Ovalle	stockbroker)	
User	organizations	have	also	set	rules	defining	fines	amounting	to	percentages	of	water	volumes	for	
the	 transfer	 of	 amounts.	 These	 percentages	 correspond	 to	 the	 estimated	 loss	 occurring	 during	
transfer.	However,	they	are	widely	questioned	by	users.		
“I	would	 like	to	know	what	the	purpose	of	this	 is.	There	you	have	one	of	the	big	
businesses	of	this	administration.	I	transfer	water,	they	make	me	pay	it	at	a	high	
cost	 and	 I	 do	not	 know	where	 that	water	 is	 going	 to.	 That	 is	 their	 decision,	 but	
they	do	not	explain	why.	So	the	organization	can	say	we	were	transferred	100,000	
mt3	and	we	received	only	66,000	from	that	guy,	nothing	more,	and	the	rest	can	be	
distributed.	Because	 it	 is	not	only	me,	 there	are	many	who	are	punished	 too,	 so	
there	is	a	considerable	volume”	(mid-size	business	farmer	2)	
Within	this	context,	there	are	State	civil	servants,	farmers,	and	leaders	who	highlight	the	regulation	
introduced	by	the	user	organization,	by	reason	of	which	the	market	operates	with	a	degree	of	order.	
The	 civil	 servant	 responsible	 for	 the	 Ovalle	 DGA,	 for	 instance,	 states	 clearly	 that	 if	 the	 user	
organization	had	not	established	regulations,	the	market	would	not	be	feasible.			
“In	 order	 to	 have	 a	 water	 market	 there	 is	 some	 kind	 of	 separate	 regulation,	
additional	rules	have	to	be	established	apart	 from	the	rest	of	the	country.	 If	you	
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pay	attention,	you	will	see	that	the	user	organizations	themselves	introduce	these	
regulations	 because	 they	 have	 to	 preserve	 order,	 if	 there	 were	 not	 these	
additional	rules	that	each	organization	possess	and	we	only	had	the	Water	Code,	
it	 would	 be	 impossible,	 unfeasible	 to	 establish	 this	 market”	 (DGA	 civil	 servant	
Ovalle)	
Conversely,	 an	 evaluation	 of	 responses	 from	 experts	 and	 civil	 servants	 from	 State	 organizations	
clearly	shows	that	the	existence	and	proper	functioning	of	the	user	organization	 is	viewed	as	a	key	
component	for	the	reasonable	administration	of	hydrological	resources.	 In	fact,	the	mere	existence	
of	the	user	organization	is	associated	with	a	better	administration	of	the	resource,	as	the	basins	with	
more	water-related	difficulties	are	those	without	an	operating	user	organization.	
“If	 you	go	 to	 the	more	 struggling	basins,	 this	will	always	be	associated	with	 the	
fact	 of	 not	 having	 organizations	 and	 having	 high	 demand.	 The	 organizations	 in	
some	way	put	pressure	on	public	associations	 that	are	 responsible	 for	 the	 issue.	
That	 is	how	we	get	an	opposing	party.	And	 the	Oversight	Board	participation	 in	
some	basins	has	been	essential	to	maintain	administration	of	the	resource”	(CNR	
civil	servant,	user	organization	head)	
Ultimately,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 highlight	 that	 it	 is	 the	 user	 organizations	 that	 control	 the	 reservoirs.	
Though	built	with	State	money,	reservoirs	are	subsequently	given	over	to	users	so	they	can	manage	
their	own	hydrological	resources.	
IMAGE	7:	LA	PALOMA	ADMINISTRATION	GIVEN	OVER	TO	WATER	RIGHT	HOLDERS	
	
Source:	El	Ovallino	newspaper	(13.09.2008)	
5.3.3	Entrepreneurs	
Water	 transaction	 entrepreneurs	 have	 played	 an	 important	 role	 for	 many	 decades	 in	 the	 Limarí	
basin.	Information	regarding	available	water	rights	and	water	volumes	is	crucial	for	buyers	and	sellers	
to	be	able	to	trade	with	each	other.		
Whereas	such	entrepreneurs	represent	an	old	tradition	in	the	area	of	this	basin,	the	legitimacy	of	this	
practice	is	also	questioned.	There	are	several	criticisms	of	these	entrepreneurs,	who	in	this	area	are	
called	 stockbrokers	 (corredores),	 but	 the	 less	 formal	 ones	 tend	 to	 be	 singled	 out.	 Yet	 this	 kind	 of	
service	is	not	considered	illegal:	“The	stockbrokers	are	not	banned,	it	is	not	illegal,	I	am	not	sure	if	it	is	
100%	legal	either,	but	this	is	how	it	works”	(CNR	civil	servant	Santiago).	
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In	 the	main	square	of	Ovalle,	 the	capital	city	of	 the	province,	 it	 is	possible	 to	 find	these	traditional	
stockbrokers	who	 are	 looking	 for	water	 rights	 purchasers	 and	 sellers.	 They	 place	 themselves	 on	 a	
bench	 or	 in	 a	 nearby	 cafe.	 The	 farmers	 know	where	 the	 stockbrokers	 are	 and	 that	 they	 can	 gain	
access	to	the	water	(volumes	or	rights)	that	they	need	through	the	stockbrokers.			
IMAGE	8:	STOCKBROKERS	ON	OVALLE	SQUARE	
	
Photograph	taken	in	Ovalle,	March	2013	
	
During	recent	years	and	by	virtue	of	an	enterprise	from	experts	and	the	CNR,	an	electronic	market	
has	 been	 established	 in	 Ovalle.	 The	 purpose	 of	 this	 project	 was	 to	 establish	 a	 legalized	 system,	
permitting	transparency	in	terms	of	market	information	and	thereby	lowering	trading	costs.	 It	 is	an	
initiative	 aimed	 at	 improving	 access	 to	 information	 on	 market	 prices.	 This	 enterprise	 has	 indeed	
made	prices	transparent,	with	the	prices	of	water	volume	trade	posted	weekly	online.			
IMAGE	9:	ELECTRONIC	MARKET	INTENDED	TO	MODERNIZE	WATER	TRADING	
	
Source:	El	Ovallino	newspaper	(15.07.2009)	
	
Many	 farmers	use	 the	electronic	market	 as	 a	 source	of	 information	 in	 spite	of	not	using	 it	 for	 the	
trades	 themselves.	 The	 prices	 that	 are	 published	 work	 as	 a	 general	 reference	 point	 for	 water	
purchasers	 and	 sellers.	 The	 response	 to	 the	 electronic	 market	 has	 hence	 been	 very	 positive,	
particularly	from	the	companies	that	are	the	main	users	of	the	electronic	market	and	that	value	the	
security	offered	by	this	legalized	institution	in	comparison	to	traditional	water	stockbrokers.	
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“Conversely,	in	this	way	it	is	safer.	Look,	I	have	an	amount	of	water,	they	offer	me	
a	price,	as	I	have	researched	I	say	this	is	the	cost,	after	that	they	tell	me	if	there	is	
anybody	interested	at	this	price	or	if	there	are	any	sales	I	can	apply,	then	tell	me	if	
there	is	anyone	interested	in	my	water	and	if	they	accept	the	price	that	I	offered	
or	 if	 they	 thought	 it	was	expensive,	 I	 say	 to	 them	how	much	 I	 can	discount,	but	
then	I	do	not	worry	and	I	know	this	way	it	is	safe,	I	will	not	have	problems	at	the	
time	of	being	paid	or	if	they	give	a	credit	check,	whatever”		(small	farmer	1)	
During	its	early	years	the	service	was	offered	for	free	on	the	grounds	that	it	was	financed	by	the	CNR,	
but	the	same	CNR	later	requested	that	charges	be	introduced.	Since	2013,	the	electronic	market	has	
operated	with	its	own	rates	and	the	organization	is	self-financed	as	a	result.		
“The	National	Water	Commission	told	us	we	have	to	charge	and	we	do	not	have	
big	problems	with	doing	so,	people	are	prepared	to	pay	for	the	service”	(electronic	
market	administrator)	
In	general,	farmers	seem	to	be	satisfied	with	the	operation	of	the	market	and	that	is	why	they	pay	for	
the	service.	The	main	users	are	large	agriculture	companies,	as	the	extent	of	their	trading	means	it	is	
essential	for	them	to	reduce	transaction	risks.	
“We	have	been	very	successful	and	well-received	by	companies.	At	the	beginning	
there	were	 so	 few	and	 now	 there	 are	 a	 lot	 of	 companies	 that	 clearly	 prefer	 us.	
They	are	the	ones	who	purchase	the	most”	(electronic	market	administrator)	5.4	Flexibility:	Cultural	Evaluations		
With	 regard	 to	 the	 elements	 that	 define	 the	 flexibility	 of	 the	 system,	 there	 are	 varying	 appraisals	
concerning	 hydrological	 resources,	 property	 rules	 and	 forms	 of	 administration.	 With	 the	 aim	 of	
observing	these	appraisals,	we	have	divided	them	into	the	three	groups	that	were	most	prevalent	in	
the	interviewees’	responses:	the	water	business,	related	legislation	and	the	status	of	water	as	private	
property.		
To	compare	the	different	perspectives,	we	divide	 informants	 into:	 (a)	 interviewees	that	are	part	of	
State	 organizations;	 (b)	 farmers,	 user	 organization	 leaders	 and	 entrepreneurs;	 and	 (c)	 experts	 and	
members	of	civil	society.	
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5.4.1	The	Water	Business	
The	 interviewees’	 descriptions	 demonstrate	 that	 water	 value	 is	 directly	 related	 to	 its	 estimated	
economic	 use.	 The	 following	 diagram	 shows	 a	 comparison	 of	 the	 views	 of	 the	 different	 parties	
regarding	water	as	an	economic	resource	and	its	relation	to	business.		
TABLE	5:	WATER	EVALUATIONS	
Topics	 State	organizations		 Users,	 leaders	 and	
entrepreneurs	
Civil	society	and	experts	
Water	
scarcity	 and	
price	
	“Yes,	 here	 the	 water	 price	 has	
risen,	 indeed…	 as	 this	 place	 it	 is,	
the	 growth	 of	 the	 interest	 for	
certain	 farming,	 the	 water	 price	
will	continue	rising”	(DGA	Ovalle)	
“As	the	place	has	grown	a	lot,	
yes,	 the	 growth	 during	 the	
last	 30	 years	 in	 the	 area	 has	
been	 great…I	 believe	 around	
3	 times	what	 I	used	 to	plant.	
Then	 the	 water	 has	 become	
now…	 in	 fact	 it	 is	 more	
expensive	 than	 the	 land”	
(mid-size	farmer)	
“When	 there	 is	 little	 water,	 we	
have	 to	 distribute	 it	 in	 an	 efficient	
way,	 the	 best	 way	 of	 doing	 so	 is	
through	 an	 established	 system	 of	
prices	 and	 a	 market”	 (pro-market	
expert)	
Water	
rights	 as	
stocks		
"There	 is	 full	 awareness	 about	
the	 intrinsic	 value	 of	 water,	 the	
economic	 value	 that	 the	 water	
has"	(DGA	local	civil	servant)	
“Water	 is	a	great	business,	 it	
allows	you	to	sell	quickly	and	
at	 a	 good	price,	 rent	 or	 even	
mortgage	 the	 water”	 (water	
trading	lawyer)	
“Water	 can	 even	 be	 confiscated.	
Farmers	 mortgage	 water	 rights	 to	
ask	 for	 loans.	 Water	 shares	 are	
money.	 It	 is	 taxable	 at	 a	 capital	
level.	 It	 is	property	as	any	other.	 It	
has	no	restriction.	It	is	capital.	(civil	
society	Ovalle)	
Actions	 as	
resources		
“Here	 you	 can	 store	 water,	 the	
reservoirs	work	as	 a	water	 bank.	
Farmers	store	water	volumes	as	if	
in	a	checking	account,	in	fact	they	
can	store	 it	 from	one	year	 to	 the	
next”	(DOH	La	Serena)	
	
	
"The	 water	 business	 is	 very	
good.	Even	for	us,	if	you	are	a	
lawyer	 you	 do	 not	 charge	 in	
money,	 you	 charge	 in	 water	
stocks.	 I	 have	 water	 shares	
without	land”		(water	trading	
lawyer	Ovalle)	
	
“If	a	person	has	a	piece	of	land	and	
has	 6	 or	 8	 water	 shares,	 and	
receives	 an	 offer	 from	 8	 to	 10	
million	 pesos	 for	 one	 water	 stock,	
sell,	 leave	 his/her	 land	 to	 dry,	 sell	
the	water	and	 it	 is	over.	Then,	 it	 is	
true	 than	 in	 many	 valleys	 like	 this	
the	 same	 thing	 is	 happening,	 they	
are	 dying	 because	 there	 are	 no	
people	 to	work,	 to	make	the	valley	
sustainable”(civil	society	Ovalle)		
Water	
trading	
“You	were	going	to	ask	the	Board	
president:	“Hey,	do	you	sell	water	
in	here?	No,	we	do	not	 sell	 here,	
people	keep	their	water”.	But	you	
go	 and	 check	 the	 Property	
Registry	 book	 and	 there	 are	 lots	
of	sales	 from	the	same	people	 to	
the	 big	 companies	 that	 are	 now	
located	there.	So,	if	after	that	you	
go	 to	 the	 same	 water	
communities,	 they	 say:	 “no,	 we	
do	not	sell	here”,	or	it	is	still	seen	
as	 something	 wrong:	 “someone	
who	sells	water,	so	wrong”.	(DGA	
national	 division	 user	
organization)	
“So	 this	 lady	 has	 around	 200	
water	 stocks	 and	 she	 does	
not	 seed	 anything	 and	 the	
land	 is	 rented	 to	 other	 users	
and	the	water	does	not	pass.	
Then,	every	year	she	sells	the	
amount	 of	 these	 200	 water	
shares,	 she	 sells	 the	 whole	
amount,	she	rents	the	water…	
she	 is	 profiting	 without	 any	
movement.	She	does	not	have	
a	 single	 plant	 and	 uses	 the	
water	 for	 her	 own	 benefit”	
(mid-size	farmer)	
“People	do	not	 like	 to	 say	 they	 sell	
water.	If	you	ask	a	farmer	directly	if	
he	has	sold	water,	he	would	say	he	
has	 not.	 There	 is	 an	 idea	 of	 water	
as	a	universal	 right	and	 that	 is	not	
tradable.	There	is	resistance,	but	of	
course,	 they	do	 it	anyway,	because	
they	can	earn	a	 lot.	 It	 is	negatively	
seen,	that	is	why	they	do	not	like	to	
say	 that	 they	 are	 sellers”	 (pro-
market	expert)	
Importance	
of	water	
“In	terms	of	the	landscape,	if	you	
look,	 it	 is	 clearly	 stated	where	 to	
water	 and	 where	 not,	 because	
vegetation	changes,	the	soil	looks	
different,	 it	 is	evident	where	they	
are	watering	and	where	 they	are	
“Look,	do	you	see	those	trees	
that	 look	 dry	 on	 the	 hill?	
Those	 are	 like	 that	 because	
they	 have	 suffered	 damage	
from	 frosting	 during	 recent	
years	and	also	because	of	the	
“Water	 is	 important	 for	 the	 whole	
society,	 because	 the	 economic	
activity	 that	 creates	 the	 most	
working	 opportunities	 is	 farming.	
That	 can	 be	 felt,	 years	 of	 drought	
and	sales	go	down,	everything	goes	
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not	 and	 that	 is	 part	 of	 the	
landscape,	 it	has	been	integrated	
here	 forever.	 It	 is	 part	 of	 their	
culture.	 Channels	 are	 the	 limits,	
watering	 areas,	 seeded	 areas,	
farming,	 reservoirs,	 rivers.	 It	 is	
lived,	 it	 is	 seen,	 it	 is	 felt,	 you	can	
feel	 it	 in	 your	 pocket,	 it	 is	
completely	 essential”	 	 (DGA	
Ovalle)	
lack	 of	water.	 Trees	 dry	 out”	
(mid-size	farmer)	
down,	 the	 market	 weakens,	
services	 too,	 many	 things	 happen,	
when	 there	 is	 a	 bad	 time	 for	
farming	 it	 goes	 to	 the	 heart	 of	
Limarí;	 if	agriculture	suffers,	Limarí	
suffers”	(local	university	expert)	
Quality	of	
water	
“In	 the	 old	 times,	 farmers	
fertilized	 with	 products	 that	
filtered	in	too	fast	and	the	plants	
could	not	absorb	 it,	 then	the	rest	
polluted	 groundwater.	 Now	 they	
use	 less	 polluting	 products”	
(INDAP	Ovalle)	
“Pollution	 issues	 are	 the	
urban	 centers	 close	 to	 the	
channels.	 People	 are	 dirty,	
they	 come	 and	 throw	 waste	
in	 the	 canal,	 because	 the	
water	 takes	 it	 and	 it	 is	 not	
seen.	 There	 was	 also	 more	
complete	 research	 recently	
about	 water	 quality	 in	 the	
basin	and	the	truth	is	that	the	
results	 were	 not	 that	 awful”		
(Camarico	administrator)	
“With	 the	 passing	 of	 time	 water	
has	 been	 contaminated.	 If	 you	 see	
the	 dam	 after	 rain…	 It	 is	 just	 that	
one	 of	 the	 things	 that	 has	 been	
done	 is	 to	 abuse	 fertilizers,	
pesticides,	 and	 stuff	 like	 that.	 Vine	
farmers	 above	 all.	 Now	 less	
damaging	 products	 are	 in	 use,	 but	
anyway	they	still	pollute	the	rivers”		
(CAZALAC	expert)	
	
In	 spite	 of	 the	 possible	 contrasts	 among	 the	 different	 kinds	 of	 parties,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 there	 is	 an	
agreement	on	the	economic	value	of	water.	The	high	cost	of	water	in	the	area,	either	as	stock	or	as	
water	 volume,	 is	 directly	 related	 to	 its	 scarcity.	 Due	 to	 the	 absence	 of	 State	 regulation	 on	 the	
economic	value	of	water,	prices	change	only	because	of	market	conditions	and	the	strength	of	supply	
and	demand.	As	a	result,	the	systematic	rise	of	water	cost	is	associated	with	the	rise	of	cultivation	in	
the	area	and	the	consistent	increase	in	cultivated	areas.			
Amongst	 the	 interviewees’	 assessments,	 it	 is	 interesting	 to	 highlight	 that	water	 is	 associated	with	
economic	concepts	such	as	stocks	or	shares	(regarding	water	rights)	and	checking	accounts	(referring	
to	the	opportunity	 to	retain	water	volumes	 in	 the	reservoirs).	 In	 the	same	way,	 the	opportunity	 to	
use	water	rights	as	backup	for	credit	requests	 (the	chance	to	mortgage)	 is	crucial	 in	understanding	
the	economic	value	of	this	resource.			
At	 this	 time	 it	 is	 understandable	 that	 general	 access	 to	 water	 and	 ownership	 of	 hydrological	
resources	is	related	to	economic	wealth.	As	the	image	below	implies,,	water	is	associated	with	other	
resources	like	oil.		
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IMAGE	10:	“THEN	THE	SITUATION	WOULD	BE	IMPROVED,	THAT	AFTER	LOOKING	FOR	WATER	FOR	SO	LONG	WE	FIND	OIL”	
	
Source:	El	Ovallino	newspaper	(02.07.2008)	
	
Without	denying	the	importance	of	the	economic	value	of	water,	there	is	also	an	important	symbolic	
element,	 which	 is	 the	 relationship	 between	 water	 and	 life	 (and,	 hence,	 productivity).	 This	 is	
understandable	because	the	main	economic	activity	 in	the	area	is	agriculture	and	as	a	result	of	the	
semi-arid	nature	of	the	geographical	terrain,	watering	makes	it	possible	to	develop	different	kinds	of	
crops.	
IMAGE	11:	THE	IMPACT	OF	WATERING	ON	THE	LANDSCAPE	
	
Photograph	taken	in	Caren,	March	2012	
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The	photograph	clearly	demonstrates	the	difference	between	the	soil	that	can	be	watered	and	that	
which	cannot.	The	green	color	throws	the	distinction	into	sharp	relief.	The	boundary	between	green	
and	 gray	 or	 brown	 is	 the	 borderline	 separating	 the	 areas	with	 and	without	water.	Where	 there	 is	
water,	there	is	life.		
One	of	 the	aspects	closely	 related	 to	water	value	 in	a	 scarcity	context	 is	agriculture	as	a	 source	of	
employment.	In	the	north	of	Chile,	whereas	agriculture	is	not	the	primary	source	of	income	(in	many	
places	mining	 is	 the	most	 important),	 it	 is	 the	activity	with	most	 labour	mobility	and	creates	more	
work.		
Another	interesting	aspect	is	the	relation	between	water	and	business.	The	most	traditional	farmers	
do	 not	 like	 to	 admit	 they	 sell	 water,	 because	 it	 is	 not	 socially	 acceptable	 to	 earn	 money	 trading	
water.	 Despite	 this	 resistance,	 farmers	 do	 sell	 both	 water	 volumes	 and	 water	 rights	 on	 a	 regular	
basis,	on	the	grounds	that	the	money	they	can	earn	by	selling	is	significant.		
Finally,	as	regards	water	quality,	although	a	water	pollution	problem	is	identified,	it	is	not	seen	as	an	
important	matter	for	the	basin.	
5.4.2	Legislation	
Analysis	 of	 the	 parties’	 discourse	 regarding	 current	 legislation	 and	 its	 suitability	 as	 a	 regulatory	
mechanism	 for	water	 administration	 reveals	 a	 generally	 negative	 view	 but	with	 different	 levels	 of	
emphasis.	To	depict	these	differences,	we	group	parties	into	State	organization	members,	users	and	
user	organizations,	and	civil	society	and	experts.		
TABLE	6:	LEGAL	REGULATION	EVALUATION	
Topics	 State	organization	 Users,	 leaders	 and	
entrepreneurs	
Civil	society	and	experts	
Water	
property	
“First	 of	 all,	 here	water	 does	 not	
belong	 to	 the	 State,	 water	
belongs	 to	 private	 parties,	
because	 private	 parties	 can	 ask	
for	a	right	and	the	State	gives	it	in	
perpetuity	 and	 inheritably,	 I	
mean,	 even	 when	 they	 die	 the	
right	 stays	 in	 private	 hands”	
(DOH	Serena)		
“There	 is	 not	 any	 kind	 of	
restriction	 on	 stock	 trading,	
there	 cannot	 be,	 at	 this	
moment	and	according	to	this	
law,	 each	 owner	 can	 do	
whatever	 he/she	 wants	 with	
his/her	water.	 It	 can	 be	 sold,	
it	 can	 be	 rented,	 the	 Board	
cannot	 say	 a	 word,	 nor	 the	
State”	(mid-size	farmer	2)	
“First	 of	 all,	 here	 water	 does	 not	
belong	 to	 the	 State,	water	belongs	
to	 private	 parties,	 because	 any	
private	 party	 can	 ask	 for	 a	 right	
and	 the	State	gives	 it	 in	perpetuity	
and	inheritably.	I	mean,	even	when	
they	 die	 the	 right	 stays	 in	 private	
hands”	(civil	society	Ovalle)	
Water/land	
division	
“Second	 of	 all,	 and	 this	 is	 really	
serious,	here	the	water	code	from	
1981	 divided	 the	water	 from	 the	
land	and	 that	cannot	be	because	
that	 causes	 the	 environmental	
problems”	(DOH	Serena)	
“It	 has	 slightly	 facilitated		
businessmen	buying	water	at	
other	places	and	where	there	
are	 microclimates,	 if	 not,	 it	
would	 not	 be	 possible	 to	
bring	water	from	other	places	
to	 more	 productive	 areas,	
“This	 code,	 from	my	point	 of	 view,	
incorporates	something	that	makes	
the	water	issue	vulnerable,	which	is	
the	division	of	water	and	land.	This	
gives	 rise	 to	 many	 abuses“	
(national	expert)	
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making	 water	 lost	 at	 some	
places	 when	 it	 is	 needed;	
here,	 I	 think	 this	 also	 has	
helped”	(small	farmer	1)	
Main	access	 “It	is	unlike	other	countries	where	
the	 basin	 organizations	 are	
public,	 collegiate,	 and	 decisions	
are	 taken	 according	 to	 the	
common	 property	 and	 so	 certain	
areas	 receive	 priority.	 For	
instance,	 drinkable	 water	 is	
saved.	 Here	 it	 is	 not,	 here	 rights	
can	be	transferred	where	there	is	
the	biggest	investment”	(CNR	civil	
servant,	user	organization	head)	
“It	is	not	possible	to	apply	the	
same	 Water	 Code	 for	
everybody,	 the	 same	 for	
people	 from	 the	 south	 of	
Chile	 and	 people	 from	 Arica”	
(mid-size	farmer	3)	
	
“There	 is	 no	 priority,	 as	 water	 has	
an	owner	the	State	cannot	say:	this	
is	 priority	 for	 drinkable	 water,	 so	
you	 have	 to	 stop	 producing”	
(Cazalac	expert)	
Ability	to	
cope	with	
scarcity;	
lack	of	
powers	
“We	have	applied	several	decrees	
of	 scarcity…	 we	 are	 living	 an	
exception	that	is	becoming	a	rule.	
So	 there	 you	 wonder:	 Does	 the	
Water	 Code	 give	 an	 answer?	 I	
think	 it	 does	 not”	 (DGA	 national	
division	user	organization)	
	
“If	 the	 government	 produced	
draft	 legislation	 to	be	passed	
and	 asked	 everyone	 who	
owns	 a	 water	 well	 or	 that	 is	
building	 one,	 because	 of	
course	 they	 do	 not	 have	
water	 and	 do	 not	 have	 any	
other	 form	 to	 water	 their	
crops,	 you	 have	 a	 deadline,	
extract	 water	 from	March	 to	
July,	 an	 amount	 of	 liters	 per	
extraction,	 that	 could	 be	 a	
solution”	(mid-size	farmer	2)	
“We	 have	 to	 modify	 article	 19(24)	
of	 the	 Constitution	 relating	 to	 the	
delegation	 of	 authority	 to	 concede	
water	 rights,	 in	 other	 words	 the	
transfer	of	the	property,	and	where	
there	 are	 political	 influences	 that	
are	 creating	discomfort	 for	 citizens	
because	of	the	water	scarcity”	(civil	
society	Santiago)	
It	 is	 important	 to	 highlight	 that	 large-scale	 farmers	 and	 agriculture	 company	 administrators	 see	
weaknesses	 in	 the	 Water	 Code	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 emphasize	 important	 advantages	 to	 this	
legislation,	 apart	 from	 the	 opportunities	 it	 produces	 for	 agricultural	 exploitation.	 Among	 these	
advantages	 are	 the	 chance	 to	 invigorate	 the	 market,	 which	 will	 make	 a	 bigger	 number	 of	 rights	
available,	the	opportunity	to	transfer	water	from	a	more	profitable	source,	and	the	security	given	to	
this	form	of	property.	
Also	 worth	 noting	 is	 the	 difference	 in	 the	 views	 of	 political	 leaders,	 depending	 on	 the	 wing	 they	
represent	 (political	 representatives	 from	 the	 current	 right-wing	 government	 and	 from	 the	 former	
government,	which	was	left	wing,	were	interviewed).			
The	 right-wing	 political	 stance	 highlights	 the	 chances	 given	 by	 national	 regulation	 to	 grow	 private	
investment,	allowing	the	State	to	be	free	from	constant	spending	on	the	issue.	The	view	of	the	left-
wing	 leader,	 meanwhile,	 highlights	 the	 deficiencies	 of	 the	 Code	 and	 the	 narrow	 scope	 for	 State	
organizations	to	act	in	order	to	confront	problems	relating	to	hydrological	resources:		
Right-wing	representative:	“in	Chile	when	you	bring	 the	project	 to	an	 investor	you	say;	 look,	 I	have	
water,	I	have	energy,	I	have	land.	Then,	you	give	them	a	concession	and	you	give	it	all	and	they	pay	
on	their	own,	and	that	is	how	you	increase	your	income,	if	the	State	stays	out	of	the	issue”	(right-wing	
civil	servant,	high	political	office).	
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Left-wing	representative:	“when	there	is	a	regulatory	framework	and	market	conditions,	civil	servants	
are	required	to	respect	that	framework	and	consequently	the	framework	for	action	is	quite	 limited”	
(Concertación	civil	servant,	high	political	office).	
The	 participants	 compared	 above	 both	 held	 high	 political	 office	 relating	 to	 hydrological	 resource	
management	 during	 the	 period	 in	which	 their	 party	was	 in	 government.	 It	 is	 clearly	 important	 to	
recognize	the	different	values	that	inform	the	beliefs	of	each	political	party.		
To	 conclude,	 another	 criticism	of	 the	 legislation	points	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 influence	 from	authorities	 in	
addressing	 the	 abuse	 of	 hydrological	 resources	 and	 the	 spread	 and	 intensity	 of	 exploitation.	
Legislation	does	not	confer	any	power	on	the	State	to	establish	 limits	 for	users:	“well	 I	 think	this	 is	
natural	selection,	the	only	thing	that	will	force	farmers	to	stop	seeding	is	a	drought.	I	believe,	I	mean	
it	is	painful	for	people,	it	is	complicated	for	me,	because	of	my	responsibilities,	but	there	is	no	way	to	
set	a	limit	to	the	number	of	hectares	they	plant.	The	only	way	is	natural	selection,	in	other	words	the	
one	who	 has	 to	 live	 is	 going	 to	 live,	 and	 the	 one	who	was	 buying	 water	 just	 because	 is	 going	 to	
understand	 that	 what	 he	 can	 really	 plant	 is	 less	 than	 he	 thought,	 a	 half	 or	 a	 quarter”	 (DGA	 civil	
servant	Ovalle).	
5.4.3	Common	or	Private	Property	
The	 final	 central	 elements	 in	 water	 value	 concern	 property	 and	 the	 kind	 of	 property	 that	 is	
associated	 with	 water.	 Based	 on	 the	 economic	 and	 legal	 rules	 connected	 to	 water	 access,	 the	
ownership	 of	 water	 incorporates	 the	 management	 and	 distribution	 of	 and	 access	 to	 hydrological	
resources.			
Although	 hydrological	 resources	 are	 recognized	 in	 the	 Water	 Code	 as	 national	 property,	 most	
interviewees	agree	that	water	is	private	property.	Those	maintaining	that	water	is	national	property	
admit	 that	 this	 would	 only	 be	 on	 paper	 because	 through	 water	 rights,	 which	 govern	 access	 to	
hydrological	resources,	it	is	possible	to	presume	water	is	a	private	property.	
TABLE	7:	COMMON	OR	PRIVATE	PROPERTY	
Topics	 State	organizations	 Users,	 leaders	 and	
entrepreneurs	
Civil	society	and	experts	
Water	owners	 “In	 other	 words	 the	 law	 says	
that	water	is	yours,	you	register	
your	 property	 in	 the	 Property	
Register,	and	it	 is	your	water	so	
is	 like	having	a	house.	From	the	
legal	 point	 of	 view,	 it	 is	 theirs	
and	 that	 is	 how	 they	 get	 it”	
(DGA	civil	servant	Santiago)	
“How	 do	 they	 suppose	 they	
will	 tell	me	what	 to	do,	 it	 is	
my	 land,	 it	 is	 my	 water...	 I	
can	 do	 whatever	 I	 want”		
(large-scale	farmer)	
“That	is	right,	they	know	it	is	their	
land.	Although	the	first	instruction	
is	 that	 water	 constitutes	
governmental	 property	 and	 what	
you	 have	 is	 an	 exploitation	 right,	
people	 see	 themselves	 as	 owners	
and	 that	 is	 it,	 it	 is	 their	 water.	
They	 do	 not	 distinguish	 between	
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an	 exploitation	 right	 and	 water	
itself”	(civil	society	Ovalle)	
Water	bank	 “The	 Oversight	 Board	 has	
everything	 under	 control,	 it	 is	
like	a	bank	that	takes	away	your	
money	so	you	do	not	lose	it	and	
gives	it	back	to	you	according	to	
the	rules”	(DGA	Ovalle)	
“Another	 innovation	 is	 that	
now	we	have	begun	to	send	
the	 account	 statements	 by	
electronic	 mail,	 because	
there	are	lots	of	people	who	
already	 use	 it,	 and	 many	
who	 operate	 in	 Santiago,	
but	above	all	we	 send	 them	
to	 the	 companies”	
(Camarico	administrator)	
“Something	 else,	 I	 do	 not	 know	 if	
you	 knew	 that	 in	 here	 you	 can	
keep	 water	 as	 if	 in	 a	 checking	
account.	Moreover,	 you	 can	 keep	
it	 from	 one	 year	 to	 the	 next,	 you	
can	even	sell	this	saved	amount	of	
water”	(CAZALAC	expert)	
National	
property	
“In	the	Water	Code	the	resource	
is	 assumed	 as	 a	 national	
property	 of	 public	 use,	 but	 at	
the	 same	 time	 it	 is	 alienable.	 It	
is	 some	 kind	 of	 concession,	 but	
is	really	difficult	to	bring	an	end	
to	this	concession.	At	this	point,	
the	 State	 would	 have	 to	
expropriate	 the	 resource	 and	
that	 is	 justified	 only	 under	
certain	conditions	and	up	to	this	
time	 it	has	not	happened”	(CNR	
civil	 servant,	 user	 organization	
head)	
“Nowadays	 water	 does	 not	
belong	 to	 the	 State,	 there	
are	other	owners	and	in	this	
area	where	water	 is	 scarce,	
its	rights	are	in	the	hands	of	
people	 with	 the	 money	 to	
buy	 the	 stocks,	 it	 is	 that	
simple”	(small	farmer	1)	
“A	national	property	of	public	use,	
which	is	extra-trade,	unsuitable	as	
property	and	untradeable;	it	takes	
its	 value	 indirectly	 through	 the	
rights	 upon	 it.	 The	 right	 is	 not	
applied	 if	 society	 does	 not	 agree,	
in	 other	 words	 because	 of	
transitivity	 there	 is	 an	 estimated	
value	 for	 the	 scarce	 resource	 and	
that	 appears	 to	 me	 as	 an	
interesting	view	of	 the	model	and	
institutionality	 we	 have	
nowadays”	 (local	 university	
expert)	
Origins	of	water	
property	
“Before	 ‘81	 there	 were	 rights,	
but	 these	 were	 not	 separated	
from	 land.	 Water	 rights	 have	
always	 belonged	 to	 private	
parties,	 but	 before	 the	 State	
used	 to	be	more	 influential	 and	
had	 more	 powers.	 On	 the	
contrary,	 now	 it	 does	 not,	 the	
State	 can	 pass	 a	water	 scarcity	
decree	or	declare	an	agriculture	
emergency,	 but	 the	 damage	 to	
the	 party	 that	 loses	 its	 rights	
must	 be	 paid	 for	 by	 the	 State,	
they	have	to	compensate	them”	
(DOH	Serena)	
“Formerly	that	was	the	idea,	
that	one	hectare	of	land	was	
a	 water	 stock	 that	 was	 the	
unit	 of	 measurement,	
because	 it	 was	 divided	
according	 to	 hectares.	
Besides,	 water	 used	 to	 be	
called	 ‘watering	 hectares’“	
(Ovalle	stockbroker)	
“At	least	big	farmers	always	say	‘I	
have	 this	 flow,	 I	 had	 the	 channel	
and	 my	 grandfather	 also	 had	 it,	
this	water	has	always	been	mine’.	
Later,	when	expropriations	started	
during	 the	 Agricultural	 Reform,	
they	 also	 said	 ‘this	 farm	 had	 this	
amount	 of	 water’	 and	 nobody	
changed	 it,	nowadays	 it	 is	divided	
into	 many	 plots	 and	 the	 right	
given	is	proportional	to	it”(Cazalac	
expert)	
Self-regulation	
by	 private	
parties		
“But	this	is	what	we	have	to	do,	
we	 do	 not	 have	 any	 other	
option,	 seeing	 that	 the	
governance	 system	 promotes	
private	 resource	 exploitation,	 it	
is	 not	 on	 the	 track	 of	 common	
property,	but	rather	on	the	track	
of	 private	 property.	 So,	 there	
are	 instruments	 to	 promote	
private	exploitation.	 Though	we	
know	that	 this	 is	going	 to	bring	
us	 problems	 in	 the	 future,	 we	
cannot	 do	 anything	 else”	 (CNR	
civil	 servant,	 user	 organization	
head)	
“When	 there	 is	 already	 an	
Oversight	 Board,	 it	 is	
already	 regulated	 and	 they	
are	 almost	 autonomous	 on	
the	decisions,	 even	 the	DGA	
has	 nothing	 to	 do	 to	
interfere”	 (leader,	 Limarí	
Monitoring	Board)	
“It	 is	 an	 absent	 State,	 not	 only	
from	 the	 assessment	 point	 of	
view,	not	only	assessing	the	use	of	
the	 resource,	 that	 is	 the	 point,	
because	it	is	a	national	property	of	
public	 service	 and	 we	 gave	 the	
State	 the	 legal	 authority	 to	 be	
responsible	of	it,	so	it	is	their	work	
and	 that	 has	 weaknesses	 along	
the	 whole	 territory”	 (local	
university	expert)	
The	 private	
culture	
“In	 this	 country	 the	 issue	 on	
private	 property	 is	 so	
entrenched,	 your	property,	 your	
land,	 your	 house,	 your	 water...	
that	 you	 do	 not	 see	 what	 is	
collective,	 the	 most	 important	
“How	 do	 they	 suppose	 they	
will	 tell	me	what	 to	do,	 it	 is	
my	 land,	 it	 is	 my	 water...	 I	
can	 do	 whatever	 I	 want.	 I	
mean	this	water	is	mine.	The	
idea	mentioned	 in	 the	 Code	
“It	 is	 so	 entrenched	 that	 in	 those	
areas	 there	are	many	people	who	
still	think	that	having	a	water	right	
is	 connected	 to	 the	 plot,	 so	 it	 is	
part	 of	 the	 land,	 it	 is	 part	 of	 my	
activity,	 I	 have	 it	 integrated	 into	
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thing	 is	 yours.	 For	 that	 reason,	
anything	the	State	can	do	is	only	
suggestive,	nothing	more”	(DGA	
national	 division	 user	
organization)	
about	 water	 being	 national	
property	 is	 like	 showing	
respect	 for	 the	 country…	 In	
other	words,	if	I	want	to	use	
it	 I	do	it	and	it	 is	only	mine”	
(large-scale	farmer)	
my	 routine.	 In	 my	 opinion	 the	
ownership	 of	 water	 has	 been	
established	 in	 the	 area”	 (local	
university	expert)	
	
Although	there	are	differences	among	parties	about	water	property	and	who	it	belongs	to,	there	is	
general	agreement	around	 the	 idea	of	national	property	of	public	use	as	mentioned	on	 the	Water	
Code,	 but	 in	 practice	 there	 is	 also	 a	 common	 impression	 that	water	 is	 private	 property.	 This	 idea	
originated	 prior	 to	 1981,	 although	 after	 the	 Water	 Code	 the	 opportunities	 to	 trade	 water	 were	
multiplied.		
	“…everybody	knows	that	water	belongs	to	them,	some	by	use	and	others	because	
they	 have	 water	 stocks.	 A	 continuity	 that	 started	 4	 to	 5	 generations	 before	
assuming	water	belonged	to	them,	and	now	they	have	legalized	it	and	say	‘I	have	
32	water	stocks’	that	in	the	past	may	have	been	28	or	so.	And	the	old	man	knows	
the	water	belongs	to	him,	indeed	it	does	belong	to	him,	although	what	belongs	to	
him	 is	a	water	exploitation	right	and	not	the	water,	but	people	do	not	see	that”	
(user	from	above	reservoir)	
Even	those	who	do	not	know	that	water	is	separated	from	land	still	see	water	as	private	property.	It	
is	possible	 to	 identify	 ideas	of	water	property	 from	the	most	 traditional	 to	others,	 likewise	coming	
from	 companies	 and	 large-scale	 farmers,	 who	 hold	 their	 own	 water	 savings,	 in	 the	 same	 way	
someone	holds	financial	savings	in	a	bank.		
Within	this	context,	there	are	daily	water	trades	in	the	basin	through	organized	water	rights	auctions.	
IMAGE	12:	WATER	AUCTION.	PEOPLE	INTERESTED	IN	PURCHASING	AND	SELLING	WATER	VOLUMES	ARE	INVITED	TO	COME	TO	
AUCTION	ON	THURSDAY	29TH	JANUARY	
	
Source:	El	Ovallino	newspaper	(27.01.2009)	
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The	 different	 and	 varying	 perspectives	 outlined	 above	 demonstrate	 the	 idea	 of	 water	 as	 private	
property	that	has	been	established	among	farmers.	Regardless	of	their	particular	emphasis,	farmers	
of	 all	 sizes	 share	 the	 idea.	 Likewise,	 civil	 servants	 from	 State	 organizations	 involved	 in	 water	
management	also	see	it	as	private	property,	dismissing	the	declaration	of	water	as	national	property	
in	 the	Water	 Code:	 ”The	 State	 has	 nothing	 to	 do,	 because	 it	 is	 real	 estate,	 something	 you	 own,	 it	
belongs	to	you.	It	is	a	lie	to	say	that	it	is	property	of	public	use,	a	lie,	a	lie”	(DOH	Serena).	
This	 has	 happened	 because	 the	 Code	 creates	 an	 ambiguous	 situation,	 where	 water	 is	 national	
property	of	public	use	but	there	are	also	individual	private	rights.	Water	is	supposed	to	be	a	national	
property	 of	 public	 use,	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 it	 can	 be	 traded.	 However,	 this	 problem	 is	 not	 the	
exclusive	responsibility	of	the	Code,	because	on	its	own	it	would	not	make	a	great	difference	to	the	
idea	of	water	as	private	property,	which	was	already	culturally	established.		
“Water,	in	truth,	in	practice	is	still	a	national	property	of	public	use,	it	was	given	to	
people	 as	 an	 exploitation	 right	 so	 they	 could	 use	water	 according	 to	 their	 own	
needs	and	for	that	purpose	they	had	to	fill	in	a	request	form,	the	state	evaluated	if	
the	water	was	available	and	if	it	was,	then	it	was	given	to	the	person	and	then	the	
private	 property	 was	 given,	 taking	 the	 right	 with	 an	 actual	 registration	 in	 the	
Property	Registrar”	(regional	DGA,	civil	servant)	
One	 cross-cutting	 evaluation	 is	 that	 the	 constant	 absence	 of	 the	 State	 lessens	 its	 control	 over	
hydrological	resources	in	the	country.	The	causes	include	the	lack	of	State	powers	and	the	restrictive	
interpretation	of	the	Water	Code.	State	civil	servants	maintain	they	only	have	tools	to	promote	the	
private	exploitation	of	the	resource.		
	“When	the	State	gave	water	use	to	normal	people,	it	gave	them	everything,	even	
the	 control	 over	 how	 it	was	 going	 to	 be	was	 lost,	 the	 State	 lost	 powers	 on	 the	
administration	of	the	hydrological	resource;	essentially	the	state	tried	to	get	rid	of	
everything	to	invigorate	the	market,	it	tried	to	be	very	small	and	give	away	most	
resources	 to	 private	 parties.	 So	 we	 cannot	 say	 or	 do	 anything,	 only	 in	 a	
catastrophe	 if	 there	 is	 no	 water,	 I	 believe	 then	 we	 would	 have	 the	 ability	 to	
administrate	what	is	left,	if	there	is	anything	left”	(regional	DGA,	civil	servant)	5.5	Collaboration:	Horizontal		
As	 set	 out	 in	 chapter	 3,	 the	 ability	 to	 connect	 the	 different	 elements	 of	 a	 system	 is	 an	 essential	
quality	to	develop	resilience.	When	we	consider	social	systems,	this	connectivity	is	directly	related	to	
associativity	and	to	the	different	appraisals	with	regard	to	it.	
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There	are	different	dimensions	where	distinguishing	associativity	in	relation	to	the	access	to	and	use	
of	 hydrological	 resources.	 Traditional	 associativity,	 user	 organizations	 and	 support	 networks	 figure	
among	the	key	types	of	associativity.	
5.5.1	Traditional	Associativity	
It	 is	possible	 to	 identify	 a	 tradition	of	 collaborative	action	 from	 the	 interviewees’	discourse.	 In	 the	
past,	these	traditions	were	very	important	for	farming	activities	and	for	the	administration	of	water	
channels.	 Yet	 most	 of	 these	 activities	 have	 disappeared,	 and	 only	 a	 few	 of	 these	 traditional	
associativity	actions	continue	to	be	practiced.		
One	of	the	activities	identified	as	community	work	is	channel	cleaning,	which	is	organized	a	couple	of	
times	during	the	year	by	association	members	with	the	aim	of	cleaning	water	channels	to	allow	their	
proper	operation.	
“For	 channel	 cleaning	 each	 one	 cleans	 its	 own	 front,	 that	 is,	 for	 every	 channel,	
each	 farmer	 cleans	 his/her	 own	 front,	 because	 channels	 have	 common	 places.	
That	 is	 why	 it	 is	 called	 a	 community,	 these	 are	 cleaned	with	 everybody’s	 help”	
(leader,	Mostazal	Monitoring	Board)	
Another	 traditional	 activity	 maintained	 in	 some	 places	 is	 the	Mingaco.	 This	 word	 describes	 the	
practice	when	farmers	harvest	with	the	help	of	neighbors,	family	members	and	friends,	giving	each	
other	support	through	the	supply	of	a	workforce.	However,	this	activity	is	almost	extinct.		
“When	 the	 task	 is	 set,	 a	 group	 of	 people	 assume	 it	 and	 then	 they	 take	 turns	
among	neighbors.	It	was	very	common	before	to	see	this	community	work,	it	was	
a	celebration,	there	was	a	feast	later	which	attracted	people	to	the	thresh”	(mid-
size	farmer)	
“Here	we	called	 it	Mingaco,	someone	had	lots	of	peaches	and	to	peel	them	they	
said	 ‘let’s	 have	 a	 Mingaco’,	 they	 prepared	 a	 feast	 and	 a	 celebration	 but	 they	
peeled	 the	peaches	during	 the	 threshing	 season.	At	 the	end	 they	would	eat	and	
after	that	they	would	go	somewhere	else	and	thresh.	But	now	those	things	are	not	
done	anymore”	(community	leader)	
This	 kind	of	 associativity	 is	 ever	 less	 commonplace.	All	 interviewees	 agreed	on	 the	 fact	 that	 these	
activities	are	disappearing.	Moreover,	civil	servants	from	the	government,	experts	and	members	of	
civil	society	offer	a	cross-cutting	analysis,	explaining	that	there	are	serious	difficulties	for	farmers	to	
work	together.	This	would	only	work	for	small	groups	with	similar	characteristics	and	a	clear	purpose.			
“There	are	a	few	exceptions,	groups	of	5	to	8	people	who	have	done	something…	
but	 these	 are	 very	 specific	 cases.	 They	 are	 selected	 and	 they	 trust	 each	 other.	
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There	 has	 to	 be	 something	 underneath	 that	 allows	 them	 to	 work.	 If	 you	 think	
about	this	for	mass	use,	it	does	not	work”	(civil	society	Ovalle)	
“No,	everyone	has	 to	do	things	 for	 themselves	 (‘cada	uno	mata	su	chancho’	 is	a	
Chilean	 idiomatic	expression	meaning	each	person	 is	responsible	for	his/her	own	
actions,	responsibilities	or	duties).	There	have	been	some	experiences	but	almost	
all	of	them	have	failed,	I	have	not	heard	of	any	successful	one.	Look,	they	used	to	
keep	everything	 in	a	storehouse,	 later	 they	used	to	sell	produce	as	a	community	
looking	 for	 a	 good	price,	 but	 very	 often	 it	 happened	 that	 a	 customer	 came	and	
talked	with	one	of	 them	aside	 saying	 ‘but	 I	 can	buy	 from	you	at	 this	amount	of	
money’…	Then	the	old	man,	instead	of	selling	as	part	of	a	community,	would	sell	it	
on	 the	 side,	 in	 that	 way	 he	 earned	 a	 little	 bit	 more	 but	 did	 harm	 to	 the	 rest”	
(INDAP	civil	servant	Ovalle)	
5.5.2	User	Organizations	
Hydrological	 resource	 administration	 is	 delegated	 to	 private	 parties,	 who	 must	 meet	 the	
requirements	 established	 in	 the	Water	Code.	 For	 this	 reason,	hydrological	 resource	administration	
needs	to	be	collaborative.			
“As	 water	 in	 Chile	 is	 conceived	 as	 national	 property	 but	 managed	 by	 private	
parties,	 the	 only	 way	 of	 seeing	 water	 as	 common	 property	 is	 through	 the	
administration	 carried	 out	 by	 user	 organizations”	 (DGA	 national	 division	 user	
organization)	
As	 set	 out	 in	 chapter	 4,	 there	 are	 three	 kinds	 of	 user	 organizations:	 Oversight	 Boards,	 Channel	
Management	 Associations	 and	 Water	 Communities.	 Oversight	 Boards	 are	 the	 most	 important	
organizations	in	the	basins,	as	they	manage	water	use	on	rivers	or	parts	of	the	river,	obliging	Channel	
Management	 Associations	 to	 organize	 themselves.	 The	 latter	 are	 smaller	 organizations	 that	 are	
responsible	 for	 water	 administration	 on	 channels.	 Nowadays,	 in	 the	 Limarí	 basin	 there	 are	 large	
Channel	Management	Associations	with	responsibility	for	administering	reservoir	water.	The	Water	
Code	establishes	the	rules	to	create	and	operate	as	part	of	a	user	organization.	
Due	to	the	networked	system	of	dams	and	channels	in	the	Limarí	basin,	the	Paloma	System	has	been	
established	 (see	chapter	4	 for	detail).	This	 system	operates	as	a	confederation	of	organizations	 for	
controlling	 allocations	 by	Oversight	 Boards	 and	 large	 Channel	Management	Associations	 in	 Limarí.	
This	umbrella	organization	has	no	legal	support.	The	Water	Code	does	not	provide	for	the	option	to	
authorize	an	organization	to	create	an	 integrated	water	administration	system	in	a	basin.	Owing	to	
this,	it	was	necessary	to	create	a	figure	to	achieve	such	a	system,	as	it	went	beyond	the	provisions	of	
the	Water	Code.		
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The	Paloma	System	is	made	up	of	nine	other	user	organizations,	including	an	Oversight	Board.		
“The	Paloma	System	is	something	very	different	to	what	we	have	seen	before	at	a	
national	 level.	 In	 fact	 the	 system	 is	not	acknowledged	under	 the	Water	Code.	 In	
the	 Paloma	 System	 you	 can	 take	 water	 from	 the	 Paloma	 reservoir,	 from	
Huatulame	 river	 or	 from	 the	 Recoleta	 supplier.	 Because	 you	 use	 all	 this	 as	 if	 it	
were	a	huge	water	bag	and	you	see	availability	across	the	whole	Paloma	System,	
and	 from	 then	 on	 you	 can	 exercise	 your	 rights”	 (DGA	 national	 division	 user	
organization)	
In	 addition,	 user	 organizations	 from	 the	 Limarí	 basin	 are	 highly	 professional	 in	 comparison	 to	
organizations	 from	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 country.	 Most	 of	 them	 have	 hired	 professionals,	 mainly	
administrators	and	security	guards	 (who	are	 responsible	 for	opening	and	closing	 the	 floodgates	on	
water	channels).	This	professionalism	is	based	on	their	long	tradition.	The	Limarí	basin	has	had	user	
organizations	since	1893,	when	the	first	Oversight	Board	was	created.	This	history	has	given	rise	to	a	
significant	 difference	 between	 the	 abilities	 of	 this	 and	 other	 user	 organizations	 from	 across	 the	
country.	The	management	of	information	within	these	organizations	is	directly	related	to	this	aspect.	
The	more	professional	they	are,	the	more	chance	they	have	of	managing	the	information	relating	to	
their	own	hydrological	resources.	
A	comparison	with	organizations	in	other	basins	reveals	that	the	latter	have	a	lower	level	of	formality	
and	professionalization.	This	is	one	reason	why	the	water	market	operates	in	a	better	manner	in	the	
Limarí	 basin	 than	 elsewhere;	 in	 order	 to	 have	 an	 operating	 market	 it	 is	 needed	 organizations	 to	
manage	the	resources.	
“There	are	more	traditional	areas,	regions	VI	or	VII	for	 instance,	where	there	are	
people	using	the	same	old	methods.	They	have	land	and	wait	for	water	to	come	as	
they	did	 40	 years	 ago.	How	 they	manage	 the	organization	 is	 still	 the	 same	 too.	
Managers	on	these	organizations	are	perpetual;	indeed	they	inherit	positions	and	
see	 themselves	 as	 social	 associations.	 And	 the	 assemblies	 have	 really	 low	
participation”	(CNR	civil	servant,	user	organization	head)	
It	is	fundamental	for	the	growth	of	large	farming	companies	to	have	user	organizations	that	operate	
properly.	In	order	to	maintain	an	efficient	watering	system,	good	management	of	channels	and	dams	
is	essential.	Farmers	and	managers	 from	agriculture	companies	 link	an	efficient	watering	system	(a	
technological	one)	with	the	opportunity	to	carry	out	transfers	and	not	waste	hydrological	resources	
in	 areas	 where	 they	 are	 not	 needed.	 The	 impact	 from	 the	 regulation	 applied	 by	 different	 user	
organizations	is	key	in	this	respect.		
Finally,	the	user	organization	is	the	partnership	strategy	most	appreciated	by	different	stakeholders	
when	 talking	 about	 its	 operation.	 However,	 user	 organizations	 work	 in	 the	 same	 way	 as	 private	
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corporations	because	 they	act	on	behalf	of	 farmers	according	 to	 the	amount	of	water	 stocks	each	
person	has.			
Assembly	and	Elections	
To	understand	the	 limitations	 faced	by	user	organizations	as	expressions	of	associativity,	 two	main	
elements	must	be	distinguished:	assembly	operation	and	the	relationship	between	votes	and	water	
stocks.	
Election	of	 representatives	 is	 one	of	 the	most	 critical	 aspects	when	dealing	with	user	organization	
rules.	 Leaders	are	chosen	within	a	democratic	process,	but	 the	votes	are	 related	 to	 the	amount	of	
water	stocks	each	farmer	has.	The	election	of	executive	committees	for	user	organizations	is	defined	
by	 the	 votes	 corresponding	 to	 each	 water	 share.	 Thus,	 the	 amount	 of	 shares	 a	 user	 owns	 will	
determine	 the	 influence	 the	 vote	 has	 in	 relation	 to	 the	whole	 number	 of	 users.	 In	 this	 respect,	 a	
common	complaint	 is	that	managers	represent	the	 interests	of	 large-scale	farmers	and	do	not	care	
for	everybody.	Small	and	mid-size	farmers	feel	under-represented.			
“Normally	these	are	organizations	with	five	managers,	if	I	have	the	vote	to	choose	
three,	I	will	have	all	the	control,	these	three	will	define	the	president	and	that	is	it.	
That	 harms	 organizations,	 because	 in	 many	 cases	 there	 is	 no	 alternation	 of	
representatives	 and	 many	 are	 not	 called	 to	 be	 presidents”	 (DGA	 civil	 servant,	
Ovalle)	
“The	Water	Code	 is	not	democratic	 in	 this	 sense	because	 the	more	you	own	 the	
more	influence	you	have.	This	constitutes	a	problem	within	small	organizations,	in	
those	that	are	poor	because	the	ones	who	have	more	can	do	whatever	they	want”	
(DGA	civil	servant,	Ovalle)	
Within	 some	organizations	 this	 regulation	has	been	disapplied	and	 the	 traditional	one	 farmer,	one	
vote	system	has	been	 introduced,	 in	spite	of	knowing	this	 is	an	 illegal	procedure	and	that	 it	makes	
collective	decisions	weaker,	because	a	decision	can	be	questioned	at	any	point	by	any	member	of	the	
organization.	
“Normally	 large-scale	farmers	are	the	ones	who	take	part	 in	these	organizations	
and	 additionally	 user	 organizations	 share	 this	 characteristic	 of	 private	
corporations,	 the	decision	making	 is	 linked	 to	 the	biggest	number	of	 stocks,	and	
for	 that	 reason	 they	 are	 normally	 managed	 by	 the	 majority	 stockholders.	 It	
operates	 just	 as	 any	 private	 rights	 corporation.	 It	 is	 clear,	 more	 stocks,	 more	
votes.	 Now	 there	 are	 some	 organizations	 where	 decisions	 are	 taken	 in	 the	 one	
person	 one	 vote	 system,	 but	 only	 at	 a	 local	 level”	 (CNR	 civil	 servant,	 user	
organization	head)	
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According	 to	 the	assessments	of	State	civil	 servants	and	experts,	 this	difficulty	 for	 small	 farmers	 in	
organization	decision-making	harms	user	participation	in	organization	assemblies.		
“Small	 farmers	almost	do	not	participate	because	they	have	very	 little	 influence.	
They	 only	 have	 to	 wait	 for	 the	 water	 to	 be	 delivered	 to	 them;	 meanwhile,	 the	
others	decide”	(INDAP	civil	servant,	Ovalle)	
“When	 you	 are	 a	 small	 farmer	 they	 normally	 do	 not	 fulfill	 their	 promises,	 they	
never	fulfill	the	programs	they	give”	(small	farmer	4)	
There	 is	 a	 significant	 difference	 in	 the	 level	 of	 experience	 of	 leaders	 from	 the	 traditional	 small	
farmers’	area	who	propose	themselves	as	representatives.	Managers	from	agriculture	companies	are	
better	prepared	to	confront	technical	decisions.		
“Those	things	happen	because	our	 leaders	are	not	prepared	and	when	there	 is	a	
meeting	 they	 do	 not	 talk	 about	 the	 important	 reasons	 for	 it,	 or	 they	 ask	 for	 a	
written	answer	 for	 instance,	 then	 they	allow	one	 thing	after	another	 to	happen,	
many	 times	 due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 knowledge.	 But	 it	 is	 a	 serious	 problem	 because	
others	have	taken	advantage	and	left	 less	water	available	for	us.	Look,	they	said	
that	 temporary	 stocks	 would	 become	 permanent,	 and	 that	 is	 feasible	 because	
they	have	the	election,	the	means	and	persuasion	to	change	the	whole	assembly’s	
mind,	while	the	rest	observe	the	making	of	deals	and	how	they	are	 losing	at	the	
same	time	in	astonishment”	(cooperative	leader)	
“This	is	the	danger	with	what	we	are	exposed	to	nowadays,	we	are	suffering	from	
it.	Because	 there	are	companies	with	a	great	amount	of	 shares	which	can	really	
influence	the	managers’	election	of	user	organizations,	making	it	harder	for	us	to	
be	heard”	(manager,	Limarí	Monitoring	Board)	
It	is	interesting	to	observe	that	certain	current	leaders	share	this	critical	assessment	of	the	influence	
that	 farmers	with	more	 shares	 can	exert,	 because	 they	 see	 that	 their	 own	work	 is	 harmed	by	 the	
power	of	large	agriculture	companies.			
“People	are	unsupportive,	most	of	them	are	not	supportive,	for	instance	if	I	have	a	
channel	8km	long	and	water	reaches	to	the	4th	because	from	then	on	it	leaks,	I	do	
not	care	for	the	ones	who	are	further	along;	the	ones	who	are	nearer	do	not	care	
either,	 they	 do	not	 help	with	money	 to	 fix	 it	 if	 there	 is	 no	benefit	 for	 them,	 the	
problem	 belongs	 to	 the	 ones	 who	 use	 it	 further	 along”	 (user	 organization	
manager,	Hurtado	river)	
Assemblies,	which	 represent	 the	 chance	 for	 stock	 owners	 to	 ask	 leaders	 for	 reports	 on	 how	 their	
interests	are	 looked	after,	suffer	from	low	attendance.	This	 is	explained	by	the	 low	expectations	of	
small	farmers	of	their	ability	to	influence	user	organization	decisions.			
“During	 the	 assemblies,	 situations	 are	 reported	 more	 than	 discussed.	 People	
attend	 because	 they	 want	 to	 know	 how	 much	 water	 they	 are	 going	 to	 get	 or	
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because	 we	 are	 going	 to	 give	 them	 free	 hot-dogs	 or	 because	 they	 can	 make	
conversation	with	some	people,	it	is	some	sort	of	social	meeting	for	the	ones	who	
have	not	seen	each	other	for	a	while”	(Cogotí	manager)	
The	same	leaders	acknowledge	the	informative	aim	of	assemblies	because	decisions	are	made	by	the	
administration.	 It	 is	also	highlighted	how	many	restrictions	there	are	for	valid	votes	(people	do	not	
attend,	have	few	stocks	or	are	in	debt	and	their	votes	are	not	valid),	so	it	is	normal	for	people	in	the	
administration	to	have	a	majority.		
	“To	make	a	decision	there	must	be	a	51%	agreement,	the	majority,	but	according	
to	the	amount	of	shares	each	person	owns.	You	can	have	stocks	and	be	a	debtor,	
if	you	paid	until	the	30th	April	of	the	previous	season	and	the	assembly	is	held	in	
June,	you	can	take	part	in	it.	If	you	are	from	a	company	you	have	the	authority	to	
represent	 it,	another	chance	 is	 to	go	to	 listen,	 if	you	have	not	paid	you	can	talk,	
give	your	opinion,	give	suggestions,	you	have	the	right	to	speak	but	not	 to	vote.	
For	example,	during	the	 last	assembly,	 there	were	5500	channel	stocks	and	only	
3200	 attended	 the	 meeting	 and	 from	 that	 number	 2800	 are	 valid	 votes,	 one	
person	 there	 could	 own	 1000	 stocks,	 then	 this	 person	 has	 almost	 made	 the	
decision”	(Camarico	manager)	
Although	organizations	 represent	 some	 sort	of	 associativity,	 they	have	 serious	difficulties	 and	 face	
much	criticism	for	not	acting	in	the	interests	of	the	whole	community.	Nonetheless,	organizations	are	
useful	 to	manage	community	 stocks	quickly,	because	decision-making	 is	done	as	a	whole	and	 they	
can	enable	changes	that	can	only	be	easily	carried	out	at	a	community	level	(such	as	waterproofing	
water	channels	or	seeding	clouds	to	stimulate	rainfall).			
“Organizations	 are	 useful	 for	 community	 actions,	 for	 instance	 cloud	 seeding,	
because	asking	stockholders	for	100	pesos	each	would	be	war;	but	here	we	reach	
an	agreement,	as	we	did	in	Cogotí,	when	we	talked	about	it	during	the	assembly,	
everybody	 supported	 the	 idea.	Moreover	 we	 agreed	 on	 a	 budget	 so	 there	 was	
nothing	to	argue	about,	we	divided	it	up	as	a	social	fee”	(Cogotí	manager)	
“It	seems	this	associativity	is	the	only	one	authorized	by	law	as	compulsory.	It	may	
appear	strange	but	the	constitution	says	nobody	can	force	you	to	be	part	of	any	
organization,	not	even	the	neighborhood	council.	But	you	have	to	be	a	member	of	
these	 organizations	 and	 oversight	 boards,	 you	 cannot	 say	 you	 do	 not	 want	 to	
because	it	is	the	only	way	to	receive	your	water”	(Camarico	manager)	
5.5.3	Support	Networks	
Farmer	 support	 networks	 represent	 another	 dimension	 where	 there	 is	 a	 chance	 to	 observe	
associative	 relations.	 The	 leading	 one	 is	 the	 support	 of	 relatives	 and	 the	 second	 one	 involves	
neighbor	 support.	 While	 users	 explain	 that	 they	 support	 neighbors	 and	 relatives	 by	 lending	
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machinery	 or	 doing	 work,	 they	 say	 that	 sharing	 water	 volumes	 is	 far	 more	 complicated.	 Due	 to	
scarcity,	they	only	lend	water	to	each	other	subject	to	a	commitment	to	return	it	as	soon	as	possible.			
“There	 are	 things	 we	 can	 do	 to	 help	 each	 other.	 But	 not	 with	 water,	 that	 we	
cannot,	 water	 is	 complicated.	 It	 can	 be	machinery,	 a	 farmer	 tractor	 or	 lending	
workers,	those	kinds	of	things.	But	not	water,	because	you	plant	according	to	the	
amount	of	water	you	have,	you	cannot	plant	more	as	it	is	very	difficult.	At	least	I	
do	not	do	this,	 if	 it	 is	only	one	person	I	can	 lend	water	but	 I	am	going	to	need	it	
back	on	a	specific	date	and	the	person	has	 to	cope	with	 it	on	his/her	own;	 I	am	
taking	a	risk	of	not	having	it	back.	But	I	think	that	part	is	hard,	people	do	not	help	
each	other	with	water”	(mid-size	farmer	3)	
Water	 lending	 is	more	common	among	 relatives.	Due	 to	 the	 spot	market,	 they	 can	do	 this	even	 if	
they	 are	 located	 deep	 within	 the	 basin.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 Paloma	 System	 is	 a	 useful	 tool	 for	
supporting	relatives.	
“Now	I	am	watering	a	little	more	because	my	cousin	lent	me	some	water.	I	ran	out	
of	water	in	February.	He	has	some	more	and	I	borrowed	it.	But	I	do	not	have	any	
idea	of	how	this	works.	It	is	good	for	me	because	I	can	water”	(small	farmer	3)	
“This	year	my	brother	helped	me	too	with	a	little	water.	I	was	running	out	of	it	and	
he	 lent	me	some	from	the	other	river,	but	 that	 is	because	we	are	 family	and	we	
work	together	too”	(mid-size	farmer	2)	
A	 common	 way	 of	 giving	 support	 is	 to	 share	 the	 harvest	 for	 consumption	 among	 relatives	 and	
neighbors:		
“For	 instance	 I	 have	 avocados	 for	 breakfast,	 and	 jam	 that	 I	 consume	and	 share	
with	other	people	 like	friends,	neighbors,	so	you	offer	this	and	later	others	share	
with	you”	(small	farmer	2)	
“As	 we	 know	 the	 issue	 is	 easier.	 For	 example	 a	 friend	 of	 mine	 has	 tomatoes,	
another	has	onions,	and	I	plant	potatoes…	so	we	keep	each	other	informed.	Hey,	
come	 to	 get	 a	 bagful	 of	 potatoes…	 and	 that	 is	 how	we	 share.	 Not	 always,	 but	
whenever	we	can”	(small	farmer	3)	
One	user	strategy	is	to	rent	water	in	groups	(or	share	a	water	provision	or	the	water	right)	during	a	
season.	Traditionally	 this	occurred	among	neighbors.	A	water	right	was	transferred	and	the	person	
using	it	in	practice	was	responsible	for	paying	the	organization	fees.		
“Sometimes	we	 rent	by	 turns,	we	 lend	 the	 turn.	One	 farmer	can	say	 to	another,	
‘Hey,	today	I	am	not	using	my	turn,	I	am	going	to	let	it	flow,	you	can	use	it’”	(pro-
market	expert)	
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This	was	 later	 legalized	 through	 the	 spot	market	 and	 this	 is	 how	people	 sell	water	 volumes	 in	 the	
most	anonymous	fashion	(through	the	electronic	market).	Even	companies	engage	in	this	practice	of	
renting	water	when	they	cannot	otherwise	gain	access	to	the	Paloma	System.	
	“Before	the	water	right	was	rented,	today	the	cubic	meters	are	sold,	which	is	the	
same,	there	has	always	been	a	way”	(small	farmer	1)	
5.5.4	The	Trust	Issue		
A	cross-cutting	element	 in	all	 forms	of	associativity	and	collaboration	 is	the	trust	that	exists	among	
people	and	towards	organizations	linked	to	water	administration.		
The	 interviews	 carried	 out	 clearly	 show	 that	 serious	 mistrust	 exists,	 mainly	 from	 small	 owners	
towards	those	with	a	 larger	amount	of	water	stocks,	and	more	so	during	periods	of	water	scarcity.	
This	 is	 related	 to	 the	great	 influence	exerted	by	 large-scale	 farmers	on	user	organization	decision-
making.	In	addition,	such	farmers	or	companies	who	have	many	water	stocks	are	accused	of	selling	
water	 yet	 continuing	 to	 use	 it	 as	 if	 they	 had	 not	 done	 so	 (with	 a	 large	 volume,	 this	 is	 harder	 to	
control).	
Another	 source	 of	mistrust	 is	 illegal	 water	 extraction.	 Among	 farmers,	 the	 risk	 of	 suffering	 water	
theft	creates	significant	mistrust.			
“For	instance,	in	the	North	some	mining	company	that	needs	water	goes	to	these	
huge	 users	 and	 buys	 their	 water	 which	 does	 not	 represent	 a	 problem	 for	 them	
because	they	have	more	water,	more	rights	and	everything.	If	they	take	one	cubic	
meter	 nobody	 notices,	 nobody	 complains.	 They	 keep	 using	 the	 same	 amount	 of	
water	but	on	paper	they	sold	the	water	to	the	mining	company.	Later,	when	they	
need	more	water	 the	 thing	 these	 large-scale	 farmers	 do	 is	 to	 buy	 it	 from	 small	
farmers,	but	at	a	very	 low	cost…	I	do	not	know,	100	thousand	pesos.	Meanwhile	
they	pass	 their	water	 rights	 to	 the	mining	company	at	10	million	pesos.	As	 they	
are	 part	 of	 the	 administration	 they	 control	 the	 information	 and	 profit	 from	 it”	
(DGA	national	division	user	organization)	
Leaders	are	accused	of	taking	advantage	of	privileged	information	about	the	water	market	for	their	
own	benefit.	The	consequence	of	this	is	a	lack	of	interest	in	making	the	market	transparent.	
“The	 idea	 is	 that	 the	 same	 organizations	 are	 the	 real	 estate	 agents’	 office	 for	
water	 rights,	 but	 they	 do	 not	 do	 it	 because	 it	 is	 not	 convenient	 as	 the	
administration	has	the	largest	amount	of	water	rights	and	they	do	not	want	this	
to	change,	and	want	to	continue	being	the	only	ones	making	profit”	(DGA	national	
division	user	organization)	
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IMAGE	13:	INVESTIGATION	INTO	LOST	CUBIC	METERS	OF	WATER	IN	COGOTÍ	
	
Source:	El	Ovallino	newspaper	(09.10.2008)	
Another	 aspect	 of	 this	 mistrust	 relates	 to	 the	 large	 planting	 areas	 that	 it	 is	 clearly	 impossible	 to	
maintain	during	times	of	water	scarcity.			
“You	 can	 find	 planting	 over	 a	 larger	 area	 than	 it	 is	 possible	 to	water	with	 that	
proportion	 of	 the	 resource,	 for	me	 it	 is	 suspicious	 to	 see	 they	 plant	more	 trees,	
more	vines	each	day.	Because	there	is	no	water;	I	do	not	know	where	they	get	it”	
(trading	lawyer	Ovalle)	
State	 civil	 servants	 have	 a	 very	 critical	 stance	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 user	 organization	 leaders.	 It	 is	
claimed	 that	 a	 significant	 percentage	of	 administration	members	 take	 advantage	of	 their	 status	 in	
order	to	take	more	water	than	they	are	supposed	to	have:	“I	would	say	that	70%	of	presidents	from	
Oversight	Boards	take	more	water	than	they	should”	(DGA	national	division	user	organization).	
Water	 rights	 titles	 are	 a	 problem	 too,	 making	 the	 amount	 of	 water	 stocks	 held	 by	 some	 user	
organizations	increase	because	their	administration	has	permitted	it	to	occur.	
“In	 this	 organization	 there	were	12,000	water	 stocks	and	now	 there	are	around	
13,000	 and	 nobody	 knows	 how.	 They	 said	 that	 the	 organization	 leaders	 take	
advantage	of	this	kind	of	situation.	Look,	there	are	several	studies	with	pieces	of	
advice	on	how	to	administrate	water	efficiently,	but	through	the	passing	of	time	it	
has	 become	 clear	 to	 me	 that	 they	 do	 not	 want	 to,	 they	 have	 many	 interests	
involved”	(trading	lawyer	Ovalle)	
IMAGE	14:	AUTHORITIES	CALL	TO	REPORT	IRREGULAR	WATER	PROFITS	
	
Source:	El	Ovallino	newspaper	(14.03.2008)	
Water	 theft	 is	 the	main	 cause	 of	 the	mistrust	 that	 pervades	 the	 system.	 There	 is	mistrust	 among	
neighbors	 or	 towards	 organizations.	 Indeed,	 during	 times	 of	 extreme	 scarcity	 people	 accuse	 each	
other	of	stealing	water	through	illegal	wells.		
"Everyone	 is	doing	 it	and	 they	all	have	wells	and	 take	a	 lot	of	water,	but	 I	 think	
that	in	some	way	they	take	advantage	because	there	are	people	who	really	have	
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problems,	maybe	they	need	more	than	I	and	by	law	they	have	to	take	their	water	
and	I	will	be	stealing	from	them.	Well	it	is	true,	if	everyone	steals	I	steal	too,	but	I	
am	not	going	to	abuse	the	system,	 it	 is	only	because	 I	need	 it	or	 I	could	 lose	my	
annual	crop”	(small	farmer	4)	
Security	guards	are	also	subject	to	suspicion.	Some	large-scale	farmers	even	hire	people	to	monitor	
the	guards	when	they	are	delivering	the	corresponding	water	because	the	farmers	assume	that	the	
security	guards	take	bribes	from	other	parties	and	do	not	deliver	the	appropriate	amount	of	water.		
Conditions	 of	 extreme	 scarcity	 have	 meant	 that	 conflicts	 among	 irrigators	 have	 worsened	 and	
reports	and	incidents	of	water	theft	have	increased.	This	is	also	an	issue	due	to	the	low	tolerance	of	
illegal	water	extraction	in	situations	where	water	is	scarce.		
An	 additional	 mistrust	 focus	 lies	 in	 fines	 for	 evaporation,	 which	 is	 a	 decision	 taken	 in	 each	
organization	to	counteract	the	effects	of	transfers.	This	can	be	related	to	a	lack	of	knowledge,	though	
there	is	also	mistrust	centering	on	the	idea	that	these	cutbacks	are	being	used	for	other	ends.		
“And	what	happens	to	this	34%?	I	would	like	to	know	what	it	is	for.	Here	we	have	
an	example	of	the	big	profit	 this	administration	 is	making.	 I	 transfer	water,	 they	
ask	me	for	a	fortune	and	I	do	not	know	where	this	water	is	going.	They	ask	for	it	
but	do	not	explain	why”	(mid-size	farmer)	
However,	it	is	also	highlighted	that	the	Limarí	case	sees	organizations	taking	care	of	their	prestige	in	
order	to	secure	respect:	“People	here	avoid	this,	there	are	many	people	who	are	more	Catholic	than	
the	 Pope	 but	 the	 habit	 is	 to	 protect	 the	 organization.	 There	 are	 things	 that	 still	 work	 under	
gentleman’s	agreements	and	others	have	failed,	anything	can	happen.	Normally	there	is	still	respect”	
(civil	servant	DGA	Ovalle).	
5.5.5.	The	Cooperative	Failure	
There	are	many	stories	about	cooperatives	in	the	basin	that	failed	soon	after	being	founded.	Users,	
State	civil	servants	and	experts	all	agree	that	this	kind	of	initiative	does	not	work.		
Many	causes	are	linked	to	this	failure:		
-	 The	 lack	 of	 preparation	 and	 resources	 for	 people	 to	 make	 the	 cooperative	 operate	 properly	
(community	member	2)	
-	How	people	address	the	failure	to	sell	their	products	on	their	own	(community	member	2)	
-	After	one	gives	up,	the	rest	also	leave	(company	manager	4)	
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-	Leaders	take	advantage	of	others	by	keeping	the	money	for	themselves	(small	farmer	2)	
-	There	is	a	cultural	mistrust	issue:	“Chilean	people	are	like	this”	(small	farmer	2)	
-	The	dictatorship	ended	some	successful	cooperatives	(mid-size	farmer	2)	
The	 few	 successful	 cooperative	 experiences	 (Pisco	 Capel,	 Pisco	 Control)	 are	 falling	 away.	 Small	
farmers	are	a	minority	and	there	are	people	trying	to	buy	all	that	they	have	left	(mid-size	farmer	2).	
INDAP	 declares	 that	 at	 a	 certain	 point	 it	 tried	 to	 encourage	 Profos,	 a	 cooperative	 system	 that	
ultimately	 failed.	 Many	 were	 ended	 by	 the	 managers	 that	 had	 established	 them	 because	 of	
insufficient	control.	
“At	some	point	INDAP	interfered,	trying	to	form	the	Profos,	which	were	some	sort	
of	associativity;	 as	 cooperatives	 they	assigned	professional	managers	 to	 run	 the	
administration	 because	 farmers	 did	 not	 know	 how	 to,	 but	 soon	managers	 sold	
everything	 and	 took	 the	money,	 they	 cheated	 on	 the	 old	men…	 so	 these	Profos	
were	a	disaster”	(civil	servant	INDAP	Ovalle)	
The	 cooperatives	 that	 are	 left	 do	 not	 operate	 regarding	 water	 issues,	 but	 only	 for	 purchasing	 or	
selling	 farm	 products:	 “Each	 person	 does	 whatever	 he/she	 wants	 with	 his/her	 water.	 It	 would	 be	
better	to	do	it	as	a	group.	I	believe	that	in	our	cooperative	we	should	manage	everything	but	having	a	
strong	ruling	system,	so	the	one	who	does	not	comply	with	our	rules	has	to	leave	the	cooperative	with	
a	fine”	(cooperative	leader).	5.6	Collaboration:	Vertical		
Vertical	connectivity	is	another	important	characteristic	in	a	resilient	system.	This	happens	between	
higher	and	lower	nodes,	not	only	at	the	level	of	similar	or	close	ones	(as	in	horizontal	collaboration).	
The	central	point	of	the	issue	is	the	relationship	between	the	State	and	farmers,	and	the	relationship	
between	experts,	the	State	and	farmers	from	the	area.	
5.6.1	The	Relationship	between	the	State	and	Farmers	
The	 relationship	 between	 the	 State	 and	 farmers	 is	 mainly	 reflected	 in	 the	 benefits	 awarded	 for	
watering	and	dam	construction.	User	organizations	play	a	particularly	 important	 role	because	 they	
distribute	 the	 benefits.	 Thus,	 the	 main	 State	 organizations	 with	 responsibility	 for	 hydrological	
resources	 (CNR	and	DGA)	have	 special	 people	 and	units	 responsible	 for	maintaining	 relations	with	
user	 organizations.	 The	 kind	 of	 support	 initiatives	 applied	 will	 depend	 on	 the	 orientation	 of	 the	
government.	 They	 may	 include	 encouragement	 and	 legalization	 of	 structures,	 training	 and	
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legalization	of	water	rights,	and	formalization	of	user	organizations.	There	are	significant	differences	
between	governments.	Before,	much	effort	was	 invested	in	training	and	empowerment,	while	with	
the	 right-wing	 government	 the	 emphasis	 has	 been	 placed	 upon	 legalization	 with	 the	 aim	 of	
developing	conditions	for	an	operating	market.		
“Now	 we	 work	 with	 organizations	 that	 look	 for	 a	 strengthening	 of	 their	 basis,	
before	 the	 work	 was	 concentrated	 on	 improving	 the	 skills	 of	 administration	
members,	 users,	 giving	 a	 lot	 of	 training.	 Currently	 the	 work	 is	 focused	 on	
strengthening	 legal	 conditions	 inside	 the	 organization,	 legalizing”	 (civil	 servant	
CNR	user	organization	head)	
“Today	 is	 different,	 there	 are	 no	 ideas	 to	 create	 leadership	 or	 strengthen	
participation,	 now	 it	 is	 important	 to	 know	 the	 Water	 Code,	 its	 rules,	 to	 know	
about	 their	 rights	and	how	they	can	participate.	Before,	we	used	 to	work	giving	
leadership	 training,	 conflict	 resolution	 techniques,	 etc.	 It	 was	 an	 organizational	
view.	Nowadays	it	 is	more	important	that	the	organization	is	legal”	(civil	servant	
DGA,	user	organization	head)	
Within	 the	 same	 units	 which	 operate	 with	 user	 organizations,	 their	 processes	 are	 recognized	 as	
cumbersome.	 Although	 the	 objective	 is	 to	 encourage	 the	 creation	 of	 organizations,	 the	 slow	 and	
complex	procedures	make	legalization	difficult:	“for	instance,	as	a	service	we	want	to	encourage	the	
foundation	of	user	organizations,	but	our	procedures	are	cumbersome,	so	we	need	to	change	that”	
(DGA	national	division	user	organization).	
At	 a	 national	 level,	 differences	 between	 State	 and	user	 organizations	 are	 serious	 either.	 In	 Limarí,	
one	of	the	 important	elements	 is	that	the	regional	management	has	many	years	of	experience	and	
organizations	have	been	well	established	for	decades.	Their	collaborative	relationship	in	this	context	
is	long-standing	and	is	better	than	in	the	rest	of	the	country.		
The	user	organization	complains	of	the	slow	process,	particularly	during	times	of	scarcity.	This	is	due	
to	the	process	of	raising	capital	during	emergencies	remains	slow	and	badly	timed	because	it	tends	
to	arrive	when	there	is	no	water	available.		
“Unfortunately,	 the	 geomembrane	arrived	 late,	 it	 should	 have	 been	here	 before	
the	money	was	 authorized	 in	 June	 and	 the	 first	 truck	 arrived	 on	 5th	December.	
The	 Regional	 Government	 provided	 the	 capital	 for	 the	 geomembrane,	 but	 the	
problem	was	how	late	it	arrived	to	us”	(manager,	Limarí	Monitoring	Board)	
Reservoir	construction	represents	a	large	investment	contribution	from	the	State	to	private	parties.	
After	the	reservoirs	have	been	built	and	become	operational,	they	are	transferred	to	private	parties	
for	 administration.	 Due	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 clarity	 in	 the	 procedures	 introduced	 by	 legislation,	 there	 are	
124	
	
significant	 difficulties.	 There	 is	 also	 a	huge	 gap	 in	 the	 temporary	 rights	 that	may	be	 created	when	
reservoirs	are	built.			
Post-transfer	reservoir	management	is	completely	independent.	Private	parties	decide	how	to	divide	
up	the	water,	though	at	some	level	government	organizations	(mainly	DOH	and	DGA)	give	technical	
support,	while	not	making	decisions.		
Cloud	 seeding	 represented	 a	 strategy	 developed	 during	 a	 time	 of	 emergency	 where	 State	 and	
organizations	 tried	 to	 collaborate.	 This	 strategy	 was	 heavily	 criticized	 because	 of	 its	 lack	 of	
effectiveness,	 in	addition	to	the	imposition	of	a	procedure,	requests	for	financial	resources	and	the	
refusal	of	permission	to	control	the	work	performance.			
“Now	for	instance	they	tried	artificial	rain,	we	were	a	little	worried	because	they	
were	sending	this	artificial	rain	project;	they	say,	“Limarí	has	to	give	this	amount	
of	money	and	Elqui	this…”	The	State	is	supposed	to	give	50%	and	the	rest	comes	
from	 us.	 I	 believe	 that	 there	 is	 a	 view	 that	 the	 State	 is	 too	 inflexible;	 there	 is	
almost	no	dialogue	on	this	issue”	(manager,	Limarí	Monitoring	Board)	
The	most	common	criticism	of	State	organizations	is	how	governmental	policies	change	with	a	new	
government.	 Sometimes	half-completed	 training	 is	 simply	discontinued,	or	established	agreements	
vanish	 with	 the	 administration	 introduced	 by	 the	 new	 authorities	 (manager,	 Limarí	 Monitoring	
Board).		
“An	important	change	with	the	new	government	regarding	our	relationship	is	that	
today	 it	 is	not	easy	to	speak	either	to	the	ministers	about	 important	 issues	or	to	
the	 national	managers,	 and	we	 see	 how	 regional	managers	 from	 organizations	
are	 not	 empowered,	 I	mean	 today	 they	 do	 not	 dare	 do	 anything.	 So	 there	 is	 a	
noticeable	change.	For	example,	we	in	this	room,	when	the	Water	Code	was	under	
review,	Humberto	Pena	was	the	national	manager	and	he	agreed	and	disagreed	
with	us	on	many	things,	but	several	things	we	discussed	at	this	table	were	added	
to	 the	 amendments	 to	 the	Code,	 he	 took	 a	 day	 to	 come	here	 to	 talk	 to	 us.	 The	
current	authorities	have	never	scheduled	a	meeting,	is	almost	impossible	to	talk	to	
them”	(manager,	Limarí	Monitoring	Board)	
A	common	argument	is	that	the	State	should	support	users	and	provide	the	resources	which	will	be	
returned	through	taxes:	“If	farmers	stop	producing,	how	much	money	will	the	State	lose	only	through	
IVA	 (valued	 added	 tax)?	As	 soon	as	 the	Government	 provide	 the	 required	 resources	 for	 large-scale	
and	small	farmers,	they	ensure	their	own	income	through	taxes”	(manager,	Limarí	Monitoring	Board).	
The	number	of	hurdles	 to	overcome	to	obtain	benefits	makes	 it	harder	 for	 small	 farmers,	which	 is	
not	the	same	for	larger	private	parties.	This	represents	a	further	criticism.	
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“In	 this	matter	 I	 have	 a	 strong	 criticism	 to	make	 of	 the	 government	 authorities	
because	we	have	fought	a	lot	to	have	some	help	with	technical	watering	support,	
and	they	have	given	none	because	the	INDAP	for	instance	does	not	work.	The	one	
that	operates	really	well	is	the	CNR,	which	operates	through	public	tenders,	within	
which	the	winner	is	the	person	who	gives	the	most;	for	a	company	that	is	going	to	
spend	500	million,	receiving	250	is	very	good	business,	but	for	a	group	of	people	
who	have	around	0.2	to	0.3	hectares	and	more,	to	invest	the	50%,	I	mean	the	250	
million,	is	impossible.	So	we	cannot	do	it	either	through	the	INDAP	or	through	the	
CNR”	(cooperative	leader)	
INDAP	should	take	care	of	the	most	vulnerable	parties.	However,	there	is	a	large	group	that	does	not	
qualify	to	receive	the	INDAP	support	and	does	not	have	the	resources	to	apply	to	the	CNR.		
State	 civil	 servants	 also	 confirm	 that	 they	 suffer	 from	 a	 lot	 of	 pressure	 from	 large-scale	 farmers	
because	the	latter	complain	in	Santiago	and	are	given	what	they	want.		
“They	 do	 not	want	 to	 invest	 their	money	 so	 they	 ask	 for	 it	 from	 the	 State.	 The	
State	has	no	obligation	 to	do	so	but	some	civil	 servants	 feel	 intimidated	when	a	
large-scale	 farmer	 comes,	 because	 the	 ones	with	 power	 come	 to	 them	 and	 say	
they	 are	 going	 to	 complain	 in	 Santiago	 or	 make	 an	 accusation	 to	 a	 minister	
because	they	are	giving	trouble…	and	that	 is	how	they	act,	here	there	are	really	
powerful	farmers,	more	than	in	any	other	place	here	in	Limarí”	(DOH	Serena)	
The	difference	in	State	contributions	has	been	important	since	the	change	in	government,	due	to	the	
right-wing	 administration	 asking	 that	 everyone	 apply	 for	 the	 public	 tender.	 Later	 the	 largest	 user	
organization,	which	has	the	most	financial	resources,	has	more	chance	of	receiving	the	new	benefits.	
“Before,	 the	money	was	 distributed	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 size	 of	 the	 farmer’s	
company	and	within	this	contest	divided	by	hand,	or	according	to	niches	that	had	
priority	issues,	for	instance:	I	have	a	program	in	Choapa,	I	have	something	in	Elqui,	
back	then	they	used	to	do	micro-contests	to	a	regional	level,	they	even	offer	to	a	
community	 level	 so	 this	 allowed	 the	 service	 to	 guide	 the	 investments	 giving	
support	 to	 the	 smallest	 farmers.	 This	 was	 heavily	 criticized	 by	 the	 change	 of	
administration	with	 the	 idea	of	 creating	greater	 rivalry	within	 the	 system;	more	
openness	for	them	was	to	make	the	contests	public	and	create	no	more	individual	
niches	but	contests	with	Macrozone”	(civil	servant	CNR	user	organization	head)	
There	are	State	contributions	that	are	classified	as	inefficient	and	that	only	fulfill	an	image	function	
(Cazalac	 expert).	 Some	of	 these	 initiatives	 are	only	 focused	on	 achieving	 a	 larger	 number	of	 votes	
when	they	appear	to	be	doing	something.	Cloud	seeding	 is	the	most	heavily	criticized	policy	 in	this	
respect.	
“If	there	is	scarcity	and	the	“Niña”	is	going	on,	to	begin	with	there	are	no	clouds.	
The	cloud	seeding	is	done	when	there	are	clouds,	when	it	 is	about	to	rain	then	it	
could	 work.	 “It	 rained”,	 they	 say,	 it	 rained	 because	 it	 was	 going	 to	 rain,	 not	
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because	 of	 the	 cloud	 seeding.	Well,	 anyway	 it	 rained,	 it	 worked	 and	 everybody	
was	happy;	the	thing	I	have	read	about	people	who	do	this	say	the	amount	of	rain	
does	not	 reach	15%,	 it	would	never	end	 the	drought…	 Instead	of	 raining	50ml	 it	
would	rain	55ml.	There	is	not	much	difference”	(Cazalac	expert)	
5.6.2	Relationship	among	Experts,	State	and	User	Organizations	
A	fundamental	bond	to	strengthen	the	resilience	of	a	social	system	is	that	which	expert	communities	
establish	with	the	rest	of	the	associations,	whether	these	are	user	or	State	organizations.		
Amongst	 the	 main	 difficulties	 identified	 is	 the	 lack	 of	 systematized	 research.	 Users	 highlight	 that	
there	is	no	clear	way	for	them	to	access	the	content	of	scientific	reports.	Nor	are	State	organizations	
well	informed	in	this	regard.	
“I	believe	that	 it	needs	to	be	systematized	a	bit	more	so	each	required	area	and	
the	government	are	well	informed,	and	also	for	the	investors	and	producers	being	
aware	of	the	risks	they	could	face”	(company	manager	3)	
One	of	the	topics	in	which	the	presence	of	experts	can	be	identified	is	in	the	research	conducted	on	
climate	change.	In	general,	users	do	not	speak	about	this	topic.	However,	they	easily	identify	centers	
which	are	devoted	to	the	study	of	climate	change	in	their	region,	and	obtain	information	from	such	
centers,	on	the	basis	of	which	they	demand	specific	projects	such	as	the	building	of	new	reservoirs.	
“We	have	learnt	so	much	about	climate	change	from	the	information	they	gave	us	
on	the	stages	of	the	study.	It	seems	that	it	did	not	have	those	good	results.	It	has	
helped	us	to	understand	what	could	possibly	happen	 in	a	better	way”	 (manager,	
Limarí	Monitoring	Board)	
User	 organizations	 and	 experts	work	 collaboratively	 in	 this	 respect.	 The	 users	 provide	 the	 experts	
with	 information	 relating	 to	 the	 market	 and	 conditions	 of	 the	 basin,	 to	 be	 used	 for	 academic	
purposes.	In	return,	users	receive	information	from	the	experts’	reports.			
“We	receive	their	support,	we	reached	an	agreement	to	collaborate	on	the	market	
issue	and	we	receive	their	information	in	return,	but	for	academic	purposes	only”	
(electronic	market	manager)	
Centers	 like	CEAZA	and	CAZALAC	are	the	most	active	ones,	giving	seminars	and	 lectures	to	farmers	
(DOH	Serena).	Some	time	ago,	INIA	was	also	a	prominent	center	(civil	servant	DGA	Ovalle).		
An	example	of	this	vertical	collaboration	is	the	creation	of	the	electronic	market.	This	initiative	was	
produced	by	a	network	made	up	of	CNR,	PUC	(Pontificia	Universidad	Catolica),	CORFO	and	the	users.	
Investments	from	CORFO	(at	the	outset)	and	CNR	(when	the	previous	investment	proved	insufficient)	
were	necessary	in	order	to	make	the	virtual	market	operative.	This	money	allowed	experts	from	the	
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Global	Change	Center	(from	PUC)	to	work	with	user	organizations	from	the	basin,	the	objective	being	
to	 clarify	 market	 information	 (prices	 mainly)	 and	 thereby	 offer	 a	 tool	 to	 reduce	 asymmetry	 in	
available	market	information.		5.7	Socio-Ecological	Memory:	Knowledge		
Knowledge	 of	 the	 ecological	 environment	 in	 general	 and	 the	 availability	 of	 water	 resources	 in	
particular	are	fundamental	in	understanding	the	relationship	between	the	community	and	its	natural	
environment.	 This	 knowledge	 is	 developed	 both	 nationally	 and	 locally,	 arising	 both	 through	
traditional	and	scientific	knowledge.		
From	the	interviews,	it	is	possible	to	identify	a	general	issue	regarding	a	lack	of	information	about	the	
water	 cycle,	 the	 capacity	 of	 aquifers,	 snow	 density	 and	 even	 the	 amount	 of	 water	 stored	 in	
reservoirs.	Moreover,	 there	 are	 difficulties	 in	 understanding	 the	 given	water	 rights,	 since	many	 of	
them	 are	 registered	 in	 books	 in	 different	 locations	 of	 the	 country,	 without	 a	 unified	 system	 that	
systematizes	the	information	about	these	rights.	
Furthermore,	information	on	the	1200	meter-point	is	almost	non-existent	because	the	tools	to	make	
appropriate	measurements	are	not	available.	This	is	mainly	due	to	the	lack	of	investment	in	this	kind	
of	instrument.	
In	parallel,	one	of	the	weaknesses	identified	concerning	knowledge	of	the	water	cycle	and	associated	
climate	 projections	 refers	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 Chile	 has	 only	worked	with	 a	 single	meteorological	 and	
hydrologic	model,	which	naturally	increases	uncertainty.	
Regarding	 access	 to	 water	 resources,	 a	 major	 challenge	 concerns	 obtaining	 adequate	 knowledge	
regarding	 the	 exploitation	 of	 aquifers.	 This	 is	 due	 to	 the	 invisibility	 of	 the	 water	 source	 and	 the	
ignorance	surrounding	aquifers;	it	prevents	users	thinking	about	groundwater	as	a	common	source.	
In	this	context,	the	 ignorance	of	state	organizations	 in	relation	to	aquifer	conditions	 is	notable.	For	
example,	 the	 director	 of	 the	 DGA	 says	 he	 does	 not	 know	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 basin	 is	
overexploited.	
Part	of	this	lack	of	knowledge	relates	to	the	lack	of	regulations	on	the	use	of	water	resources.	After	
the	 construction	 of	 reservoirs	 and	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 1981	 Water	 Code,	 the	 extent	 and	
intensity	 of	 crops	 in	 the	 area	 increased	 dramatically,	 and	 they	 have	 since	 required	 higher	 water	
availability	and	flexibility	for	use	in	addition	to	systematically	increased	acres	with	permanent	crops,	
placing	stress	on	the	water	cycle.	
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5.7.1	Local	Traditional	Knowledge	
There	are	also	important	differences	in	farmers’	knowledge	with	respect	to	agricultural	exploitation.	
The	oldest	ones	are	reluctant	to	use	machines	and	increase	the	extent	of	their	crops,	leaving	them	
unable	to	increase	their	wealth	but	helping	to	maintain	more	sustainable	farming	compared	to	
intensive	farming	and	industrial	agriculture.	
However,	this	kind	of	knowledge	is	ever	less	commonly	used.	This	is	mainly	due	to	the	change	in	the	
characteristics	of	farmers	and	a	sustained	increase	in	the	large	agricultural	companies	from	outside	
the	basin.	At	the	same	time,	the	traditional	farmers	who	continue	using	local	knowledge	have	had	to	
face	constant	changes	in	climate	over	the	past	few	years,	not	knowing	when	and	how	much	to	plant,	
with	traditional	knowledge	proving	of	little	use	when	unexpected	seasonal	changes	occur.	
Based	on	this,	many	small	traditional	farmers	say	they	suffer	major	losses,	mainly	because	they	make	
decisions	to	grow	plantations	that	require	a	lot	of	water	resources.	This	happens	even	when	user	
organizations	announce	the	availability	of	water	for	the	season.	Apparently,	practices	such	as	trust	in	
God	and	belief	that	it	will	rain	enough	have	ended	up	damaging	farmers	on	multiple	occasions.	
There	 is	 a	 clear	 and	 important	 difference	 among	 types	 of	 farmers	 involving	 management	 of	 the	
availability	of	water.	The	most	prominent	have	support	from	professionals	who	handle	the	necessary	
information	 to	 make	 appropriate	 use	 of	 the	 resources,	 while	 the	 smaller	 ones	 do	 not	 have	 the	
information	or	the	ability	to	process	it,	and	during	drought	years	they	may	make	incorrect	decisions.	
However	and	at	the	same	time,	 it	 is	observed	that	there	are	external	companies	who	do	not	know	
the	water	needs	of	the	plantations	in	the	region,	so	they	tend	to	buy	fewer	shares	of	water	than	are	
necessary	for	the	crops.	In	this	sense,	it	remains	a	disadvantage	to	be	without	local	knowledge.	
5.7.2	Scientific	Knowledge		
From	the	analysis	of	the	interviews,	the	way	in	which	knowledge	is	transferred	from	experts	to	users	
and	State	organizations	is	a	serious	concern.	Interviewees	indicate	the	need	for	greater	cooperation	
among	universities,	the	State	and	the	private	sector.		
Communication	difficulties	between	the	scientific	sector	and	the	State	mainly	relate	to	the	lack	of	
access	to	information	and	the	lack	of	interest	of	State-dependent	agencies.		
The	receipt	of	scientific	studies	by	the	State	has	serious	difficulties.	As	much	as	they	may	be	
positively	received,	many	such	studies	end	up	stored	in	official	desks	without	being	broadly	applied.	
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This	is	due	to	the	State’s	lack	of	resources,	personnel	and	skills	to	make	use	of	the	knowledge	
obtained.	
State	organizations	 face	a	serious	 lack	of	knowledge.	For	example,	 the	General	Water	Office	 (DGA)	
does	 not	 have	 accurate	 information	 about	water	 rights	 given	 nationwide	 and	 currently	 in	 use.	 To	
address	 this	 problem,	 they	 are	 currently	 working	 on	 a	 national	 register	 of	 water	 resources.	 In	
general,	 there	 is	 serious	 concern	 over	 the	 DGA’s	 information	 management,	 as	 they	 are	 legally	
responsible	for	managing	the	information	on	water	rights	and	yet	other	State	organizations	identify	
them	as	entirely	deficient.	
In	addition	 to	 this	problem	 in	 the	DGA,	a	deficit	 is	 identified	 in	 the	 information	 that	 the	State	and	
experts	give	to	the	private	sector,	leaving	plenty	of	room	for	interpretation,	which	can	lead	to	serious	
consequences	for	the	sustainability	of	watersheds.	
On	the	other	hand,	user	organizations	do	receive	some	information	from	experts	on	the	availability	
of	 water	 and	 snow	 in	 the	 basins.	 However,	 they	 identify	 the	 need	 to	 improve	 the	 delivery	 of	
information	and	its	systematization.	This	is	because	farmers	still	do	not	have	sufficient	data	to	make	
informed	decisions	and	assess	the	risks	associated	with	inadequate	management	of	water	resources.	
A	major	problem	is,	 for	example,	that	the	Paloma	System	is	 found	to	actually	have	 less	water	than	
the	 amount	 stated	 in	 the	 official	 records.	 This	 is	 a	 severe	 problem	 when	 all	 the	 water	 has	 been	
consumed;	 it	 is	 known	 that	people	will	 demand	more	but	 that	water	does	not	 exist.	 This	 shows	a	
deficit	 in	 knowledge	 and	 management	 of	 the	 operational	 model	 of	 the	 system.	 To	 address	 this	
problem,	 divers	 have	 been	 hired	 to	measure	water	 levels	 and	 use	 this	 information	 to	 correct	 the	
previous	erroneous	data,	but	only	when	the	water	was	running	out.		
In	 general,	 State	 civil	 servants,	 farmers	 and	 their	 user	 organizations	 express	 the	 need	 for	 further	
information	on	the	conditions	of	the	aquifers,	the	amount	of	water	in	reservoirs,	the	water	quality	in	
rivers	and	the	forecasts	made.	5.8	Socio-Ecological	Memory:	Learning		
Based	on	the	interviews,	it	is	possible	to	identify	different	dimensions	related	to	learning	in	socio-
ecological	memory.	There	are	elements	that	can	be	associated	with	learning	from	the	system,	but	
more	importantly,	there	are	critical	elements	that	demonstrate	the	absence	of	this	learning.		
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5.8.1	No-learning:	More	Intensive	and	Extensive	Farming		
Users	themselves	identify	a	weak	general	learning	ability	as	a	weakness.	One	of	the	most	critical	
concerns	is	that	the	measures	implemented	to	tackle	drought	stop	when	the	drought	ends.		This	is	
not	appropriate	considering	that	droughts	are	cyclical	in	the	region.	
"Besides	you	know	what	will	happen,	if	the	drought	is	over	and	this	year	is	good,	
the	reservoirs	are	supposed	to	be	filled	and	they	will	immediately	forget	about	this	
issue.	 Nobody	 is	 going	 to	 talk	 about	 cloud	 seeding,	 the	 law	 will	 continue	 to	
operate	 but	with	 the	 assigned	 resources	 and	we	will	 be	 relaxed	 for	 three	more	
years,	then	when	the	drought	comes	again,	it	will	last	seven	more	years,	there	we	
will	 start	 again.	 During	 the	 first	 half	 of	 the	 drought,	 it	 will	 really	 worry	 us	 and	
when	we	solve	 the	problems	 this	alarm	will	be	ended	and	 this	 is	a	never-ending	
story.	 Now	 if	 all	 you	 are	 doing	 everything	 and	 the	 drought	 stops,	 we	 should	
continue	to	do	so	for	the	next	term	so	it	would	not	merely	be	useful	to	face	what	is	
happening	now"	(Hurtado	river	user	organization	head)	
This	is	connected	to	water	scarcity.	Nevertheless,	there	is	another	directly	related	factor	that	has	not	
been	fully	addressed:	there	are	no	limits	on	farming	exploitation.	The	farmers	themselves	recognize	
the	need	to	set	limits	and	regulations	for	farming	exploitation,	since	they	identify	excessive	demand	
on	water	resources.	
"We	are	 a	 little	 irresponsible	 on	 the	 amount	 of	 planting	 and	we	have	no	 limits,	
and	as	there	are	people	with	so	much	capital	that	have	no	limit	to	spend	it,	then	
they	buy	500	acres,	they	live	buying	and	continue	to	buy	water	but	basically	if	the	
water	is	a	resource	that	has	a	limit	then	it	is	impossible	to	give	them	all	the	water	
they	need”	(mid-size	farmer)	
The	evaluation	made	by	 farmers,	user	organizations	and	experts	 is	 that	 the	 current	drought	 is	not	
greater	than	that	which	began	in	1996.	However,	the	planted	area	is	much	greater,	so	the	effects	are	
very	different.	
"It	 happens	 that	 the	 plantation	 area	 has	 greatly	 increased.	 So	 there	 is	 a	 higher	
demand.	According	 to	 statistics,	 the	drought	 is	not	worse	 than	1996,	 it	 is	 about	
the	same,	but	the	planted	area	has	increased	by	40%	therefore	water	demand	is	
greater.	 The	 resource	 usage	 is	more	 intensive"	 (Hurtado	 river	 user	 organization	
head)	
With	the	same	amount	of	water	rights,	a	much	wider	area	with	permanent	crops	has	been	irrigated,	
which	requires	a	continuous	use	of	water.		
The	local	authority	(DGA)	recognizes	this	problem,	but	assumes	that	the	State	has	no	chance	to	enact	
new	regulations.	The	only	option,	then,	is	“natural	selection”:	those	who	have	sufficient	water	rights	
will	survive.	
131	
	
"As	time	passes,	the	demand	for	water	goes	up,	because	the	water	stocks	are	the	
same,	but	 the	use	of	water	 is	higher.	Think	of	 the	 fact	 that	 in	 the	year	1997	we	
had	the	Cogotí	reservoir	almost	dry,	Paloma	from	750	million	of	mt3,	had	only	48	
million	 less	 than	now	and	Recoleta	was	9	million	of	 the	100	of	capacity.	So	with	
that	high	demand	the	system	was	almost	broken	and	today	Cogotí	 is	40	million,	
Recoleta	also	other	40	and	Paloma	 is	about	130,	we	are	practically	 in	 the	 same	
conditions	 as	 in	 1997	 because	 the	 irrigated	 area	 has	 grown.	And	 the	 problem...	
well	 I	 think	this	 is	natural	selection,	 the	only	thing	that	will	not	allow	farmers	to	
continue	planting	is	a	drought.	I	think	it	is	painful	for	people,	it	is	difficult	for	me,	
for	the	office	I	hold,	but	there	is	no	way	to	limit	the	number	of	hectares	planted"	
(civil	servant	DGA	Ovalle)	
A	key	aspect	of	this	issue	is	the	replacement	of	temporary	crops	with	permanent	crops:	“Until	1980	
or	so,	 it	was	a	period	in	which	the	deficiencies	were	not	noticed	because	the	agricultural	sector	had	
not	 yet	 developed	 as	 far	 as	 it	 has	 now.	We	were	 also	 flexible,	 if	 you	 planted	wheat	 and	 had	 less	
water,	and	then	you	planted	less.	Today	with	permanent	crops	...	I	remember	in	1997	we	had	15,000	
hectares	 of	 plantations	 and	 today	 we	 have	 about	 40,000,	 later	 every	 time	 a	 drought	 comes	 the	
situation	becomes	more	complicated"		(manager,	Limarí	Monitoring	Board)	
An	assessment	by	Paloma	System	administrators	themselves	suggests	that	the	basin	has	reached	a	
limit	of	efficiency	 in	the	use	of	resource,	taking	 into	account	the	 intensity	and	length	of	crops.	This	
limit	has	increased	the	risks,	since	changes	in	the	water	supply	directly	affect	agricultural	production.	
Although	it	may	seem	obvious,	for	years	there	has	been	no	learning	on	the	subject.	
5.8.2	Learning:	Transfers	and	Losses		
Nonetheless,	 not	 everything	 is	 negative.	 One	 aspect	 that	 is	 positively	 evaluated	 and	 evidently	
constitutes	a	lesson	learnt	from	the	system	concerns	the	regulations	conducted	by	user	organizations	
with	regard	to	water	transfers.		
For	many	years,	these	regulations	did	not	exist	and	it	was	believed	that	if	anyone	had	a	water	right	in	
the	basin,	 this	 could	be	 transferable	 from	one	place	 to	another	within	 the	basin.	However,	due	 to	
multiple	movements,	 user	 organizations	 began	 to	 resent	 these	 changes,	 because	 if	 an	 amount	 of	
water	 rights	 vanished,	 the	 same	 costs	would	be	 spread	 among	 fewer	users,	whereas	 if	 new	 rights	
were	added,	sometimes	user	organizations	had	problems	with	the	ability	to	conduct	them.	
"It	was	previously	thought	and	thus	divulged	that	if	you	purchased	a	right	from	an	
organization,	you	could	take	 it	and	transfer	 it	to	another	organization	and	use	 it	
to	 water	 in	 a	 different	 place,	 almost	 like	 a	magical	 movement	 and	 as	 if	 water	
balances	 could	 change	 places,	 well	 that	 happened	 for	 a	while	 and	 there	was	 a	
high	 transfer	 of	 water	 rights.	 But	 then	 it	 started	 happening	 that	 organizations	
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began	 to	 regulate	 these	 changes,	 because	 they	 realized	 that	 when	 a	 right	
disappeared	 in	a	given	 channel,	 the	 channel	was	 still	 the	 same	 section	and	was	
not	elastic,	it	did	not	shrink.	Then	they	realized	they	could	not	come	and	just	make	
it	transfer,	but	they	had	to	have	some	way	to	regulate	transfers,	only	permitting	
transfers	in	certain	directions"	(local	university	expert)	
Although	there	are	some	differences,	 in	general	all	user	organizations	have	established	procedures	
for	water	transferring,	by	setting	limits,	penalties	and	costs	for	different	kinds	of	transfer.		
One	 aspect	 that	was	 restricted	 is	 that	 in	 some	 cases	 transferring	 is	 limited	 to	 seasons,	 cannot	 be	
permanent,	and	must	be	made	on	a	yearly	basis.	This	allows	for	authorization	only	if	there	is	enough	
water	during	the	season	and	the	use	of	other	water	users	is	not	affected.	A	threshold	is	also	set,	as	
this	allows	a	minimum	volume	to	be	established	for	transferring	in	the	reservoir.	
"So	what	we	want	by	applying	the	temporary	transfer	 is	 that	 the	user	continues	
participating	 in	 the	 costs	 of	 the	 original	 channel	 and	must	 apply	 for	 an	 annual	
transfer,	established	for	the	season.	That	provides	the	chance	to	prevent	the	user	
from	causing	harm	to	others.	Another	determination	made	is	that	the	allocations	
that	are	transferred	have	a	maximum	volume	in	the	reservoir,	in	order	to	fit	water	
availability,	 and	 the	 number	 of	 shares	 that	 are	 moving	 every	 season	 must	 be	
assessed"	(manager,	Limarí	Monitoring	Board)	
Another	interesting	innovation	in	this	respect	is	that	some	user	organizations	have	established	rules	
allowing	the	distribution	of	losses	so	this	does	not	only	affect	the	last	users	in	the	water	channel.	This	
certainly	is	a	decision	for	the	good	of	the	collective	that	is	taken	through	learning.	
"We	will	implement	a	new	system	to	manage	the	losses.	Before	a	community	had	
a	loss,	and	so	another	had	another,	but	now	we	will	make	a	unified	system	where	
losses	 are	 going	 to	 be	 calculated	 to	 be	 covered	 by	 everyone	 together,	 sharing	
payment	for	losses"	(administrator	Camarico)	5.9	Self-organization	
Finally,	self-organization	is	an	important	element	observed	in	a	resilient	system.	To	some	extent,	it	
includes	the	previously	mentioned	features	because	only	a	flexible	and	connected	system	that	is	
capable	of	learning	is	able	to	modify	itself.	In	addition,	however,	some	extra	elements	of	self-
organization	are	set	out	below.	
5.9.1	Innovation	Capacity		
Most	of	the	innovation	skills	in	the	socio-ecological	system	arise	out	of	the	market.	Innovations	take	
effect	 rapidly	 within	 this	 framework.	 User	 organizations	 also	 promote	 innovation.	 The	 State	
organizations	undoubtedly	show	the	least	innovative	skills.		
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Government	 civil	 servants	 see	 their	 own	 innovation	 skills	 as	 fairly	 limited.	 They	 are	 constantly	
working	to	address	emergencies,	being	unable	to	address	longer-term	issues:	"I	believe	that	we	only	
see	times	of	emergency,	so	we	have	to	save	the	situation	because	we	have	to	pay	attention	to	what	is	
happening	today	"(DGA	national	division	user	organization).	
The	 same	 users	 and	 leaders	 affirm	 that	 the	 ability	 to	 create	 change	 only	 appears	 in	 times	 of	
emergency	 and	 does	 not	 remain	 when	 the	 emergency	 has	 been	 overcome.	 In	 fact,	 one	 of	 the	
criticisms	that	leaders	make	is	that	State	authorities	expect	the	system	to	collapse,	not	doing	enough	
to	 prevent	 this	 outcome.	 In	 this	 context,	 users	 also	 consider	 that	 government	 actions	 to	 address	
drought	are	merely	short-term	reactions	that	can	only	mitigate	effects.	
"There	are	no	problem-solving	skills	for	the	 long	term	in	the	authorities.	 Imagine	
what	could	be	done	if	 it	were	so,	we	would	improve	irrigation,	ponds	for	people,	
channel	 lining,	 change	 hoses,	 but	 if	 there	 is	 no	 water,	 how	 could	 you	 do	 this	
improvement	work?"	(electronic	market	administrator)	
	
Likewise,	major	 faults	 are	 revealed	 in	 coping	 with	 drought	 conditions	 when	 prior	 investment	 had	
been	necessary	but	was	not	undertaken:	 "what	happens	 is	 that	besides	 looking	 for	aquifers,	 other	
than	taking	water	from	the	river,	it	is	necessary	to	make	great	efforts	and	investment	to	install	water	
pipes,	 from	 anywhere,	 but	 that	 investment	 should	 have	 been	 made	 yesterday,	 not	 tomorrow"	
(manager	Paloma	System).		
Senior	management	 figures	 in	 State	 organizations	maintain	 that	 a	 50-year	 overview	 is	 not	 easy	 to	
establish,	 as	 the	 political	 pressure	 to	 be	 effective	 before	 elections	 is	 very	 high.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	
farmers	have	a	short-term	view:	they	are	all	concerned	with	saving	this	year’s	harvest,	to	cover	for	
emergencies.	
"We	are	looking	at	such	a	short-term	view	because	we	all	want	to	save	this	year’s	
production.	Many	people	who	grow	vines	have	already	harvested,	they	are	calm.	
Grape	growers	still	face	a	little	more	suffering,	but	we	must	persevere,	we	have	to	
pray	because	we	harvest	 in	August,	September,	 so	we	still	have	several	months.	
We	want	to	harvest	this	season	but	if	we	do	not	we	have	to	prune,	then	there	is	no	
longer	anything	to	do	because	we	will	not	win"	(mid-size	farmer)	
However,	 user	 organizations	 have	 shown	 the	 ability	 to	 innovate	 when	 managing	 emergencies.	 In	
2013,	they	dug	wells	in	the	reservoir,	in	order	to	pump	and	deliver	water	into	the	channels	(Paloma	
System	manager).	 An	 important	 part	 of	 the	 innovations	 relate	 to	 improving	 water	 conduction,	 in	
order	to	reduce	losses	on	the	small	amount	of	water	they	have	(electronic	market	administrator).	In	
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fact,	 user	 organizations	 also	 conduct	 innovations	 with	 a	 long-term	 view,	 mainly	 in	 the	 form	 of	
regulations	and	limitations	on	transferring	(as	previously	discussed).	
The	most	important	innovation	to	address	the	problems	of	water	has	been	the	"water	tables".	These	
initiatives	were	 commenced	 during	 the	Concertación	 governments	 and	were	 intended	 to	 improve	
coordination	among	the	different	stakeholders	of	a	watershed	and	promote	dialogue,	with	the	aim	
of	developing	integrated	watershed	management.	However,	these	tables	failed	for	several	reasons,	
mainly	because	of	 the	absence	of	 supporting	 legislation	and	paralysis	 resulting	 from	the	change	of	
government.	
There	is	a	major	ongoing	project	concerning	the	possibility	of	transferring	water	from	southern	Chile	
to	 regions	with	more	difficulties	 in	accessing	water.	The	market	 itself	has	been	the	main	driver	 for	
this	project	and	it	is	seen	as	the	great	innovation	for	the	coming	years,	since	it	would	allow	water	to	
be	moved	from	Region	VIII	to	Region	III.	
Finally,	expectations	of	profound	changes	including	changes	in	the	Code	are	considered	possible	only	
if	a	significant	citizen	movement	were	to	occur,	which	would	be	the	result	of	a	water	crisis	affecting	a	
large	 part	 of	 the	 population.	 There	 are	 no	 other	 ideas	 considered	 useful	 in	 moving	 towards	 a	
significant	change	in	the	water	management	system.	
5.9.2	Self-transformation	Ability	
From	our	discourse	analysis,	we	can	identify	that	the	ability	of	self-transformation	is	quite	limited.	As	
seen	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 so	 far	 only	 user	 organizations	 have	 attempted	 to	 develop	 market	
regulations,	with	 the	State	 showing	 itself	 to	be	 incapable	of	doing	 so.	However,	 it	 is	 interesting	 to	
note	that,	in	general,	there	are	significant	expectations	of	greater	market	regulation	from	the	State;	
even	private	parties	themselves	require	more	regulation.	
One	 of	 the	major	 difficulties	 in	 stimulating	 long-term	 transformation	 relates	 to	 decisions	 that	 are	
made	 only	 in	 relation	 to	 short-term	 consequences.	 This	 is	 especially	 difficult	 for	 politicians	 as	 the	
immediate	consequences	of	decisions	may	have	significant	repercussions	in	subsequent	elections.	
"Many	 think	about	 the	 vote	 for	 the	 following	month	and	 that	 vote	 is	 the	whole	
problem;	 they	 lose	ground	on	 everything	 that	 is	 structural.	We	have	a	beautiful	
plan	 for	 a	 reservoir	 with	 an	 estimated	 amount	 of	 time	 and	 defined	 deadlines,	
resources	 as	 a	 priority,	 but	 if	 someone	 else	 comes	 along	 and	 says	 "it	 is	 not	 a	
priority	I	prefer	to	spend	all	that	money	on	buying	grass	for	the	animals	because	
we	 will	 have	 more	 votes”,	 there	 is	 not	 much	 we	 can	 do"	 (senior	 right-wing	
government	politician)	
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State	 organizations	 identify	 the	 market	 as	 a	 major	 impediment	 to	 implementing	 changes.	 This	 is	
because	 the	 State	 does	 not	 have	 enough	 resources	 to	 purchase	 the	 water	 rights	 that	 would	 be	
necessary	to	boost	actions	for	safeguarding	sustainable	basins.	
"We	 are	 tied	 beyond	 bureaucracy,	 the	 market	 issue	 is	 sharp,	 complicated,	
sometimes	you	have	projects	but	do	not	have	rights,	and	you	simply	do	not	have	
any	 right,	 for	 example,	 go	 and	 buy	 rights	 at	 Puclaro,	 La	 Paloma,	 they	 are	 no	
longer	 sold.	 One	 can	 do	 many	 things	 but	 after	 that	 it	 results	 from	 not	 having	
rights,	it	is	a	super	sensitive	issue,	the	market	works	but	of	course	it	is	not	as	open	
as	going	there	and	buying"	(CNR	civil	servant	Santiago)	
The	Need	to	Regulate	Crop	Spread	
The	main	request	is	the	need	for	regulation	of	crops	or	seeding.	Free	competition	will	not	maintain	
ecological	homeostasis	 in	the	basin,	a	diagnosis	shared	even	by	 large	agricultural	companies.	Users	
expect	 regulation	 from	 the	 State	 or	 from	 user	 organizations	 to	 establish	 limits	 on	 the	 spread	 of	
plantations.	
"It	 was	 never	 thought	 to	 generate	 some	 kind	 of	 guidance	 towards	 investment,	
stating	a	limit	of	cultivated	areas,	making	a	distinction	between	permanent	crops	
and	annual	crops.	It	does	not	exist	because	I	think	that	maybe	the	State	says	‘this	
is	 not	my	 problem’	 and	 then	 those	who	 have	 to	worry	 about	 it	 are	 the	 private	
parties,	 but	 when	 a	 problem	 occurs	 it	 also	 affects	 the	 State	 because	 the	 labor	
force	needed,	used	and	affected,	become	a	burden	to	the	State,	probably	because	
of	the	taxes	forgone,	and	on	the	other	hand	the	State	often	has	to	ask	the	banks	
themselves	to	freeze	charges	and	so	a	series	of	events	begins	that,	 like	 it	or	not,	
affects	the	whole	nation	and	therefore	also	the	State”	(company	manager	3)	
In	this	context,	the	State	ought	to	say	that	the	basin	is	sufficient	for	a	specified	amount	of	people	and	
should	 be	 devoted	 to	 a	 specified	 type	 of	 exploitation	 (mining,	 agriculture,	 etc.).	 But	 State	
organizations	stress	that	they	do	not	have	any	powers	to	set	 limits	on	agricultural	exploitation	and	
that	this	should	be	done	by	the	user	organizations	that	have	the	power	to	apply	regulations.	
"But	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 best	way	 to	manage	 reservoir	 resources,	 there	 is	 nothing,	
there	 is	no	planning,	 there	may	even	be	an	 increase	 in	producing	 fields,	but	 the	
drought	has	 lasted	a	while.	This	 is	not	new	and	people	are	still	planting	without	
being	aware	of	this	being	a	cyclical	matter,	that	we	may	have	a	good	year	or	one	
that	 almost	 permanently	 limits	 the	 ability	 to	 act.	 Monitoring	 Boards	 have	 the	
autonomy	to	allocate	their	irrigation	seasons	and	is	very	little	that	the	DGA	can	do	
there.	So	they	are	the	ones	who	have	all	the	power	to	decide	on	how	the	resource	
is	consumed	and	how	it	is	not"	(CNR	commissioned	officer	user	organization)	
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The	Chances	of	Legislative	Change	
Another	key	element	in	the	analysis	of	the	timelines	of	self-transformation	refers	to	the	possibility	of	
the	 system	 improving	 legal	 regulations,	 specifically	 the	Water	Code.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	difficulties	
and	limitations	revealed	by	the	process	of	reforming	the	Water	Code	in	2005	have	shown	the	poor	
management	 of	 politicians	 and	 legislators	 on	 this	 topic,	 in	 addition	 to	 a	 general	 lack	 of	 interest	
throughout	the	whole	country.	
After	12	years	of	parliamentary	discussion,	only	minor	modifications	were	adopted,	which	even	then	
did	not	substantially	change	the	model	in	practice.	In	addition,	important	mistakes	were	made,	such	
as	 forcing	 people	 to	 use	 water	 or	 sell	 to	 others	 if	 they	 did	 not	 use	 it.	 There	 was	 no	 vision	 of	
sustainability	in	the	2005	reform,	the	most	important	consideration	being	to	improve	the	market.	
"In	2005	they	had	the	big	opportunity	 to	amend	the	Water	Code.	The	subject	of	
fees	came	up	and	whoever	does	not	use	the	water	has	to	pay	the	fee,	and	you	see	
that	 in	this	area,	that	 is	stupid,	 it	means	that	whoever	does	not	use	the	water	 is	
obliged	 to	 use	 it	 when	 it	 should	 be	 the	 other	 way	 round...	 Hey,	 leave	 it	 thereI	
should	be	paying	whoever	does	not	use	the	water,	and	after	they	say	"well…if	you	
do	not	pay	the	fee".	What	is	the	State	doing?	Auction	to	the	highest	bidder,	when	
it	should	have	said	it	goes	to	the	State"	(DGA	Serena)	
However,	ecological	flows	were	an	important	innovation.	But	as	they	do	not	take	retroactive	effect,	it	
is	necessary	to	look	at	ways	to	establish	ecological	flows	in	those	rivers	that	are	already	exhausted:	
“what	exists	 is	 the	ecological	 flow	as	 law,	 it’s	not	 true	and	you	have	 to	 leave	 it,	but	 that	came	out	
after	all	the	rights	had	already	been	granted.	In	the	South	it	is	easier	because	there	are	rivers	where	
there	are	water	rights	that	have	not	yet	been	given.	 It	 is	possible	there,	but	because	there	 is	water	
abundance	and	there	is	no	scarcity”	(CAZALAC	expert).	
In	this	context,	demands	are	connected	mainly	to	the	recovery	of	water	ownership	by	the	State	and	
the	 public	 status	 of	 water.	 The	 interviews	 identify	 a	 possible	 alternative:	 to	 re-declare	 water	 as	
national	property	of	public	use,	establishing	priorities	for	water	use,	safeguarding	the	constitutional	
right	to	human	consumption	and	protecting	minimum	flows	to	maintain	the	sustainability	of	basins.	
"Most	 of	 the	 proposals	 relate	 to	 article	 19(24)	 of	 the	 Constitution,	 oriented	 at	
repealing	 and	 reforming	 the	 legal	 system	 and	 water	 property,	 recovering	 the	
public	 domain,	 and	 declaring	 it	 as	 a	 national	 asset	 for	 public	 use,	 establishing	
priorities	for	human	use,	and	establishing	a	flow	to	ensure	availability	to	protect	
the	 basin.	 These	 three	 issues	 are	 key.	All	 these	 are	 expressed	 in	 a	 specific	Draft	
Law.	The	problem	is	how	long	it	will	take	to	be	processed,	if	it	is	processed”	(civil	
society	Santiago)	
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In	general,	respondents	talk	of	the	need	for	change	in	the	policy	to	deliver	rights	in	order	to	ensure	
integrated	basin	management.	
“If	 we	 want	 one	 thing	 at	 the	 basin	 level,	 we	 need	 to	 establish	 different	
management.	 An	 integrated	 management	 is	 impossible	 today	 with	 the	
institutions	 we	 have.	 If	 I	 own	 I	 can	 use	 all	 the	 water,	 that	 is	 what	 happened	
recently	 in	 the	 Aconcagua	 for	 example,	 where	 there	 was	 a	 verbal	 agreement,	
apparently	someone	did	not	respect	it	and	left	no	water	for	the	rest...	but	he	had	
every	right	to	do	it	from	that	point	of	view,	of	course”	(civil	society	Santiago)	
In	 this	 context,	 there	are	 representatives	 identified	with	name	and	 surname	who	have	agricultural	
interests	 or	 defend	 the	 interests	 of	 others.	 Some	 even	 shamelessly	 steal	 water,	 abusing	 their	
parliamentary	position.	The	problem	is	that	people	continue	choosing	them	as	politicians.	They	also	
have	a	lot	of	influence	and	therefore	are	not	easily	monitored	or	fined.	
"Congressman	XX,	a	Democrata	Cristiano,	 this	gentleman	has	 spent	years	 in	 the	
sector,	 years	 as	 a	 deputy.	 It	 was	 very	 easy	 to	 see	 that	 he	 was	 stealing	 water	
because	his	water	 rights	were	 two	 liters	per	 second,	he	had	 three	wells	and	yet	
had	two	hills	planted.	So,	either	he	was	God	or	he	was	stealing.	He	had	no	way	to	
justify	 the	amount	of	crops.	He	 is	a	deputy	 for	 the	area,	 it	was	 the	same	people	
who	elected	him	and	his	son	is	the	Mayor	of	Cabildo.	Then	you	say	how?	How	can	
people	choose	him	 if	 it	 is	so	obvious	that	he	steals	water?	But	people	do	choose	
him"	(DGA	national	division	user	organization)	
Another	 source	 of	 problems	 was	 the	 “Ley	 del	 Mono”	 established	 in	 the	 context	 of	 this	 reform.	
Certain	 parliamentarians	misused	 information	 and	 took	 advantage	 of	 their	 circumstances	 to	make	
many	 wells	 and	 regularize	 groundwater	 rights.	 The	 difficulties	 generated	 by	 such	 regularizations	
continue	to	this	day	in	some	pending	cases.	
"Regulation	was	attempted	with	a	modification	made	 in	2005,	which	was	that	a	
grace	 period	 was	 given	 to	 legalize	 water	 wells	 through	 what	 was	 called	 "the	
transitional	quarter".	This	was	called	the	“Ley	del	Mono	del	Agua”,	which	allowed	
farmers	 to	 regularize	wells	of	2	 liters	per	second	to	 the	north	and	4	 liters	 to	 the	
south	of	Santiago"	(CNR	commissioned	officer	user	organization)	
One	 of	 the	 political	 parties	 identified	 as	 having	 ulterior	 interests	 involved	 in	 water	 rights	 is	 the	
Democrata	 Cristiano	 party.	Many	 of	 its	members	 have	 direct	 or	 indirect	 interests	 in	 the	 area	 and	
hence	 retain	 the	 model	 and	 oppose	 the	 development	 of	 greater	 control.	 Both	 members	 of	 civil	
society	and	civil	servants	from	State	organizations	themselves,	who	have	faced	pressures	from	these	
politicians,	identify	this	as	problematic.	
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According	to	a	former	minister,	the	main	difficulty	in	making	amendments	to	the	legislation	was	the	
lack	 of	 quorum.	 For	 instance,	 a	 major	 constitutional	 reform	 to	 the	 Water	 Code	 has	 been	 with	
Congress	since	2009.	
"In	our	country	and	the	poor	formation	of	the	Chilean	Parliament,	for	these	kind	of	
reforms	a	certain	quorum	and	majorities	are	required	and	at	least	at	the	time,	I’m	
speaking	of	the	time	when	I	was	a	Minister,	we	did	not	have	the	quorum	needed	
to	 make	 those	 changes.	 However,	 there	 was	 an	 attempt	 in	 the	 government	 of	
President	Bachelet,	a	constitutional	amendment	 regarding	water	was	entered	 in	
November	or	December	of	2009.	Of	course,	it	is	paralyzed	in	Congress,	this	being	
simply	a	matter	of	the	views	with	respect	to	the	resource	and	the	profound	nature	
of	the	debate”	(Concertatión	officer,	high	political	office)	
One	of	the	finest	achievements	of	civil	society	in	terms	of	promoting	discussion	about	the	reform	of	
the	code	and	water	problems	was	 the	 recent	establishment	of	 the	Commission	of	Water	Resource	
Certification	and	Drought	 (Comisión	de	Recursos	Hídricos	de	Certificación	y	 Sequía).	 This	permitted	
the	separation	of	the	discussion	of	water	from	the	Public	Works	Commission,	where	it	had	achieved	
no	importance.	
"We	 managed	 to	 establish	 a	 Commission	 of	 Water	 Resource	 Certification	 and	
Drought	with	 the	Parliament,	which	means	 that	water	 issues	 are	 removed	 from	
the	discussion	of	the	Public	Works	Committee"	(civil	society	Santiago)	
	
Procedural	Modifications		
Another	element	identified	in	the	discourse	analysis	is	 linked	to	the	need	to	modify	the	procedures	
relating	 to	 water	 resource	 management.	 It	 should	 be	 highlighted	 that	 the	 diagnosis	 primarily	
establishes	the	changes	that	are	necessary	but	have	not	so	far	been	implemented.		
In	this	context,	greater	collaboration	is	required	among	different	sectors	of	the	State	associated	with	
the	problem	of	water	resources.	
“Agriculture,	 Mining,	 Environment,	 Public	 Works	 and	 National	 Assets	 were	 all	
linked	 for	 water	 in	 State	 territories	 and	 I	 think	 that	 it	 was	 also	 the	Ministry	 of	
Planning	and	Cooperation,	memory	may	fail	me	at	this	moment,	then	the	way	to	
handle	 this	 is	 a	 way	 that	 has	 much	 to	 do	 with	 politics	 and	 I	 am	 talking	 about	
politics	of	management,	that	is	to	say,	to	identify	meeting	places	where	positions	
are	discussed,	ultimately	that	consensus	is	reached	between	the	positions,	I	think	
more	than	a	battle	of	strength	this	is	a	fight	of	convenience,	you	have	to	achieve	
the	greatest	benefits	by	sector	at	the	time	of	managing.	I	do	not	believe	in	having	
a	war	of	the	titans	within	the	State	apparatus,	that	seems	harmful	and	inefficient	
to	me.	Quite	 the	opposite,	 I	 think	chances	have	 to	be	created	under	presidential	
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instruction,	so	they	have	the	power	to	confer	the	highest	authority	on	Ministers	to	
manage	 the	 nature	 of	 agreements”	 (Concertación	 civil	 servant,	 high	 political	
office)	
On	the	other	hand,	 it	 is	also	necessary	 to	strengthen	accountability.	Users,	civil	 servants,	and	even	
the	 former	minister	 agree	on	 this	point:	"Strengthening	accountability	 is	urgent	and	 immediate,	 in	
that	respect,	because	a	very	important	part	of	water	scarcity	is	associated	with	its	indiscriminate	and	
clandestine	use.	Then	there	is	a	first	measure	from	what	we	can	call	the	manual,	absolutely	from	the	
manual,	but	then	other	instruments	that	are	related,	for	example,	to	reviewing	the	flow	for	different	
projects	to	check	if	the	environmental	variables	developed	in	a	manner	other	than	as	expected,	this	is	
an	available	legal	institutional	mechanism"	(Concertación	civil	servant,	high	political	office).	
In	general,	the	State	should	have	more	tools	to	act	on	issues	of	water	management	in	the	northern	
sector,	where	 there	 is	 a	 permanent	 state	 of	 drought:	 "What	we	 should	 aim	 for	 is	 to	 assume	 that	
drought	is	a	normal	phenomenon	in	this	sector	and	thus	we	need	to	have	contingency	plans,	A,	B	and	
C.	And	how	to	manage	a	water	culture	in	the	region	where	water	is	valued	differently	and	how	I	can	
empower	the	State	to	complain	 if	necessary	and	to	be	able	to	act	against	these	monsters,	who	run	
the	region,	manage	water	and	do	what	they	want"	(DOH	La	Serena).	
The	DGA	is	viewed	as	a	weak	unit.	It	is	argued	that	the	ideal	answer	would	be	to	install	a	Ministry	of	
Water:	"We	have	a	weak	General	Management,	we	 should	aim	now	 for	a	Ministry	of	Water,	as	 in	
other	 places.	 It	 is	 a	 fallacy	 to	 speak	 of	 integrated	watershed	management,	 you	 cannot	 talk	 of	 an	
integrated	watershed	if	you	do	not	have	a	minimum	level	of	water	control"	(civil	society	Santiago).	
The	CNR	view	is	that	neither	the	State	nor	user	organizations	have	tools	to	regulate	access.	Water	is	
delivered	and	 then	 traded	 to	 the	highest	bidder:	"Water	 resources	are	used	ever	more	 intensively;	
with	more	 efficient	 use,	 the	 cultivated	 land	 expands	 and	 resource	 demand	 increases.	 The	Ministry	
speaks	 of	 Chile	 as	 an	 agricultural	 provider	 and	 where	 they	 want	 most	 of	 the	 production	 to	 be	
exported,	 that	 means	 important	 requirements,	 then	 all	 signals	 go	 towards	 promoting	 a	 more	
intensive	 use	 of	 the	 resource	 and	 organizations	 do	 not	 get	 into	 these	 issues.	 But	 if	 we	 at	
governmental	agencies	do	not	have	the	ability	to	regulate	these	issues,	user	organizations	have	even	
less.	There	is	no	way	to	define	to	which	area	resources	should	be	allocated	either,	here	water	rights	
were	given	away	and	now	they	operate	to	the	highest	bidder,	we	have	no	role"	(CNR	commissioned	
officer	user	organization).	
Another	important	limitation	is	that	it	is	not	possible	to	restrict	the	change	of	use:	"The	truth	is	that	it	
is	not	possible	to	restrict	the	change	of	use.	And	the	situation	is	so	critical	that	we	cannot	even	limit	
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the	 farmers,	 if	 a	 farmer	 has	 20	 water	 stocks	 and	 assuming	 that	 these	 20	 stocks	 will	 manage	 to	
irrigate	20	hectares,	 that	 farmer	might	well	 have	 those	20	 stocks	and	plant	40	acres"	 (Ovalle	DGA	
officer).	
Adding	Expert	Knowledge	
Finally,	 another	 major	 difficulty	 associated	 with	 limitations	 in	 self-transformation	 concerns	 the	
incorporation	of	expert	knowledge	(also	referred	to	in	the	section	on	vertical	collaboration).	
Here,	a	key	element	 is	the	need	for	 information	on	the	extent	and	intensity	of	sustainable	crops	 in	
the	 basin.	 A	 further	 concern	 is	 the	 type	 of	 crop	 that	 can	 be	 planted	 by	 seeded	 area:	 "Perhaps	
regulate	some	crops,	because	here	with	a	free	market	economy,	everyone	plants	whatever	they	want,	
wherever	they	want	and	it	is	really	important	to	know	about	areas,	studies,	I	do	not	know,	there	are	
things	that	you	can	no	longer	do.	The	number	of	hectares	in	certain	areas	and	obviously	continuing	to	
improve	regulation,	there	are	many	things	to	do,	the	Monitoring	Board,	I	think	they	have	to	continue	
improving	the	regulation	of	and	access	to	information"	(company	manager	1).	
From	 another	 point	 of	 view	 there	 is	 also	 the	 project	 of	 a	 systematic	 increase	 in	 seeded	 land.	 For	
example,	the	CNR	plans	and	works	to	double	the	irrigated	surface	with	planned	new	works:	“Those	
are	long-term	plans	for	the	coming	20	years,	we	should	double	it,	I	mean	nearly	double	the	irrigated	
area	that	these	new	works	incorporate"	(right-wing	civil	servant,	high	political	office).	
Because	of	this	difficulty	in	the	sharing	of	expert	knowledge,	the	idea	has	developed	that	managing	
water	 resources	 must	 be	 well-proportioned	 and	 respectful	 of	 the	 economic	 value	 of	 water,	 but	
consideration	of	the	environmental	dimension	has	been	postponed,	with	serious	consequences.	
"In	Chile	the	economic	dimension	of	the	resource	has	been	seen	as	essential,	that	
is	 to	 say,	 while	 there	 has	 been	 support	 for	 economic	 activities	 and	 also	 the	
dimension	 of	 provision	 for	 the	 population,	 as	 well	 as	 support	 for	 the	 lives	 of	
human	beings,	the	environmental	dimension	of	the	resource	has	been	postponed	
or	ignored	and	not	properly	managed,	which	has	had	consequences	in	the	short-,	
medium-	 and	 long-term	 availability	 of	 the	 resource”	 (Concertación	 civil	 servant,	
high	political	office).	
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6. Adaptability	and	Vulnerability	in	Limarí	Basin	
The	adaptive	ability	of	a	socio-ecological	system	refers	to	the	system’s	reaction	to	a	specific	threat.	
For	the	purposes	of	this	study,	climate	change	is	considered	as	the	threat,	particularly	its	expression	
through	prolonged	droughts.	
As	we	 saw	 in	 chapter	2,	 how	a	 system	 responds	 to	 a	 threat	depends	on	 the	 characteristics	of	 the	
system	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 resilience.	 However,	 it	 is	 also	 possible	 to	 distinguish	 four	 key	 elements	
connected	 to	 a	 specific	 threat:	 threat	 identification,	 threat	 control,	 recovery	 from	 damage	 and	
chances	of	transformation	to	deal	with	new	threats.	Below	we	address	each	of	these	aspects	in	turn.	6.1	Threat	Identification	
The	interviews	recognize	different	dimensions	in	the	identification	of	threat.	The	three	most	frequent	
are	climate	change,	water	scarcity	and	economic	risks.		
These	 three	 dimensions	 all	 refer	 to	 threats	 related	with	 climate	 changes	 and	 how	 the	 region	 has	
been	 affected	by	 an	 intense	drought	 for	more	 than	 seven	 years.	 Emphasis	 of	 the	precise	problem	
varies	depending	on	the	kind	of	interviewee.		
There	 are	 also	 elements	 that	 crosscut	 these	 recognized	 threats:	 the	 lack	 of	 information	 on	water	
availability	 (especially	aquifers),	absence	of	regulations	 for	the	 intensity	and	spread	of	seeding,	 the	
introduction	of	mining	companies	and	water	quality	decay.	
6.1.1	Climate	Change	
Most	interviewees	describe	a	change	in	the	characteristic	weather,	which	represents	the	main	source	
of	threat.	Experts,	State	civil	servants	and	leaders	of	user	organizations	speak	directly	about	climate	
change.	However,	only	a	few	farmers	refer	to	this	global	phenomenon,	though	many	link	changes	in	
climate	with	the	currents	of	el	Niño	and	la	Niña.	
Among	the	main	changes	observed	in	prevailing	weather	conditions	is	the	variation	in	snow	density,	
which	 consequently	produces	 less	water	 in	 the	area	and	means	water	evaporates	 faster.	 The	 zero	
degree	isotherm	has	been	shown	to	have	moved	from	1000	to	about	1500	meters.	
"Snow	density	 is	 different,	 for	 a	 cubic	millimeter	 you	had	 so	much	 snow	before,	
now	 the	 same	 cubic	 millimeter	 of	 snow	 produces	 less	 water,	 the	 density	 is	
different.	There	is	more	space,	more	air,	so	when	the	sun	rises	the	air	evaporates	
and	the	other	influence	is	the	area.	I	mean,	through	global	warming	the	isotherm	
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has	shifted,	back	 then	snow	falling	with	a	density	of	0.8	was	supposed	to	 fall	at	
1000	meters,	for	example;	now,	as	the	isotherm	has	shifted,	the	amount	supposed	
to	fall	at	1000	is	now	falling	at	1500;	and	the	amount	supposed	to	fall	at	1500	is	
now	 falling	 at	 2000.	 So	 the	 density	 or	 the	 area	 and	 quality	 of	 the	 snow	 has	
changed"	(Camarico	manager)	
Although	the	explanations	for	this	change	in	the	snow	are	not	attributed	only	to	climate	change	but	
also	to	the	phenomena	of	el	Niño	and	la	Niña,	there	is	a	certainty	and	consensus	about	the	change	in	
snow	conditions	during	the	last	decade.	
"Hopefully	 the	 isotherm	will	 not	 continue	 rising	because	 that	 is	 also	making	 the	
issue	more	complicated.	The	forecast	from	now	until	2100	is	four	or	five	degrees	
and	 obviously	 it	 will	 tend	 to	 rise	 and	 the	 natural	 reservoir	 we	 have	 in	 the	
mountains	will	no	longer	be	the	same.	We	are	facing	a	scenario	in	which	within	50	
years	it	will	not	have	the	same	volume,	because	the	idea	is,	to	face	it,	the	area	is	
going	to	be	even	more	desertified	than	is	today,	so	you	obviously	have	to	restrict,	
water	 is	 restricted	and	 immediately	crops	will	certainly	be	restricted"	 (right-wing	
civil	servant,	high	political	office)	
"I	do	not	dare	accept	the	causes	that	tend	to	be	asserted	because	I	do	not	know	its	
origin,	maybe	 it	 is	a	natural	 change	but	whatever	 it	 is,	 it	 is	happening.	The	 rain	
curves	are	especially	low,	the	thaws	were	not	as	violent	before	but	it	is	happening	
one	month	earlier	than	it	used	to.	I	even	have	a	photographic	record	of	this,	I	work	
from	 photos,	 I	 have	 been	 taking	 them	 from	 one	 point,	 since	 I	 am	 here	 putting	
them	next	 to	 each	 other	with	 the	 date.	 And	 thaws	 happen	 early,	 a	 photograph	
from	September	 three	years	ago	 is	not	 the	same	as	September	now	with	similar	
rainfalls.	 I	have	understood	that	the	effects	can	be	seen	 in	the	 long-term,	50,	70	
years	 later,	 let	 us	 say	 that	 is	 the	 catastrophic	 effect,	 not	 before	 but	 on	 a	 small	
scale	 it	 is	 because	 the	 snow	 is	 gone	 before"	 (administrator,	 Hurtado	 river	
Monitoring	Board)	
Knowledge	Production	
There	 are	 also	 fears	 of	 serious	 deficiencies	 in	 the	 production	 of	 knowledge	 concerning	 climate	
change.	 This	may	 be	 because	 there	 is	 an	 absence	 of	 interdisciplinary	 research	 and	 the	 social	 and	
human	aspects	are	not	taken	into	account	in	tenders	and	therefore	are	not	seriously	tackled	by	the	
experts.	
"I	think	for	example	that	everything	related	to	drought	and	also	to	flooding,	which	
are	the	two	extremes,	there	is	an	important	part	of	the	social	sciences	that	should	
be	 involved,	 but	 there	 is	 no	 interest	 in	 that.	 In	 the	 State	 there	 is	 no	 idea	of	 this	
need"	(national	climate	change	expert)	
In	 addition,	 experts	 in	 general	 distinguish	 that	 this	 field	 of	 research	 is	 only	 beginning	 to	 be	
recognized,	meaning	knowledge	remains	highly	rudimentary.	One	of	the	reasons	for	this	uncertainty	
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is	that	measurement	points	are	scarce	and	 instruments	are	not	up-to-date.	Therefore,	many	of	the	
projections	are	made	using	imprecise	estimates.	
"I	 would	 say	 that	 we	 boast	 that	 at	 a	 Latin	 American	 level	 we	 have	 a	 great	
network,	the	truth	is	it	is	not	that	bad,	but	it	turns	out	that	when	the	points	were	
defined	 to	 establish	 monitoring	 stations,	 30	 or	 40	 years	 ago,	 those	 were	 the	
appropriate	 points,	 nowadays	 upstream	 of	 these	 points	 you	 have	 the	 situation	
that	resources	are	being	extracted	to	be	used	for	some	purpose"	(national	climate	
change	expert)	
"So	 far	 I	 would	 say	 that	 there	 is	 nothing	 very	 concrete	 about	 it,	 we	 are	 just	
beginning.	There	are	no	further	studies	of	these	and	in	these	cases	we	have	been	
working	based	on	secondary	information,	in	other	words	nothing	new,	but	based	
on	 what	 has	 already	 been	 done.	 So,	 many	 times	 you	 are	 making	 estimates	 to	
determine	what	the	problem	will	be	here	in	Santiago,	but	we	have	no	calculations	
at	 the	 points	where	 they	will	 extract	 the	 resources;	we	 have	 them	 at	 a	 specific	
point	 and	 we	 do	 the	 estimate	 to	 transfer	 the	 measurements.	 So	 it	 is	 not	 very	
accurate"	(national	climate	change	expert)	
It	is	also	recognized	that	an	important	part	of	knowledge	acquired	is	not	taken	into	account	by	State	
organizations.	Although	government	agencies	request	studies,	a	large	proportion	of	the	results	have	
not	been	read,	much	less	factored	into	decision-making.	Experts	point	out	that	in	spite	of	identifying	
interest	among	groups	of	professionals	who	work	in	public	bodies	on	issues	of	climate	change,	their	
main	interests	and	priorities	are	those	of	the	organization,	with	initiatives	subsequently	lost	in	time	
and	reliant	only	on	personal	interest.	
"I	 have	 been	 interviewed	 by	 other	 people	 from	 Universidad	 de	 Concepción	 and	
they	asked	me	‘What	are	you	doing	on	climate	change?’	and	I	answered	nothing,	
to	 be	 honest.	 But	 of	 course	 the	 question	 could	 also	 be,	 ‘What	 are	 you	 doing	 to	
address	water	stress?’	Sure,	because	the	climate	change	issue	somehow	becomes	
secondary,	 regardless	 of	 whether	 the	 probability	 is	 high,	 and	 effectively	 certain	
regions	will	be	affected,	basically	our	main	problem	is	the	water	stress	situation"	
(CNR	officer	Santiago)	
The	 greatest	 source	 of	 knowledge	 identified	 is	 the	 National	 Climate	 Change	 Plan,	 though	 it	 is	
recognized	 by	 its	 own	 producer	 as	 very	 uncertain	 and	 limited.	 Though	 some	 of	 the	 civil	 servants	
interviewed	highlight	 its	quality	and	 the	need	 for	projections	 regarding	 climate	variability	over	 the	
next	century,	the	plan	is	not	taken	into	account	for	producing	adaptation	policies.	
"We	hold	 to	what	we	have,	 from	predictions	 that	 researchers	 tell	us	 ‘here	 it	will	
rain	 less	and	there	 is	going	to	be	 less	snow’,	 that	 is	what	they	tell	us,	so	we	will	
not	have	our	first	reservoir	in	the	mountains	and	the	snow,	we	should	build	more	
reservoirs	in	the	Andean	foothills	to	collect	rain	water,	but	there	is	nothing	about	
that"	(manager,	Limarí	Monitoring	Board)	
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Moreover,	users	also	claim	that	 the	 information	 in	expert	 reports	on	climate	variability	 is	available	
for	investors.	
"In	fact,	I	think	systematizing	is	needed	for	each	of	the	areas	that	are	required,	so	
the	government	is	informed,	another	for	investors	to	be	informed	and	another	so	
that	those	who	actually	produce	are	fully	informed	and	know	the	risks	they	face"	
(company	manager	3)	
Regional	research	centers	that	have	greater	prominence	and	maintain	an	ongoing	collaboration	with	
civil	 servants	 from	 the	 area,	 farmers,	 and	 leaders	 of	 user	 organizations	 are	 the	 main	 sources	 of	
information.	
"In	 this	 sector	 the	 role	of	 the	universities	 is	very	 important.	They	are	 in	 research	
centers	 like	 CEAZA,	 CAZALAC	 and	 they	 have	 the	 topic	 very	well	 integrated,	 they	
encourage	activities	such	as	seminars,	talks	for	farmers	so	they	can	have	a	culture	
on	these	topics.	They	are	very	important	in	the	region"	(civil	servant	Serena	DOH)	
Farmers	 identify	 crop	 problems	 that	 are	 associated	 with	 changes	 in	 climate,	 either	 as	 a	 global	
phenomenon	or	through	ocean	currents,	which	lead	to	problems	in	agricultural	production.	
"I	 have	 had	 problems	 that	 I	 never	 had	 before	 and	 I	 attribute	 them	 to	 climate	
change,	for	example	I	have	my	fruits;	usually	these	are	very	standardized	in	terms	
of	size	and	this	year	I	have	had	lower	quality"	(large-scale	farmer	2)	
IMAGE	15:	CLIMATE	CHANGE	BRINGS	BLEAK	OUTLOOK	FOR	AGRICULTURE	
	
Source:	El	Ovallino	newspaper	(03.12.2007)	
6.1.2	Water	Scarcity		
Since	 the	 construction	 of	 reservoirs,	 the	 system	 has	 only	 failed	 twice	 due	 to	 extreme	 drought,	 in	
1996	 and	 2013.	 Nonetheless,	 after	 the	 failure	 of	 1996	 there	 was	 heavy	 rainfall,	 meaning	 the	
reservoirs	 recovered.	 2013	was	 the	 first	 time	 that	 the	 shortfall	 was	maintained	 for	 a	 long	 period.	
Region	 IV	has	now	experienced	 seven	years	of	drought,	 and	 the	 reservoirs	will	 be	dry	by	 the	next	
season.	This	will	mainly	affect	the	Limarí	province	where	there	is	greater	agricultural	production.	
"In	Region	 IV,	 I	 think	we	have	had	about	seven	years	of	drought	and	believe	me	
that	within	two	more	months	the	dams	will	be	dry,	at	least	in	the	Limarí	province	
which	is	the	strongest	of	all	of	northern	Chile,	as	far	as	acreage	is	concerned.	The	
early	 vegetables,	 the	 fruit	 which	 comes	 to	 us,	 the	 grapes	 and	 vegetables	
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consumed	 in	 Chile	 are	 there;	we	will	 reach	 two	months	with	 reservoirs	 at	 zero,	
absolutely	zero"	(right-wing	civil	servant,	high	political	office)	
The	vast	majority	of	interviewees	identified	the	fact	that	it	may	not	rain	next	winter	as	a	major	risk.	
Without	 rain	 the	 new	 season	 would	 be	 catastrophic,	 because	 there	 is	 simply	 no	 water	 in	 the	
reservoirs,	with	no	reserves	for	the	new	season.	
"Well,	if	it	does	not	rain	this	year	obviously	it	is	going	to	be	catastrophic,	because	
the	 reservoirs	 will	 not	 be	 able	 to	 sustain	 agriculture	 as	we	 know	 it	 so	 far,	 that	
requires	a	lot	of	water	and	there	is	no	water"	(independent	agronomy	expert)	
The	prediction	for	the	season	divides	into	three	scenarios:	it	rains	enough	for	the	season;	it	rains	just	
a	 little	 so	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 sustain	 the	 entire	 season;	 and	 it	 does	 not	 rain.	 In	 the	 last	 case,	
companies	would	 stop	producing.	One	possible	 consequence	would	be	 that	a	 lot	of	entrepreneurs	
would	leave	the	basin,	with	serious	consequences	for	the	province.	
"If	 it	 does	 not	 rain	 next	 year,	 entrepreneurs	 are	 going	 to	 leave,	 I	 do	 not	 know	
where,	but	for	people	who	work	who	make	a	living	from	that	I	do	not	know	what	
is	 going	 to	 happen,	 there	will	 be	major	 complications,	we	 prefer	 to	 think	 it	will	
rain"	(small	farmer	1)	
Agriculture	
It	 is	 recognized	 that	 efficient	 irrigation	 has	 permitted	 the	 achievement	 of	 maximum	 efficiency	 in	
water	 use,	 but	 this	 has	 the	 consequence	 of	 a	 much	 higher	 risk.	 Due	 to	 the	 intensive	 use	 of	 the	
resource,	 the	planted	area	affected	by	 the	drought	 is	much	 larger.	This	 issue	 is	 very	 important	 for	
large	 agricultural	 companies	 and	mid-size	 and	 large-scale	 farmers	with	 efficient	 irrigation	 systems:	
"Today	 the	 issue	 is	much	more	 sensitive	 because	 the	 same	 pond	waters	 three	 times	 the	 hectares"	
(company	manager	1).	
A	 serious	 difficulty	when	 establishing	 the	 idea	 of	 drought	 is	 that	 even	 if	 the	 year	 is	 “normal”,	 the	
system	will	remain	under	significant	water	stress,	because	there	is	not	enough	water	for	the	reserves	
to	recover.	This	is	because	the	system	works	with	a	horizon	of	three	years.	
"It	is	drying	up,	I	could	say	anything	about	the	rainfall,	and	this	year	was	a	normal	
year	with	a	lack	of	snow.	But	it	rained,	is	almost	difficult	to	say	drought,	even	the	
new	boss,	the	new	Executive	Secretary	of	the	General	Commission	of	Irrigation,	he	
accepted	 it	and	said	there	was	no	drought,	of	course,	 if	 the	rainfall	supports	the	
opposite	idea.	Where	was	the	drought?	Our	system	is	for	three	years,	this	year	our	
system	stores	1	million	cubic	meters.	You	have	to	store	water	for	three	years	and	
three	years	were	already	fulfilled	and	this	year	people	already	said	that	the	dam	
would	remain	at	25	million,	we	will	maintain	20.	That	 is	very	 little,	at	25	million	
the	 level	will	 stay	 under	 the	 valve	 and	will	 not	 reach	 it	 to	 come	out"	 (manager,	
Hurtado	river	Monitoring	Board)	
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IMAGE	16:	INCREASINGLY	CRITICAL	WATER	SCARCITY	IN	THE	PROVINCE	
	
Source:	El	Ovallino	newspaper	(10.01.2008)	
	
Water	Companies	
The	cubic	meter	is	becoming	more	expensive	and	water	companies	are	forced	to	buy	water	to	meet	
demand.	This	can	have	serious	consequences	for	public	consumption.	
“The	 cubic	meter	 is	 about	 120	 and	 the	water	 company	 charges	 400	 pesos,	well	
they	also	charge	for	conduction	and	treatment...	so	go	figure.	For	this	reason,	this	
situation	can	become	really	complicated.	Because	they	have	to	buy	the	water	they	
are	missing,	anyway	they	are	controlled	by	volume	and	then	they	say	ok,	let	them	
take	their	right	of	100,000	m3,	but	then	they	took	150,000	and	extra	volumes	they	
have	to	pay	as	a	rent”	(civil	servant	DGA	Ovalle)	
There	 is	 preferential	 treatment	 for	water	 companies	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	do	not	 take	 turns	 and	
receive	a	continuous	supply	of	water.	
"The	water	 company	provides	preferential	 treatment	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	give	
water	 continuously,	 they	 do	 not	 take	 turns	 or	 anything.	 But	 they	 do	 engage	 in	
apportionment,	which	means	they	will	share	the	66%	also	with	them.	And	 if	 it	 is	
not	 enough,	 you	 have	 to	 go	 like	 the	 rest	 to	 the	 water	 market	 and	 buy"	 (civil	
society	Ovalle)	
It	 is	 important	 to	emphasize	 that	part	of	 the	problem	 is	 that	water	companies	are	private	and	are	
legally	 guaranteed	 profitability,	 so	 if	 the	 price	 of	 water	 is	 very	 high,	 they	 also	 raise	 the	 cost	 of	
drinkable	 water.	 Then	 the	Monitoring	 Board	 declares	 that	 although	 priority	 is	 given	 to	 the	water	
companies,	they	must	purchase	water	rights	or	water	volumes	like	the	rest	of	the	users,	as	they	are	a	
private	corporation.	
"What	 they	 have	 done	 in	 other	 basins	 is	 also	 to	 rent	 or	 purchase	water	 rights.	
Sure,	so	this	year	we	will	have	around	20	million	if	they	use	9	million,	I	think	there	
are	also	restrictive	measures	and	restrictive	situations	inside	houses,	you	will	have	
to	use	less	water,	but	what	they	have	been	required	to	do,	and	I	remember	that	in	
previous	droughts	 in	Santiago,	water	companies	had	to	 rent	 rights	because	they	
claimed	they	did	not	have	enough	and	they	were	told	"well,	this	thing	is	based	on	
rights,	so	like	any	private	party	as	this	water	company	is	a	business,	then	rent	your	
rights”"	(leaders,	Limarí	river	Monitoring	Board)	
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Moreover,	 currently	 declining	 volumes	 are	 already	 affecting	 the	 dilution	 of	 waste	 by	 water	
companies,	which	directly	affects	water	quality.	This	problem	will	undoubtedly	worsen	if	it	does	not	
rain	during	the	next	season.	
"There	are	farmers	who	are	affected,	especially	first	channels	that	are	close	to	the	
unloading	 zone	because	 as	 the	water	 slips	 it	 gets	 diluted,	 but	 first	 channels	 are	
affected,	because	they	get	water	of	very	poor	quality.	We	have	repeatedly	made	
complaints	to	the	Superintendence	of	Sanitation	Services	because	the	truth	is	that	
the	water	is	insufferable	in	appearance	and	odor.	Then	there	is	a	serious	problem"	
(leaders,	Limarí	river	Monitoring	Board)	
The	fall	in	water	quality	becomes	patently	obvious	when	the	river	is	approaching	the	mouth.	This	is	
because	the	dilution	rate	is	lower	and	sewage,	fertilizer	remains	and	salts	from	soil	erosion	are	added	
to	the	water.	
"In	the	Limarí	river	the	change	 in	water	quality	 is	evident,	when	you	go	down	to	
the	end	of	 the	 river,	 the	 salinity	 increases	by	 the	presence	of	watersheds	and	 in	
dry	years	 it	also	becomes	more	acute,	because	the	rate	of	dilution	flow	is	 lower.	
Then	 the	 issue	on	wastewater	appears,	 the	 issue	on	water	quality,	which	 is	also	
affected	by	products	used	for	agriculture"	(leaders,	Limarí	river	Monitoring	Board)	
IMAGE	17:	PEOPLE	COMPLAIN	AT	SOTAQUI	BECAUSE	WATER	GOES	BROWN	
	
Source:	El	Ovallino	newspaper	(27.09.2007)	
	
For	water	 companies	 to	 have	priority	 an	 Emergency	Decree	must	 be	passed,	 by	way	of	which	 the	
Monitoring	 Board	 should	 give	 priority	 to	 safeguarding	 human	 consumption.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 people	
who	 do	 not	 have	 access	 to	 a	 drinkable	water	 network	 and	where	 the	wells	 of	 the	 rural	 drinkable	
water	system	have	gone	dry,	water	is	brought	with	cistern	trucks.	
"There	the	highest	priority	is	drinkable	water	which	is	guaranteed	throughout	this	
year	in	large	cities,	and	for	areas	that	are	obviously	far	from	big	cities	and	do	not	
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have	wells	the	network	is	brought	closer	through	trucks	with	drinkable	water,	that	
happens	 today,	 but	 the	 big	 cities	 are	 supplied"	 (right-wing	 civil	 servant,	 high	
political	office)	
IMAGE	18:	LOS	CANELOS	LOCAL	COMPLAINS	OF	SPENDING	MORE	THAN	A	MONTH	WITHOUT	DRINKABLE	WATER	
	
Source:	El	Ovallino	newspaper	(30.10.2009)	
	6.2 Control	Capability	
When	 the	 adaptive	 ability	 of	 a	 system	 is	 evaluated	 and	 threats	 are	 identified,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	
observe	 the	 chances	 of	 controlling	 them.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 the	 socio-ecological	 system	 being	
analyzed,	the	main	control	strategies	are	efficient	irrigation,	the	water	market	and	State	benefits.	Of	
course,	 these	 control	 strategies	 are	 applied	 with	 obvious	 differences	 depending	 on	 the	 type	 of	
farmer	and	the	farmers’	own	abilities	to	control	the	threat.	
Below	 we	 describe	 different	 parties’	 evaluations	 of	 the	 various	 control	 strategies.	 The	 parties	
considered	 in	 this	 study	 also	 commented	 on	 the	 strategies	 implemented	 to	 address	 situations	 of	
scarcity.	
6.2.1	Efficient	Watering	
Channels	and	reservoirs	are	essential	to	increase	irrigation	efficiency.	These	contribute	to	cutting	the	
amount	of	 fresh	water	that	 is	“lost”	 into	the	sea,	storing	and	distributing	when	plantations	require	
water.	These	elements	together	provide	what	farmers	call	“security	of	irrigation”.	
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IMAGE	19:	CANAL	LINING	GIVES	FARMERS	SECURITY	OF	IRRIGATION	
	
Source:	El	Ovallino	newspaper	(04.02.2009)	
	
To	achieve	this	security	of	irrigation,	maintenance	of	reservoirs	and	canals	in	addition	to	distribution	
of	stored	water	are	fundamental	tasks.	In	this	context,	user	organizations	play	a	very	important	role,	
since	 they	 are	 responsible	 for	 the	 management	 of	 irrigation	 facilities	 and	 water	 distribution	
according	to	user	rights.	
For	 the	 Limarí	 basin,	 the	 Paloma	 System	 bears	 responsibility	 for	 coordinating	 the	 distribution	 of	
water	 from	reservoirs	and	channels,	deciding	how	much	water	will	be	distributed	each	season	and	
coordinating	 other	 user	 organizations	 in	 this	 respect.	 This	 system	would	work	 very	well	 in	 normal	
drought	times,	but	when	scarcity	is	extreme	or	has	already	been	widespread	for	years,	as	in	the	case	
of	the	latest	drought,	clear	problems	emerge	in	controlling	the	threat.	
For	 example,	 last	 year	 it	 was	 decided	 to	 use	 all	 the	 water,	 although	 this	 did	 not	 meet	 the	
recommendations	of	the	Office	of	Hydraulic	Works,	which	indicated	that	water	should	be	saved	for	
the	next	season.	
"The	 model	 proposed	 by	 the	 Office	 of	 Hydraulic	 Works	 suggests	 maintaining	
water	 availability	 in	 the	 reservoir	 at	 about	 30%.	 But	 farmers	 said	 ‘what	we	 get	
today	with	watering	30%,	next	year	another	30%...’	because	with	30%	many	crops	
die.	Then	they	said,	 ‘Let	us	water	more	calmly	and	next	year	we	will	see...’;	 they	
are	 depleting	 their	 resources,	 they	 preferred	 to	 exhaust	 the	 grant	 and	 they	
distributed	practically	all	the	water	in	the	reservoirs.	So,	if	this	year	is	bad	again...	
there	will	be	no	water	to	deal	with	it"	(civil	servant	DGA	Ovalle)	
Indeed,	the	following	year	after	the	interview	was	also	a	dry	year	and	the	reservoirs	completely	
exhausted	their	water	reserves.	
6.2.2	Market	to	Control	Scarcity	
The	 interviewee	 responses	 indicate	 that	 the	water	market	 is	 the	most	 important	 tool	 to	deal	with	
drought.	 Above	 all,	 the	 spot	market	 or	 the	 opportunity	 to	 purchase	water	 volumes	 represent	 the	
main	strategy	for	mid-size	and	large-scale	farmers,	because	when	they	do	not	have	enough	water	to	
water	their	crops	they	go	to	the	market	and	buy	the	missing	volume.	
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During	dry	years	small	farmers	sell	their	water	allocations,	while	mid-size	and	large-scale	farmers	buy	
them.	This	 is	because	 large-scale	 farmers	and	agribusiness,	apart	 from	having	the	resources	to	buy	
water	 at	 market	 price,	 usually	 have	 permanent	 crops,	 which	 prevents	 them	 from	 suspending	
irrigation	 in	 a	 bad	 season,	 because	 trees	 die	 and	 their	 large	 investments	 disappear	 as	 a	 result.	
However,	most	of	the	small	farmers	have	temporary	crops,	which	are	seeded	each	season.	Thanks	to	
this,	 they	can	decide	not	 to	plant	during	a	dry	season	and	 instead	may	sell	 their	water	allocations.	
Thus,	small	farmers	achieve	a	steady	income,	which	in	many	cases	is	better	at	a	financial	level	than	
the	intended	planting	of	a	temporary	crop.	
There	 is	also	 the	chance	 to	purchase	water	 rights.	This	 strategy	 is	mainly	adopted	by	mid-size	and	
large-scale	traditional	farmers	in	the	basin,	who	often	purchase	more	water	rights	than	they	expect	
to	 require	 for	 their	 plantations,	 because	 having	 this	 surplus	 allows	 them	 to	 cope	more	 effectively	
during	drought	years.	Having	more	water	 rights	 than	necessary	 in	a	normal	year	allows	 farmers	 to	
have	more	water	availability	in	drought	years.	
The	price	of	water	in	years	of	scarcity	increases	significantly.	This	is	because	there	is	no	regulation	to	
set	the	price	of	water	(the	water	market	is	autonomous).	Clearly,	this	has	the	consequence	that	only	
farmers	with	greater	financial	resources	can	afford	to	buy	water	rights	or	allocations	of	water	during	
dry	seasons.	
"Yes	but	these	are	expensive,	the	price	is	about	100	pesos	for	the	cubic	meter,	so	
you	cannot	afford	it.	Just	imagine	that	for	the	chili	I	spent	9,000	cubic	meters,	and	
at	100	pesos	each	we	are	talking	about	900,000	pesos...	you	cannot.	The	company	
needs	 3,000,	 another	 1,000	 to	 pay	 for	 water,	 another	 500	 over	 here...	 so	 you	
cannot,	it	does	not	work	for	me.	Then	I	have	to	lower	my	expenses,	I	cannot	spend	
so	much...	and	one	of	the	major	expenses	is	water"	(small	farmer	3)	
Until	a	few	years	ago,	a	common	strategy	to	monitor	the	effects	of	drought	was	for	organizations	to	
overdraw	on	 their	water	 reserves,	with	 the	commitment	 to	 return	 the	water	 requested	during	 the	
next	 period.	 This	 worked	 in	 the	 manner	 of	 a	 credit	 line	 in	 a	 bank	 account.	 However,	 due	 to	
complications	brought	about	by	this	system,	this	option	was	suspended.	In	addition,	during	extra	dry	
periods	 like	the	current	one,	 it	 is	no	 longer	possible	to	overdraw	because	the	reservoirs	have	been	
emptied.	
"Before	it	was	normal	that	organizations	used	an	overdraft,	this	was	handled	as	a	
checking	account,	then	they	asked	for	loans	and	those	were	deducted	in	the	next	
season.	I	mean	if	I	requested	5%	more,	I	had	to	deduct	it	from	the	volume	of	the	
following	 season.	 But	 this	 is	 not	 done	any	more,	 it	was	 very	 complicated.	What	
can	 be	 done	 is	 that	 a	 water	 organization	 buys	 from	 another	 organization,	 and	
they	 also	 lend	 or	 sell	 among	 themselves	 because	 they	 are	 interconnected.	
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Irrigators	can	also	purchase	from	each	other,	an	organization	that	is	complicated	
can	 buy	 certain	 volumes	 of	 water	 from	 another	 organization.	 I	 mean	 if	 the	
overdraft	was	 cut	 off,	 then	 the	 only	 solution	 is	 peer	 lending"	 (civil	 servant	 DGA	
Ovalle)	
6.2.3	Role	of	the	Government	in	Controlling	the	Threat	
There	 are	 significant	 demands	 on	 the	 State	 during	 times	 of	 water	 shortage,	 with	 strong	 criticism	
when	 it	 does	 not	 meet	 expectations	 in	 terms	 of	 mitigation	 measures.	 Strategies	 that	 are	
implemented	 with	 State	 support	 to	 deal	 with	 emergencies	 include	 cloud	 seeding	 and	 emergency	
benefits.	
Cloud	Seeding		
Of	 the	 strategies	 promoted	 by	 the	 State	 to	 deal	 with	 drought,	 cloud	 seeding	 is	 the	 most	 heavily	
criticized	due	to	its	high	cost	and	the	lack	of	evidence	in	support	of	its	effectiveness.	
"Well	now	 they	 said	 ‘we	have	 to	 seed	clouds’...	but	 these	are	only	 lies,	 I	am	old	
here	and	I	know	it	does	not	work.	If	there	is	drought	and	la	Niña	is	happening,	to	
start	there	are	no	clouds.	So,	seeding	occurs	when	there	are	clouds,	and	when	it	is	
about	to	rain	and	as	it	is	raining	or	not	raining	and	it	can	work,	‘it	rained’	they	say,	
but	 it	 rained	 because	 it	 had	 to	 rain,	 not	 because	 they	 seeded.	 People	 who	 are	
dedicated	to	this	also	say	that	in	this	sector	the	increase	in	rainfall	would	never	be	
more	than	15%.	There	is	not	much	difference"	(mid-size	farmer	3)	
Consequently,	this	strategy	is	mainly	seen	as	politically	motivated.	The	aim	is	to	show	that	something	
is	being	done,	even	though	in	practice	it	has	no	significant	impact	on	drought.	But	many	farmers	do	
welcome	this	gesture	of	trying	to	do	something	to	deal	with	the	drought.	
“Well,	 cloud	 seeding	 is	 greatly	 appreciated,	 because	 it	 is	 better	 than	 doing	
nothing.	At	 least	one	sees	the	Government’s	concern	behind	it,	saying	‘hey,	 look,	
we	 do	 not	 have	 our	 arms	 crossed	 looking	 mournful,	 at	 least	 we	 are	 doing	
something”	(company	manager	4)	
Emergency	Funds	
Among	the	resources	released	by	the	State	in	situations	of	drought	are	emergency	funds,	which	are	
used	for	example	to	cover	channels	so	as	to	avoid	 losing	water	through	seepage.	Such	benefits	are	
welcomed	when	appropriate.	However,	there	are	 important	questions	 in	this	area	as	well,	because	
during	the	last	drought	the	resources	came	when	there	was	no	more	water	in	the	reservoir,	so	there	
was	no	reason	to	cover	the	channels.	To	address	the	last	emergency,	the	State	gave	five	billion	pesos,	
one	billion	 to	buy	geo-membranes	and	 four	billion	 to	be	 claimed	 through	benefit	 applications.	 Yet	
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civil	servants	acknowledge	that	very	little	could	be	achieved,	as	due	to	bureaucratic	difficulties,	the	
resources	did	not	reach	the	farmers	in	need.	
"The	 regional	 government	 created	 a	 fund	 to	 alleviate	 the	 issue	 of	 this	 year’s	
complex	situation,	which	would	become	concrete	through	passing	a	development	
law	to	be	administered	by	the	CNR,	providing	four	billion	for	two	specific	 things:	
installing	 geo-membranes	 with	 a	 refueling	 system	 of	 channels,	 but	 cheaper	 to	
prevent	 infiltration;	 but	 there	 were	 problems	 in	 the	 transfer	 of	 funds	 and	 the	
money	arrived	late"	(CNR	commissioned	officer	user	organization)	
Moreover,	State	organizations	recognize	that	due	to	the	scale	of	the	drought,	despite	the	resources	
invested	to	control	 its	effects,	 they	have	not	accomplished	a	great	deal	simply	because	there	 is	no	
water.	
"But	in	this	emergency	the	truth	is	that	there	is	little	we	could	do,	we	have	limited	
room	for	maneuver,	I	think	the	conditions	do	not	exist	for	being	able	to	bring	more	
water	than	what	we	have,	it	is	a	huge	drought	and	emergency	actions	have	been	
numerous,	but	they	will	not	mitigate	all	the	terrible	drought	that	there	is"	(right-
wing	civil	servant,	high	political	office)	
In	addition	to	these	emergency	measures,	 the	State	supports	small	 farmers	with	benefits	and	debt	
restructuring,	or	with	food	for	animals.	
"Well,	little	ones	cannot	buy	water	at	the	market,	big	ones	can.	The	State	supports	
small	 ones	with	 benefits,	 bonuses,	 support,	 waivers,	 because	 all	 the	 small	 ones	
cannot	pay	their	 loans,	the	State	must	even	give	them	nourishment,	food	for	the	
animals"	(civil	servant	Serena	DOH)	
IMAGE	20:	FIRST	DROUGHT	EMERGENCY	BONUSES	DELIVERED	IN	LIMARÍ	
	
Source:	El	Ovallino	newspaper	(01.03.2008)	
	
IMAGE	21:	NATIONAL	COMMISSION	OF	IRRIGATION	HANDED	$548	MILLION	TO	IRRIGATOR	ORGANIZATIONS	
	
Source:	El	Ovallino	newspaper	(15.10.2008)	
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Priority	Access	and	Scarcity	Decrees	
It	is	very	difficult	for	the	State	to	establish	priority	uses,	because	as	it	is	not	the	owner	of	the	water	
rights,	 it	 must	 consider	 the	 interests	 of	 private	 parties.	 Despite	 this,	 in	 emergency	 contexts	 the	
organizations	 responsible	 for	 delivering	 drinkable	 water	 are	 given	 preferential	 treatment.	 For	
example,	water	companies	are	permitted	to	draw	water	continuously	and	are	not	subject	to	the	shift	
system	like	other	users.	However,	water	companies	are	only	given	what	they	are	entitled	to	have	and	
if	they	run	out	of	the	water	corresponding	to	them,	they	are	forced	to	buy	water	to	meet	the	needs	
of	the	population	(DGA	officer	Ovalle).	
IMAGE	22:	EMERGENCY	COMMITTEE	IN	LIMARI	PRIORITIZES	DRINKING	WATER	
	
Source:	El	Ovallino	newspaper	(14.02.2008)	
	
Legal	remedies	exist	to	expropriate	rights	and	focus	priority	on	human	consumption.	Nonetheless,	to	
date	these	resources	have	not	been	used	because	it	would	be	too	expensive	for	the	State	(it	would	
have	to	pay	for	the	expropriated	water	rights	at	market	price).	As	such,	then,	these	powers	have	not	
yet	been	used.	
"It	is	in	the	law	but	has	never	been	used	because,	let	us	say	‘we	are	going	to	leave	
all	 these	avocado	crops	dry	 to	give	water	 to	 the	 lady’,	 then	who	pays?	We	have	
not	reached	that	yet"	(civil	servant	DGA	Serena)	
One	of	 the	 strategies	 that	 the	 State	 has	 to	 address	 situations	 of	water	 scarcity	 is	 through	 scarcity	
decrees.	Under	these	decrees	the	State	has	some	additional	powers	to	authorize	water	extraction	in	
order	 to	 deal	 with	 emergency	 situations.	 Interestingly,	 in	 some	 critical	 areas	 consecutive	 scarcity	
decrees	have	been	established.	Thus,	the	decrees	that	should	be	an	exception	become	the	norm	and	
this	context	of	normalized	exception	is	constantly	responding	to	the	immediate	emergency,	meaning	
there	is	no	chance	to	ensure	the	sustainability	of	the	basin	from	a	long-term	perspective.		
"These	 scarcity	 decrees	 are	 exceptions	 that	 can	 be	 established	 according	 to	 the	
Water	Code.	However,	we	have	several	scarcity	decrees...	we	are	experiencing	an	
exception	that	is	already	becoming	a	general	statement.	So	then	you	ask	yourself:	
is	 the	Water	 Code	 responding?	 I	 do	 not	 think	 so.	 Because,	 for	 example,	what	 a	
scarcity	decree	allows	is	to	extract	water	without	a	right	to	use	it,	to	survive	and	
to	save	your	crops	too.	Then	a	new	version	is	issued	to	function.	It	is	supposed	to	
be	 an	 exception,	 but	 now	 we	 already	 have	 three	 shortage	 decrees	 in	 Ligua-
Petorca,	 for	 example.	 So	we	 are	 living	 in	 a	 permanent	 state	 of	 exception"	 (civil	
servant	DGA	OU)	
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The	great	difficulty	presented	by	these	states	of	emergency	is	that	after	1981,	even	though	powers	
were	 allocated	 to	 the	 State	 in	 these	 contexts,	 if	 any	 private	 water	 rights	 are	 violated	 in	 order	 to	
address	the	emergency,	the	State	must	pay.	This	is	a	severe	limitation	on	taking	action	in	emergency	
contexts.	
"Before	 1981	 the	 State	 had	 more	 strength.	 Facing	 a	 drought	 for	 example,	 the	
State	could	define	priority.	There	was	an	emergency	and	 the	State	said,	ok,	 first	
priority,	 drinkable	water,	 second	 for	 animals	 and	 third	 for	 other	 uses.	 The	 State	
passed	 an	 emergency	 decree	 and	managed	water,	 however	 not	 now,	 the	 State	
can	still	pass	a	decree	on	water	shortage	or	agricultural	emergency,	but	the	one	
who	loses	his	right,	the	State	has	to	pay	for	the	damage,	they	have	to	repay	them"	
(civil	servant	Serena	DOH)	
6.2.4	Differences	among	Farmers	to	Confront	the	Drought	
Strategies	 to	 control	 the	 threat	 of	 drought	 vary	 widely	 depending	 on	 the	 resources	 that	 farmers	
have.	As	mentioned	above,	the	market	is	one	of	the	main	resources	in	coping	with	drought;	however,	
market	 participation	 is	 absolutely	 conditioned	 by	 the	 resources	 available	 for	 farmers.	What	 small	
farmers	do	is	establish	temporary	crops,	as	a	result	of	which	they	can	and	do	sell	their	water	volume	
(in	some	cases	also	the	water	right).	Mid-size	farmers	attempt	to	buy	water	volume	to	cover	or	save	
what	 they	 can,	 favoring	 the	 planted	 areas	 that	 generate	 higher	 profits.	 Finally,	 big	 business	 and	
agricultural	 companies	 often	meet	 their	 water	 needs	 by	 purchasing	 water	 volumes	 or	 new	water	
rights.	
"Then	 you	 start	 to	 see	 two	 phenomena:	 1.	 Producers	 with	 no	 permanent	 crops	
who	are	willing	not	 to	plant	 that	 season	sell	water,	usually	at	 real	prices,	which	
suits	 them	 better	 than	 planting	 and	 means	 a	 secure	 income	 with	 no	 risk	
associated	with	drought,	 and	 sell	 that	water	 to	 those	 that	are	more	exposed	 to	
the	effects	of	drought,	basically	producers	of	permanent	crops.	In	this	way,	thanks	
to	the	market,	in	a	drought	situation	you	allow	water	to	be	redistributed,	and	the	
little	water	left	gets	to	where	it	is	most	needed"	(pro-market	expert)	
Another	 strategy	 of	 large-scale	 farmers	 is	 a	 financial	 evaluation	 based	 on	 the	 amount	 of	 available	
water,	prices	and	potential	 losses,	 thereby	deciding	which	 sectors	are	more	profitable	 for	planting	
and	leading	to	a	decision	as	to	which	sectors	to	water	or	leave	dry.	
"We	 just	water	 less.	 I	mean,	we	 get	water	 to	whatever	we	 can	water,	 later	we	
have	to	 leave	a	part	without	watering.	Last	serious	drought	 I	was	a	kid,	but	this	
year	I	remembered	it	because	you	see	dry	trees.	People	decide	where	to	irrigate,	
the	rest	is	left	dry"	(small	farmer	2)	
Those	with	fewer	difficulties	would	be	the	traditional	large-scale	farmers,	who	by	access	to	resources	
and	 knowledge	 of	 the	 area	 have	 more	 rights	 than	 planted	 hectares.	 A	 practice	 common	 to	 this	
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category	of	farmer	is	to	buy	three	shares	per	hectare,	as	a	protection	strategy	against	drought.	
Another	strategy	that	 is	 implemented,	depending	on	the	resources	available,	 is	to	build	emergency	
wells.	 Those	who	 have	 sufficient	 resources	 (it	 is	 an	 expensive	measure)	 build	wells	 to	 extract	 the	
water	that	corresponds	to	them	at	surface	level,	from	groundwater.	
"Each	 private	 party	 has	 a	 pool	 of	 strategies,	 if	 you	 ask	 a	 private	 party	 how	 he	
manages	 when	 things	 are	 bad	 he	 will	 give	 you	 a	 list	 of	 things	 he	 will	 do,	 and	
believe	me	he	is	going	to	do	them,	and	has	them	in	order,	and	if	you	start	to	find	
out	why	he	put	them	in	that	order,	there	 is	a	fairly	clear	rationale.	Among	those	
things	are:	I	reduce,	I	shrink,	I	used	to	grow	ten,	now	seven,	and	the	other	three	I	
am	going	 to	 grow	half,	 I	will	water	 it	 a	 couple	 of	 times	 in	 the	 season	and	 I	 am	
going	to	shrink	it	and	if	it	is	more	serious	I	leave	those	three	and	if	it	is	even	larger	
I	 leave	 the	annual	 crops	or	 the	 short-cycle	ones	and	 I	 stay	only	with	permanent	
crops	and	 if	 is	even	 larger	 than	that,	 I	buy	water	on	the	spot	market	but	well,	 if	
not,	 I	 make	 a	 well	 or	 I	 exploit	 the	 well	 that	 I	 already	 have	 from	 the	 previous	
drought"	(local	university	expert)	
A	strategy	that	is	used	by	farmers	with	permanent	crops	is	to	cut	the	trees	to	the	trunk,	because	as	it	
requires	less	water,	the	tree	has	a	higher	chance	of	being	saved.	
"For	those	who	are	in	crisis,	what	these	people	do	is	to	cut	the	tree	at	the	trunk	so	
that	 the	 tree	 will	 not	 die	 because	 it	 stops	 the	 evapotranspiration,	 since	 the	
transpiration	 occurs	 through	 the	 leaves...	 then	 having	 no	 leaves,	 you	 just	 put	 a	
droplet	of	water	and	that	holds	the	roots	down,	so	the	tree	will	not	die"	(mid-size	
farmer	3)	
Usually,	 we	 can	 say	 that	 the	 problem	 is	 always	 for	 the	 smallest	 farmers,	 since	 those	 with	 more	
resources	 can	buy	water,	while	 smaller	 farmers	 can	only	 reduce	 surface	or	 introduce	 shorter	 crop	
cycles.	They	have	neither	the	opportunity	to	buy	water	nor	the	chance	to	make	investments	in	more	
efficient	 irrigation	 systems	 or	 to	 build	 wells.	 In	 addition,	 in	 some	 cases	 and	 despite	 forecasts	 of	
shortages,	small	 traditional	 farmers	continue	planting	 intensive	watering	crops.	Sometimes	they	do	
not	make	rational	decisions,	but	it	is	merely	a	question	of	habit.	
Finally,	 a	 fundamental	 difference	 was	 observed	 between	 the	 regulated	 and	 unregulated	 areas:	 in	
reservoirs	it	is	not	possible	to	trade	water	volumes	but	rather	water	stock	or	water	flow	(renting	or	
buying).	This	means	that	in	the	case	of	the	regulated	area,	irrigation	security	is	much	higher	because	
it	 is	 possible	 to	 store	 large	 amounts	 of	 water	 and	 trade	 water	 volumes	 (local	 university	 expert).	
Paradoxically,	some	farmers	who	have	water	rights	above	and	below	the	reservoir	identify	the	supply	
below	 the	 reservoir	 as	more	 problematic,	 since	 they	 run	 out	 of	 stored	water,	 but	 above	 the	 flow	
continues,	though	it	may	be	limited,	and	it	is	shared.		
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6.2.5	Prolonged	Drought	
From	 the	 perspective	 of	 user	 organizations,	 a	 common	 strategy	 is	 to	 deliver	 water	 through	 shift	
systems	 to	 avoid	 losses	 from	 leakage	 to	 the	 greatest	 extent	 possible.	 When	 this	 happens,	 each	
farmer	must	water	whenever	possible,	 but	 according	 to	 the	watering	 schedule	 (manager,	Hurtado	
river	Monitoring	Board).	But	in	some	extreme	cases,	another	strategy	to	cope	with	drought	is	cutting	
rivers	and	then	passing	the	flow	from	one	channel	to	the	next,	in	order	to	stop	losing	water	through	
leaking	 and	 evaporation.	 In	 these	 cases,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 sustainability	 of	 the	 basin	 is	 not	
considered,	as	rivers	dry	up.	
“In	 extreme	 cases,	 for	 example	 if	 it	 does	 not	 rain	 again	 this	 year,	 goodbye	
ecological	flow.	Nobody	here	is	going	to	respect	the	ecological	flow,	here	you	need	
to	water	the	trees,	so	everything	will	be	consumed.	Here	what	you	do	is	whenever	
there	 is	more	water,	 for	example,	 instead	of	2,000,	 there	are	only	300	 liters,	we	
know	that	the	water	is	not	enough	to	get	to	the	end,	because	it	will	be	absorbed	
and	will	not	be	enough	for	anybody,	then	that	is	what	is	done,	the	first	channel	is	
taken	and	all	the	water	is	pulled,	then	passed	to	the	other	and	so	on,	then	we	do	
not	make	it	go	through	the	river,	but	only	from	channel	to	channel.	But	that	is	only	
in	situations	of	extreme	drought”	(leader,	Mostazal	Monitoring	Board)	
All	 these	 strategies	 are	 for	 normal	 dry	 years.	 In	 critical	 periods,	 this	 is	 not	 possible,	 as	 there	 is	 no	
water	to	distribute,	sell	or	pump.	In	the	context	of	a	critical	period,	strategies	are	limited	to	reducing	
planted	 land,	 closing	 the	 fields	 and	working	 temporarily	 in	 another	 sector,	migrating	 to	 the	 city	 in	
search	of	employment,	surviving	with	State	benefits,	and	receiving	water	in	trucks.	
In	 Limarí	 basin	 during	 the	 2013	 and	2014	 seasons,	 the	 situation	was	 so	 critical	 that	 the	 reservoirs	
dried	up	and	the	Paloma	System	failed,	which	meant	they	began	to	distribute	river	water	as	if	there	
was	no	reservoir.	
"When	the	reservoir	fails,	everything	that	enters	corresponds	to	Limarí	river,	so	 I	
have	to	charge	it	to	them.	Who	are	the	creators	of	water	exploitation	rights	in	the	
condition	 without	 reservoir,	 then	 the	model	 establishes	 that	 the	 condition	 goes	
back	to	without	reservoir"	(administrator,	Paloma	System)	
In	this	extreme	situation,	farmers	are	seriously	affected	and	it	is	also	not	feasible	to	ensure	drinkable	
water,	as	this	comes	from	the	reservoir.	
6.2.6	Cooperation	as	Control	Strategy	
Conflicts	between	farmers	are	more	evident	when	there	is	a	drought.	Water	theft	is	complicated	and	
accusations	between	neighbors	or	between	 irrigators	 from	 the	 same	communities	become	critical.	
Similarly,	user	organizations	are	more	frequently	questioned.	Civil	servants	will	only	 interfere	when	
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there	is	no	other	option,	since	water	problems	are	conceived	as	problems	between	private	parties.	
"We	act	when	the	situation	is	already	out	of	control,	before,	the	truth	is	that	they	
have	to	solve	the	issue	among	themselves.	It	is	like	being	in	the	jungle	where	the	
big	eats	the	small,	 in	fact	it	 is,	 in	theory,	whoever	has	a	lawyer	and	has	financial	
resources	to	handle	a	conflict	and	therefore	has	more	chance"	(civil	servant	DGA	
Serena)	
Despite	 this,	 some	 basic	 cooperation	 agreements	 have	 been	 established	 in	 private	 when	 facing	 a	
great	 crisis,	 to	 confront	 the	 imminent	 shortage	 in	 terms	 of	 human	 consumption.	 These	 are	 called	
water	tables	(mesas	de	agua),	which	have	worked	under	certain	circumstances	but	so	far	have	not	
been	institutionalized	and	only	work	in	response	to	the	emergency	and	in	specific	contexts.	
It	is	also	possible	to	see	some	support	networks	operating	in	contexts	of	extreme	scarcity.	However,	
it	must	be	highlight	that	these	are	scarce	and	limited	to	family	networks.	
"So	imagine,	I	have	to	rent	more	land	in	order	to	water,	I	rent	16	in	order	to	water	
10.	And	now	I	am	watering	a	little	more	because	my	cousin	lent	me	a	bit	of	water.	
Otherwise,	I	would	have	finished	my	water	in	February"	(small	farmer	3)	6.3 Recovery	Potential	
The	 third	 step	 in	 the	adaptation	process	 is	 linked	 to	 the	 system’s	 recovery	 from	the	 threat.	 In	 this	
study,	the	different	parties’	discourse	leads	one	to	the	conclusion	that	there	is	a	chance	of	recovery,	
especially	when	comparing	to	past	droughts	and	the	diagnosis	of	the	current	situation.	
6.3.1	The	Market	as	an	Alternative	to	Recovery		
After	 several	 years	 of	 drought,	 farmers	 may	 face	 serious	 financial	 problems	 depending	 on	 the	
investments	 involved	 in	 damaged	 crops.	 Specifically	 at	 risk	 here	 are	 farmers	 with	 permanent	
plantations,	who	may	suffer	severe	damage	related	to	the	death	of	trees.	This	mainly	affects	mid-size	
farmers,	who	generally	 incur	debt	 in	order	to	seed	and	cannot	meet	their	financial	commitments	 if	
their	crops	fail.	
Small	farmers	who	manage	to	react	in	times	of	crisis	may	decide	to	sell	their	water	for	the	season,	so	
they	avoid	losing	crops	and	can	overcome	the	dry	season.	This	creates	a	much	better	position	from	
which	to	recover.	
“Then	 the	 spot	market	 offers	 a	 unique	 opportunity	 for	 these	 farmers	 to	 reduce	
their	exposure	to	risk.	Either	I	failed	in	the	season	or	I	planted	something	and	I	see	
that	the	situation	is	very	bad	due	to	the	drought,	my	plants	are	going	to	die,	then	I	
decide	to	stop	my	crop	and	sell	the	water,	so	then	I	could	protect	myself	against	
the	risk	and	keep	my	water	rights.	That	is	what	many	small	farmers	do,	since	the	
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existence	of	this	market	has	enabled	them	to	face	the	risk	 in	this	way.	However,	
large-scale	farmers,	besides	buying	water,	also	have	crop	insurance;	they	can	take	
out	loans	and	there	are	plenty	of	ways	to	face	the	negative	effects	of	a	drought”	
(pro-market	expert)	
More	traditional	sectors,	which	do	not	participate	 in	this	market,	can	only	try	to	save	their	animals	
and	crops,	but	this	is	impossible	in	large	droughts	and	very	significant	losses	occur	as	a	consequence.	
"There	are	some,	there	are	sectors	that	are	very	old	in	the	basin,	where	it	will	not	
happen	and	it	becomes:	I	will	water	precariously,	I	will	make	sure	that	my	animals	
are	well	and	I	will	be	saved	from	drought	as	I	have	been	saved	for	the	last	50	years	
and	they	will	do	it	that	way,	but	those	are	the	more	traditional	sectors,	those	who	
have	not	been	 touched	by	 the	magic	wand	of	 communications"	 (local	university	
expert)	
An	important	difference	between	farmers	is	the	production	horizon.	While	those	who	have	vegetable	
(or	 temporary)	 crops	 calculate	 their	 losses	 for	 the	 season,	 large	 plantations	 must	 consider	 their	
business	on	a	 five-to-ten-year	 scale.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	damage	 to	production	and	 recovery	 times	
are	also	completely	different.	
At	the	same	time	and	due	to	the	market	itself,	one	of	the	problems	faced	by	State	organizations	in	
implementing	recovery	projects	in	the	area	is	the	high	cost	of	water	rights	in	dry	seasons.	Projects	to	
address	the	prolonged	drought	become	unfeasible,	because	the	price	that	the	State	would	have	to	
pay	to	have	rights	cannot	be	met.	
"We	 are	 tied	 up,	 beyond	 bureaucracy,	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 market	 itself	 is	 sharp,	
complicated,	 sometimes	 you	 have	 projects	 and	 have	 no	 water	 right,	 and	 you	
simply	 do	 not	 have	 any	 water	 right,	 for	 example,	 go	 and	 buy	 water	 rights	 at	
Puclaro,	La	Paloma,	they	are	no	longer	sold.	One	can	do	many	things	and	then	you	
face	having	no	rights,	it	is	an	extremely	sensitive	issue,	the	market	operates	but	of	
course	it	is	not	as	open	as	to	go	there	and	buy"	(CNR	civil	servant	Santiago)	
Due	 to	 the	 characteristics	 of	 the	Water	 Code,	 although	water	 is	 stated	 to	 be	 a	 national	 asset	 for	
public	 use,	 ending	 a	 grant	 of	water	 rights	means	 expropriation,	 an	 unthinkable	 option	 due	 to	 the	
costs	it	would	imply	for	the	State.	
"Besides	 the	 Water	 Code	 has	 a	 trap,	 because	 it	 recognizes	 the	 resource	 as	 a	
national	asset	for	public	use,	but	at	the	same	time	is	an	alienable	asset.	It	is	like	a	
kind	of	concession,	but	it	is	very	hard	to	end	this	concession.	Then	the	State	would	
have	to	expropriate	the	resource	and	this	is	justified	only	under	special	conditions	
that	so	far	have	not	occurred"	(CNR	civil	servant	user	organization	head)	
Thus,	 the	State	 faces	significant	 limitations	 in	generating	support	strategies	 for	 the	recovery	of	 the	
area.	
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6.3.2	Intensive	Farming	and	Depletion	of	the	Basin		
It	 is	essential	to	highlight	the	difficulties	that	the	basin	faces	 in	recovering	from	water	scarcity	with	
respect	to	agricultural	over-exploitation.	The	spread	of	cultivated	crops	has	tripled	in	recent	decades,	
as	has	the	intensity	of	the	plantations.	Before,	there	was	a	balance	between	permanent	plantations	
(fruit	 trees)	and	temporary	planting	 (vegetables).	Today,	 the	situation	 is	very	different	because	the	
proportion	of	land	seeded	with	vegetables	has	decreased	significantly.	
"When	the	dams	were	installed	people	changed	and	switched	to	permanent	crops,	
and	 therefore	 drought	 hits	 much	 harder	 than	 years	 ago”	 (DGA	 civil	 servant	
Serena)	
The	problem	relates	specifically	 to	the	 irrigation	security	delivered	by	the	reservoirs,	channels,	and	
the	 chance	 to	 buy	water,	 as	 farmers	 became	 reliant	 and	 accustomed	 to	 planting	more	 than	 they	
could	cover	with	the	water	shares	in	their	possession.	Thus,	it	 is	possible	to	say	that	the	amount	of	
shares	remains	the	same,	but	the	use	of	water	 is	much	more	 intensive	and	the	watered	area	 is	 far	
greater	than	before.	
"People	had	their	shares,	with	20	shares	they	irrigated	20	hectares,	later	modern	
irrigation	came	and	with	20	they	irrigated	40	hectares	and	after	they	irrigated	60	
buying	water...	you	see?	That	means	that	over	time	the	demand	for	water	rises,	
because	the	shares	are	the	same,	but	the	use	of	water	is	much	more	intensive.	The	
irrigated	 area	 has	 grown.	 But	 there	 is	 no	 way	 to	 limit	 the	 number	 of	 hectares	
planted"	(DGA	civil	servant	Ovalle)	
The	main	problem	is	 that	much	dry	 land	has	been	prepared	for	cultivation,	working	predominantly	
with	permanent	crops.	Nowadays,	investment	losses	are	much	higher	and	the	stress	on	the	basin	is	
greater.	 In	this	context	there	is	no	opportunity	for	the	State	to	regulate,	there	are	no	legal	tools	to	
limit	the	hectares	cultivated	or	the	kind	of	crop.	This	is	also	important	because,	the	amount	of	water	
required	varies	depending	on	the	kind	of	crop	planted.		
"You	are	in	a	cute	hanging	‘paltal’	with	avocados	and	have	a	drought	and	50%	of	
the	avocados	fall,	have	another	drought	and	the	remaining	ones	fall;	the	vine	will	
hold	more,	 the	vine	will	hold.	You	water	a	 little	here,	a	 little	 there	and	then	you	
save	the	year,	but	not	the	avocados,	that	is	the	issue.	I	have	had	several	avocado	
trees	but	I	am	giving	it	up"	(mid-size	farmer	1)	
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IMAGE	23:	PALTAL	IN	LIMARÍ	BASIN	
	
Photograph	taken	in	Limarí	basin,	March	2013	
6.3.3	Issues	in	Resource	Administration	
A	 critical	 element	 in	 recovery	 is	 the	 risk	 of	 the	 aquifer	 being	 damaged.	 This	 is	 because	 during	
drought,	a	common	coping	strategy	 is	 the	construction	of	new	wells	and	deepening	of	 the	existing	
ones.	This	can	be	performed	by	those	with	the	necessary	resources	and	in	some	cases	makes	it	easier	
to	cope	with	the	crisis.	The	problem	is	that	the	aquifer	is	subjected	to	a	demand	surplus	that	makes	it	
difficult	for	the	recovery	process,	due	to	both	over-exploitation	and	pollution	of	aquifers.	
"Whoever	 has	 more	 money	 makes	 the	 deepest	 well	 and	 takes	 and	 takes,	 then	
those	who	built	their	wells	first	at	an	average	depth	are	ending	up	with	nothing,	
then	 they	 have	 to	 make	 another	 well.	 The	 problem	 is	 that	 you	 do	 not	 see	 the	
effects	of	an	aquifer	immediately,	you	see	them	later,	in	the	river	you	see	it	from	
one	 irrigation	 season	 to	 another,	 but	 here	 you	 do	 not	 see,	 then	 suddenly	 you	
realize	 that	 there	 is	 no	 more	 water	 in	 the	 aquifer	 or	 the	 water	 has	 been	
contaminated	 with	 chlorides,	 with	 sulfides.	 Recovering	 from	 that	 would	 take	
centuries"	(DGA	civil	servant	Serena)	
Thus,	 one	 aspect	 that	 could	 significantly	 hinder	 the	 recovery	 of	 a	 basin	 after	 a	 drought	 is	 the	
depletion	or	 contamination	of	 aquifers	 through	excessive	use	 as	 a	 strategy	 to	 control	 the	damage	
wrought	by	a	drought.	
Moreover,	 a	 critical	 element	 in	 recovery	 is	 that	 reservoirs	 also	 take	 several	 years	 to	 be	 refilled,	
meaning	 irrigation	 security	 is	 lost	 for	 several	 seasons.	When	 the	 reservoir	 dries	 up,	 as	 happened	
during	the	last	crisis,	it	is	necessary	to	wait	for	several	years	of	normal	rainfall	before	returning	to	the	
reserve	levels	that	gave	security	to	the	irrigation	sector.	
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IMAGE	21:	COGOTÍ	RESERVOIR	
	
Photograph	taken	in	Limarí	basin,	January	2014	
	
IMAGE	22:	PALOMA	RESERVOIR	
	
Photograph	taken	in	Limarí	basin,	March	2014	
	
6.3.4	Aging	and	Migration	as	a	Limitation	on	Recovery	
Another	 element	 that	 reduces	 the	 chances	 of	 recovery	 is	 migration.	 Small	 farmers	 facing	 great	
droughts	are	forced	to	work	in	other	sectors	because	they	cannot	plant	on	their	land.	In	many	cases	
they	either	move	to	the	North	to	work	in	the	mining	industry	or	to	the	capital	city	of	Chile,	because	
there	are	supposedly	more	job	opportunities.	This	profoundly	limits	the	possibilities	for	recovery	of	
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agriculture	in	the	area.	
"Many	of	the	small	farmers,	the	poorest,	they	are	migrating.	Because	they	cannot	
make	 it,	 then	 they	 have	 to	 go	 to	 work	 somewhere	 else"	 (INDAP	 civil	 servant	
Ovalle)	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 if	 businesses	 close	 because	 of	 the	 lack	 of	water	 for	 their	 crops,	 a	 severe	 crisis	
occurs	in	the	province,	because	farming	is	the	main	source	of	work.	Water	shortages	and	closure	of	
plantations,	in	addition	to	the	bankruptcy	of	agricultural	companies,	also	push	people	to	migrate	to	
the	North	in	search	of	more	profitable	work	in	mining.	
"There	 are	 hundreds	 of	 thousands	 of	 seasonal	 workers	 who	 make	 their	 living	
there,	with	 the	 employers,	 so	 if	 employers	were	 not	 there,	 I	 do	 not	 know	what	
Ovalle	would	be	living	off.	There	 is	much	work,	the	harvest	period,	then	pruning,	
later	 thinning,	 then	 tying	 everything	 up,	 what	 is	 meant	 by	 picking	 avocados,	
harvesting	mandarins"	(small	farmer	1)	
"I	spend	a	lot	of	time	alone	because	kids	go	North	to	work	because	here	there	are	
no	job	sources,	they	leave"	(civil	society	2)	
The	elderly	are	left	alone	on	their	land	and	new	generations	are	going	to	look	for	work	opportunities	
elsewhere.	 Subsequently,	 because	 of	 this	migration,	 recession	may	 occur	 at	 province	 level,	 which	
ends	up	being	a	further	problem	for	the	central	government.	
"It	 is	 a	 terrible	 unemployment	 problem	 that	 occurs,	 lost	 taxes	 because	 that	
production	will	not	happen,	 the	bank	stops	 it	because	previously	approved	 loans	
for	crops	are	not	available,	then	a	mini-recession	starts	at	a	zonal	level"	(manager,	
Hurtado	river	Monitoring	Board)	
This	 ultimately	 results	 in	 an	 increasingly	 aging	 population	 and	 the	 decline	 of	 small	 farmers	 and	
peasants,	which	further	hinders	the	system’s	recovery	from	a	severe	drought.	6.4	Ability	to	Self-modify	
Finally	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 system	 to	 adapt,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 consider	 the	
transformation	of	the	system	itself	when	facing	a	specific	threat.	The	ability	of	the	social	system	to	
make	 changes	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 relation	 to	 the	 environment	 when	 faced	 with	 similar	 threats	 in	 the	
future	is	essential	to	maintain	the	system	adapted.	
These	possibilities	of	transformation	are	directly	related	to	the	ability	of	the	system	to	innovate	and	
self-organize	(see	previous	chapter).	In	addition,	we	consider	certain	specific	aspects	that	are	directly	
related	to	drought.	
To	 identify	 transformation	 opportunities,	 we	 considered	 evaluations	 from	 different	 observers	
concerning	the	following	topics:	evaluation	of	current	strategies,	adaptive	expectations,	expectations	
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for	legislation,	and	integrated	watershed	management.	
6.4.1	Assessment	of	Current	Strategies		
Stakeholders	 generally	 see	 strategies	 as	 reactive	 measures.	 All	 the	 strategies	 are	 concerned	 with	
addressing	 the	 emergency,	 with	 an	 inability	 to	 think	 about	 the	 long-term	 problem.	 Far	 from	 a	
transformation	of	the	system,	the	strategies	point	to	an	even	more	intensive	use	of	the	resource.	
"Today	we	 need	 to	 update	 because	we	 have	 droughts,	 because	we	 have	 basins	
that	can	no	longer	be	over-exploited,	because	we	have	to	create	a	water	highway	
and	do	cloud	seeding,	 those	are	only	 reactive	attitudes	of	a	 system	 in	which	we	
have	not	been	able	to	think	about	the	long	term"	(national	expert)	
Similarly,	 organizations	 invest	 as	much	 as	 possible	 in	 an	 efficient	 use	 of	 the	 resource,	 in	 order	 to	
extend	land	use	with	safer	irrigation.	This	also	involves	intensive	resource	use	without	modifications	
to	the	model	or	strategies	that	incorporate	the	long-term	sustainability	of	the	watershed.	
Paradoxically,	the	end	of	the	drought	is	among	the	dangers	associated	with	the	lack	of	innovation	in	
providing	adaptation	strategies.	This	is	because	the	only	way	to	achieve	a	level	of	awareness	of	the	
need	to	modify	the	model	is	through	a	sustained	crisis	over	time.	
"You	know	what	will	happen,	if	the	drought	is	over	and	this	year	is	good,	imagine	
that	the	reservoirs	are	 filled,	 they	will	 forget	 the	subject.	No	one	 is	going	to	talk	
about	 the	drought	problem	any	more,	 the	 law	will	 continue	 to	operate	but	with	
resources	 allocated	 and	 we	 will	 be	 relaxed	 for	 three	 more	 years,	 then	 when	
drought	returns	that	will	 last	seven	more	years	then	it	 is	going	to	start	again,	at	
first	in	the	middle	of	drought,	we	will	be	alert	and	then	as	we	solve	the	problems	it	
is	 going	 to	 end	 and	 this	 is	 a	 never-ending	 story.	 Now	 if	 all	 you	 are	 doing	
everything	and	the	drought	stops,	we	should	continue	to	do	so	for	the	next	term	
so	 it	 would	 not	 merely	 be	 useful	 to	 face	 what	 is	 happening	 now"	 (manager,	
Hurtado	river	Monitoring	Board)	
6.4.2	Adaptation	Expectations		
In	the	words	of	the	great	majority	of	those	interviewed,	there	is	concern	only	about	the	next	season,	
about	the	urgency	of	the	current	irrigation	plantations.	Despite	the	issue	of	climate	change	appearing	
in	some	contexts,	this	is	not	reflected	in	the	coping	strategies	employed.	The	horizon	remains	merely	
the	following	year.	
"I	think	the	only	thing	you	can	do	now	is	pray	for	rain,	because	we	have	nothing	
left"	(small	farmer	1)	
Concurrently,	the	State	shows	no	real	interest	in	projections	of	vulnerability	to	climate	change.	There	
are	only	small	groups	or	isolated	professionals	who	show	some	interest	in	the	results,	but	it	is	clear	
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that	they	have	no	resonance	in	the	organization.	
"There	are	groups	in	the	Ministry	for	Public	Works	that	are	not	formal,	they	invite	
you	to	deliver	information	from	the	results	of	your	project,	this	is	generally	people	
who	are	working	on	climate	change	issues	and	water	resources	but	it	is	informal,	
it	is	rather	on	its	own	initiative,	it	is	not	a	requirement	of	the	organization.	But	at	
least	that	could	give	rise	to	later	having	a	group	that	is	at	least	interested	in	the	
subject	 and	 can	participate	 in	 something	more	 formal	 in	 the	Ministry"	 (national	
climate	change	expert)	
The	DGA,	which	 is	 the	most	 important	organization	with	 relation	 to	water	 issues,	does	not	have	a	
head	of	climate	change.	This	makes	it	clear	that	there	are	no	strategies	from	this	organization	(DGA	
officer	Santiago).	The	CNR	is	somewhat	similar.	Although	there	is	a	person	who	has	participated	in	a	
committee	on	climate	change,	it	has	not	gone	beyond	assuming	that	the	projections	indicate	future	
problems	in	access	to	water,	but	since	the	organization	that	implements	different	measures	focused	
on	efficiency	in	irrigation	has	no	powers,	then	no	relevant	action	is	taken.	
"Well,	 if	 everyone	agrees	 that	 climate	 change	affects	water	 resources,	 if	we	are	
clear,	 then	we	 should	 think	of	a	more	 fundamental	 issue,	but	 that	 is	 it,	because	
truly,	we	do	not	do	anything	about	it"	(CNR	officer	Santiago)	
Moreover,	 in	 user	 organizations,	 although	 the	 problem	 is	 recognized,	 neither	 alternatives	 nor	
strategies	are	visualized	to	address	climate	change	and	drought	in	the	longer	term.	
"I	 have	been	discussing	 the	 report	 I	made	 to	 the	Board,	 not	 in	 terms	of	 climate	
change,	but	as	statistics	from	the	Board,	I	have	detected	the	thaw	comes	a	month	
before,	 that	 is	 how	 it	was	 before,	melting	 in	 September,	 now	we	 are	 in	 August	
already,	 that	 happened	and	 that	 is	 a	 fact,	 I	 am	now	at	 the	 stage	 that	we	 have	
reported,	 we	 have	 talked	 but	 at	 this	 time	 we	 have	 no	 contingency	 plan	 in	 this	
regard"	(manager,	Hurtado	river	Monitoring	Board)	
6.4.3	Ruling	Expectations	
A	key	element	in	the	potential	for	transformation	is	the	ability	to	modify	the	model.	 In	order	to	do	
so,	the	law	on	administration	of	water	resources	must	also	be	amended.	In	general,	expectations	are	
low	 in	 this	 regard.	Different	 interviewees	agree	there	 is	a	 lack	of	political	concern	about	 the	water	
issue,	 the	 general	 lack	 of	 public	 awareness,	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 appropriate	 tools	 to	 generate	
amendments	to	the	model.	
For	 many	 of	 those	 interviewed	 it	 is	 essential	 to	 improve	 the	 institutional	 conditions	 of	 water	
management,	 for	 example	 by	 strengthening	 the	 oversight	 capacity	 of	 the	 State.	 This	 would	 be	
extremely	important,	since	many	of	the	scarcity	problems	relate	to	situations	of	over-exploitation.	
Drought	should	be	considered	as	a	normal	element	of	the	sector,	so	as	to	achieve	better	contingency	
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plans.	 Here	 it	 would	 be	 essential	 for	 the	 State	 to	 have	 greater	 powers	 to	 control	 the	 different	
economic	groups	related	to	water	resources.	
“What	one	should	aim	at	is	to	accept	that	drought	is	a	normal	phenomenon	in	this	
sector	 and	 thus	 have	 contingency	 plans,	 A,	 B	 and	 C.	 And	 how	 I	 handle	 a	water	
culture	in	the	region	where	water	is	valued	differently	and	how	I	can	give	tools	to	
the	 state	 for	 a	 better	 way	 to	 stay	 firm	 and	 you	 can	 act	 before	 these	 great	
entrepreneurs	who	run	the	region,	manage	water	and	do	what	they	want”	(DOH	
officer	Serena)	
In	 general	 it	 is	 recognized	 that	 the	 Water	 Code	 is	 not	 adequate	 to	 face	 the	 situation	 and	 the	
institutional	conditions	to	confront	climate	change	have	not	been	generated.	
"So	we	have	been	 living	 in	a	 state	of	 emergency	 for	quite	a	while.	And	 I	 do	not	
imagine	 that	 this	 will	 happen	 or	 that	 it	 will	 be	 something	 specific,	 but	 rather	
climate	 change	 is	 a	 general	 issue.	 You	will	 have	moments	 of	 great	 drought	 and	
other	water-intensive	times.	So,	is	the	Water	Code	adequate	to	face	this	situation?	
No.	 Besides,	 there	 are	 no	 institutional	 tools	 to	 face	 it...	 I	 think	 we	 are	 not	
prepared.	Not	at	all"	(officer	DGA	user	organization)	
However,	 far	 from	having	 the	 intention	 to	make	 changes	 to	 the	 legislation,	 representatives	 of	 the	
current	government	 indicate	that	the	model	will	achieve	agriculture	 intensification	through	a	more	
efficient	 use	 of	 water	 resources	 (right-wing	 civil	 servant,	 high	 political	 office).	 The	 stated	 path	 to	
achieve	 this	 aim	 is	 to	 develop	more	 irrigation	 facilities,	 even	 considering	building	more	 reservoirs,	
channels,	and	even	a	water	road.	This	 latest	 initiative	seeks	to	transfer	water	from	the	southern	to	
the	northern	regions	of	the	country.	
"The	water	road	is	a	long-term	project,	we	want	to	get	all	the	surplus	that	is	in	the	
South	and	bring	it	to	the	North	which	is	where	we	have	the	problem"	(right-wing	
civil	servant,	high	political	office)	
Expectations	rest	on	a	crisis	of	major	proportions	that	results	in	social	unrest	forcing	the	model	to	be	
modified.	This	may	occur	when	there	 is	greater	water	scarcity	 in	the	central	part	of	the	country.	 In	
addition,	new	leaders	who	can	trigger	these	processes	of	profound	transformation	are	necessary.	
"It	 seems	 to	 me	 that	 there	 must	 be	 constrained	 situations	 of	 access	 to	 the	
resource	and	there	must	be	leaders	that	have	the	qualities	to	lead	the	process,	but	
both	conditions	together:	the	need	and	the	leaders,	because	the	institutional	and	
legal	 issues	are	 too	 restricting	 to	develop	 these	community	 initiatives.	Well,	and	
third,	 but	 it	 should	 be	 first,	 there	 should	 be	 national	mobilization	 on	 the	water	
issue,	where	the	State	is	pressured	to	re-legislate"	(civil	society	South)	
6.4.4	Integrated	Watershed	Management		
Finally,	experts	indicate	that	the	only	way	to	achieve	adaptation	to	climate	change	is	through	altering	
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the	 policy	 for	 rights	 delivery	 and	 regulation	 through	 the	 market.	 It	 would	 not	 be	 possible	 to	
sustainably	manage	a	basin	with	the	current	model.	
"If	what	we	want	is	a	global	thing	in	a	particular	basin,	the	way	rights	are	being	
delivered	today,	where	the	one	above	may	exercise	all	its	rights	carrying	problems	
downstream,	 it	does	not	work.	 So	 if	 you	want	 something	at	 the	basin	 level,	 you	
need	 to	 create	 separate	management,	 as	 integrated	management	 is	 impossible	
with	the	institutionalism	we	have	today"	(national	climate	change	expert)	
Geographically	 and	 administratively,	 Chile	 would	 be	 capable	 of	 installing	 an	 integrated	
watershed	 management	 system.	 But	 for	 this	 to	 be	 achieved,	 certain	 legal	 reforms	 are	
required	 to	strengthen	 its	operation	and	return	 to	 the	State	 the	 legal	 tools	 to	 implement	
such	a	system.	
"I	believe	that	Chile	has	the	potential	to	have	an	impeccable	integrated	watershed	
management	to	operate	efficiently.	However,	there	are	certainly	going	to	be	some	
legal	instruments	that	will	have	to	adapt	to	a	management	structure	based	on	the	
logic	of	integrated	basin	management;	but	I	insist	it	has	all	the	potential	that	the	
political	and	administrative	division	of	the	country	offers	us.	We	benefit	from	the	
fact	that	user	organizations	are	sharply	demarcated,	consequently	there	are	valid	
and	 recognized	 parties	 or	 interlocutors,	 which	 have	 legal	 significance	 and	 are	
easily	 identifiable.	 This	 is	not	unknown	 territory,	 there	 is	a	point	 that	 is	 key	and	
that	 is	 a	 regular	 structure	 of	 the	 State	which	 has	 jurisdiction	 over	 the	 resource.	
Therefore,	 the	 conditions	 are	 present,	 what	 is	 missing	 is	 to	 organize	 the	 public	
institution"	(Concertación	civil	servant,	high	political	office)	
In	this	context,	the	experience	of	the	water	tables	is	an	important	landmark.	These	are	referred	to	as	
instances	when	efforts	were	made	to	implement	a	collective	management	of	the	basin.	However,	the	
descriptions	of	these	instances	indicate	that	the	fundamental	weakness	of	the	experiences	was	that	
they	were	merely	 grounded	 in	 goodwill.	 There	was	 no	 legal	 basis	 for	 collective	 decisions	 in	 these	
areas,	 and	 therefore,	 they	 were	 not	 valid	 and	 the	 great	 owners	 of	 water	 rights	 (agricultural	 and	
mining	companies)	did	not	accept	the	decisions	that	did	not	benefit	them.	
The	experience	of	the	water	tables	establishes	the	need	for	an	amendment	to	the	law	to	ensure	that	
the	decisions	made	are	binding	and	that	respect	for	agreements	does	not	solely	rely	on	people’s	will.	
According	 to	 the	 evaluations	 of	 our	 interviewees,	 there	 is	 no	 other	 option	 if	 we	 wish	 to	 move	
towards	integrated	watershed	management.	
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7. Ability	of	Chilean	Model	to	Deal	with	Situations	of	Water	
Stress		
Water	 is	 one	 of	 the	 elements	 that	 are	 vital	 for	 humanity’s	 survival.	 Although	 a	 large	 area	 of	 our	
planet	 is	 covered	 by	 water,	 the	 water	 resources	 available	 to	 humans	 are	 limited	 and	 of	 unequal	
geographic	distribution.	 It	 is	estimated	 that,	at	present,	 close	 to	one-third	of	 the	world	population	
lives	under	some	form	of	water	stress	and	that	by	2025	this	 figure	could	grow	to	two-thirds	of	the	
world	population	(Mauser,	2010).	 
Chile	 is	a	good	example	of	this	situation.	While	 in	southern	Chile	there	 is	abundant	water	resource	
availability,	in	the	North	we	find	very	limited	availability.	Northern	Chile	is	one	of	the	driest	regions	in	
the	world.	It	faces	significant	situations	of	water	stress,	accentuated	by	the	intensive	exploitation	of	
its	aquifers	and	surface	waters	through	mining,	farming,	and	industrial	activities	and	urban	sanitary	
services.	 In	 parallel,	 the	 projections	 for	 this	 zone	 in	 the	 light	 of	 climate	 change	 predict	 a	 possible	
intensification	of	water	scarcity	due	to	rising	temperatures	and	forecasts	of	reduced	rainfall.	Multiple	
situations	of	vulnerability	have	thus	been	identified	at	rural	and	urban	levels	(ECLAC,	2009;	CONAMA,	
2008;	AGRIMED,	2008;	DGA,	2007).	 
Access	to	water	resources	in	Chile	is	managed	through	a	water	market,	wherein	water	resources	are	
administered	much	 like	a	 commodity:	 subject	 to	 the	 forces	of	 supply	and	demand	and	based	on	a	
free	market	 regime	 that	 regulates	 the	 use	 and	 consumption	 of	 national	 resources.	 The	 legislation	
that	established	and	legitimizes	this	market	is	the	1981	Water	Code,	which	allows	water	rights	to	be	
traded	 independently	 of	 land	ownership.	 Studies	 on	 this	 issue	 have	 identified	 various	 problems	 in	
this	 institutional	 framework,	 among	 them	 a	 significant	 concentration	 of	 water	 right	 ownership,	 a	
worsening	 of	water	 stress,	 the	 absence	 of	 an	 integrated	management	 of	watersheds,	 and	 various	
limitations	 on	 government	 control	 of	 the	 resource	 (Chile	 Sustentable,	 2010;	 Bauer,	 2003;	 Donoso	
2003;	 Hernández,	 2006;	 Núñez	 &	 Soto,	 2010;	 Gentes,	 2007;	 CEPAL,	 2003;	 SAMTAC-CEPAL,	 2000;	
Banco	Mundial,	 2011).	 In	 spite	 of	 all	 these	 difficulties,	 the	 sole	 significant	 reform	 implemented	 in	
respect	 of	 the	 Water	 Code	 (in	 2005)	 merely	 modified	 peripheral	 aspects	 of	 the	 institutional	
framework	(such	as	the	payment	of	license	fees	for	non-use,	ecological	flows,	and	procedures	for	the	
creation	of	water	communities,	among	others). 
Considering	the	new	scenario	generated	by	climate	change	projections	for	the	region,	understanding	
the	 Chilean	 model	 and	 assessing	 its	 benefits	 acquires	 major	 significance.	 It	 is	 foreseen	 that	 the	
current	water	management	difficulties	may	worsen	as	competition	 for	water	 resources	grows,	and	
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ever	 more	 pressures	 are	 brought	 to	 bear	 on	 the	 current	 institutional	 framework	 (León,	 2008;	
Hadjigeorgalis,	 2004;	 Gentes,	 2007).	 Faced	 by	 ever	 greater	 situations	 of	 water	 stress,	 both	
institutional	governance	and	local	resource	management	become	vital	for	adequate	water	resource	
management	and	sustainability. 
This	 research	 has	 aimed	 to	 observe	 the	 Chilean	 model	 for	 confronting	 situations	 of	 hydrological	
stress.	This	topic	is	key	from	the	point	of	view	of	climate	change,	considering	that	the	Chilean	model	
represents	a	globally	unique	institutional	response	in	the	context	of	a	country	that	struggles	with	an	
intensifying	water	scarcity	issue	in	its	northern	and	central	regions.	
With	the	aim	of	observing	the	conditions	created	by	the	Chilean	model,	we	decided	to	research	the	
situation	 in	 the	 Limarí	 river	 basin,	 in	 the	north	of	 the	 country,	 a	 place	where	 the	model	 has	 been	
operating	 uninterrupted	 for	 many	 years.	 We	 carried	 out	 numerous	 interviews	 in	 this	 basin,	
complemented	 with	 press	 and	 document	 analysis.	 This	 permitted	 the	 development	 of	 a	 general	
description	of	the	socio-ecological	system	from	a	social	perspective,	assessing	characteristics	related	
to	resilience	 in	 this	kind	of	system	and	adding	these	analyses	 to	an	evaluation	of	specific	 reactions	
when	faced	with	a	water	scarcity	threat.			
Below	 we	 present	 a	 summary	 of	 our	 main	 findings	 according	 to	 the	 research	 objectives	 and	 the	
different	dimensions	that	arose	from	our	theoretical	approach.		7.1	Prominent	Findings	
§ The	 perception	 of	 water	 as	 private	 property	 is	 previous	 to	 the	 1981	 Water	 Code.	 Since	
watering	channel	building	began,	farmers	had	established	an	indirect	form	of	ownership	of	these	
constructions	 and	 hence	 proprietorship	 of	 water:	 “I	 have	 this	 flow,	 I	 built	 the	 channel	 or	 my	
grandfather	 built	 the	 channel	 and	 this	 water	 has	 always	 belonged	 to	 me”.	 From	 the	 1930s	
onwards,	when	the	basin	was	declared	empty	and	the	water	rights	were	established,	the	water	
market	 began	 to	 take	 shape	 and	 the	 idea	 of	 water	 being	 a	 form	 of	 property	 became	 fixed,	
meaning	that	in	order	to	have	access	to	water	it	was	necessary	to	buy	water	rights	from	others.	
Thus,	 the	 concept	 of	 water	 as	 private	 property	 was	 settled	 in	 the	 culture	 of	 the	 areas	 under	
study.				
§ The	perception	of	water	as	private	property	cannot,	then,	be	attributed	to	the	Water	Code.	
Even	the	current	code	is	not	completely	internalized;	many	people,	especially	older	generations,	
do	 not	 know	 they	 can	 sell	 water	 separately	 from	 the	 land,	 but	 they	 do	 know	 they	 can	make	
money	by	virtue	of	water	selling	and	that	water	is	a	private	property	that	belongs	to	each	person.	
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Nonetheless,	 the	 conditions	 that	were	established	under	 the	Water	Code	both	 invigorated	 the	
water	market	and	decreased	State	powers	to	confront	precarious	situations.			
§ It	is	clear	that	the	model	deepens	social	inequalities.	Farmers	with	enough	resources	receive	
several	tools	from	the	water	market	to	confront	water	scarcity,	while	small	farmers	only	can	sell	
their	 water	 (although	 this	 does	 represent	 an	 alternative	 during	 periods	 of	 moderate	 water	
scarcity).		At	the	same	time,	a	sustained	increase	in	the	concentration	of	land	and	water	property	
is	 clearly	 evident.	 Small	 farmers	 are	 decreasing	 and	 agricultural	 exploitation	 is	 ever	 more	
prevalent	in	the	hands	of	large	agricultural	companies.		
§ The	State	does	not	have	initiatives	to	address	the	challenges	of	climate	change.	Nor	does	it	
have	them	to	confront	extreme	and	sustained	water	scarcity.	The	assessment	given	by	State	civil	
servants	revolves	around	difficulties	they	have	in	confronting	scarcity	issues,	whether	because	of	
the	lack	of	power	conferred	to	them	or	the	lack	of	available	resources.	Yet	the	same	civil	servants	
observe	 that	 their	 own	 policies	 only	 encourage	 the	 use	 of	 hydrological	 resources	 without	
providing	any	chance	to	appraise	long-term	sustainability.			
§ Currently,	a	huge	number	of	small	 towns	are	being	supplied	by	cistern	trucks	because	they	
do	 not	 have	 sufficient	 drinkable	water	 (groundwater,	 rivers,	 and	 other	 sources	 have	 run	 dry).	
This	has	affected	the	quality	of	life	in	many	small	towns	and	villages	within	the	basin.	
§ The	 increasing	 migration	 is	 also	 related	 to	 water	 issues	 in	 the	 area.	 As	 many	 agricultural	
crops	have	been	abandoned,	people	find	themselves	compelled	to	look	for	work	in	other	sectors	
and	areas.	 Furthermore,	 small	 farmers	 cannot	 continue	 living	off	 their	 land	and	are	pushed	 to	
change	their	occupation	and	move	elsewhere.		
§ Mistrust	is	one	of	the	most	severe	harmful	elements	for	farmers	and	user	organizations.	It	is	
evident	that	there	are	difficulties	in	creating	associative	initiatives.	Experiences	in	the	area	have	
been	full	of	failures	(for	example,	cooperatives).	Simultaneously,	mistrust	is	widespread	because	
of	 water	 theft,	 which	 is	 a	 common	 practice	 among	 both	 large-scale	 and	 small	 farmers	 during	
times	of	scarcity.			
§ A	significant	 issue	 relating	 to	 the	model	 is	 that	 it	 allows	 changes	 in	use	 to	more	profitable	
practices	through	the	market.	Nowadays,	the	common	changes	in	use	are	to	transfer	water	rights	
to	the	mining	industry	or	intensive	agriculture.	The	problem	is	that	this	practice	can	have	serious	
effects	on	the	basin’s	sustainability,	in	addition	to	affecting	individuals.		
§ To	make	changes	in	the	model,	a	constitutional	amendment	implementing	tools	to	manage	
hydrological	resources	at	a	basin	level	would	be	necessary.	It	could	be	possible	to	move	towards	
170	
	
an	integrated	basin	management	system,	at	least	in	part,	by	making	certain	legislative	changes.	
Among	 those	 elements	 that	 would	 benefit	 from	 this	 kind	 of	 integrated	 management	 are	 the	
political-administrative	division	and	the	long	tradition	of	user	organizations	 in	the	basins	where	
water	is	currently	scarce.		7.2	Resilience	and	Sustainability		
The	 information	 gleaned	 from	 the	 discourse	 of	 different	 stakeholders	 reveals	 certain	 aspects	 that	
weaken	the	resilience	of	the	system.	
Flexibility:	The	market	provides	flexibility	in	the	system.	In	addition	to	the	legalization	and	respect	of	
water	rights,	this	has	enabled	water	scarcity	to	be	addressed	on	many	occasions.	However,	over	time	
this	flexibility	has	lessened	due	to	the	lack	of	State	regulation.	The	fact	that	farmers	have	no	limit	on	
the	extension	of	their	crops	creates	risk.	The	Paloma	System	and	the	water	market	allow	farmers	to	
seed	much	more	than	they	could	if	they	only	made	use	of	the	rights	they	own.	This	 implies	serious	
consequences	 for	 sustainability:	 on	 one	 hand	 there	 is	 an	 intensive	 use	 of	 hydrological	 resources,	
while	 on	 the	 other,	 erosion	 comes	 about	 from	 seeding	 on	 steep	 slopes	 (which	 eliminates	 native	
vegetation).		
The	 indiscriminate	 rise	 in	 permanent	 crops	 has	 led	 to	 over-exploitation	 of	 the	 basin	 and	 to	 a	
reduction	of	 temporary	 crops,	which	has	 permitted	 the	 concentration	of	water	 use	on	permanent	
crops	when	necessary.	 If	 temporary	 crops	 continue	disappearing	 in	 this	manner,	 there	will	 not	 be	
enough	water	to	be	transferred	for	permanent	crops.	One	of	the	main	problems	for	flexibility	in	the	
basin,	 then,	 is	 this	 significant	 fall	 in	 temporary	 crops.	 Likewise,	 innovation	 has	 permitted	 a	 more	
“efficient”	but	less	sustainable	use	of	the	resource	(in	relation	to	production).		
Connectivity:	The	professionalization	of	user	organizations	is	the	biggest	strength	in	this	area.	These	
organizations	bring	users	together	and	are	favorable	for	making	decisions	as	a	group,	in	addition	to	
being	 responsible	 for	 hydrological	 resource	 administration.	 Owing	 to	 the	 conditions	 for	 their	
confirmation,	 these	 are	 organizations	 requiring	 associativity	 for	 water	 management.	 Despite	 the	
significant	 opportunities	 for	 associativity,	 user	 organizations	 are	 deeply	 altered	 by	 the	 legal	
representation	system	they	have,	because	those	with	more	capital	in	the	association	have	a	greater	
opportunity	 to	 influence	 its	 decisions.	 The	 biggest	 difficulty	 in	 here	 is	 the	 repetition	 of	 inequality,	
which	 discourages	 small	 farmers	 from	 participating.	 Furthermore,	 mistrust	 and	 support	 network	
impairment	can	restrict	connectivity	within	the	system.			
Memory:	 In	 this	 context,	 an	 obvious	 concern	 is	 how	 people	 are	 losing	 traditional	 knowledge	
concerning	 the	 relationship	 with	 the	 ecological	 surroundings.	 Nonetheless,	 one	 may	 observe	 a	
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difference	 between	 local	 farmers	 and	 the	 agricultural	 companies	 that	 come	 from	 other	 places	 to	
carry	on	business	in	the	region.	People	from	the	area	are	more	respectful	of	droughts	and	take	more	
measures	to	prevent	their	negative	effects	whenever	possible.			
A	 further	 feature	 is	 that	 the	 State	 makes	 decisions	 about	 water	 management	 at	 a	 central	
administrative	level,	which	makes	it	harder	to	take	local	socio-ecological	memory	into	account	in	this	
process.	Simultaneously,	water	seems	to	be	less	important	for	the	State	in	general.	For	example,	the	
State	 has	 no	 designated	 body	 to	 conduct	 or	 administrate	 water-related	 issues	 and	 conflicts.	
Responsibility	 and	decisions	 are	divided	 into	different	 units	 and	 these	 are	part	 of	 larger	ministries	
where	 the	 hydrological	 issue	 is	 not	 so	 important	 (e.g.:	 DGA	 at	Ministry	 for	 Public	Works,	 CNR	 at	
Ministry	for	Agriculture,	Ministry	for	the	Environment).		
Self-organization:	 Among	 the	 main	 difficulties	 recognized	 is	 the	 incompetence	 of	 the	 system	 in	
modifying	 hydrological	 resource	 administration	 rules.	 As	 these	 rules	 are	 defined	 by	 concentrating	
them	 in	 the	 State,	 though	 there	 is	 awareness	of	 the	difficult	 problems	 the	model	 has	 in	 the	 area,	
local	parties	have	no	chance	to	control	or	make	decisions	about	the	rules.	This	is	remarkable,	taking	
into	account	that	this	is	the	basin	where	the	model	operates	at	its	best	and	it	is	this	experience	that	
has	given	rise	to	the	desire	to	emulate	the	model	in	similar	basins.		
With	 regard	 to	 the	 market	 framework,	 clearer	 innovations	 have	 been	 introduced,	 such	 as	 the	
establishment	of	an	electronic	market	and	the	meaningful	contribution	of	clearly	stating	prices	and	
trading.		
User	 organizations	 have	 also	 achieved	 the	 creation	 of	 new	 initiatives	 to	 encourage	 regulation,	 for	
instance	restricting	 transferring.	This	kind	of	 regulation	has	allowed	problems	between	users	 to	be	
avoided.	 Nevertheless,	 user	 organizations	 can	 only	 ensure	 that	 users	make	 use	 of	 the	 amount	 of	
water	to	which	their	rights	entitle	them,	but	cannot	interfere	in	the	kind	of	use,	the	crop	extension	or	
the	kind	of	crop	planted.		7.3	The	Adaptability	Issue	
Finally,	 through	 observation	 of	 the	 system	when	 faced	 with	 a	 specific	 threat,	 one	may	 judge	 the	
existing	 chances	 of	 adjustment.	 Below,	we	 scrutinize	 the	 four	 elements	 set	 out	 in	 our	 theoretical	
chapter.		
Threat	identification:	the	main	threat	 identified	is	worsening	scarcity	related	to	desertification,	soil	
degradation,	water	 pollution,	 and	 financial	 problems	 relating	 to	 the	harm	 suffered	due	 to	 farming	
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exploitation.	 Concern	 regarding	 climate	 change	 is	 limited	 to	 experts	 and	 professionals	 from	 some	
user	organizations.			
Control	 capability:	 Face	with	an	ongoing	 threat,	 the	system	 loses	control.	 	Though	 there	are	some	
minor	scarcities,	 the	 facilities	and	 flexibility	of	 the	system	allow	such	a	 threat	 to	be	addressed.	Yet	
when	it	becomes	widespread,	as	happened	during	the	last	drought	crisis,	the	system	does	not	have	
the	tools	to	manage	the	threat.	Over-exploitation	and	authorizing	extensions	of	use	 is	 identified	as	
the	problem,	with	limits	required	on	crop	planting,	but	there	is	no	strategy	to	prevent	this	activity.		
Recovery	potential:	The	ability	to	recover	appears	relatively	restricted	owing	to	the	deep	crisis	and	
the	 resulting	migration	 processes.	 All	 these	 seem	 to	 highlight	 that	 the	 basin	will	 not	 be	 the	 same	
after	 the	 drought.	 There	 will	 be	 a	 larger	 concentration	 of	 property	 (small	 farmers	 sell,	 mid-size	
famers	 are	 bankrupt),	 a	 smaller	 number	 of	 the	 economically	 mobile	 population	 will	 remain,	 and	
there	will	be	a	rise	in	desertification	and	soil	degradation.	Owing	to	the	empty	pools,	the	system	will	
take	years	to	recover	its	storage	level	(if	it	does	so	at	all).	
A	serious	additional	problem	 is	 that	channel	and	reservoir	overlaying	conducted	by	the	CNR	for	an	
efficient	 use	 of	 human	 resources	 has	 produced	 a	 systematic	 lowering	 of	 natural	 filtration	 and	 has	
caused	 harm	 to	 groundwater	 refill.	 This	 has	 severe	 consequences	 for	 sustainability	 of	 the	 water	
supply.	 The	 technological	 development	 of	 irrigation	 is	 specifically	 aimed	 at	 achieving	 a	 larger	
watering	surface,	without	paying	attention	to	the	sustainability	of	the	basin.	
Within	 this	 context	 there	 are	 important	 anomalies	 in	 State	 responsibilities.	 For	 instance,	 the	 State	
needs	 to	 create	 proper	 conditions	 for	 the	 recovery	 of	 the	 system,	 providing	 guidelines	 for	 the	
appropriate	 kind	 of	 crop	 for	 the	 basin	 and	 specifying	 the	 amount	 of	 soil	 that	 should	 be	 used	 for	
planting.	The	lack	of	regulation	means	the	basin	has	a	lower	ability	to	recover.			
Transformation	 ability:	 Over-exploitation	 throughout	 the	 Limarí	 basin	 has	 clearly	 produced	 the	
current	crisis	there.	A	serious	issue	is	that	the	system	has	not	been	able	to	stop	over-exploitation	and	
has	no	tools	to	do	so.	The	government	states	that	private	parties	are	responsible	for	taking	care	of	
the	sustainable	management	of	the	hydrological	resource	because	they	can	and	must	do	it.	State	civil	
servants	 accept	 that	 they	 cannot	 control	 private	 activity,	 though	 they	 are	 aware	 that	 over-
exploitation	could	harm	the	aquifers	and	 leave	them	useless	 for	centuries.	The	chance	of	changing	
this	situation	is	reduced	by	the	previously	identified	weak	ability	for	self-organization.		
The	opportunity	for	transformation	is	 low	mainly	because	of	the	need	for	profound	legal	reform	of	
the	exiting	legislation.	In	spite	of	this,	politicians	appear	to	be	indifferent	or	in	some	cases	have	water	
business-related	financial	interests,	with	the	result	that	they	do	not	wish	to	modify	the	trading	rules.		
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In	conclusion,	unlike	other	authors	 I	would	say	that	 the	problem	 is	not	water	privatization.	Rather,	
the	 issue	 lies	 with	 the	 lack	 of	 power	 conferred	 on	 the	 State	 and	 the	 weak	 market	 regulation.	
Similarly,	 the	 State	 does	 not	 have	 the	 opportunity	 to	 ensure	 the	 sustainable	management	 of	 the	
hydrological	resources.	
In	addition	to	becoming	aware	that	the	effects	of	climate	change	that	we	are	experiencing	are	the	
result	of	our	emissions	into	the	atmosphere,	we	are	also	witnessing	how	the	indiscriminate	growth	of	
crops	 has	 sharpened	 these	 consequences.	 This	 is	 even	 starker	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 water	 stress	
situation	such	as	the	one	that	we	have	studied.	The	intensive	use	of	resources	has	ultimately	resulted	
in	the	collapse	of	the	basin.	
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